Opinion
U.S. policy in the Middle East and aggression toward Iran
The United States continues to menace Iran. It is deploying naval armadas and additional military forces to the region to intimidate Tehran. Simultaneously, it aims to debilitate the country through economic sanctions and by lending support to domestic anti-government activities. However, it must not be forgotten that Iran—no matter how weakened it may become—possesses a state tradition, a profound institutional memory, an experienced military, and military technology that are incomparably stronger than those of Iraq or Syria.
There are, of course, significant reasons for the United States’ aggressive posture. In recent years, its influence—both globally and in the Middle East—has been waning; its hegemonic capacity is eroding, and its control over the strategic environment is weakening. The U.S. explicitly admitted as much in its defense strategy document released at the end of 2025. It no longer possesses the power to project force into every corner of the globe. It lacks the capacity to maintain occupying forces in two countries simultaneously. Yet, at the turn of the century, it did exactly that: occupying Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. It was capable of effecting regime change in three countries through “Color Revolutions”—as seen in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005).
The U.S. no longer commands such power. This decline is one of the drivers behind its fury and its emphasis on hard power. The U.S. failed to impede China’s rise or prevent Russia from rapidly recovering and expanding its influence. Beyond the growing footprint of these two powers in the Middle East, Washington was also unable to prevent the strengthening of their relations with Iran. The U.S. could not replicate in Iran what it accomplished in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, doing so would be exceptionally difficult.
For a considerable time, the U.S. has prioritized the containment of China, aligning its political, military, and diplomatic assets accordingly. Consequently, rather than intervening directly in Middle Eastern crises, it pushes its regional allies to the forefront. It demands that these allies seize the initiative. It prefers proxy wars, increasingly activating terrorist organizations and non-state actors. It resorts more frequently to social engineering, perception management, psychological warfare, hybrid warfare, and asymmetric warfare tactics. Its actions in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, and Sudan serve as proof of this shift.
Iran was the regional actor that benefited most from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Iranian influence in Syria was already deeply rooted historically. Furthermore, Iran distinguished itself through its anti-Israel stance and its tensions with Saudi Arabia. As a result, Iran steadily increased its influence in the Middle East for years, up until a few years ago.
U.S. priorities in the Middle East
The United States is an imperialist state. Therefore, its priorities regarding the Middle East are numerous and diverse, encompassing geopolitical, strategic, and economic dimensions, as well as aspects related to the region’s rich energy resources and transit routes.
If one were to rank these priorities from the U.S. perspective, the security of Israel would always occupy the first position. Subsequent items would include the control of energy resources and routes, the encirclement of Iran, the reduction of Iranian influence, regime change in Tehran, the establishment of a Kurdish state, the rollback of China’s increasing influence, the halting of Russia’s growing weight, and the support of Saudi Arabia and the Arab nations it leads.
U.S. interest in Middle Eastern energy resources dates back more than a century. For instance, on May 31, 1919, the U.S. Department of State sent the following directive to all its diplomatic missions worldwide: “Wherever petroleum is found or is likely to be found, report on the status of control over those oil resources, prospects for development, and opportunities for U.S. participation in oil production there.” In other words, even then, the U.S. had set its sights on the Middle East, on Mesopotamia, and on the territories of the dismantling Ottoman Empire. On May 3, 1920, Bedford, an executive at Standard Oil of New Jersey, obtained the text of an agreement made on April 27 between France and Britain in San Remo to partition the oil in the aforementioned territories. He obtained this via French delegates in San Remo and transmitted the document to Washington through the U.S. embassy. Washington was furious. France was to receive a 25% share of Mesopotamian oil in exchange for its docility regarding British control. If the oil were to be operated by private companies, this share would remain 25%. Oil operated by private companies in this region would remain under permanent British control. It became clear that the U.S. had to act immediately to protect its rights in the Middle East. (Lawrence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Türkiye, 1914-1924, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965).
When analyzing U.S. global and Middle East policies, the country’s imperialist character must always be taken into account. As an imperialist state, it seeks to access new markets and seize energy resources and precious minerals. Its priorities, threat definitions, objectives, and alliances are shaped accordingly. Looking at the post-World War II era, when the U.S. significantly increased its global weight, one observes the following: The bipolar order and the Cold War years had begun. Most colonies had gained their independence. Among these newly independent nations were countries exploited by Europeans since the 15th century, as well as those that had fallen under the sway of imperialism in the 19th century. These countries were not industrialized enough to be capitalist, nor did they possess a working class or class consciousness sufficient to adopt the socialist model. The majority of these countries were located in the Middle East and Africa.
During the Cold War, the U.S. viewed the USSR and communism as threats. It sought to prevent the development of anti-imperialist leftist currents and anti-imperialist nationalist movements within the Third World and among countries joining the Non-Aligned Movement. In the Middle East, the U.S. perceived Arab socialism—distinguished by its nationalist, anti-imperialist, pro-independence, and leftist character—as a threat. These movements in Arab countries were influenced by the tradition of the Committee of Union and Progress [CUP] in Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Kemalist Revolution. The movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in the 1950s (his name derives from Djemal Pasha, one of the leaders of the CUP) and the Ba’ath movement [meaning “Resurrection”] which rose with similar claims in Syria and Iraq (though there are differences between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath movements), unsettled the U.S. during those years.
The establishment of close relations between these Arab movements and the USSR also alarmed the U.S. In response, Washington supported Islamist movements in these countries to counter them. The “Green Belt Project,” aimed at encircling the USSR with Islamist regimes in Muslim countries, was activated during this period. Through this project, brought to the agenda in 1977 by Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Islamist currents were supported in Türkiye, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Saudi-U.S. relations developed further, and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in Egypt received significant support from the U.S.
Dimensions of U.S.-Iran tension
With the overthrow of the pro-American Shah of Iran in 1979 as a result of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the rise of Khomeini to power, the importance the U.S. attached to the Green Belt Project increased further. The U.S., which desired full alignment from the four countries within the scope of the Green Belt Project (Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), lost its influence in Iran when the Islamic Revolution took place in 1979. Immediately thereafter, it incited Iraq against Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Arab world (excluding Syria) and the West supported Iraq. The total loss of life for Iran and Iraq exceeded one million. The economies and industries of both countries suffered massive blows. Throughout the war, Western arms manufacturers sold vast quantities of weapons to both belligerents, as well as to countries with close U.S. ties, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE, and Bahrain.
Iran is one of the pivotal countries of the region. Encircling Iran and changing its regime are among the United States’ priorities. To this end, it has been applying economic sanctions for years. It isolates Iran politically and diplomatically. It threatens and pressures the country militarily. It attempts to obstruct Iran’s nuclear activities. The U.S. views Iran as one of the greatest obstacles to a Kurdish state, which is intended to be established through the partitioning of four regional countries (Iraq, Syria, Iran, Türkiye). Israel, one of the U.S.’s two strategic partners (the other being the UK), is also in a state of constant tension with Iran; in 2025, the two countries launched air attacks against one another for 12 days. The two states view each other as existential threats. In recent years, Israel has dealt heavy blows to Iranian-backed Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The regime change in Syria and the increasing influence of the U.S. and Israel over Damascus constitute a major defeat for Iran.
The U.S. is also attempting to block Iran’s oil exports. It imposes sanctions—or threatens to impose them—on countries that trade with Iran. It has designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization and pressured the European Union to adopt a similar decision. The U.S. also pressures Egypt and Saudi Arabia to keep their distance from Iran, forcing the Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia to take a stance against Tehran.
Will U.S. sanctions against Iran achieve their objective?
Iran has lost significant influence following the overthrow of Assad in Syria—a country where it had invested and provided massive support for years—and the successive blows dealt by Israel to Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Iranian-backed “Shiite Crescent,” the “Axis of Resistance,” and Iran’s proxy forces beyond its borders have suffered heavy losses. Currently, only the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen continue their struggle.
The sanctions and economic embargoes the U.S. has applied since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, its efforts to incite the public to rebellion against the regime, and its attempts to render PJAK (the Iranian extension of the PKK terrorist organization) more effective, have not yet yielded the hoped-for results. While attempting to encircle Iran, the U.S. has also sought to weaken it through proxy wars. Yet, following the U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran actually increased its influence in the region.
U.S. economic sanctions have been effective; they have hindered Iran’s technological development and dragged down its oil and natural gas exports. However, they have thus far failed to bring Iran to its knees. Poverty, unemployment, the high cost of living, corruption, and repression within the country have fueled anger toward the regime. Nevertheless, it has been observed that when faced with foreign intervention, the Iranian people set aside their grievances and ideological differences to defend their country against external threats. Furthermore, possessing nuclear deterrence is a goal upon which different political views in the country converge and agree.
In conclusion, Iran is a country with a strong state tradition and deep historical accumulation. It utilizes Persian nationalism, the Islamic Revolution, Shi’ism, anti-Americanism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and enmity toward Zionism and Israel in its foreign policy—deploying each at the right place, at the right time, in the right dose, and according to the interlocutor. Even if Iran has taken heavy blows in recent years, the influence it has achieved as a regional actor, its alliance relations, military power, state structure, and national culture remain significant. One must not forget that despite anti-regime opposition and significant problems on the domestic front, Iran will resist the U.S., and even in the worst-case scenario, it remains a state incomparably stronger than Syria or Iraq.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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