On New Year’s Day 2025, Syrian transitional government Foreign Minister Assad Shibani arrived in Riyadh at the invitation of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, marking his first diplomatic visit. This visit is a reciprocal gesture following the Saudi delegation’s visit to Damascus last week, showcasing to the world that “New Syria” is moving away from the dark era of war and embarking on a new chapter of national reconstruction.

At the onset of the Syrian crisis 13 years ago, Saudi Arabia led the Arab League in cooperation with Western nations in an attempt to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime to dismantle the “Shiite Crescent,” which was perceived as a strategic threat. This effort failed as the rise of ISIS became the top international threat, and Russia, along with the Shiite Crescent, successfully preserved Assad’s rule. Syrian-Saudi relations hit rock bottom and only began to recover in 2023 when Saudi Arabia and Iran ended their sectarian disputes and normalized relations. However, before these ties fully normalized, the Assad regime rapidly collapsed.

As the international community subtly acknowledged Syria’s new government—especially after both the Shiite Crescent and the Resistance Axis faltered—Syria and Saudi Arabia found a historic opportunity for structural realignment. Saudi Arabia quickly became the top regional partner of the Syrian transitional government. This cooperation is mutually beneficial and logical, as neither Saudi Arabia nor the new Syrian regime are natural allies of Iran. The closeness and potential alliance between “New Syria” and Saudi Arabia, the leading Arab nation, will further consolidate Arab unity and diminish Iranian and Shiite influence.

The Syrian Foreign Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia signifies a key move by the transitional government to open a new chapter. It sends a practical message to the outside world about the desire to end war and conflict, seek internal reconciliation and stability, and rebuild national governance, society, and the economy, as well as rejoin the international community. This visit also serves as a test for the new governance and diplomatic philosophy of the leader Ahmed Shara (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), making it particularly noteworthy.

Last week, Saudi state television “Al Arabiya” aired a half-hour interview with Shara. The controversial figure, once clad in military gear, appeared in a suit, spoke elegantly, and demonstrated fluent, standard Arabic with composure and confidence. His governance ideas and strategic planning impressed viewers, but his signature beard served as a reminder of his origins linked to Al-Qaeda.

Shara reflected on his governance experience in Idlib, emphasizing that toppling Assad required not only military strength but also mobilizing civilian forces to minimize destruction and casualties. He underscored efforts to engage with the previous regime, including Assad himself, to ensure a smooth transition of power. Although Shara acknowledged that the “Idlib experience” might not fully apply to the complexities of all of Syria, the transitional government is willing to unite different factions under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, address the interests of various ethnic groups, restore order, and establish a national unity government based on constitutional reforms or a new constitution. A population census and general elections will follow to facilitate the return of 15 million displaced Syrians.

Shara acknowledged the diverse forces involved in Syria and stressed the importance of developing bilateral relations with all parties based on mutual respect for Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This includes recognizing Syria’s historical ties with Russia and urging the U.S. to lift the “Caesar Act” sanctions to ease Syria’s economic hardships. He also highlighted the need to address Turkey’s control over northern territories but avoided more sensitive issues like the fate of the Golan Heights, relations with Israel, and complete disengagement from terrorism. However, he made it clear that ending Iran’s long-standing influence in Syria was a top priority.

As a Sunni Muslim—representing 80% of Syria’s population—Shara emphasized the role of Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab states. He linked Syria’s security and stability to the Gulf’s prosperity and expressed hope that these countries would play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction and share in the benefits. Shara revealed that he had extensively studied Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” and admired its economic diversification efforts. He welcomed Saudi participation in major Syrian reconstruction projects and infrastructure investments, reflecting a clear strategic direction in his choice of Saudi Arabia for his first diplomatic visit. This signaled that “New Syria” aligns with the Arab world and mainstream Sunni leadership, seeking Gulf Arab states’ support for stability and recovery.

Less than a month after the opposition coalition, led by Shara, seized power in Damascus, they initiated dialogue, reconciliation, and measures to dissolve armed factions and unify national forces. They also began negotiations with Kurdish forces in the northeast and Druze leaders. The transitional government declared that “New Syria” would not adopt the federalism favored by some Kurds but would retain a highly centralized republic.

Upon capturing Damascus on December 8, the transitional government appointed Mohamed Bashir, a technocrat widely accepted by the opposition, as Prime Minister. Former President Assad, in exile in Moscow, announced his resignation and called for a peaceful transfer of power. Diplomatic transitions occurred smoothly, ensuring the continuity of Syrian representation internationally.

To foster “New Syria’s” reconstruction, Shara announced plans to dissolve his core military force, the “Syrian Sham Liberation Army,” at a national dialogue conference, paving the way for the integration of all factions into the national army. He outlined a three-year plan for constitutional reform and a four-year timeline for general elections, prioritizing legal reconstruction and restoring order.

Although the international community was surprised by Assad’s rapid fall and remains wary of Shara’s past ties to terrorism, they pragmatically accepted the transitional government. Like Afghanistan’s Taliban, conditions for diplomatic recognition include protecting minority and women’s rights, forming an inclusive government, and severing ties with terrorism. However, unlike the Taliban, Syria’s new government has quickly engaged with the international community, highlighting Syria’s strategic importance in the region.

The Syrian transitional government faces the common tasks of all new governments in war-torn countries, namely the three major reconstructions: security reconstruction, political reconstruction, and economic reconstruction. For “New Syria,” security reconstruction is clearly the top priority, which involves achieving a genuine and comprehensive ceasefire, integrating all armed factions into the national armed forces, ending armed divisions, restoring full peace and security, and ensuring the free flow of people, goods, and particularly humanitarian supplies.

Political reconstruction, which is a more long-term and fundamental task, depends on the success of security reconstruction. This includes conducting political dialogues under the framework of UN Security Council resolutions, forming a coalition government with broad representation, and drafting or amending a new constitution through comprehensive consultation, public opinion solicitation, and the guidance of legal experts. Subsequently, nationwide elections will be organized based on the new constitution and an authoritative, reliable, and updated population census, resulting in unified legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Achieving this step is expected to take three to five years.

Political reconstruction represents a fragile and sensitive transitional phase that will test the ability of various factions to compromise and reconcile their political demands, national identity, and ethnic identity. It will challenge the transitional government in managing the “dual legacy” of Arab nationalism and the Ba’ath Party ideology, which has governed Syria for over half a century. The goal is to avoid the tragic scenario seen in Iraq, where the new government, after Saddam Hussein’s fall, hastily disbanded the national defense forces and purged the Ba’ath Party, leading to nationwide chaos. If this transitional phase is not carefully navigated, “New Syria” risks falling into the kind of decade-long civil war experienced by Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, escalating into a “small world war” or “Syria War 3.0,” thereby destroying the historical opportunity to build and shape “New Syria” and plunging an entire generation back into bloodshed and conflict. During this phase, lifting the Syrian people out of hunger and poverty and enabling them to live and work in peace is crucial. This will depend not only on the wisdom and leadership of the transitional government but also on the generous assistance and strong support of the international community.

Economic reconstruction is not only an urgent task for “New Syria” but also a long, arduous mission that will follow security and political reconstruction. To some extent, it is the fundamental guarantee for the long-term stability of Syria’s security and political systems. Had the Assad regime successfully stabilized the economy, people’s livelihoods, and the military over the past four years, the opposition forces would not have been able to overthrow decades of rule in just 12 days. The failure to fundamentally address economic and livelihood issues ultimately made the Assad government the fifth “domino” to fall 13 years after the Arab Spring erupted, following the collapses of strongman regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. This outcome underscores the Assad regime’s failure to learn from the painful lessons of those countries.

The Syrian transitional government has inherited a war-torn nation in disarray and deep crisis, but it has also ushered in a new era for “New Syria.” Whether Syria can ultimately be rebuilt into an independent, free, democratic, inclusive, stable, developing nation with full sovereignty and territorial integrity will be determined by time.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

In 2024, China’s economic recovery still appeared sluggish, falling short of the expectations of many observers. However, on the other hand, China remains the world’s largest growth engine from a global perspective.

More importantly, China finally made some long-awaited decisions or witnessed certain shifts in circumstances. While these actions may seem belated, they are by no means too late.

1. Timely Adjustments to Economic and Financial Policies

In 2024, China introduced a series of accommodative economic and financial policies, including lowering the reserve requirement ratio, increasing infrastructure investment, and supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.

The stock market quickly rebounded, real estate in major cities stabilized, the manufacturing PMI returned to expansion, and the consumer market gradually recovered.

It remains uncertain whether confidence in the capital markets has been fully restored. However, given that by year-end the government reintroduced the concept of a “moderately loose monetary policy” for the first time in 14 years, 2025 holds promising prospects.

Had these policies been implemented immediately after the pandemic, their effects might have been even greater. Yet the negative consequences of excessive quantitative easing in finance policies in the West have often been described in China using the idiom “drinking poison to quench thirst.”

Considering this, the Communist Party of China’s hesitation is understandable. Fortunately, the shift did not come too late.

2. Prudent and Gradual Implementation of Delayed Retirement Policy

Another issue with far-reaching implications is China’s approach to delayed retirement. Many long-time China observers are aware that transitioning a population of 1.4 billion into an aging society poses a colossal challenge.

With birth rates continuing to decline, the so-called demographic dividend is vanishing, and the pressure on the pension system is mounting.

In recent years, delayed retirement has been widely discussed in Chinese society. Although, like people in other countries, most Chinese are not eager to work longer, the implementation of delayed retirement is inevitable.

Thanks to extensive public discussions and the Communist Party’s consideration of diverse opinions, the gradual reforms have been broadly accepted, avoiding the political deadlocks or street protests seen in some developed countries.

The Communist Party could have implemented this reform earlier and more decisively, but the widespread discussions increased public acceptance. This delay, therefore, has its own value.

3. Strategic Breakthroughs in Regional Diplomacy

China also witnessed long-awaited shifts in regional diplomatic dynamics.

Amid a complex geopolitical environment, China fundamentally sought to ease relations with Japan, India, and Australia, allowing it to focus on domestic affairs and competition with the United States. However, unlike the first two areas, this required “cooperation” from other countries.

On one hand, the changes of this year are the result of China’s consistent efforts through a mix of soft and hard policies; on the other hand, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president also played a role. Finally, these countries have noticeably adjusted their stances toward China.

The Sino-Indian border issue was once again effectively managed, Japan’s foreign minister made positive statements toward China, and Sino-Australian relations, after some turbulence, returned to normalcy, benefiting both economies. These diplomatic breakthroughs have created a more favorable regional environment for China.

It would have been better if these changes had happened earlier, but the current outcomes are still quite satisfying.

It is worth mentioning that, on the anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth in late 2024, China test-flew two new fighter jets, believed to be the world’s first two sixth-generation fighters. This groundbreaking event placed China ahead of the West in advanced fighter technology.

On the same day, AI company DeepSeek officially launched the first version of its new model series, DeepSeek-V3, and simultaneously made it open source. Among open-source models, its test performance ranked first, matching closed-source large models in many aspects, and its computational cost is reportedly “only 1/100 of GPT-4.”

Had these achievements emerged earlier, they might have prompted the United States to more seriously consider how to engage in equal dialogue and “healthy competition” with China.

But even now, it’s not too late—especially before the new U.S. president takes office. Perhaps he will understand.

2024 is about to become history, and the year will certainly stand out as a period marked by turmoil, thrilling events, and unexpected developments—a year of upheaval fitting the natural attributes of the Chinese zodiac’s Year of the Dragon. In Chinese culture, the dragon, one of the 12 zodiac signs, symbolizes the emperor, a harbinger of good fortune, and a super beast full of vitality that can stir the seas and skies. In Western culture, however, the dragon represents ominous forces, possessing great power but also destructive and potentially devastating tendencies. Reflecting the nature of the Year of the Dragon, 2024 has witnessed a series of political maneuvers and conflicts across the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, casting a bloody and shadowy tone over the world, foreshadowing more unrest and uncertainty in the coming year.

Trump’s Triumphant Return Sparks Global Anxiety

The biggest surprise and risk of 2024 was the U.S. presidential election and the unexpected, forceful comeback of former President Donald Trump. The Democratic Party, which had governed for just four years, replaced President Joe Biden with Vice President Kamala Harris in the race, but this did little to hinder Trump and the Republican Party’s overwhelming momentum. After surviving an assassination attempt, Trump stunned the world by reclaiming the White House with a decisive victory. The Republican Party also achieved a rare feat, gaining control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the Supreme Court.

Having already experienced the “fierce” leadership style of Trump, the world now faces an even more assertive and confident “Trump 2.0,” with the U.S. consolidating power under one party, increasingly shaped by Trump’s influence. Trump’s return to office is expected to lead to the U.S. withdrawing from international multilateral organizations and treaties, such as the WHO, the Paris Climate Agreement, and UNESCO, disrupting the global governance system. Trump’s “America First” and “America Above All” policies will likely result in steep tariffs on trade partners and pressure on security allies to significantly increase their military spending. Trump may also undermine U.S. post-WWII transatlantic and transpacific alliances, potentially damaging the so-called “Pax Americana.” Trump’s comments about making Canada the 51st state, the necessity of owning Greenland from Denmark, and regaining control of the Panama Canal have left these nations feeling uneasy and tense.

Russia-Ukraine War Tilts in Favor of Russia 

After nearly three years, the Russia-Ukraine war is now clearly favoring Russia. As the conflict extends into its third year, Russia has transitioned from a strategic defensive position to an all-out offensive, consolidating control in the south and expanding its dominance in the Donbas region, forcing the Ukrainian army into retreat. Russia continues to target Ukraine’s infrastructure, aiming to demoralize both the Ukrainian military and civilian population. Despite ongoing aid from the U.S. and Europe, Ukraine suffers heavy losses, particularly in manpower, making it difficult to sustain prolonged warfare.

With Trump set to return to office and his opposition to prolonging the war, the U.S. policy of supporting Ukraine’s war of attrition is losing ground. Ukraine’s government is now faced with the possibility of losing U.S. support, prompting President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior officials to openly acknowledge their inability to reclaim lost territories. There is increasing openness to peace talks, even if it means ceding land. More Western leaders are beginning to believe that the war could reach a ceasefire by 2025.

Political Crises in Germany and France Challenge European Unity

 One of the year’s surprises was the domestic crises in Germany and France, the two engines of the European Union. In Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s dismissal of Finance Minister Christian Lindner of the Free Democratic Party led to internal conflict, resulting in a successful no-confidence vote in the Bundestag. This forced Germany to call early parliamentary elections in February 2025. The root of Germany’s political crisis lies in economic and social issues, including Scholz’s proactive involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, increased defense spending, and value-driven diplomacy aligned with the U.S. The inability to manage immigration, revive the manufacturing sector, and improve social welfare has led to declining public support. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is gaining momentum and may play a role in forming the next government.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to hold early elections in mid-2024 resulted in a surge in far-right popularity, leading to a fragmented parliament and political instability. By December 4, Prime Minister Michel Bayeni, who had been in office for just three months, was ousted by parliament. Ten days later, François Bayrou took over as prime minister, becoming Macron’s sixth prime minister and the fourth within a year. However, Bayrou’s tenure remains uncertain, with approval ratings plummeting to a historic low of 34%.

After Brexit, the EU’s traditional “trio” slimmed down to the “Franco-German duo,” but with political instability and frequent government changes in both countries, European integration and cohesion are severely impacted. This weakens the influence of these cornerstone nations on international affairs. If far-right forces enter ruling coalitions, it will undoubtedly challenge traditional policies in Germany and France, potentially leading to the “fragmentation” of the EU and even a historic regression in the unification process.

The Middle East war was unprecedentedly brutal, leaving multiple losers and one winner

The “Sixth Middle East War” was triggered by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which rapidly spread vertically across the Eastern Mediterranean and horizontally to the Persian Gulf. This created an “eight-front” war, with Israel leading the U.S. in one camp and Iran and Syria aligning with militia forces from Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq in the opposing camp. The war, marked by brutal sieges in Gaza and intense airstrikes in Lebanon, unexpectedly reignited Syria’s civil war, which had been dormant for four years. Even more unexpectedly, this led to the swift collapse of the Syrian regime without major battles.

This hybrid war, interwoven with conventional warfare, guerrilla tactics, shadow wars, proxy conflicts, and high-tech operations, brought shame to modern civilization. Turkey emerged as the sole winner, exploiting the chaos to help topple Bashar al-Assad’s regime. However, all other parties, including Israel and Palestine, ended up as losers. The biggest strategic failures were suffered by Russia and Iran, both of which had deeply influenced Syria. Russia lost its status as a major global player in the Middle East, while Iran’s painstakingly cultivated “Axis of Resistance” and “Shia Crescent” were severely damaged.

Apart from Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria—whose territorial losses to Israel provided some legitimacy to their military actions—other parties engaged in the conflict under the guise of self-defense or Palestinian liberation, pursuing their own interests. This war, the largest in the Middle East since the Cold War, resembled a “Spring and Autumn Unjust War,” driven by ulterior motives.

Former Colonies Assert Independence, France’s Military Fully Withdraws from Africa 

On December 20, France began withdrawing troops from Chad, a Central African nation. Although the withdrawal involved only 120 personnel, it marked a historic step in reducing France’s political and military influence in Africa, as Chad was France’s last military outpost on the continent. New governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—where coups had occurred—had previously expelled French troops, welcoming new allies such as Russia and the U.S.

France, a former colonial ruler of many African nations, had maintained a military presence even after these countries gained independence. This was often justified by counterterrorism efforts and the protection of French interests. France’s intermittent military interventions in Chad had lasted nearly 64 years, peaking at 1,000 troops. Since 2014, France’s counterterrorism operation “Barkhane” in the Sahel region once deployed 5,100 troops. However, as France’s overall power declined and President Macron sought to scale back overseas deployments, African nations’ growing sense of autonomy forced France to gradually retreat.

Failed Coup in South Korea: “Blue House Curse” Strikes Again

East Asia also saw turmoil in 2024. Initially, North Korea’s relations with the South deteriorated rapidly after drones infiltrated Pyongyang. This led to the renewal of a mutual defense alliance between North Korea and Russia, with reports of North Korean troops being sent to the Russia-Ukraine battlefield, creating dual hotspots in East and West.

As global attention focused on the evolving North Korea-Russia relationship, South Korea experienced political upheaval overnight. Plagued by a political crisis, President Yoon Suk-yeol, swayed by advisers practicing fortune-telling, unconstitutionally declared martial law, triggering South Korea’s most severe constitutional crisis since the “June Struggle” of 1987.

Amid global scrutiny, opposition lawmakers broke through martial law lines and entered parliament, overturning Yoon’s decree with a two-thirds majority. This forced Yoon to retract his declaration and publicly apologize. Despite avoiding bloodshed, Yoon fell victim to the so-called “Blue House Curse,” becoming the second sitting president to face impeachment. Although the failed coup highlighted South Korea’s mature democratic processes, it exposed severe partisan strife, paralyzing the nation’s political system.

BRICS and SCO Expand, Global South Continues to Rise

On December 23, Russia, host of the 2024 BRICS Summit, announced that starting January 1, 2025, Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Cuba, Uganda, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan would officially join BRICS as partner countries. This marks another major expansion following last year’s historic enlargement, incorporating nations from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Additionally, 24 other nations remain on the waiting list for membership.

Coincidentally, at the June 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, Belarus’ membership was approved, bringing the total number of full members to 10, alongside two observer states and 14 dialogue partners.

BRICS and the SCO, both initiated by emerging and developing countries, continue to thrive and expand, underscoring the decline of the Western G7 bloc. This reflects the redistribution of political, economic, and trade power, highlighting the shifting balance from West to East and North to South. The Global South’s increasing cooperation and collective pursuit of peace and development symbolize a new vision, offering a rare bright spot in an otherwise turbulent 2024.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.