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Scrambling for power: Differences between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban

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For the past 20 years, the Haqqani Network has been fighting alongside the Taliban for a common goal and has carried out the bloodiest attacks across the country. However, in these 20 years, the responsibility of all the attacks of this network was taken by the Taliban, and they tried not to recognize this network as a group separate from the Taliban.

Although the name of the Haqqani network was mentioned a lot in the media, the Taliban spokesman always had said that all are members of the Taliban and that there are no separate structures of the Haqqani’s and the Taliban.

During over 20 years, the Taliban managed to introduce the Haqqani network as a part of itself, and the responsibility of all the attacks of Haqqani’s were assumed by the Taliban spokesperson.

Even after the collapse of the republic system, following the withdrawal of US troops and the return of the Taliban into power, Taliban officials and leaders of the Haqqani network tried hard to hide the identity of their network and consider themselves part of the “Islamic Emirate” of the Taliban.

But with the passage of time and for various reasons, the Haqqani network has returned to its origin and tends to reveal its hidden identity. This network has recently released a series of videos of its fighters who have carried out suicide attacks in the past 20 years, targeting the then Afghan security forces and the foreign troops across Afghanistan.

Haqqani network is willing to reveal its hidden identity

In the latest video published by the Haqqani network, had showed Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network and the current Interior Minister along with his brother Badruddin Haqqani where both saying goodbye to a young suicide bomber and explaining the attack plan to him.

Badruddin was the youngest brother of Sirajuddin, whom the Taliban’s official website identified as the initiator of the suicide attacks, and according to the Taliban, he had designed and implemented 75 suicide attacks, including the attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. His name was in the US blacklist and eventually he was killed in an American drone attack in 2012.

Though, apparently the Haqqani network is now part of the Taliban government, but in addition to the military structures, its propaganda section is also separate. Last Thursday, Haqqani network commemorated the death anniversary of Maulvi Sangin, the former military officer of this network in Paktika province. This was despite the fact that senior Taliban officials did not even write anything about him on social platforms and did not even make a small reference to him. But members of the Haqqani network commemorated this day by releasing a documentary film on the life of Sangin and called him a national hero.

Taliban didn’t broadcast Haqqani commander documentary film in national tv

The spokesperson of the Kabul Police Command, who is a member of the Haqqani network and a member of Molavi Sangin’s family, called him his role model. However, this documentary film was not broadcasted on the national television under the control of the Taliban, but in Shamshad, a private tv channel and on big screens in the provinces of Kabul, Khost, Nangarhar and some other provinces.

Sangin, originally from Zirok district of Khost province and from the Zadran tribe. He was born in North Waziristan and had close relations with the Pakistani Taliban.

He had a history of war not only in Afghanistan, but also in Waziristan, and he was involved in armed battles with different people. His name was on the US blacklist, he was killed by an American drone on September 9, 2013 in North Waziristan of Pakistan.

He was one of the important commanders of the Haqqani network. US soldier Beau Bergdahl, who was later exchanged with five current senior Taliban officials, was captured by the fighters under Sangin’s command, which the Haqqani network considers his greatest heroism. The Haqqani network held Bergdahl from 2009 to 2014. The Haqqani network called Sangin a heroic fighter in the documentary it made about him.

But the noteworthy point is that in this documentary he is not introduced as a member of the Taliban, but is called a member of the Haqqani network or the Haqqani group.

This is despite the fact that during the last 20 years, the Haqqani network did not consider itself as a separate armed structure from the Taliban. Meanwhile, in this documentary, an audio file of Rahimullah Yousafzai, a former BBC reporter, is played, calling him one of the important commanders of the Haqqani network.

Internal dispute between the Taliban and Haqqani network is getting serious

In parts of the documentary, videos of his battles are played. In one of these videos, he is seen next to Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In this documentary, all the talks about him were done by members of the Haqqani network, many of whom now hold various positions in the Taliban’s Ministry of Interior in Kabul.

In this documentary, no one except members of the Haqqani network talked about Sangin. At the end of the documentary, he is mentioned as a member of the Haqqani network, not a member of the Taliban.

The point is that after three years since the return of the Taliban into power, and internal disputes among the Taliban and Haqqani over government positions, now the Haqqani’s are apparently trying to reveal their true identity in the Taliban government.

The frequent release of videos of suicide fighters by the Haqqani network may be a message to the Taliban that the heavy burden of the war is on the shoulders of this group and the regime should have a bigger share of it. Previously, the leader of the Haqqani network criticized the monopoly of power and considered this practice as the detriment of the Taliban government.

After 20 years of the Haqqani network defending its identity and the Taliban’s indifference to the killed commanders of this group, even to the extent that the national television controlled by the Taliban did not allow the broadcast of a documentary of one of the commanders of this network, it shows that the hidden battle between the Haqqani network and the Taliban is unfolding and expanding.

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Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets

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Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.

Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.

The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.

The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.

Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.

The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.

Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.

The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.

Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.

The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.

Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.

Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.

Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.

According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.

This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.

The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:

“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”

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Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions

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Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.

Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.

China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.

Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.

The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.

It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.

However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.

Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.

Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.

On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.

The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.

Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.

Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.

Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.

Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.

According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.

Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.

The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.

A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.

These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.

Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.

Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.

Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.

Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”

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China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers

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China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.

China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.

In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.

The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.

Financial sector stability

China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.

China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.

“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.

Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.

Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan

Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.

The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.

Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.

Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.

Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.

Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.

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