Opinion
The U.S. 2025 ‘National Security Strategy’ Report and the Disintegration Facing the U.S.–Europe Alliance
The Twilight of Transatlantic Relations: The U.S. 2025 Version of the ‘National Security Strategy’ Report and the Disintegration Facing the U.S.–Europe Alliance
Wang Wanying and Ma Xiaolin
The 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report released by the Trump administration of the United States on December 4 was like a huge stone thrown into a pool of water, stirring up stormy waves. This document, which proclaims America’s future new security policy, not only removes China and Russia from the position of primary threats, but also tolls the imminent centennial death knell for the transatlantic alliance that has lasted for a hundred years. Not only that, Trump also harshly castigated and humiliated America’s European allies, fearing that Europe might misread this report announcing the end of the U.S.–Europe marriage.
On December 9, Trump said in an interview with the U.S. outlet Politico that “most European countries are becoming rotten.” He accused Europe’s immigration policies of being a “disaster,” saying that “they want political correctness, and that makes them weak” … and that some European leaders are “utter fools.”
The Daily Telegraph, published on the 10th, even revealed that a leaked version of the 2025 “National Security Strategy” report shows that the Trump administration intends to have Hungary and Italy leave the European Union. German Chancellor Merz, however, was not surprised. When commenting on this official U.S. document on the 9th, he said that America’s national security strategy confirmed his judgment: “Europe, and Germany as well, must be more independent from the United States in terms of security policy.” He emphasized that Europeans must be prepared for the United States no longer being an alliance partner …
Looking at the “National Security Strategy” (NSS) reports released by three U.S. administrations from 2017 to 2025, the U.S.–Europe transatlantic relationship has undergone a dramatic shock from “transactional partners” to a “values alliance,” ultimately moving toward “strategic divergence” and a “civilizational rupture.” The 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report marks that the transatlantic alliance system after World War II is facing substantive disintegration, and U.S.–Europe relations have officially entered a “post-ally era.”
This trajectory of evolution is not a simple policy swing, but rather a structural reckoning by the United States of its global strategy against the backdrop of soaring costs of maintaining hegemony and intensifying domestic political polarization. From the initial appearance of cracks in 2017 to the civilizational rupture in 2025, every step points to the “irreversibility of divergence,” with its roots deeply embedded in the profound misalignment of power, interests, and values between the U.S. and Europe.
The Overall Picture of the Evolution of Transatlantic Relations
The U.S. “National Security Strategy” is not only a declaration of foreign policy, but also a reflection of its domestic political ecology and global strategic anxiety. From 2017 to 2025, transatlantic relations experienced a shift from a “boiling frog in warm water” style of transactionalization, to a brief “last gasp” during the Biden period, and finally to a “shock therapy”–style rupture in 2025.
This evolution reveals a cruel strategic reality: the traditional Western alliance system can no longer adapt to a multipolar world order and the internal political ecology of the United States. The U.S.–Europe rupture in 2025 is not an accidental “black swan” event, but the inevitable result of three intertwined logics—U.S. hegemonic contraction, U.S.–Europe cognitive misalignment, and the deconstruction of values. A rupture in capabilities forces the United States into strategic retrenchment; a rupture in threat perception leads the U.S. and Europe to move in opposite directions regarding their geopolitical focal points; and a rupture in values pushes former allies to the edge of a “clash of civilizations.” This process demonstrates that the estrangement of transatlantic relations is not a temporary tactical adjustment, but the inevitable end of a historical cycle.
- The Prelude to Divergence: Accumulation of Contradictions and Failure of Repair (2017–2024)
Before the final rupture in 2025, U.S.–Europe relations went through policy attempts by two administrations that were starkly different yet causally linked. Various signs in this stage indicate that the foundation of the alliance had long been eroded by “transactionalism,” and subsequent repair efforts failed to address the root cause.
1. The Initiation of Transactionalism: The First Appearance of Cracks (2017–2020)
The “National Security Strategy” report released in December 2017 was the starting point of divergence. It broke the post–Cold War U.S. consensus on the “liberal international order” and introduced naked realism into the sacred realm of alliance relations.
First, it established the “debt-based” positioning of allies. The Trump 1.0 administration regarded allies as projects to be evaluated on a balance sheet. This so-called “principled realism” was in fact “transactionalism without moral distinction.” The report harshly criticized NATO allies for failing to meet the target of 2% of GDP in defense spending. At the time, this was interpreted in Europe as a negotiating tactic, but later proved to be a signal that the U.S. strategic community’s tolerance for NATO “free-riding” had dropped to zero.
Second, it pioneered economic nationalism. The 2017 version of the “National Security Strategy” defined economic prosperity as a core pillar of national security and, for the first time, explicitly regarded trade deficits as a national security threat. This logic of “trade as war” made it difficult for the U.S. and Europe to form a united front in policy toward China. During this period, Europe was forced to adopt a “hedging” strategy, attempting to maintain a balance between China and the United States.
2. The Fragile “Last Gasp”: Failure of Repair (2021–2024)
After the Biden administration took office, it attempted to reverse its predecessor’s course through the 2022 version of the “National Security Strategy,” once again establishing Europe as a core partner in defending the “rules-based order.” However, the limitations exposed during the implementation of this report highlighted the structural irreversibility of the U.S. strategic retrenchment trend.
First, the hollowing out of alliance mechanisms. Although the Biden administration established the “U.S.–EU Trade and Technology Council” (TTC) in an attempt to coordinate technology policy toward China, as think tanks such as the Atlantic Council have pointed out, the U.S. side was never willing to establish a “democratic technology alliance” with treaty-binding force. The TTC ultimately remained only at the level of loose policy dialogue.
Second, the covert continuation of “America First.” The massive subsidies and local content requirements in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) triggered strong warnings from Macron about a “split within the Western camp,” and Europe’s industrial circles even described it as “the murder of European industry.” This meant that even during the “ally” period, the United States was unwilling to make concessions to Europe on core economic interests. This kind of “false healing” failed to withstand the pressure of the resurgence of isolationism within the United States, laying the groundwork for the complete rupture in 2025.
- The Outbreak and Inevitability of the 2025 Divergence
The 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report released by the Trump 2.0 administration is not only a sudden policy shift, but also a “final reckoning” of the contradictions accumulated in the earlier period. It marks the elevation of U.S.–Europe relations from tactical divergences entangled in interests to a structural rupture at the level of geopolitics and civilizational cognition.
1. The Explicit Outbreak of Divergence: Deep Ruptures Across Four Dimensions
Strategic “Neglect and Retrenchment”:
Many media outlets have keenly noted that in this report of more than 30 pages, only two and a half pages are devoted to Europe. Leonardo Hutter, a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the United States, stated bluntly that this means the United States no longer regards Europe as part of its core interests: “Europe has become increasingly irrelevant to the United States.” The report clearly proposes prioritizing the Western Hemisphere, aiming to eliminate the influence of external forces in Latin America, marking a substantive retreat by the United States from “globalism” to “hemispherism.” The United States announced a substantial reduction in its permanent military presence in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The report states that “indiscriminate global intervention has hollowed out U.S. power,” and that the United States must refuse to continue acting as the “world’s police.”
Security “Undermining at the Root”:
On the NATO issue, the 2025 report adopts a strategy of “undermining at the root,” completely changing the nature of the alliance. The report not only requires Europe to share costs, but also demands that Europe take over defense responsibilities. It reiterates the startling consensus reached at the June 2025 Hague Summit: NATO member states committed to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Even though this target adopts a dual-track structure of “3.5% core defense + 1.5% civil defense infrastructure,” easing short-term fiscal pressure, it still maintains a high-pressure posture requiring allies to fully pay for their own security. The strategic intent behind setting such a high threshold is not truly to expect Europe to meet it, but to create a state in which allies are in “permanent default.” This provides the United States with a “legitimate” pretext, based on the principle of “transactional realism,” to adjust, scale back, or even refuse to implement Article Five at any time, effectively making NATO’s collective defense commitment conditional and hollow.
In addition, the report announces the suspension of all military assistance to Ukraine and unilaterally proposes a peace plan aimed at “rebuilding strategic stability with Russia.” This plan includes limiting Ukraine’s military capabilities and prohibiting its accession to NATO, and is widely regarded as sacrificing Ukraine’s sovereignty, effectively relegating Europe’s security agenda to a secondary position. From Vice President Vance’s blunt criticism of Europe at the Munich Security Conference at the beginning of the year, to the United States’ “over-the-head diplomacy” toward Europe on the Ukraine issue, all indicate that the United States no longer regards Europe as an equal partner requiring consultation, but rather as a strategic chess piece to be disposed of at will.
Economic “Designation as an Adversary”:
In the economic and trade domain, the 2025 report regards the European Union as a major competitor, and in some formulations even implies that it is more “exploitative” than geopolitical rivals. The report places “economic security” in an absolute priority position and plans to impose punitive “reciprocal tariffs” on EU goods in response to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and digital services tax. The report even uses the highly confrontational term “Liberation Day tariffs,” implying that the United States needs to be “liberated” from Europe’s trade exploitation. In the high-tech field, the United States leverages its dominance in AI and quantum computing, using extraterritorial jurisdiction and standards monopolization to force European companies to become dependent on the United States within technological ecosystems. This logic of “you must rely on me, but I will exploit you” renders the TTC mechanism nominal in existence only, transforming it into a tool for U.S. pressure.
Ideological “Civilizational Defense”:
The most shocking and subversive part of the 2025 report is its abandonment of America’s customary “export of democracy,” turning instead to an isolationist “civilizational defense,” and directly launching attacks on Europe’s mainstream political values. The report puts forward the theory of “civilizational erosion,” claiming that due to open immigration policies, multiculturalism, and the “suppression” of freedom of speech (referring to EU regulation of social media), Europe faces the risks of “civilizational extinction” and “replacement.” This marks a rupture between official U.S. ideology and Europe’s liberal mainstream.
Furthermore, the report openly proposes that the United States will support “patriotic” parties within Europe (namely right-wing populist forces) to “correct Europe’s current trajectory” and resist the erosion of the foundations of Western civilization by multiculturalism. This means that the United States has shifted from being a supporter of European integration to an instigator of European fragmentation. Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt sharply pointed out that this effectively positions the United States as “the right wing of Europe’s far right.” Liana Fix, a researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes that this way of viewing U.S.–Europe relations from a “civilizational” perspective marks “the end of transatlantic alliance relations based on liberal values.”
2. Proof of the Inevitability of Divergence: Three Structural Root Causes
From “transaction” in 2017, to “alliance” in 2022, and then to “divergence” in 2025, the evolution of the positioning of transatlantic relations in U.S. national security strategy reveals a cruel strategic reality: the traditional Western alliance system can no longer adapt to a multipolar world order and the internal political ecology of the United States. This evolution is not accidental, but the result of the combined effects of three major structural factors:
First is the rupture of power. The United States is no longer able to simultaneously maintain a global hegemonic system and the living standards of its domestic population, and must carry out strategic retrenchment. The idea of “denial strategy” has become mainstream—concentrating resources on the Indo-Pacific and abandoning Europe.
Second is the rupture of threat perception. The United States views China as an existential threat and Europe as a tool or even a burden; Europe views Russia as an existential threat and China as a systemic rival but also a necessary partner for cooperation. This misalignment of geopolitical interests is structural and cannot be bridged by diplomatic rhetoric.
Third is the rupture of values. With the institutionalization of right-wing populism in the United States, the U.S. and Europe have gradually drifted apart on core values such as democracy, human rights, climate change, and multilateralism. “Shared values” have become an empty shell, replaced by the projection of the theory of “civilizational conflict” within the Western world itself.
- Europe’s Passive Adaptation to the “Inevitable Divergence”
If German Chancellor Merkel’s speech in 2017 was a “warning” of the U.S.–Europe breakup, then the 2025 version of the U.S. “National Security Strategy” report is the “verdict.” Europe has no choice but to accept the reality that the United States has already “left.” Confronted with the “shock” brought by the 2025 report, Europe’s strategic community has gone through a process from shock and denial to forced action. The extremization of U.S. policy is pushing Europe to become a truly independent geopolitical pole.
1. Promoting the Hardening of Europe’s Political Stance
In a speech on December 8, European Council President Costa sent a clear signal. He stated that it is unacceptable for the United States to issue threats of interference in Europe’s internal politics, emphasizing that “allies do not threaten to interfere in the internal political lives of other allies.” Costa frankly admitted that differences in worldview between the United States and Europe are widening, that the United States no longer believes in multilateralism, and that Europe must “achieve sovereign autonomy” in response to the new U.S. strategy. Former President of the European Commission Prodi also called for the formulation of policies “to make its stance firmer,” even though the EU has not yet formed a systematic response. However, Europe’s voices are not unified. U.S. support for European right-wing forces has produced immediate effects, exacerbating fragmentation within Europe. Right-wing governments in countries such as Hungary and Italy have welcomed parts of the 2025 report, viewing them as endorsements of their own anti-immigration and anti–EU centralization policies. This has led to divisions within the EU on policies toward the United States and Russia, making it difficult to form a unified voice to counter U.S. pressure.
2. Accelerating the Process of “Strategic Autonomy” and Tactical Hedging
The introduction of the 2025 version of the “National Security Strategy” report and a series of moves by the Trump administration have made Europe’s desire to accelerate “strategic autonomy” even stronger. On the one hand, defense autonomy is speeding up. Faced with the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals, countries such as Germany and Poland have been forced to substantially increase defense budgets, trying to fill the conventional deterrence vacuum left by the United States; Germany plans to establish a new special defense fund, with the “turning point of the times” shifting from slogan to implementation, and is discussing with France the Europeanization of the nuclear umbrella; the United Kingdom has also clearly put forward “NATO first, but not NATO only,” and is seeking to establish a new strategic partnership with the European Union; as the only two nuclear powers in Europe, the United Kingdom and France have seen an unprecedented increase in urgency regarding defense cooperation, and the two countries are accelerating the advancement of an upgraded version of the “Lancaster House Treaties.” In short, Europe is enhancing its “autonomous capacity to act without the United States” by increasing defense capabilities and investing in strategic industries. On the other hand, the “red line” defense in technology and trade. Since the beginning of this year, the European Union has carried out a series of enforcement actions against U.S. technology companies based on the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. Analysts believe this is the EU’s direct response to U.S. tariff intervention, intended to “draw red lines” vis-à-vis the United States in the field of digital sovereignty. Europe is learning to play its hand with the United States more cleverly by gathering more bargaining chips.
*Wang Wanying – Assistant Research Fellow, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation Studies, Ningbo University; Lecturer, School of Foreign Languages, Ningbo University
*Ma Xiaolin – Specially Appointed Research Fellow, Institute for Central and Eastern European Economic and Trade Cooperation Studies, Ningbo University; Bao Yugang Chair Professor; Professor, Zhejiang International Studies University; Dean, Institute of Mediterranean Studies
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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Russia2 weeks agoDrone strike shuts down Yandex data centre in Russia’s Ryazan region
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America2 weeks agoTrump weighs presidential memorandum to cut surging US diesel prices
