OPINION
Lone Wolf in Power: Can Shigeru Ishiba Lead Japan Out of the Quagmire?
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on
Niu Jiarui
Research Assistant, Department of History, Shanghai University
On September 27, 2024, the result of the presidential election of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw Shigeru Ishiba triumph over the frontrunners, including the favored candidate, Sanae Takaichi, securing the majority of votes in the second round to become the 28th President of the LDP. Under Japan’s parliamentary system, the leader of the ruling party is invariably the Prime Minister. Consequently, on October 1, following the resignation of the Kishida Cabinet, Ishiba was elected by the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in a joint session, garnering over 50% of the votes, thus officially assuming the role of the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan.
Who is Shigeru Ishiba? Once labeled by the media as a ‘pro-China’ figure, claiming that ‘China poses zero threat to Japan,’ Ishiba has long been known within the LDP as a ‘lone wolf,’ often at odds with various factions within the party, yet he managed a stunning reversal in the polls. Recently, during his campaign, he proposed the establishment of an Asian version of NATO, demanding equal status with the United States, demonstrating a hawkish stance. The question remains whether Ishiba’s leadership will bring new changes to Japanese politics and how it will affect Japan’s relations with China and the United States.
Will his tenure be groundbreaking or ephemeral? The coordination and protection of forces within and outside the party are key.
Ishiba’s election is seen as a result of the machinations of power brokers and factional politics within the LDP. In 2008, Ishiba’s first attempt at running for the LDP presidency ended in defeat by former Prime Minister Taro Aso. In the 2012, 2018, and 2020 elections, he faced similar failures, largely due to his poor relations within the party, often clashing with sitting prime ministers and causing political divisions, leading to his repeated losses in intra-party elections.
In this year’s election, Ishiba won the presidency with a narrow margin of 215 to Takaichi’s 194. Two factors contributed to this outcome: firstly, Takaichi’s radical policies raised concerns among conservative members within the LDP, and secondly, several key ‘kingmakers,’ such as former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, former LDP President Fumio Kishida, and former Prime Minister Taro Aso, all endorsed candidates in the second round. After the initial round, except for Aso’s faction, most of the previously undecided factional votes flowed towards Ishiba. This shift was not only due to Ishiba’s political promises to regain the trust of his peers but also a calculated move by factional leaders to test the waters with a potentially reformist figure within the party. Despite the claim of a faction-free election, the reality is that the election was still influenced by factional politics, and Ishiba’s victory may be a trial by the factions to see if he can lead the LDP out of its current doldrums and restore public confidence. The factions remain cautiously optimistic.
On October 1st, the list of cabinet members was also announced, reflecting the compromises and concessions made by the politically weak Ishiba to various forces.
Japanese politics is essentially about interpersonal relationships, emphasizing the exchange of power and the balance of factional power. Maintaining harmony within the party requires a delicate balance of power and relationships among factions. The new cabinet lineup, which includes one member from the Kishida faction (Kochikai), two from the Aso faction (Wakate Kyokai), one from the Motegi faction (Heisei Kenkyukai), one from the Ishiba faction (Suigetsu-kai), two from the old Nishimura faction, one from the old Hayashi faction, one member from the Komeito, and 11 unaffiliated members, demonstrates a balance between experience and fresh blood, factional equilibrium, cross-factional cooperation, gender and age diversity. This reflects Ishiba’s effort to seek balance in the new cabinet.
Although Ishiba has been cautious and conservative in his actions to avoid conflicts with various parties, his position as Prime Minister remains precarious.
Recently, Ishiba has been accused of potential financial misconduct within his faction, the Suigetsu-kai, involving unaccounted-for political funds. Based on public opinion, such revelations at this time are likely to be recognized as the result of threats or hints from within the party or external forces, signaling to Ishiba to stay within his bounds.
Regardless, the new Prime Minister is immediately facing the risk of a political scandal, which could adversely affect the LDP’s upcoming House of Representatives election. Initially, the Ishiba Cabinet’s approval rating was only 51%, the lowest since 2001. It remains to be seen whether this support rate can be maintained above 50%. Whether the unstable governance can be put on the right track depends on various factors. Given the fragile position of the Ishiba administration, his policies and political direction may be determined by the party’s leadership. How Ishiba balances various forces and successfully fulfills his role as Prime Minister remains to be seen.
A Quest for Equivalence with the United States? Ishiba’s Grand Strategy May Be Difficult to Realize
Japan has long sought military self-defense and strategic protection.
Since the 1951 signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan has maintained a high degree of unity with the United States in military strategy. Alongside the external cooperation formed by the U.S. military presence and Japan’s strategic use of land, Japan has established an internal strategy to expand the scope and responsibilities of its Self-Defense Forces, while also seeking to amend the Constitution’s Article 9, which renounces war. These have long been consistent political goals of the LDP and other conservative parties.
Since the 21st century, leaders such as Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Fukuda Yasuo, and Shinzo Abe have prioritized military strength as part of their policy platforms, actively promoting the revision of defense guidelines and constitutional reform. Ishiba has also taken a hawkish stance in the field of military security, advocating for the establishment of an ‘Asian version of NATO’ during his campaign and emphasizing the importance of a basic national security law and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.
What is Asian version of NATO? As the name suggests, it aims to establish a military organization or alliance in Asia, similar to NATO in Europe, involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and other Asia-Pacific countries, with rights and obligations of mutual military cooperation . Ishiba argued, ‘Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Asia… Asia lacks a collective self-defense system like NATO, and thus has no mutual defense obligations, making it prone to war… the establishment of Asian version of NATO is indispensable.’ He emphasized that geopolitical tensions are the principal rationale behind this proposal. Concurrently, Shigeru Ishiba underscores the notion that ‘Japan is a sovereign and independent nation,’ perceiving the current Japan-U.S. relationship as inherently ‘asymmetrical.’ The advocacy for an Asian version of NATO, rooted in the discourse of regional threats, aims to augment Japan’s military standing in East Asia. It seeks to establish a dialogue mechanism of equal standing between Japan and the U.S. and extend Japan’s military strategic reach into North America, thereby augmenting Japan’s strategic influence on the global stage.
However, the reality is that there are many obstacles to the establishment of the Asian version of NATO. Due to the different relationships with China and the cultural and institutional differences between Asian countries and Europe, the NATO model is difficult to replicate in Asia.
Firstly, ASEAN countries oppose it. The Jakarta Post, as the official newspaper of Indonesia, stated that ASEAN is not interested in Japan’s ‘Asian NATO’ proposal, as this alliance is seen as an affront, as participating in such a military alliance would only escalate regional tensions. ASEAN emphasizes the establishment of a multilateral framework centered on economic benefits, which is inconsistent with Japan’s focus on military competition in East Asia, revealing Japan’s intentions for military strength in the Asian NATO proposal.
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also clearly expressed India’s negative response. He emphasized that India has a unique historical background and diplomatic strategy and does not intend to become part of any military alliance, nor will it follow the practices of other countries. This statement sends a direct and clear message to the new Japanese Prime Minister that India seeks autonomy and independence in security and strategic cooperation and is unwilling to participate in the construction of a regional military group similar to NATO.
At the same time, the pursuit of an equal position with the United States in Asian NATO will inevitably face opposition from the United States. The concept of an Asian NATO with Japan advocating for ‘leadership under the United States and Japan’ and ‘parity with the U.S. in military terms’ is fraught with challenges, and Ishiba also stated that ‘elevating the Japan-U.S. alliance to the level of the U.S.-U.K. alliance is my mission.’ U.S. officials responsible for East Asian and Pacific affairs stated that Ishiba’s proposal to ‘establish a more formal institution’ is not yet ripe, and the United States prefers to optimize the existing cooperation framework rather than seek the creation of a new closed military alliance.
Therefore, they all have issued a warning to Ishiba, greatly extinguishing the flames of Ishiba’s Asian NATO ambitions, and the United States and ASEAN’s refusal to Japan’s proposed regional military alliance makes the strategic blueprint of Asian NATO difficult to implement.
Is Ishiba a ‘pro-China faction’ within the LDP? Ishiba’s stance on China after taking office still requires cautious observation.
Before becoming Prime Minister, Ishiba showed a ‘pro-China’ signal during his time in governance. As a Christian who empathizes with the weak, Ishiba demonstrated a rare stance on China-Japanese historical issues, acknowledging that ‘Japan should reflect on and apologize for the war,’ stating that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of that war. Compared to the Japanese right-wing politicians who always beautify historical facts and refuse to admit the aggression of war, Ishiba’s stance within the LDP is quite pro-China, and he has long been considered by the Japanese media as a member of the ‘pro-China faction’ within the party. On the issue of China, Ishiba has emphasized that China is not a threat to Japan and has recently stressed the importance of dialogue and exchange to continuously advance strategic reciprocal relations with China.
However, as the leader of Japan, will Ishiba adhere to the political stance of his youth after taking office? On the one hand, Ishiba’s repeated appearances in the election have focused on achieving ‘Asian NATO’ as his governing goal. The establishment of a military alliance inevitably requires creating an imaginary enemy—is it China or North Korea? In this case, will China-Japanese relations deteriorate due to Japan’s military extremism? On the other hand, his demand to station U.S. troops in Guam and establish a security dialogue with the United States on an equal footing has been clearly rejected by the United States. ‘The strategy of competing with the United States’ must be implemented, does this mean that Japan’s strategy will shift, and through strengthening cooperation with China, will it achieve its cunning goals?
Japan’s security has always relied on external support. And Japan, which has long maintained a unified front with the United States, if seeking external parity with the United States, must rely on the interests and strategic support of opposing forces to maintain a close but independent alliance distance. However, in reality, Japan cannot achieve such ambitions at present. As mentioned above, the domestic situation in Japan is unstable, and the external strategy is blocked. Ishiba’s goal of Asian NATO is difficult to achieve breakthrough progress in his three-year term. Looking at the domestic situation, such as the LDP’s financial reform, the upcoming House of Representatives election, the disaster relief in Noto, and the adjustment of the economic market deflation… Japan’s domestic political ruins are in urgent need of repair, leaving Ishiba’s cabinet with little room to develop overseas forces. Therefore, on the external stance, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not loudly proclaimed the strategic shift of Japan after the prime minister’s change, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwao Tsukuda also stated that Asian NATO should be ‘carefully considered.’
Ishiba’s softened diplomatic stance after taking office shows such a conservative handling logic: Japan’s comprehensive alliance relationship with the United States will not change, and Japan’s consistent strategy towards China will not change because of the promotion of security system expansion. Domestic affairs are prioritized over foreign affairs, and the opportunity-based security competition under the threat of the region will be temporarily shelved, with continuous planning and covert operations in the future. Faced with the situation in the East, Japan’s current statements are more conservative, avoiding focal disputes with China and the United States, while focusing on the adjustment of domestic affairs and easing diplomatic pressure. Especially for China-Japanese relations, it is also stated that ‘although there are various unresolved issues,’ there is a desire to build a constructive and stable relationship through strengthened dialogue. Therefore, whether the Japan-U.S. relationship will enter an ‘adrift’ era, or whether the hawkish stance will be implemented to the end, maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance’s security network against China and North Korea, we cannot generalize.
Ishiba’s policy declaration behind shows Japan’s sensitivity to changes in the East Asian geopolitical landscape and the country’s anxiety about Japan’s progress, which is a struggle against the current. Under the competition of China and the United States, the Ishiba cabinet chooses diplomatic compromise, prioritizing domestic affairs, which is the consideration of Ishiba’s timing and also the inevitable result of Japan’s political environment. In such diplomatic deployment, Japan-U.S. relations and Japan-China relations will not change significantly in the future, and the direction of Japan will have to wait and see Ishiba’s future governance performance.
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“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?
Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.
But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.
In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.
These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.
This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.
The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.
The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.
This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.
The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.
Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.
OPINION
Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East
Published
3 days agoon
18/11/2024By
Ma XiaolinOn November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.
Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.
Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.
Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.
Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.
However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.
Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.
Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.
Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.
In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”
It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.
The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.
Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.
With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.
Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.
Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.
Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.
Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.
Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.
Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.
Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.
These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.
Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.
In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.
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