Opinion
North Korea breaks the siege and Russia turns eastwards

On 17 October, the Yonhap news agency confirmed through North Korean media that the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s legislature, had amended the constitution 10 days earlier to explicitly define South Korea as an ‘enemy country’. Over the past week, North Korea has taken a series of high-profile actions to demonstrate its strength to South Korea. At noon on the 15th, North Korea blew up the military demarcation line between the two countries north of the Gyeonggi Line, the Donghae section of the inter-regional highway, cutting off both sides of the road. In response, South Korea conducted a symbolic ‘counter-fire’ on its side of the demarcation line, firing German-made Taurus cruise missiles capable of penetrating the ground for the first time in seven years.
North Korea accused the South Korean military of using drones to enter its airspace and even infiltrated the capital Pyongyang on the 3rd, 9th and 10th of the month to distribute anti-North Korean leaflets. Although the South Korean military has denied any involvement, observers believe this is the ‘drone version’ of the two sides’ past psychological warfare, which has evolved from the traditional methods of loudspeakers and air-dropped balloons. Given the widespread use of drones in modern warfare and the reality of multiple battlefields, it is clear that North Korea’s harsh response is not an act of grandstanding, but rather a ‘might makes right in the face of strength’ approach to express itself more forcefully.
On 9 October, North Korea appointed a new defence minister and agreed to test-fire 240 mm guided rocket artillery shells with a maximum range of 67 km to hit the target that would completely cover the South Korean capital Seoul, about 50 km from the 38th parallel, in the event of a war between North and South. On 11 October, the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) issued an operational readiness directive, ordering the joint artillery units in the border area and the units carrying out important fire attack missions to go into a state of full fire readiness. On the 11th, the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) issued a combat readiness directive, ordering the joint artillery units in the border areas and the units conducting significant firepower strikes to go into a state of full fire readiness and threatening that further detection of South Korean drone strikes would be considered a ‘declaration of war’. The DPRK also announced that eight artillery brigades on the DPRK side of the 38th parallel had been placed on ‘stand-by’.
However, observers find it unusual that Russia has seized the opportunity to strengthen diplomatic interaction with the DPRK and even to consolidate joint defence commitments, promising to send troops to help the DPRK in the event of an ‘invasion’. At a delicate time when the battlefield struggle between Russia and Ukraine has entered a critical phase and Israel and Iran are preparing to ignite a war in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, known as one of the world’s powder kegs, has once again deteriorated due to North-South relations, adding colour to the great power chess game.
The three hotspots are closely linked by a strong internal correlation and logical chain. The United States has no time to pay attention to the normalisation of US-North Korean relations, which has created an opportunity for North Korea to take advantage of the situation and try to break its isolation by trying to resume North-South Korean relations and US-North Korean relations. Russia, on the other hand, needs to further strengthen its diplomatic focus on the East. It is ready to take advantage of the situation to exert pressure on Northeast Asia and to work closely with North Korea to achieve its goal of encircling and defeating the enemy in order to diffuse and balance US and European pressure.
On 14 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted to the Duma a bill on the ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Article 4 of the treaty states that if one of the signatory parties is attacked by force by one or more states and is in a state of war, the other party shall immediately provide military and other assistance by all available means. The alliance agreement between Russia and North Korea is a bilateral matter within the sovereign, constitutional and international law competences of the parties and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, the timing of Putin’s request is intriguing. The agreement was signed with Kim Jong-un during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June this year.
Putin’s submission of the Russian-North Korean alliance treaty to the National Assembly for consideration and approval, in order to make it a document with legal force and strategic deterrence, is a concrete demonstration of the close interaction and mutual cooperation between the two sides. It is difficult to say who is more active between Russia and the DPRK, or who needs whom more. In truth, this is a result of the emotional cohesion of the two ‘lone shepherds’ and their joint efforts to counter external threats. However, the bilateral strategic need to strengthen Russian-North Korean relations, especially the military alliance, is not due to a sudden change in the situation on the peninsula or the deterioration of inter-Korean relations, which prompted Vladimir Putin to legalise the agreement and send a signal to the outside world.
In June this year, the two Koreas accused each other of dumping large quantities of waste paper and soil from weather balloons. In the same month, Putin visited North Korea for the second time in 24 years and the two sides signed a military alliance agreement. However, it is difficult to say whether Putin’s failure to submit the Russian-North Korean treaty to the legislature for ratification in time for his return was due to the fact that the relevant procedures needed more time, or whether the Kremlin deliberately waited to see what would happen. In any case, it is clearly unusual for Putin to take such a critical step at a time when inter-Korean relations have suddenly thawed.
In fact, the key turning point in this period of deteriorating inter-Korean relations came on 30 December 2023. On that day, Kim Jong-un pointed out at a Workers’ Party meeting that the inter-Korean relationship was not an inter-Korean relationship, but a hostile wartime relationship, and proposed to completely cut off bilateral land transport links. Based on the latest and highest definition of bilateral relations, the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly decided in January this year to dissolve the long-standing ‘Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland’, the ‘National Economic Cooperation Bureau’ and the ‘Geumgangsan International Tourism Bureau’. The DPRK National Assembly also accused South Korea of making ‘reunification through assimilation’ and ‘systemic reunification’ a national policy for nearly 80 years, which contradicts North Korea’s national policy of reunifying the country ‘on the basis of one nation, one state and two systems’. Therefore, North Korea has said that ‘national reunification can never be achieved’ in relations with the South.
The main reason for the rapid deterioration of South Korea-North Korea relations is North Korea’s deep disappointment and dissatisfaction with the inter-Korean and inter-American relations, which did not meet North Korea’s expectations and did not progress after many warm interactions in 2018, especially after the Singapore, Hanoi and Panmunjom summits. In particular, the failure of the United States to find a solution for the lifting of sanctions in exchange for Pyongyang’s denuclearisation by the end of 2019, in line with its expectations, has caused great disappointment in North Korea. The strategic trust between North Korea and the United States has long been in serious deficit, and US-North Korea relations have once again reached an impasse as party changes and domestic political struggles in the United States have come to the fore. At the same time, North Korea continues to take decisive steps towards ‘de facto nuclear armament’ and a ‘unified nuclear missile strategy’, making it impossible to lift US-led sanctions and creating a worsening, even deadly, vicious circle between the two countries.
With the Russian-Ukrainian war at a stalemate and relations between China and the United States severely strained, American attention to Northeast Asia is not possible. This situation is providing North Korea with space and diplomatic and security leverage to regain strategic favour with China and Russia. At a time when unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are at the forefront of the world’s debate on how they have ended the era of tanks and changed the course of warfare, South Korea’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have repeatedly entered North Korean airspace, objectively deepening North Korea’s hostile assessments and countermeasures. This situation is the unavoidable responsibility of South Korea.
Russia’s strong support for North Korea shows that, on the one hand, Russia is indeed strengthening its ‘pivot to the East’ strategy in its foreign policy and, on the other hand, it is showing a rather pronounced pragmatism and leverage thinking by treating relations with North Korea as ‘reheating the old dish’. Putin’s first visit to North Korea in 24 years clearly shows that since he came to power in 2000, his focus on relations with America, Europe and China has led him to neglect and treat Pyongyang, his former East Asian neighbour, former war buddy and old friend, coldly. Now, however, in the face of Western military, diplomatic, economic and financial pressure, he has been forced to greatly enhance North Korea’s diplomatic status and strategic role by reopening the long-closed gates of Pyongyang and signing an alliance agreement in order to gain a solid and reliable strategic backyard and establish a common eastern line in the Asia-Pacific region against the strategic dimensions of America and NATO. Similarly, Russia has fully consolidated its ‘New Era Partnership of Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation’ with China and increased its focus on Vietnam, one of its strategic partners in Southeast Asia.
The sudden warming of Russian-North Korean relations and the reaffirmation of the alliance in recent months has much to do with the fact that Japan and South Korea follow the United States and are close military allies, especially since they chose sides in the Russia-Ukraine war and are small followers of the United States, even actively seeking to join NATO and promote the ‘Asia-Pacificisation’ of the alliance. This creates a strategic constraint and threat to Russia from the Asia-Pacific region, particularly from the Far East. Moreover, since August 2023, the DPRK has provided Russia with a ‘certificate of loyalty’ by supplying more than 1 million artillery shells and missiles.
Drastic changes in the international environment, especially the prolongation of the Russia-Ukraine war and the crisis in Northeast Asia, which have not been fundamentally resolved and even the common rivals and enemies are still the same, will inevitably push the DPRK to show its goodwill to Russia in various ways, at the same time attracting Moscow’s ‘two-headed eagle’ to the Far East, especially to the US’s mortal enemy, North Korea. Of course, Russia and North Korea have renewed their honeymoon not only because of the unforgettable memories of the Cold War, but also because of the realistic need to deal with the risk of a hot war and to jointly reconstruct the world and regional order in accordance with their respective goals. In a way, this situation is particularly dangerous because it resembles the international strategic environment before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the dynamics of the great power game and the internal conflicts on the Korean Peninsula.
At a time of renewed tensions on the Korean peninsula, with Russia and North Korea forming a close alliance, China launching large-scale military exercises to encircle Taiwan, and maritime police patrolling around the island for the first time, the premiere of the major television drama *’Shangganling’ on CCTV-1 on 16 October inevitably raised many associations for some observers. But this is purely coincidental. None of the world’s three major hotspots were triggered by China, nor did China play a leading role; on the contrary, China has always hoped for and advocated an immediate end to these conflicts.
History is always similar and often repeats itself, but as the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus warned, ‘you cannot bathe in the same river twice’. The relations between China and Russia have reached their best level in history, China and North Korea have renewed their friendship and mutual assistance agreements. On the other hand, China and the US have once again entered a period of serious friction and confrontation. However, unless the US invades North Korea again and threatens China’s core interests, it is impossible for China, Russia and North Korea to return to the same trenches as during the Cold War. Therefore, no matter how close relations between Russia and North Korea become, this will not lead to a return to the old path of military antagonism between China and the US and the Western camp.
The continuous broadcasting of Chinese television dramas about the Korean War and the strong conflicts and frictions that Russia and North Korea have with the United States are two different things. The fact that China has crossed a forbidden zone with its television dramas and presented a series of productions on the Korean War basically expresses the determination of the Chinese government and people to stand up against tyranny and oppression. This sends a message to American policymakers that they should not repeat the mistakes of the Korean War and return Sino-US relations to the bloody and dark past.
*Battle on Shangganling Mountain is a protracted military engagement during the Korean War, during which China fought to resist US aggression and aid Korea (1950-53).
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Iran-US negotiations: What does the Muscat meeting signify?

Following a protracted period of fluctuating relations, negotiations between Iran and the United States commenced on April 12 in Muscat, Oman. While not the first instance of dialogue between Tehran and Washington, the current geopolitical landscape imbues these talks with exceptional significance, as the fate of the Middle East hinges considerably on their outcome. Consequently, the character of these negotiations differs markedly from previous encounters.
Tehran enters this round of negotiations amidst a challenging environment: the legacy of former President Trump’s maximum economic pressure campaign persists, coupled with rhetoric hinting at potential military action against Iran. Israel’s ongoing military operations in Gaza, widely criticized and labeled by some as genocide, continue as it projects an image of success; Hezbollah appears constrained within Lebanon’s internal political dynamics; the political landscape in Damascus has shifted, potentially affecting the established support lines Iran previously relied upon for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups opposing Israel; Iranian-aligned forces in Iraq are preoccupied with internal political strife; and Iran itself confronts a severe currency and economic crisis. Simultaneously, Israeli lobbying efforts reportedly seek to persuade influential US figures to support decisive action against Iran. From Israel’s perspective, Iran purportedly lacks the strategic capacity for a sustained, high-intensity conflict against it.
Despite this assessment, Iran maintains it is not negotiating from a position of weakness. Ali Larijani, advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated that a military attack on Iran would mean “gambling with the lives of American soldiers”. Iran acknowledges the potential for significant damage to its strategic infrastructure from a US or Israeli attack but warns that its retaliation would inflict severe consequences on both nations.
Iran has also articulated a broader retaliatory strategy, threatening not only direct retaliation for an attack but also targeting US troops and interests throughout the Middle East, including in allied Arab nations. Such actions could destabilize key regions, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and potentially impact maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This escalation would place the already delicate security balance in several Arab states under immense strain.
Therefore, while Iran-US negotiations are not unprecedented, the current context imbues them with exceptional significance for regional security.
From Saturday talks to Saturday negotiations!
Following several hours of indirect discussions on Saturday, both delegations reported a positive atmosphere. Accounts from both sides regarding the tenor of the talks were largely consistent, with both the Iranian chief negotiator and the White House offering favorable evaluations. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator, described the discussions with the United States as “constructive”, “promising”, and “mutually respectful”. Araghchi said, “I have explained Iran’s position with determination and a forward-looking approach. Both sides have decided to continue this process in a few days.”
Meanwhile, the White House described the initial indirect talks hosted by Oman as “entirely positive and constructive”. The White House emphasized that the parties agreed to resume negotiations the following Saturday.
A notable point reportedly emerging from the US side emphasized a commitment to resolving disputes through diplomacy and dialogue whenever possible.
Initial reactions from both Tehran and Washington presented a consistent and cautiously optimistic narrative. This convergence has fostered a temporary de-escalation following weeks of heightened tension and raised hopes for short-term easing of friction.
Nevertheless, the path forward remains complex and challenging. While initial signals are promising, preparedness for various outcomes is essential. The willingness to continue talks might suggest, for now, that the US is not immediately demanding Iran’s “red lines” – such as the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program or severe restrictions on its missile industry – be met as preconditions. Conversely, Iran seems prepared to offer more substantial assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, potentially including restoring uranium enrichment levels closer to those stipulated in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Barring unforeseen disruptions, it is plausible that future negotiations could address topics such as the easing of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and reduced pressure on purchasers of Iranian oil.
Upcoming negotiation sessions, potentially scheduled for Saturdays, appear poised to be critical junctures for Iran and the broader Middle East, making the outcomes of these weekend discussions highly anticipated.
Risks
Despite the cautiously optimistic mood following the initial talks, significant risks loom over the negotiation process. Chief among these is potential opposition from Israel. Israel may view these talks as undermining its preferred strategy towards Iran and could take actions to disrupt the process. Potential disruptive actions could range from releasing sensitive intelligence on Iran’s nuclear or missile programs to covert operations or targeted provocations, such as assassinations of Iranian officials. Furthermore, influential pro-Israel lobbying efforts in Washington represent a significant factor, potentially shaping the perspectives of US negotiators—an avenue of influence less available to Iran.
Donald Trump’s potential influence and unpredictable nature also represent a significant variable. His political style often involves projecting strength and seeking public acclaim, sometimes employing confrontational rhetoric. This approach can include language perceived as condescending or insulting by negotiating partners. Given Iran’s sensitivity to perceived disrespect or arrogance from the US, such rhetoric could derail negotiations abruptly. Iran’s preference for indirect talks, while perhaps appearing strategically complex, may stem from deep-seated mistrust rooted in historical grievances concerning perceived US arrogance and past policy shifts. Therefore, alongside potential Israeli actions, the unpredictable nature of US politics, particularly concerning figures like Trump, poses a substantial risk to the sustainability of any diplomatic progress.
Internal Iranian politics present another layer of complexity. Significant diplomatic achievements could bolster the political standing of the current Pezeshkian administration. However, such success might also galvanize domestic political opposition. While the current administration under Pezeshkian and negotiator Araghchi may adopt a more cautious public approach compared to their predecessors (like the Rouhani administration and negotiator Jawad Zarif), the risk of internal efforts aimed at undermining the negotiations to discredit the government remains.
Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, noted in a recent interview, “Strangely enough, in these 40 years, whenever we have wanted to open up with various countries, there has always been some negative event either inside or outside the country.”
This historical pattern highlights the potential for similar disruptive incidents to affect the current talks.
Opinion
Trump’s “New Tariff Policy” Provokes Trade War, Hurts Himself and Others

On April 2 (EST), U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 10% “base tariff” on imports from over 180 countries and regions, effectived at midnight on April 5, with only Russia temporarily exempted. Additionally, Trump will impose personalized higher “reciprocal tariffs” on countries with the largest trade deficits with the U.S., effective from midnight on April 9. All other countries will continue under the original 10% base tariff. Trump claimed he holds the “modification authority” to raise or lower tariffs as needed. U.S. Treasury Secretary Besant also warned trade partners not to retaliate. On the same day, U.S. stock markets plummeted, with the three major indexes hitting the largest single-day drop in nearly five years, and the dollar also fell against major currencies.
If trade wars are world wars without gunpowder, then Trump has recklessly initiated an unprecedented one, pushing the U.S. into conflict with the entire world. This war concerns not only national tax revenues but also the global industrial, supply, and value chains, the rules of world trade and economic development, and even public sentiment, international relations, and the global power structure.
The Trump administration truly reflects the Republican Party’s preference for elephants, and his “new tariff policy” is like an elephant barging into the china shop of the world trade system and international relations—rampaging recklessly, ignoring friend or foe, causing massive damage, and successfully turning the U.S. into a “global enemy” and “universal nuisance” for the first time.
From an economic perspective, Trump’s tariff plan aims to force countries into new trade deals to balance trade, bring manufacturing back to the U.S., increase employment, tax revenues, and federal savings, and expand the market share of American products—all in support of “Making America Great Again.”
From a geopolitical perspective, the policy fulfills campaign promises by using economic weapons to enhance the U.S.’s bargaining position in global economics and diplomacy. Tariffs are wielded as strategic tools to coerce and weaken opponents, punish allies and partners that challenge U.S. hegemony, and suppress those with differing worldviews—all in order to maintain U.S. dominance in the international order.
Trump’s “new tariff policy” harms in three ways: harms the U.S., harms others, and harms the world.
Firstly, raising import tariffs across the board may not revive U.S. manufacturing or attract investment back home. Instead, it will raise the prices of imported goods, making American distributors and consumers pay more, especially in automobiles, electronics, and household appliances. Moreover, the policy could trigger stagflation, increase costs in agriculture and industry, weaken U.S. export competitiveness, and even lead to exclusion from global markets. Many U.S. business groups harshly criticized the policy, and more than half of public opinion polls are pessimistic. Goldman Sachs raised the probability of a U.S. recession within 12 months from 20% to 35%, in other words, Trump is, so to speak, “shooting himself in the foot.”
Secondly, imposing heavy tariffs on goods imported from various countries into the U.S. will present enormous industrial, trade, and economic challenges—and even social and political crises—for all targeted nations. The high U.S. tariffs may force many multinational companies to withdraw from traditional low-cost countries and relocate to lower-tariff regions, leading those former hosts to suffer from industrial hollowing-out, trade marginalization, financial bubbles in stock and currency markets, and economic deterioration. This could result in national bankruptcy, social unrest, regime changes, or even armed conflict. Historical experience shows that when major economies like the U.S. shift or export their crises, it can bring disaster to developing nations.
Thirdly, Trump’s “new tariff policy” creates a crushing situation, described as “where the elephant herd tramples, no grass grows,” bringing gluttonous calamity to the world. This tariff weapon not only harms over 180 U.S. trade partners, but also disrupts global pricing, trade, labor division, value, and supply systems. It undermines the global trade loop and supply-demand market that the U.S. painstakingly built post-WWII, causing an “epic-level” disaster for the global economy. The Financial Times predicted that a global trade war triggered by Trump could result in $1.4 trillion in economic losses. If countries retaliate with 25% tariffs, the resulting depression could be on par with the Great Depression of 1930.
Trump’s policy reveals a “triple loss” for the U.S. as the world’s leading power: loss of morality, loss of norms, and loss of friends.
Imposing heavy taxes reflects moral failure—selfishness and profit-seeking at the expense of others’ well-being. It’s a modern version of Louis XV’s “After me, the flood,” and a manifestation of America’s impulsive and reckless hegemony, abandoning its professed values of freedom, equality, and fraternity, as well as its evangelical “messianic mission.”
It’s also a loss of norms. As the inheritor of Western civilization, savior in two world wars, and key architect of the post-war global order, the U.S. once stood as a model. Francis Fukuyama even called the “American dream” the “end of history.” But Trump’s policy has shattered that image—applying high tariffs indiscriminately, even starting with close neighbors like Mexico and Canada, and targeting transatlantic allies and Asia-Pacific military partners. The U.S. now acts not as a leader, but as a tyrant. The Trump administration is dismantling the Western “political idol” that stood for nearly a century.
The result is also a loss of trust and allies. In pursuit of “Making America Great Again,” the U.S. is betraying even its closest friends—be it Mexico and Canada (over fentanyl and immigration), its WWII and Cold War allies in Europe, or Indo-Pacific allies like Japan and South Korea. Even new partners like Vietnam feel betrayed. No wonder European leaders now call America “Europe’s enemy” and see “de-risking” as aimed at the U.S.; no wonder Japan’s former PM Ishiba Shigeru bitterly laments his “extreme disappointment and regret”; no wonder Vietnam feels Trump’s “charm diplomacy” has hit the rocks.
In the end, those who once admired, trusted, and followed America are now disillusioned. The U.S. has become isolated.
As Mao Zedong once said, “The first question of revolution is to distinguish friends from enemies.” In today’s global trade system, it’s clear: the U.S. has made itself the enemy of the world. Applied to today’s international relations, global economic and trade systems, and the game of global circulation, all parties would likely have to acknowledge that in the process of maintaining normal and equitable international relations and ensuring smooth, stable international trade and economic operations, the United States has already positioned itself against the entire world—becoming a “global enemy .” At least when measured by the dimension of tariff wars, America’s comprehensive hostility and antagonism toward all nations, regardless of their social systems, political structures, ideologies, or values, has reached an absurd extreme. It now operates under a doctrine of “tariffs first, money above all, America supreme.” On April 2, Trump called it “Liberation Day,” but in truth, it marks America’s turn toward new conservatism, abandonment of globalization, and potential end as a global economic leader. It is a day of disaster for the world economy—and a day of declaration for global partners preparing to resist America’s trade hegemony.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
48-Hour Exclusive Exploration of the Stronghold of the US-Israel Enemy ‘Houthi Forces’

On March 28, after “disappearing” from my social circle for nearly 48 hours, I returned to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, coinciding with a new wave of airstrikes by the US and British air forces. Despite the danger at hand, my thoughts were still lingering in the past 48 hours—full of excitement and memories of my journey to and from Saada province and its steep mountains. We were not only among the first group of foreigners invited after the Houthi forces took control of the capital, but also pioneers lucky enough to explore the Houthi headquarters. Although the visit was brief and superficial, everything we saw and heard felt novel and fascinating.
March 26 marked the tenth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab-Islamic coalition’s military intervention in Yemen’s civil war. For the Houthis, it also marked the tenth anniversary of their religious jihad against the Saudi coalition and the United States. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” with the coalition’s air force unleashing bombs and missiles across Yemen under the pretext of saving Yemen’s legitimate government and halting the Houthi advance after their capture of Sana’a.
At 5 a.m. that day, our “international brigade”—comprising former officials, journalists, and scholars from the US, UK, South Africa, Malaysia, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia and China—departed in a convoy arranged by the Houthis to visit their “revolutionary base” and “uprising headquarters” in Saada province.
For security reasons, our trip was kept secret. We departed at dawn when there were few pedestrians or vehicles on the streets. Instead of the armored and bulletproof vehicles we previously used in Sana’a, we traveled in identical white Toyota Land Cruisers, with a lead vehicle flashing lights but sirens off to guide us quietly out of the city.
Less than a week before the end of Ramadan, the city of Sana’a, which had been noisy all night due to evening iftar and pre-dawn suhoor, fell silent at dawn. We drove easily through the dark, sparse streets and left the city smoothly as the sky lightened, heading north on the Chinese-built Sana’a–Saada highway toward Saada city, the provincial capital 230 km away.
Sana’a and Saada, two adjacent inland provinces in Yemen’s northwestern highlands, have no rivers or tall mountains along the route—only continuous brown hills, gravel, and desert. Occasional small green oases provided a glimpse of life on this famously barren ancient land. While the scenery was monotonous and lifeless, it felt fresh and memorable to us.
No matter how far we traveled, on both sides of the road were clusters of short plants—either exposed to the sky or covered with white mesh—densely planted qat trees. Their leaves contain the hallucinogenic substance cathinone and juice that suppresses hunger and boosts alertness. Reportedly, 70% of Yemenis are addicted to qat. Though water is scarce, 60% of it is used to irrigate qat trees. In short, Yemenis can go a day without food, but not without qat.
After traveling nearly 200 km and reaching the border between Sana’a and Saada provinces, our driver told us this area was once occupied by Al-Qaeda and was only fully cleared by the Houthis after 2015. Although the Houthi-controlled area is in a state of war, we didn’t see any signs of conflict—no soldiers, military vehicles, camps, air defense systems, or war scars. Even the few security checkpoints were almost symbolic. In contrast, I experienced far stricter and more numerous checkpoints in southern Iraq last year, making that place seem more dangerous than Yemen.
Our vehicle was playing Yemeni pop songs all the way—rhythmic and powerful, in a typical Arab rap battle style. The melodies were modern and catchy, with tunes that deeply resonated, and the lyrics were passionate and stirring, featuring buzzwords like “Gaza” and “Palestine.” The driver said this was a representative work by a Houthi rap artist named Iras Laith (Iras being the Arabic name for Jesus, and Laith meaning “lion”), whose songs have gone viral globally, especially in the Third World. The U.S. government has reportedly placed a $26 million bounty on him.
Yemeni friends familiar with Irsa said that whenever he performs his rap, his comrades dance the traditional jambiya (curved dagger) dance around him, and his popular songs have seen massive downloads online. A Houthi soldier mentioned that in order to protect Irsa, the Yemeni people have hidden him—just as they’ve hidden their “revolutionary leader,” Hussein’s brother and heir to the cause, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
Three and a half hours later, in a slightly dim and dusty atmosphere, we passed through the “Saada Gate,” damaged by U.S. or Saudi coalition airstrikes, and arrived at this city—considered the “eye of the storm” in Yemen and even the entire Middle East. We checked into the so-called five-star “Yemen Star International Hotel,” a six- or seven-story building. It is located on a side street off Saada’s main road and had clearly just been renovated, possibly even unfinished. We guessed we were among its first guests. Although the hotel lacked internet, it had most basic facilities and satellite TV with various foreign-language channels, including programs from the “Yemen TV” run by the southern government.
During our time in Saada, we experienced a rare extended internet outage, causing an unintentional scare for our families back home. On the morning of the 27th, I happened to see a text alert about a missed call—only then did I realize my daughter and other colleagues and students had tried to reach me multiple times and had been searching for us all night. Since we left the hotel at dawn on the 26th, we had lost connection with our contacts back home via social media and WeChat. In the rush to leave, I hadn’t anticipated a full communication blackout. Before departure, I had only briefly informed a contact at the embassy and a colleague at Xinhua News Agency via WeChat that I was joining the group heading to Saada. Since we didn’t return to Sana’a that day, and I had my phone on silent due to recent daily meetings, it ended up causing needless worry for friends, family, and colleagues. I truly feel sorry—though that’s another story.
Looking out the hotel window, the city of Saada was not large, shielded to the north by hills—about one kilometer wide east to west, and three to four kilometers long north to south. The city consisted mostly of low-rise buildings, many with tin roofs, and only seven or eight mid-rise buildings under ten stories tall. On the sunlit northern hills a few kilometers away, three giant Arabic slogans were spelled out in white stones: “Muhammad,” “Ali,” and “Persistence Means Victory.” The emphasis on the name “Ali” alone reveals the Shia religious identity of the people of Saada.
Yemen’s main population follows the Zaidi sect, the smallest branch of Shia Islam. Zaidis believe in the fifth-generation Imam Zaid, a descendant of Muhammad and Ali, whom they regard as the hidden Mahdi. Because of this, they are also called the “Five-Imam Sect.” Alongside the “Seven-Imam Sect” (Ismaili) and the “Twelve-Imam Sect” (Twelvers), Zaidis form one of the three major Shia branches. Zaidis have primarily survived in Yemen’s Shia-majority population and are theologically closer to Sunnis due to their recognition of the authority of the first four caliphs, making them the most moderate of all Shia sects.
Upon arriving in Saada, after a simple lunch, former Minister of Information Dayfallah al-Shami accompanied us to visit the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombing sites and the Saada Martyrs’ Cemetery. One site bombed by the U.S. was a cancer center under construction. At the scene, at least two top floors had been pierced by missiles, and the floor below had partially collapsed. Some group members found an unexploded heavy bomb in the basement. According to the site manager, this was the site of the March 24 U.S. bombing. No casualty information was mentioned.
After leaving the U.S. bombing site, we were taken to visit bombing sites left behind by the Saudi-led coalition. Along the way were several ruins, but our hosts specifically took us to see two bombed-out buildings at Saada University, one of which was a student dormitory. It’s said the bombings occurred around 2017. Desks and chairs under the rubble suggested that part of the facility had indeed been classrooms or laboratories. The seats scattered outside had been eroded by wind and rain, leaving only rusted metal frames… As for why the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombed civilian facilities, only the historical archives may one day tell us the truth.
On the 24th, while in Sana’a, we had also visited one U.S. and one Saudi coalition bombing site respectively. The U.S. strike was said to be on a residential building, but the remains didn’t look like a home—there were no signs of domestic items. Organizers said 15 people were injured and two died, though we weren’t arranged to visit any of the wounded in the hospital. The Saudi coalition site was from a few years ago and reportedly extremely tragic: over 800 people attending a funeral were “deliberately” bombed, resulting in more than 150 deaths and around 600 injuries.
What struck us the most was the Saada “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” where hundreds of war victims lie. Especially heartbreaking was the “Children’s Martyrs’ Corner,” where dozens of boys and girls who died prematurely are buried. In front of their flower-like portraits, mourners had placed bunches of fake flowers. Four of the deceased children were from the same family—it seemed they perished together in a single car, the twisted wreckage of which now hangs above their resting place. Previously, we had also visited a “Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Sana’a, but the emotional weight there couldn’t compare to the children’s section in Saada.
After our first day in Saada, we returned to the hotel together in a minibus. On the way back, we passed through the main street, where the run-down buildings resembled those in Sana’a. Infrastructure was very poor, and street shops were mostly ordinary stores, repair shops, eateries, or fruit stands. The streets were packed with people, and puddles and mud from recent rain made the roads chaotic. Cars and motorbikes weaved wildly, and there wasn’t a single traffic light on the main street. A few traffic police vaguely attempted to direct traffic. What caught my eye most was that nearly every motorcycle carried three or four children—an indirect sign of Yemen’s high birthrate and youth-heavy population.
That night in Saada wasn’t peaceful. Our thoughtful hosts knocked on the door to ask if we needed toiletries. We politely declined and hinted not to be disturbed again. However, at midnight, they knocked again and brought a large bag of unopened pajamas and toiletries, which was quite touching. In the deep of night, as we were fast asleep, they knocked a third time to deliver a hearty breakfast—flatbread, chickpea paste, eggs, drinks, and mineral water—placing the tray at our door.
Around noon on the 27th, our hosts, having taken a good nap after iftar, appeared leisurely in the hotel lobby and “suddenly” informed us that we would be going to Maran, a town on the northern border of Saada province, 70 kilometers away, to visit the hometown of Hussein, the founder of the Houthi movement. It was another unexpected delight. We divided into Toyota off-road vehicles, crossed Saada city, and headed for the northern mountains of the province bordering Saudi Arabia.
Throughout the week, all our activities had been notified at the last minute. We were never told in advance who we would meet—not even the drivers knew our next stop; they were only told to follow. Due to the wartime situation and open threats from Israel and the U.S. to assassinate Houthi leaders, the secrecy of our movements was for the safety of both our hosts and us foreign guests. We fully understood this and respected the principle: “guests follow the host.”
Heading north from Saada, the 70-kilometer journey involved crossing mountain after mountain—the farther we went, the higher the mountains, and the steeper the roads. Although the quality of the mountain roads rivaled provincial highways back home, they were still winding and twisty, taking two full hours for a one-way trip. Unlike the semi-hilly, semi-desert landscape along the Sana’a–Saada highway, this mountainous route revealed large oases, terraced fields, sparse trees, and even streams and small dams, indicating that northern Saada is a relatively agriculturally developed area, though still mostly at a subsistence level of natural economy.
Approaching the birthplace of the Houthi movement—the town of Maran, where Hussein launched his rebellion—the terrain was dominated by towering ridgeline mountains running east-west, averaging over 200 meters in height. Each mountain had three to five typical Yemeni earth buildings about ten meters tall. The mountains around Maran are densely packed, with earthen buildings scattered across peaks, forming a breathtaking skyline that resembled a miniature “Great Wall.” The scene evoked an ancient system of warning beacons, signaling threats across great distances.
Below this “Great Wall” were clusters of earth buildings that resembled a mix between farmhouses, forest forts, and watchtowers. These provided shelter from the elements for local farmers and served as strongholds against outside threats. This remote area—far from the centers of power in both Yemen and neighboring countries—offered an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare. It’s here that the Houthi movement was born, grew strong, suffered setbacks, and rose again—ultimately expanding from Yemen’s northwest corner to take over much of the country.
Finally, deep in the mountains, just 20 kilometers from the Saudi border and adjacent to the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran, we arrived at Maran—a small, picturesque town nestled in the hills. This was Hussein’s hometown and resting place, located in a naturally defensible spot with steep terrain.
The Houthi forces built a majestic “Martyrs’ Cemetery” on a high point resembling an eagle’s beak, constructed primarily in off-white stone and offering panoramic views of the surrounding mountains. On the town’s broadest hilltop—nearly 1,000 square meters—they also built a grand marble plaza for Hussein’s tomb. At the center lies a beautifully crafted rectangular sarcophagus engraved with Quranic verses. Along a long flight of concrete stairs descending the mountain, another burial site can be found, along with a cave where Hussein once hid from government troops during the early revolutionary days.
Shami, our guide and recently resigned Minister of Information, accompanied us throughout. He vividly narrated the life of Hussein and the legends of the Houthi movement, especially the six-year “First War” from 2004 to 2010, recounting dramatic life-and-death struggles between the Houthis and the government, and the key figures who played roles in that era.
What stood out was Shami’s emphasis that the Houthi movement doesn’t operate on a cycle of revenge and has moved beyond tribal narrow-mindedness. Many former mortal enemies who once exchanged gunfire with them are now colleagues and comrades, holding positions in the Houthi-led administration. In fact, none of the Houthi officials who accompanied us to Saada—including the escorts, bodyguards, and drivers—were from Saada. They hailed from Sana’a, Ibb, Marib, and even more distant provinces. Former Houthi Prime Minister Habtoor, whom I had interacted with several times, is from Aden and once served as its governor—suggesting he is likely a Sunni Muslim.
My Houthi friends told me that they don’t differentiate by sect or region; they believe in “One Yemeni Family.” The Houthi movement’s ability to sweep through northwest Yemen and ultimately control more than half the country would have been impossible without such inclusiveness.
In 1962, a republican revolution broke out in North Yemen, ending more than 1,000 years of Zaidi Imamate theocratic rule. Afterward, Zaidi elites and the population found themselves caught between the internal pressure of Yemen’s secular republicanism and external pressure from Saudi-supported Sunni Salafism, and were gradually marginalized. In 1992, aiming to revive “Zaidism,” religious leader Hussein from Saada established the “Believing Youth” movement. Through religious schooling and preaching, it spread religious and political ideas, resisting the republican regime led by Saleh internally and countering Saudi ideological expansion externally, while also laying out a vision for an Iranian-style Islamic regime.
In 1994, four years after Yemeni unification, civil war broke out. Hussein, who belonged to the same powerful Hashid tribe as Saleh, led Saada tribal militias to help the government suppress the southern rebellion—partly out of tribal interests and other political calculations—thereby growing his own power.
After 2001, as the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Saleh government was forced to align with the U.S., supporting troop deployments to both countries. While the Houthis did not support international terrorism, they consistently adhered to anti-American and anti-Zionist ideology, focused on liberating Islamic lands and reviving Islam. This caused the two sides to become enemies again. In 2004, a six-year civil war broke out between the Houthis and government forces. Hussein was killed early in the conflict. His successors renamed the “Believing Youth” to the “Houthis” in his honor, vowing to carry on his fight until a ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2010.
In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. The country plunged into political chaos. Losing both military and popular support, and abandoned by the Hashid tribe, Saleh was forced to resign. With backing from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the Hadi government—mainly supported by southern factions—was established. In 2014, amid efforts to form a federal system, the Houthis rebelled again, claiming their interests were not being protected. They swiftly entered the capital, seized power, and—teaming up with Saleh for the third time—set up parallel administrative and legislative institutions to replace the Hadi government, forcing it into exile in Saudi Arabia.
On March 25, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a “Ten-Nation Coalition” of Arab and Islamic countries to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, and on March 26 officially began airstrikes against the Houthis—ushering in a new phase of the conflict. The Houthis declared Saudi Arabia, its allies, and their Western backer, the United States, as enemies. The following year, with Jordan and others mediating, the Houthis began peace talks with the coalition. In 2017, Saleh—accused by the Houthis of betrayal and of negotiating for personal gain—broke ranks. Disputes over military control further escalated tensions. Eventually, Saleh was intercepted and executed by the Houthis while fleeing Sana’a.
By 2023, the Houthis had become a powerful force, controlling half the country. They extended Hussein’s anti-American, anti-Israel ideology abroad and, for the first time, intervened in the Israel-Palestine conflict. They became a solid pillar of the “Axis of Resistance,” opened a front in the Red Sea, targeted Israel, and even launched airstrikes deep inside Israeli territory—triggering military retaliation from the U.S., U.K., and others.
On the night of the 27th, after having iftar in Saada, we concluded our rapid tour of the Houthi stronghold and began our overnight journey back to Sana’a. The drive took nearly four hours, with no streetlights along the way—our young driver relied entirely on his familiarity with the roads. He had been driving all day, and we worried about whether he had the strength to stay alert. But Yemenis have their own way—both the driver and the bodyguard riding shotgun kept chewing qat leaves for energy, seasoned by years of battlefield experience. The bodyguard, only 23 years old, was already a veteran with five years of combat experience.
While we were away from Sana’a, media reports indicated that the U.S. and U.K. had launched airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport and other targets. Shortly after midnight, we returned to the noisy city of Sana’a. We had barely settled into our hotel for half an hour, just beginning to notify friends and family via WeChat, when a series of thunderous explosions erupted in the clear night sky. The sound of F-16 fighter jets circling overhead followed, along with sporadic anti-aircraft fire. Drawing on my extensive frontline experience in Gaza and Baghdad, I could almost identify every model of jet, missile, bomb, or bullet just by sound. My immediate reaction: “The U.S. is launching an airstrike.” And this was the first time during my week in Yemen that I directly experienced and heard a U.S. strike.
On the 29th, I left Yemen as planned, bidding farewell to the Houthi movement, with whom I had only just begun to interact and was far from familiar. Yet, the Houthis have now risen to become a key part of the “Axis of Resistance” and an important player on the Middle Eastern stage. This political “celebrity” or “nouveau riche” type of non-state actor, despite Yemen’s extreme poverty and streets full of struggling citizens, has positioned itself as the backbone and vanguard of “Palestinian liberation.” In my view, its enthusiastic promotion of the Palestinian cause is a strategy aimed at shielding itself under the banners of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism, using the turmoil it stirs in the Middle East—especially in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean—to gain broader domestic, regional, and international legitimacy. Ultimately, this is a bid to force the international community to recognize it as Yemen’s sole legitimate representative, or at the very least, to secure dominance and voice in the process of forming a joint government.
This trip may not have yielded every possible gain, but it still brought many insights—some even unexpected. That said, the regrets are obvious. Despite our repeated requests, we never got the chance to visit the front lines to see Houthi soldiers, equipment, or camps. We had no opportunity to speak with their top leader—Hussein’s brother and successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. We didn’t visit the crucial Red Sea port city of Hudaydah under Houthi control, let alone conduct a full investigation in rival-controlled areas like Aden or Taiz.
Fouad, an advisor to the Houthi “Prime Minister” who coordinated my entire visit, tried to reassure me, saying, “It’s okay. Come again next year. We’ll take you to Aden, or anywhere else you want to go.” This wasn’t just his personal wish—it likely reflects the broader ambition of the Houthis to one day unify and rule the entire country.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
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