The news broke like a bombshell in media circles. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the umbrella organization for the PKK/PYD (which is known as the PKK in Syria and has been a primary concern for Türkiye in recent years), reached an agreement with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the current Syrian President (formerly known as al-Jolani). Starting from the evening of Monday, March 10th, when the news hit agencies, the media erupted with a range of reactions, from claims of the PKK/PYD’s self-dissolution to assertions of Syria’s territorial integrity being secured. Some commentators even suggested this was a rejection of federation, a new setback for Israel, and a significant success for Türkiye. The atmosphere recalled the period following Assad’s departure on December 8, 2024, when there was talk of conquering the neighbouring country, even going so far as to assign license plate numbers to Syrian and other Middle Eastern cities.

What does the agreement entail?

However, the eight-article agreement text does not present a particularly optimistic outlook. In fact, a careful examination reveals that Syria has been (or is being) reshaped into an undeclared federation. The very act of the SDF signing an agreement with the Syrian government implies the construction of a federal structure. On one side stands a state, Syria, and on the other, a structure that perceives itself as a state (or on the path to statehood) and is considered a terrorist organization by Türkiye. In other words, the SDF, with the PYD/PKK at its core, is the entity that has entered into an agreement with the Syrian state. Typically, states engage in agreements with other states or international organizations. The fact that the SDF and the Syrian state have signed an agreement/reconciliation text warrants careful consideration.

The first article of the agreement, stating that “the right to merit-based representation and political participation in Syria, regardless of religious or ethnic origin, is guaranteed,” may initially appear positive. However, when considered alongside the subsequent article, which states that “the Kurdish community is recognized as an integral part of Syria and its constitutional rights are guaranteed,” it becomes evident that this contains serious issues. A federal structure is present, even if unnamed (pending the final Syrian constitution).

If a Kurdish community exists within Syria, and its existence is constitutionally recognized with its rights (the specifics of which will be defined in the constitution) guaranteed, other ethnic and sectarian groups will inevitably make similar demands. For instance, the Alawites, predominantly residing in Syria’s coastal region and recently subjected to horrific massacres by HTS, are likely to present similar demands. The same applies to the Druze community living in territories that Israel occupied and gained control over immediately after Assad left the country on December 8, 2024. In fact, Druze community leaders have repeatedly declared that they cannot live under a radical Islamic regime centered on HTS and would prefer to join Israel if forced to do so. Considering that the southern part of the Druze region, the Golan Heights, was occupied and annexed by Israel in the 1967 war (despite being Syrian territory under international law), the seriousness of their threats becomes clearer. It should be emphasized that Syria is being steered towards a federation that could lead to partition. In such ethnic, religious, and sectarian federations, quotas allocated to these groups, rather than merit, will likely be more influential in matters such as personnel recruitment.

The reference to the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian state, with all its constitutional rights, including citizenship, guaranteed, signifies a significant step towards federation. The existence of a “Kurdish people” and the mention of their constitutional rights imply that the constitution should be drafted on the basis of “peoples.” One of the main articles of the Syrian constitution will likely begin with a sentence such as, “The Syrian state is the common state of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites…” or “Syria is the common country of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites…”

In this scenario, it can be assumed that Syria will consist of at least four or five autonomous or federated structures. These structures will likely have their own parliaments, internal administrations (including public order forces like police and gendarmerie), judicial systems, and “self-defense forces,” as the PKK prefers to call them. In essence, we can anticipate four or five autonomous/federated units resembling the fragmented and largely independent Kurdish Federal Government of Northern Iraq. It should also be underscored that it is improbable for such a state, formed with a very weak central government in line with Israel’s interests, to possess a substantial army. It would be overly optimistic to believe that in such a federation, named or unnamed, everyone would coexist harmoniously, with different peoples treating each other with utmost respect and avoiding conflicts over power-sharing. The likelihood of such ethnic, religious, and sectarian federal structures, which are inherently fragile, surviving peacefully in a region like the Middle East, where Israel and the US are constantly involved, is extremely low. The possibility of these structures being drawn into disintegration through civil war or territorial conflicts, triggered by external manipulation of internal disputes, should not be underestimated.

The fifth article of the agreement, stating that “the Syrian state shall ensure the return of all displaced refugees to their former places (villages and towns) and guarantee their security,” might initially seem to address the return of refugees who have fled Syria. However, this may not be the case. If this article concerned refugees outside Syria, its inclusion in this agreement would be unnecessary, as such matters fall entirely under the jurisdiction of the Syrian central government. If it referred to refugees from PKK/PYD-controlled areas who were forced to flee their homes due to ethnic cleansing, many of whom are outside the country, this sentence would need to be worded differently. It appears that the “refugees” in question are PKK/PYD groups who have been forced to flee from Turkish-controlled territory, and their return to this territory is being guaranteed by the Syrian state. This could be a precursor to forcing Türkiye out of the territory under its control in the coming years.

Since 2011, Türkiye’s Syria policy has not consistently prioritized national interests. On one hand, Türkiye rightly used force to prevent the PKK/PYD from attaining the status of a puppet autonomous state. On the other hand, Türkiye did everything possible to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Assad regime. Ultimately, the Assad regime was overthrown, and the PKK/PYD has come very close to achieving significant autonomy. The prospects of Syria’s fragmentation and eventual disintegration are not distant.

During the Assad (Baath) regime, as the PKK/PYD faced pressure from Türkiye, they repeatedly approached the Damascus government, stating, ‘Give us autonomy, let us join you and fight together against Türkiye.’ [Assad’s government] said, “You are traitors who cooperate with America. Syria is a nation-state and has a unitary structure. We will not give you or anybody else anything that will disrupt this constitutional structure, we can only enact some regulations for local administrations in the 2012 constitution, and that will apply to all of Syria, not just you.”‘. Ultimately, there is now a Syria that some claim Türkiye conquered, a government described as “our boys,” and the PKK/PYD has signed a treaty with it that includes extensive autonomy. This raises the question: Was this Türkiye’s ultimate objective?

On March 5, French government spokesperson Sophie Primas stated that French President Emmanuel Macron, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer were considering a joint visit to the United States, with the visit expected to be completed “in the short term.” If this plan materializes, it will mark the second time these three European leaders visit the White House within a short period following Donald Trump’s re-election as president. Previously, Macron and Starmer had attempted to persuade Trump in person to value the traditional transatlantic relationship and maintain U.S.-Europe alignment on the Russia-Ukraine war, but with little success. Zelensky’s visit to the White House, however, turned into a diplomatic disaster, with both sides engaging in heated arguments that ended on bad terms. Zelensky’s delegation even left the White House hungry, as they were asked to leave without partaking in the lavish luncheon prepared by their host.

The three White House summits marked another diplomatic “Waterloo” for Europe after its “darkest moment” at the Munich Security Conference. At Munich, European leaders were publicly humiliated by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and were shocked to witness the U.S. engaging in high-level diplomacy with Russia. Despite their dismay, some still held onto illusions. However, after experiencing Trump’s stern lecturing at the White House, European leaders have become much more pragmatic and realistic. Therefore, before seeking another visit to the White House, France and the UK have adjusted their previous stances on the Russia-Ukraine war, now supporting ceasefire negotiations, while Ukraine has obediently stated its willingness to transition from war to peace “under U.S. leadership” and sign a “minerals-for-security” agreement with the U.S.

European leaders are striving to repair the U.S.-Europe relationship, which has been severely fractured by “Trump’s new policies,” in an effort to preserve “peace under American rule.” They aim to ensure continued transatlantic cooperation through three key ties: traditional values, the transatlantic political alliance, and the NATO military alliance, while maintaining a shared destiny, shared interests, and shared moral values. However, Trump 2.0 is likely to bring more sadness, harm, and worries to his European allies. To some extent, European countries have realized that they must adapt to the historical turning point of a “the profound changes unseen in a century.” They must accept the “historical end” of the U.S.-Europe partnership and quickly achieve strategic awakening, gradually breaking free from their strategic dependence on the U.S. while strengthening strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, military self-reliance, and strategic self-preservation.

Europe’s strategic awakening follows an undeniable historical and practical logic. First, no powerful nation remains dominant forever, no absolute center of power is eternal, and no strong ally is unbreakable. This is a lesson from thousands of years of human history, frequently discussed by Western politicians, and confirmed by more than ten shifts in global power centers since the 1500s.

Moreover, under “Trumpism,” the U.S. is irreversibly shifting toward a new era of isolationism, mercantilism, and Monroe Doctrine-style policies, focusing on self-revolution, self-redemption, and making itself “great again.” It has grown weary of acting as the world’s leader, fulfilling international obligations, bearing multilateral responsibilities, and financing global initiatives. The U.S. is even reluctant to continue practicing the evangelical “Messianic” spirit of benevolence and global salvation. Europe must recognize that after a century-long alliance, the U.S. and Europe are now at a crossroads where separation is inevitable. More precisely, the U.S. is actively dismantling the global order and rule-based system it built and sustained for a century—without caring about Europe’s grievances or how it complains tearfully about the break-up.

Europe must now consider how to end its strategic dependence on the U.S. Historically, the U.S. was a “bastard child” of European civilization on the North American continent. However, in the process of breaking away from its colonial “sinful womb,” this “illegitimate offspring” unexpectedly became Europe’s ultimate lifeline and savior. Since its entry into World War I and subsequent victory, the U.S. has fought increasingly stronger wars, achieving an unprecedented level of global hegemony. It has continuously shaped Europe’s fate: without strong American leadership and generous support, Europe could not have swiftly defeated the Axis powers, rapidly recovered from the devastation of two world wars, collapsed the Soviet-led Cold War adversaries, or maintained its dominance in Western education, science, technology, economy, and soft power.

A century of dependence has conditioned Europe into a “fatherly” or “motherly” psychological attachment to the U.S., fostering both admiration and reliance. Despite frequent complaints, disputes, and protests against this overbearing “patriarch,” Europe remains unable to break free. However, the time has come for Europe to awaken from this dependence and embrace strategic independence.

Strategic Autonomy: Europe’s Honor and Dream

Strategic autonomy is not only Europe’s honor and dream, but also one of its primary goals in the pursuit of unity. Historically, Europe has long been unable to act independently due to its internal fragmentation, where numerous feudal states coexisted. Even after the establishment of the Westphalian system, Europe still found itself entangled in two world wars. After World War II, Europe was further drawn into the grand geopolitical game of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Being weak and vulnerable, Europe had to rely on the protection of a strong United States to ensure its security and development.

With the collapse of the Cold War order and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Europe’s dream of unification became increasingly tangible. Through five rounds of EU enlargement, most European countries were brought under the same umbrella. Simultaneously, NATO’s continued eastward expansion pushed Europe’s security frontiers deep into Russia’s traditional strategic heartland.

As the 21st century began, Europe’s strategic environment underwent a dramatic improvement. It not only emerged from the historical shadow of the Soviet threat but also witnessed new developments in the United States—where growth stagnated, and signs of contraction and decline appeared. Thus, strategic autonomy became a new European aspiration, gaining widespread support from nations and citizens alike. However, the U.S. establishment, particularly represented by the Democratic Party, has continued efforts to keep Europe under White House leadership through shared values, traditional alliances, and military partnerships. To achieve this, the U.S. carefully orchestrated the “Ukraine trap,” using Russia as a “scarecrow” to frighten many small European nations, thereby forcing them to remain under the American hegemonic umbrella and continue following Washington’s lead.

Trump’s new policies actually present Europe with a historic opportunity and a strategic window to break free and establish true self-reliance. However, Europe still lacks the necessary strategic confidence and preparedness. It continues to seek leverage from the United States and, in some cases, even prefers to remain under American strategic protection. The inevitable outcome of this approach is that Europe will eventually find itself standing on shaky ground.

Strategic Autonomy: Independent Path Internally, Diplomatic Independence Externally

Strategic autonomy means choosing an independent path domestically and achieving diplomatic independence externally. Europe has historically been the birthplace of modern international relations and diplomacy, serving as both the intellectual foundation and early model for American diplomacy. As a master of geopolitical maneuvering, Europe has long been a dominant player in global affairs.

However, diplomacy must be backed by national power—particularly economic and military strength. This fundamental rule has often left Europe, despite its past glory, with a form of “crippled diplomacy.” With the exception of a few cases such as France, most European countries have historically aligned themselves with U.S. policy, often adhering to White House directives. They have been required to continuously coordinate their policies and even political stances with Washington to ensure transatlantic alignment, thereby creating a synchronized diplomatic chorus.

After the Cold War, the acceleration of global multipolarity provided Europe with greater diplomatic space and maneuverability. European nations, based on their own interests or the collective interests of the EU, have at times pursued diplomatic policies that diverged from or even opposed those of the United States. This growing diplomatic independence, driven by strategic autonomy, has become a concrete manifestation of Europe’s pursuit of unity and strength. However, it has also inevitably become the primary source of conflict, disagreement, and friction between Europe and the U.S.

During Trump’s first term (Trump 1.0), diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Europe emerged, particularly over issues related to values. However, these differences were quickly mended during Joe Biden’s administration. With Trump’s return to power (Trump 2.0), the transatlantic diplomatic relationship has once again diverged—not only in ideology but also in paradigm. Disputes over trade wars and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have further widened the gap, to the point where Europe and the U.S. are now moving in entirely different directions. Ironically, this divergence will, in turn, reinforce Europe’s diplomatic independence.

Europe’s Greatest Crisis: The Security Dilemma

Europe’s most pressing crisis is its security dilemma—specifically, whether it can establish an independent and powerful military force outside the NATO framework and achieve military self-sufficiency, including the ability to confront its traditional adversary, Russia, on its own.

After the Cold War, Europe embraced NATO, an alliance centered around the United States. The essence of this arrangement was to leverage American military power to neutralize the Soviet threat, prevent Germany’s resurgence, and ultimately avoid another world war.

For more than half a century, the U.S. has maintained a strong military presence in Europe, with numerous bases and a large troop deployment. Washington has also consistently covered over half of NATO’s defense budget, with its military expenditures exceeding 3% of its GDP annually. This long-standing reliance on American security guarantees has not only led Europe to neglect its own military capabilities but has also become an unsustainable burden for the U.S.

With Trump’s Return, NATO’s Easy Days Under U.S. Protection Are Over 

With Trump back in office, NATO can no longer enjoy the luxury of relying on the U.S. security umbrella. The alliance must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defense. During his first term, Trump pressured NATO members to increase their military spending to 2% of GDP. In his second term, he is now demanding it be doubled to 5%, significantly reducing the burden on the U.S.

For Europe, achieving military independence and self-reliance has become an urgent reality. In terms of conventional troop numbers, weaponry, strategic capabilities, and defense industry strength, Europe remains far behind the U.S. in the short term. It may even struggle to counterbalance Russia. As the Trump administration plans to abandon Ukraine, and Europe is forced to prepare for defending Ukraine—or even itself—alone, serious questions arise: How quickly can the EU establish its own military force? Can it rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by the UK and France?

The European “Rearmament” Plan

On March 4, in response to the U.S. cutting off weapons, intelligence support, and possibly even satellite links to Ukraine, the European Union announced a plan to raise approximately €800 billion to “rearm Europe” and establish a secure and resilient defense framework. Under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany—after nearly 70 years of pacifism—has doubled its defense budget, surpassing 2% of GDP. The newly elected government coalition, led by Friedrich Merz, is set to propose a bill in the German Parliament next week to establish an extra-budgetary fund of €500 billion under the guise of infrastructure investment, but ultimately aimed at further increasing defense expenditures.

As founding members of NATO and permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain and France are stepping up as Europe’s natural leaders. While attempting to salvage the crumbling U.S.-Europe geopolitical marriage, they are also actively strategizing Europe’s post-“U.S. withdrawal” defense framework. Discussions include “nuclear sharing” and the potential formation of a European “security force” to support Ukraine.

Observers suggest that the EU and its member states are about to enter an unprecedented period of multilateral and bilateral security negotiations, scrambling to fill the “three-dimensional vacuum” left by the U.S. abandoning its NATO leadership responsibilities—or potentially withdrawing from NATO altogether. This vacuum includes historical disillusionment, present uncertainty, and psychological panic over the future.

Trump 2.0: A Long-Term Shift? 

Theoretically, Trump’s second term could last eight years, and “Trumpism” might persist even longer. In just two months since his return, Trump has already withdrawn from agreements, abandoned allies, and broken diplomatic trust—all with strong momentum that is likely to continue and expand.

This trajectory threatens to overturn the entire post-WWII global security system, international governance framework, and global order. Almost overnight, the United States—once Europe’s unwavering ally and “big brother”—has morphed into a familiar stranger, a tariff war instigator, an ideological adversary, and even a strategic rival.

Meanwhile, Europe is left to navigate an uncertain path alone, and the “Western world” as we know it appears to have fractured into two distinct entities: the U.S. and Europe. The EU was completely unprepared for such a historic and profound transformation in transatlantic relations. European Council President Ursula von der Leyen even described it as a “watershed moment.”

The Inevitable U.S.-Europe Split

The transatlantic relationship is now undergoing systematic dismantling, revision, and restructuring. European leaders are investing enormous efforts in trying to restore the relationship to normalcy. However, the ideological and economic differences between the U.S. and Europe have become so vast that they are likely to drift further apart, potentially reaching the point of no return.

As history has shown, long periods of unity are followed by division, and long periods of division eventually lead to reunification. This historical cycle is playing out once again.

Ma Xiaolin, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Mediterranean Research Institute
Zhang Lupeng, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Slavic Research Center at the Mediterranean Research Institute

On February 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the annual meeting of the Federal Security Service (FSB) that Russia and the United States are ready to re-establish cooperative relations. He noted that not everyone is pleased with the U.S.-Russia dialogue and that some are attempting to disrupt the process. On the same day, U.S. and Russian delegations held the first round of closed-door bilateral consultations in Istanbul, Turkey, lasting over six hours. The focus of the talks was the operation of embassies in each other’s countries and visa issues.

This meeting followed a series of significant events, including the phone call between the U.S. and Russian presidents on February 12 and a milestone diplomatic meeting between senior representatives of both countries in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 18. These developments indicate that with the advent of the Trump 2.0 era, the two major adversaries—Russia and the United States—are attempting to turn the page on the dark chapter of the Ukraine crisis and move rapidly toward the normalization of bilateral relations. Additionally, according to Bloomberg, the two countries are discussing the Arctic as a new area for economic cooperation, including joint resource extraction and the development of Arctic trade routes.

At this delicate moment of a sharp adjustment in U.S.-Russia relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke with Putin on the phone on February 24—the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Two days later, Xinhua News Agency published a commentary stating that the conversation between the Chinese and Russian leaders sent a “clear signal to the world” in three key aspects: “China-Russia relations are mature, stable, and resilient”; “steady advancement of cooperation in various fields”; and “timely communication on important issues.”

As U.S.-Russia relations quickly warm, U.S.-European relations become tense, and the Russia-Ukraine war potentially accelerates toward an end in 2025, several key questions arise: Will U.S.-Russia relations see substantial improvement? Will China-Russia relations be affected? How will China respond to U.S.-China and China-Europe relations? How will China maximize benefits while avoiding harm? These are new and critical choices China must confront.

The U-Turn in U.S. Diplomacy and Russia’s Strategic Relief

The Russia-Ukraine war has lasted for three years. While Russia has occupied parts of four eastern Ukrainian regions, strengthened Putin’s leadership position, improved the Russian military’s combat experience, and deepened strategic cooperation with North Korea, it has also paid a heavy price. This includes but is not limited to: damage to its international reputation, strained diplomatic relations, declining regional influence, a NATO expansion forming a C-shaped encirclement around Russia, threats to maritime security in the Black and Baltic Seas, risks to overseas military outposts, massive war expenditures, economic sanctions disrupting trade and energy exports, reduced foreign investment, significant casualties, domestic tensions, and population loss. These difficulties have created unprecedented challenges for Russia. However, Trump’s pro-Russia stance has presented Moscow with a strategic opportunity, significantly easing external—particularly U.S.—pressure.

First, Russia’s “special military operation” is expected to achieve its strategic goals. The Trump administration has essentially accepted Russia’s conditions, including Ukraine not joining NATO, halting NATO’s eastward expansion, the resignation of the Zelensky administration, suppression of Nazi influences in Ukraine, and Russia’s control over portions of the four eastern Ukrainian regions. This includes gaining substantial land, resources, and population in the Donbas region. Meanwhile, peace talks will prevent further escalation of the war, reduce external military threats to Russia, and ensure the country’s strategic security.

Through three years of military action, Russia has reinforced its influence in the post-Soviet space, blocked Ukraine’s westward integration, demonstrated its resolve and ability to defend national interests, strengthened its voice on the international stage, secured its position in the Black Sea, and maintained control over the crucial strategic stronghold of Crimea. Furthermore, the new Syrian government has shown friendliness toward Russia, agreeing to allow Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim as strategic footholds in the eastern Mediterranean.

Based on current trends, future peace negotiations will likely ensure Russia’s geopolitical interests in Ukraine, particularly its control over eastern Ukraine. Consequently, Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe will be enhanced, positively affecting its security environment and increasing its leverage in negotiations with Western countries.

Additionally, Russia’s previously difficult situation is expected to improve comprehensively. The restoration of U.S.-Russia relations and peace talks with Ukraine could allow Russia to rebuild ties with Western nations, reduce international isolation, ease sanctions and external pressures, improve its global image, and expand diplomatic space. This, in turn, would better protect Russia’s national interests and enhance its international influence.

The Long-Term War’s Severe Impact on the Russian Economy

If Russia can collaborate with the United States to reach a peace agreement on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it may gradually lift or ease sanctions, restore normal economic and trade exchanges with other countries, and stabilize energy prices. This would alleviate economic pressure and create favorable conditions for domestic economic development.

The Trump administration has claimed that it will not only cooperate with Russia in the fields of economy, energy, and space but also support Russia’s re-entry into the G7. These policies would be beneficial for Russia’s economic recovery and growth. Recently, the continuous strengthening of the Russian ruble indicates that the market is generally confident in the Russian economy. Once the war ends, Russia will be able to redirect more energy and resources from the military sector to domestic economic development, social progress, and improving people’s livelihoods. This would promote the comprehensive development of the country and society, enhance living standards, strengthen domestic stability and cohesion, and restore the country’s overall strength.  

China-Russia Relations May Be Affected, and China Needs to Adjust Timely and Prudently 

The improvement of U.S.-Russia relations will profoundly impact the Russia-Ukraine situation and the global landscape. The Trump administration, by strengthening U.S.-Russia relations and promoting peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, may readjust the United States’ global strategic layout, focusing more resources and efforts on other key regions and areas. This could lead to increased pressure and containment efforts against China.

First, Russia’s strategic dependence on China may decrease, requiring China to adjust its expectations. The frequent high-level interactions between Russia and the U.S. suggest a trend toward normalization of bilateral relations. Russia is expected to resume cooperation with the U.S. in several areas of shared interest, including Ukraine’s future and Middle East governance, as well as in the fields of economy, energy, and space exploration. As the Trump administration relaxes restrictions on Russia, the overall Western sanctions pressure will gradually decrease, expanding Russia’s strategic space for survival on the international stage.

At the same time, this also means that Russia’s dependence on China will gradually diminish, and its strategic autonomy will increase. The previous trend of Russia’s “pivot to the East and South” may slow down. As a result, China’s initiative in cooperation with Russia may decrease, and it will have to adapt to a scenario where Russia regains greater strategic autonomy and bargaining power in bilateral exchanges.

Second, the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations will not be smooth, and China need not be overly anxious. The current interactions between U.S. and Russian leaders only indicate a trend toward easing tensions, but resuming contacts does not equate to genuine improvement in relations. U.S.-Russia relations are still in the early “ice-breaking” stage, and there is still a long way to go before full normalization. Similarly, reaching a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement will require extensive work. Therefore, it is premature to declare a U.S.-Russia “honeymoon period” or predict that the Russia-Ukraine war will soon end.

China should closely monitor U.S.-Russia interactions, maintain communication with Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the U.S., and coordinate with key Global South countries through mechanisms such as BRICS. This would allow China to continue playing a constructive role in the Ukraine issue while safeguarding its own interests.

Third, Trump’s major policy shift toward Russia faces resistance.

1. Domestic political opposition – Trump’s policy proposals are highly controversial in the U.S., as the Democratic Party broadly supports continued assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s push for a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement could exacerbate partisan divisions and internal political struggles in the U.S., affecting the government’s decision-making efficiency and execution.
2. Impact on the U.S. military-industrial complex – A peace agreement would immediately reduce military-industrial demand, which could lead to open or covert opposition from defense contractors and military-industrial capital.

3. European dissatisfaction – Trump’s push for a Russia-Ukraine peace deal has already sparked dissatisfaction among European allies, who fear that the U.S. move will weaken NATO’s cohesion and leave Europe more vulnerable when facing Russia alone. This could lead to fractures in U.S.-Europe relations and impact traditional transatlantic alliances.

As a result, the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine conflict will also depend on the responses of the EU, Ukraine, and other involved parties—it is not solely dictated by the U.S. and Russia. The Trump administration faces constraints from the Democratic Party establishment and military-industrial interests at home, and given Trump’s unpredictable leadership style, the process of restoring U.S.-Russia relations will not be entirely smooth. Whether there will be obstacles, how significant these obstacles will be, and whether there will be setbacks remain areas worth continuous observation and attention.

Managing Complex Relations with Russia and the U.S.: China Holds the Initiative 

1. Putin is not Trump; Russia-China relations under Putin will not experience drastic swings.

In the next four years, China should focus on consolidating and strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia in the new era and enhancing communication and coordination with Russia on the Ukraine issue. As U.S.-Russia relations ease significantly, Russia’s diplomatic situation will gradually improve. However, under Putin’s leadership, Russia is unlikely to place more trust in the U.S. within just four years of Trump’s presidency than in its long-term strategic partners such as China.

Unlike Trump, who comes from a business background, Putin is a more stable and far-sighted politician who will undoubtedly make long-term, stable plans for Russia’s strategic development and national interests.

The world is generally adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward Trump’s current administration, closely observing whether his team can effectively govern the United States, suppress the Democratic establishment, build his own loyal political base, and achieve his goal of “Making America Great Again” by suppressing all competitors and consolidating U.S. global hegemony. The ultimate objective is to ensure that, four years from now, the MAGA faction can continue executing Trump’s policies and securing the interests of the Trump family.

2. China should remain strategically clear-headed and not allow the Trump administration to disrupt its pace.

China should maintain strategic clarity, stability, and direction to the greatest extent possible, avoiding falling into a strategy of attrition set by its competitors.

In recent years, a common view among China-U.S. strategic think tanks is that within the next ten years, the power balance between China and the U.S. may shift. If, by then, China’s national strength surpasses that of the U.S., Washington may adjust its stance toward China—potentially abandoning its suppression strategy and choosing to cooperate with China in governing the world.

This is, of course, the ideal scenario. However, under this logic, China would need to accelerate its development over the next decade and surpass the U.S. in various key indicators. The danger of this approach, however, is that it could lead to excessive consumption of China’s developmental potential and exhaust the nation.

During the Cold War, the U.S. used military competition to drain the Soviet Union, eventually leading to its collapse. The Reagan administration’s “Star Wars” program forced the Soviet Union into an unsustainable arms race, depleting its national strength. This was a carefully planned U.S. strategic trap.

The current China-U.S. competition is a long-term struggle involving both economic development (“charging energy”) and strategic military capabilities (“releasing energy”).

– China’s institutional advantages, economic and social potential, and cultural resilience allow it to engage in a long-term battle of endurance rather than rushing to surpass the U.S. in every aspect.

– China does not need to engage in a direct competition for dominance with the U.S., nor does it need to exhaust itself in the process.

– Instead, China should focus on preserving national potential, balancing its relationships with the U.S., Russia, and Europe, and maintaining strategic stability on the Taiwan issue.

– China should leverage soft and smart power strategies to outmaneuver its opponents while ensuring sustainable and long-term national development.

– The ultimate goal remains the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, achieved through a balanced and methodical approach to strengthening both hard and soft power.  

3. China should strengthen relations with Europe, especially restoring cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries.

Trump’s pro-Russia stance has alarmed and dissatisfied European nations. Many EU countries fear that after suffering major economic losses due to the Ukraine crisis, they will also face U.S. security blackmail.

China should take concrete measures to help the EU enhance its strategic autonomy by strengthening economic, technological, and trade cooperation and ensuring shared benefits.

– Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, are increasingly concerned about their security as Russia gains the upper hand amid U.S.-Russia reconciliation.

– This presents an opportunity for China to revive the “16+1” China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Mechanism.

– China should closely monitor these developments and strategically plan the restoration of China-Central and Eastern European cooperation.

Over the next three to four years, China should, under the framework of international norms, enhance mutually beneficial relations with Europe, boost trade exchanges, reduce tariff barriers, expand cooperation in artificial intelligence and renewable energy and strengthen people-to-people exchanges to increase China’s strategic maneuverability in Europe.

4. Strengthening and protecting China’s strategic deterrence, particularly its nuclear deterrence and national security capabilities.

China must continue developing its strategic deterrence, particularly its nuclear deterrent and overall national security infrastructure.

– Enhancing the technological advancement and ensuring the absolute security of China’s nuclear capabilities is a key pillar of national security and territorial integrity.

– Regardless of whether they belong to the Republican or Democratic Party, U.S. politicians fear Russia’s strong strategic nuclear forces. As a result, the U.S. has always been cautious when dealing with Russia.

– Ukraine, on the other hand, lost its strategic nuclear deterrence and suffered severe consequences—its national security and territorial integrity were brutally violated.

To ensure China’s long-term national security, it is imperative to maintain a robust strategic deterrence, including nuclear capabilities, and reinforce national defense to deter potential threats.

Conclusion 

1. Putin’s Russia will not abandon its long-term strategic partnership with China in favor of short-term gains from Trump’s U.S.
2. China should remain strategically patient, avoiding unnecessary exhaustion in competition with the U.S.
3. China must seize the opportunity to strengthen relations with Europe, particularly Central and Eastern European countries, amid U.S.-Russia reconciliation.
4. Strengthening strategic deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, remains a crucial safeguard for China’s national security.

By following these principles, China can effectively navigate the shifting geopolitical landscape while ensuring its long-term stability and prosperity.