Donald Trump remains one of the world’s most unpredictable leaders, yet India appears confident in its approach to managing relations with him. Indeed, the Indo-US relationship arguably reached new heights during Trump’s first term. Under his administration, the US became India’s largest trading partner, defense deals worth billions of dollars were finalized, and the two nations collaborated closely on shared “challenges,” notably China.

Naturally, the path wasn’t always smooth, particularly concerning trade disputes. However, many observers believe India navigated its relationship with Trump more effectively than many other nations.

What accounts for this perceived success?

Three primary factors contribute to India’s approach: economic engagement, the personal rapport between Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and India’s strategic concessions yielding benefits for the US.

Trump, often described as a transactional leader, doesn’t operate from a “grand theory” of foreign policy. Instead, he tends to evaluate relationships based on tangible benefits for the US. In this context, India’s primary offering is its expanding economy. The country’s recent growth trajectory, particularly the burgeoning middle class, holds significant interest for a leader focused on economic outcomes.

In 2017, Trump said, “Since India opened its economy, it has seen astonishing growth and a new world of opportunities for its expanding middle class.” This economic growth presented opportunities for US firms to sell to Indian companies and attract Indian investment into the US. This dynamic was evident during Trump’s first meeting with Modi in 2017: SpiceJet finalized a $10 billion deal with Boeing for over 100 aircraft, and the US agreed to sell $2 billion worth of Predator drones to the Indian military. Trump publicly commended New Delhi for these agreements.

Subsequent meetings between Modi and Trump consistently emphasized trade deals and investments. New Delhi, similar to strategies employed by other nations, highlighted India’s investments in the US and significant defense purchases, aligning with Trump’s focus on economic wins.

Despite significant differences in personality and background, Trump appeared to hold Modi in high regard. Trump has referred to Modi as “India’s Elvis” and one of the US’s “greatest friends.” Notably, Modi was the first leader Trump hosted for a working dinner at the White House in 2017. Trump also lauded Modi for his “tremendous accomplishments,” praise not typically bestowed on many other world leaders. Critics suggest Trump admires Modi’s “populist strongman” persona. Trump himself alluded to this dynamic in a 2024 podcast interview, describing Modi as a “good guy” who could nevertheless be “a real pain in the ass,” specifically referencing Modi’s firm stance regarding Pakistan.

Modi, in turn, demonstrated adeptness in managing the relationship. Large-scale events like the 2019 “Howdy Modi!” rally in Texas and the 2020 “Namaste Trump” event in India, both drawing massive crowds, clearly impressed Trump. He praised Modi as one of “America’s greatest and most loyal friends” and pledged that, if re-elected, India would “have no better friend” than the US. Trump might also view strong ties with Modi as beneficial for garnering support among Indian-Americans.

The third factor involves strategic concessions from India, resulting in perceived gains for the US. New Delhi strategically yielded on certain issues prioritized by Trump.

Illegal immigration serves as one example.

While the deportation of undocumented Indian immigrants from the US sparked some public discontent in India, the Indian government maintained a low-key response. Officially, it condemned illegal immigration and signaled its willingness to accept deportees without significant obstruction.

India also reduced tariffs on certain US products, including motorcycles and agricultural goods, addressing Trump’s vocal complaints about high Indian import duties.

New Delhi calculated that these concessions would satisfy key Trump demands. These moves were not without reciprocal benefits for India, however. Trump facilitated India’s access to high-end defense technology. He also appeared receptive to Indian priorities, such as combating Khalistani separatist groups operating in the US, and reportedly agreed to the extradition of Tahawwur Rana, sought by India in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Recapping the first Trump term, the US became India’s largest trading partner, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was revitalized, and Washington adopted a more assertive stance towards China. Furthermore, there was minimal US interference in India’s domestic politics. This latter point—minimal interference in India’s internal affairs—is particularly significant for New Delhi.

From New Delhi’s perspective, these outcomes suggest that “India’s game plan for Trump” is largely effective.

The potential extradition of Tahawwur Rana, sought by India as a key figure in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks (2008), represents a major Indian objective in bilateral discussions. Securing US agreement for his extradition has been a long-standing Indian demand. Joint statements often include commitments to take “decisive action” against groups threatening India’s security, which India interprets as progress on the Khalistan issue.

Discussions often include potential US commitments to streamline defense sales to India, possibly involving reviews of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which govern defense exports. Exploratory talks regarding a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement, which could open the US defense market to Indian companies, are also a recurring theme. Such developments, facilitating access to advanced defense technology, are viewed as significant gains by India.

However, these potential gains for India are often counterbalanced by US trade demands.

For years, Donald Trump has complained about high Indian tariffs on US goods. Addressing these complaints, discussions often revolve around negotiating a new bilateral trade agreement (distinct from a comprehensive free trade agreement) aimed at granting US companies enhanced market access, potentially with target dates like late 2025. The stated ambition includes finalizing such an agreement and boosting bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030, more than doubling current levels.

Meanwhile, while the US already sells billions in oil and gas to India, a key objective for a potential second Trump administration would likely be reducing the significant trade deficit (around $50 billion) by increasing these sales further. A renewed energy partnership could position the US as one of India’s top energy suppliers.

Thus, the dynamic involves India potentially gaining access to more US defense technology while facing pressure to purchase more US energy.

However, India’s willingness to significantly increase US energy imports beyond symbolic amounts likely hinges on competitive pricing, especially compared to discounted supplies available from sources like Russia.

Nevertheless, India is already a substantial and growing customer for US goods. Imports from the US have increased significantly in recent years (e.g., by $3 billion in one recent period), with crude oil being the top commodity by value since 2019. Furthermore, New Delhi highlights its $40 billion investment in the US in recent years, supporting approximately 500,000 American jobs. New Delhi can leverage these existing purchases and substantial investments to counter pressure for further increases in imports from the US. These activities may have also helped prevent the trade deficit from widening further. Additionally, India can argue that its defense posture and role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region align with and advance US interests, potentially mitigating pressure to buy more US arms. India’s naval operations in Middle Eastern waters to protect shipping and its efforts to supply missiles to Southeast Asian nations as a counterweight to China further bolster this argument.

Modi has also pledged cooperation in combating illegal immigration to the US, targeting human trafficking networks. Given the political sensitivity of illegal immigration in the US, such cooperation helps assure Washington that India respects US concerns on this front.

Other potential areas of discussion or agreement include the US offer of the F-35 fighter jet, coinciding with India’s search for a 5th generation aircraft, and joint calls for Pakistan to prevent its territory from being used for terrorism.

Early in Trump’s first term, Modi was among the first world leaders hosted, following only the leaders of Israel, Japan, and Jordan—all close US allies. This sequencing signaled the importance the Trump administration placed on the US-India partnership, although immediate, concrete results were not necessarily expected at that early stage. Nevertheless, initiatives like the announced “US-India COMPACT for the 21st Century (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Trade and Technology)” aim to provide a framework for strengthening the partnership.

However, significant uncertainties requiring attention persist, particularly regarding the handling of undocumented migrants and the provision of sanctions waivers. Specifically, the implications of a potential Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, including potential reluctance to grant sanctions waivers, remain unclear for India’s strategic Chabahar port project.

Finally, India’s strategies for navigating potential trade disputes under Trump have faced criticism for being reactive or insufficient. Critics argue that some measures, such as concessions on tariffs, appear aimed at short-term appeasement rather than long-term strategic positioning, seemingly uncharacteristic of New Delhi’s usual approach. The “Make in India” initiative, designed to boost domestic manufacturing, serves as another example. Despite initial enthusiasm and Trump’s apparent support for India as a manufacturing alternative to China, its overall success has been limited, potentially dampening initial US optimism. While progress is evident in sectors like mobile phones and pharmaceuticals, broader success remains elusive. In many other sectors, competitors, especially China, present formidable challenges. More significantly, inadequate infrastructure remains a major impediment to the “Make in India” goals. Consequently, India appears to be falling short of its initial ambitions in this area. In other words, it seems that Delhi still has a long way to go.

Amid fluctuating global trade dynamics, New Delhi, prioritizing the US relationship for strategic reasons, is actively negotiating multiple bilateral trade agreements (reportedly seven). These aim to bolster India’s economic standing and tackle market access and production hurdles. Concessions are expected to vary across agreements based on strategic considerations. The political capital invested and positive rhetoric surrounding these negotiations signal a departure from past skepticism, partly driven by pressures like Trump’s focus on tariffs.

Characteristically pragmatic, New Delhi focuses on mitigating immediate risks and protecting existing market shares in both goods and services. While maintaining market share is crucial, the ultimate objective remains growth. Acknowledging India’s achievements is fair, yet its manufacturing expansion efforts have arguably fallen short of potential.

And yet, despite these challenges, the India-US relationship appears fundamentally robust.

Recent remarks by Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar offer insight:

Jaishankar stated, “Many of Trump’s priorities are working for us.”

He added, “We believe that working with the US to strengthen the international financial and economic system should be a priority.”

Furthermore, Jaishankar observed, “The US is moving towards multipolarity and that suits India.”

At 11:00 p.m. local time on March 20, I boarded Yemen Airways flight IY647, which took off in the rain from Queen Alia International Airport in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Meanwhile, air raid sirens were once again sounding in Israel to the west, as it was reported that the Yemeni Houthi forces had launched missiles at Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city, which were successfully intercepted. More than two hours later, the Boeing aircraft carrying nearly 200 passengers flew at low altitude over the brightly lit Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and landed safely. Our local hosts drove us through long city roads to finally settle at the Shaba Hotel. With Ramadan more than halfway through, this mysterious Arab capital at the frontlines of war was at its liveliest and most bustling time of day. There were no signs of war — perhaps the night had masked the smoke and devastation of the battlefield. On the surface, the infrastructure in Sana’a appeared so outdated that it reminded me of Gaza, Palestine, where I was stationed 25 years ago.

In the early morning of the 21st, the Houthi forces claimed they had launched a “Palestine-2” hypersonic missile at Israel the previous day, successfully striking a military target south of Tel Aviv. It’s truly surprising that the Houthis — often dubbed the “slipper army” — are now capable of producing hypersonic missiles themselves. It’s a testament to the rapid advancement and widespread accessibility of modern technology. What was once exclusive to major world powers no longer holds a monopoly, evoking the sense of “the swallows of yesteryear’s noble halls now nesting among common folk.”

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree emphasized that this was the second missile attack launched from Yemen on Israeli territory within 24 hours. Observers noted that this was also the Houthis’ first strike on Israeli soil following Israel’s renewed airstrikes and partial ground raids in Gaza — actions that have already caused nearly a thousand Palestinian deaths.

Just prior to the attack on Israel, the Houthis had engaged in a direct confrontation with the U.S. Red Sea fleet — again sparked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On March 7, the Houthis warned Israel that if humanitarian aid restrictions on Gaza were not lifted within four days, they would resume attacks on ships entering or exiting Israeli ports through the Red Sea. This coincided with the second round of ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas stalling. On the 10th, before the Houthi deadline expired, Israel preemptively announced a cutoff of electricity to Gaza to pressure Hamas. Consequently, the Houthis resumed their Red Sea ship attacks.

The Houthis’ support for Hamas and advocacy for the Palestinian cause naturally angered the U.S., which unconditionally backs Israel. Between March 15 and 19, under orders from President Trump, the U.S. launched its largest recent air assault on Houthi positions via the USS *Harry S. Truman* carrier group in the Red Sea, targeting their radar, air defense, missile, and drone systems. The strikes extended over Sana’a, the Red Sea city of Hodeidah, and the Houthi stronghold in Saada province near the western border. In response, the Houthis launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against U.S. naval targets.

Amid all this, Israel swiftly resumed large-scale air and ground assaults on Gaza, reclaiming the “Netzarim Corridor,” which cuts off north-south traffic within the Gaza Strip. According to U.S. and Israeli media, Israel had informed the U.S. in advance of its plans to reignite conflict in Gaza and received open support from the Trump administration. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the assault was “just the beginning.” With the renewal of conflict, the far-right factions that had exited Israel’s coalition government announced their return. Analysts believe Netanyahu is deliberately reigniting war to hinder the next phase of ceasefire talks, thereby preserving his fragile coalition, prolonging his political life, and avoiding accountability for the severe consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood attack that had previously rocked Israel.

Before Trump returned to power, with Hamas and Hezbollah suffering heavy blows—especially after the unexpected fall of the Damascus regime—the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean underwent significant changes. The year-long “Sixth Middle East War” seemed to be nearing its end, and the focus of both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States, the Arab world, and even the international community shifted toward the multidimensional reconstruction of Gaza. The Houthi forces even temporarily suspended their attacks on Israeli targets in the Red Sea region. However, the failure of the second round of ceasefire negotiations over Gaza and the outbreak of renewed fighting suggest that the “Sixth Middle East War” has not truly ended but has simply moved past an intermission and entered a new phase—with a change in the main battlefield and primary adversaries.

From Israel’s perspective, after more than a year of intense southern offensives, the Israeli military has essentially crushed Hamas. Following two months of focused campaigns in the north, it not only severely weakened Hezbollah but also unexpectedly caused the collapse of the Assad regime, leading to the complete fall of the northwest wing of the “Shiite Crescent.” The key goal of the third phase is to eliminate Hamas’s presence in Gaza entirely, and with the help of the United States, strike hard at the Houthis and Iran, both of whom strongly support Hamas.

From Hamas’s point of view, although it has lost most of its leadership and main combat forces, and the Palestinian people have paid a tremendous price, it has not lost its political foundation or its legitimacy in the struggle. Hamas remains the irreplaceable governing force in Gaza. After the first phase ceasefire, Hamas quickly mobilized thousands of police and security personnel to maintain public order—demonstrating its remaining strength and unwillingness to exit the political and historical stage. It is eager to remain in Gaza under the banners of “legitimate resistance” and the “Palestinian cause,” and participate in the political, security, and economic reconstruction of Gaza in this new era.

From the U.S. perspective, Trump does not want to be permanently tied to Israel’s war chariot. Yet, based on national interests, personal ties, and religious beliefs, he has no choice but to shield and support Netanyahu’s government and Israel. Therefore, Trump introduced the “Clear Gaza” plan to pressure the Palestinians and the Arab world. He has also launched heavy strikes on the Houthis to ease Israel’s burden, while publicly warning and threatening Iran—the so-called “ultimate backer”—in an attempt to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cool down the Middle East, and ultimately reduce America’s involvement in the region.

From Iran’s perspective, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” has led to two direct confrontations with Israel, nearly dragging the entire country into full-scale war. It has also seen severe setbacks for the twin geopolitical drivers of the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance.” Iran has suffered a historic political and diplomatic defeat, with more than forty years of investment and influence—especially since the Arab Spring—lost almost overnight. This could undermine the legitimacy of its policies and governance. Over the past few months, Iran has maintained a hardline diplomatic stance—emphasizing support for Palestine and issuing warnings to Israel and the U.S.—which in turn has provoked Israel and the U.S. to “press their advantage” and try to defeat both the “Shiite Crescent” and “Axis of Resistance” through the Gaza war.

From the Houthis’ point of view, since their original goal was to establish an Iranian-style regime, they naturally adopted Iran’s political and diplomatic discourse. That means they must raise the Palestinian banner and align themselves with the Palestinian narrative to overcome the inherent disadvantages of being a Shiite militia. However, the Houthis also possess a level of confidence in their discourse that Iran lacks—because both Palestinians and Yemenis (including the Houthi tribes) are ethnically Arab. For a long time after their uprising began, the Houthis were preoccupied with survival and unable to involve themselves in other causes. Since the outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2014 and their rise in power, the Houthis remained focused on fighting the internationally recognized Yemeni government—backed by Saudi Arabia and the “Islamic Ten”—and had no capacity to engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now, with the Houthis gradually controlling one-third of the country’s territory, two-thirds of its population and Red Sea coast, and major cities like Sana’a and Hodeidah—and having developed cruise missiles and drones capable of striking deep into Saudi Arabia and the UAE—their leaders’ vision has clearly expanded. Their ambitions have grown, and their geopolitical appetite is no longer what it used to be. Thus, after Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” offensive in October 2023, the Houthis responded with military actions, officially joining the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” opening a new front in the Red Sea outside the Eastern Mediterranean theater—forming the southern battlefield of the ‘Sixth Middle East War.’

From a certain perspective, the Houthi forces—who firmly believe that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”—see their vast desert homeland of Yemen, full of tribes and known for its simple yet tough customs, as a second Afghanistan. With confidence in their military capabilities, they believe that the United States would never dare to send hundreds of thousands of troops for a ground invasion. Instead, the U.S. can only rely on long-range airstrikes, which not only do not harm the Houthis’ survival foundation, but actually serve as a form of publicity—elevating the Houthis in global public opinion as a new bastion of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism. This strengthens their political legitimacy, the perceived justness of their struggle, and the necessity of unifying governance and the state.

Although the Houthi movement rarely publicly links its support for the Palestinian cause, concern for Palestinian suffering, and promotion of the Palestinian narrative directly to its own ideals and ambitions, it can be inferred that such large-scale actions—at the risk of drawing fire and becoming enemies of Israel and the U.S.-led Western allies—are actually intended to force the international community, especially the Arab League, to recognize its effective governance in Yemen. It seeks acknowledgment of its leadership role in Yemen’s political reconstruction and a withdrawal of support for the exiled government. Even if the world does not accept a new Houthi-led regime acting alone, it should at least support a coalition government led by the Houthis—thus ending over a decade of war in Yemen and bringing stability to the Red Sea region.

From this angle, war and peace in Gaza are not just private matters between Palestine and Israel; they are part of the broader political dynamics of the Middle East—and even global politics. Resolving this complex chain of issues is no easy task. But at the very least, achieving a ceasefire in Gaza could deprive surrounding nations and political factions of their excuses and leverage, giving Middle Eastern leaders space to focus on key issues like development, cooperation, and prosperity.

As for the Houthis’ control over much of ancient Yemen—once known as the “Happy Land”—the country remains one of the poorest and most underdeveloped in the world. The Houthi forces have poured significant funds into developing missiles, drones, and various military technologies to “rescue” Palestinians hundreds of kilometers away, while their own people continue to live below the poverty line. This is not a choice any leader with national responsibility should make in terms of priorities. However, for revolutionaries and revolutionary parties, seizing nationwide power and establishing a unified government is likely their most urgent political desire and mission. The Houthi movement and its leaders can hardly resist the immense temptation of political power.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

The news broke like a bombshell in media circles. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the umbrella organization for the PKK/PYD (which is known as the PKK in Syria and has been a primary concern for Türkiye in recent years), reached an agreement with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the current Syrian President (formerly known as al-Jolani). Starting from the evening of Monday, March 10th, when the news hit agencies, the media erupted with a range of reactions, from claims of the PKK/PYD’s self-dissolution to assertions of Syria’s territorial integrity being secured. Some commentators even suggested this was a rejection of federation, a new setback for Israel, and a significant success for Türkiye. The atmosphere recalled the period following Assad’s departure on December 8, 2024, when there was talk of conquering the neighbouring country, even going so far as to assign license plate numbers to Syrian and other Middle Eastern cities.

What does the agreement entail?

However, the eight-article agreement text does not present a particularly optimistic outlook. In fact, a careful examination reveals that Syria has been (or is being) reshaped into an undeclared federation. The very act of the SDF signing an agreement with the Syrian government implies the construction of a federal structure. On one side stands a state, Syria, and on the other, a structure that perceives itself as a state (or on the path to statehood) and is considered a terrorist organization by Türkiye. In other words, the SDF, with the PYD/PKK at its core, is the entity that has entered into an agreement with the Syrian state. Typically, states engage in agreements with other states or international organizations. The fact that the SDF and the Syrian state have signed an agreement/reconciliation text warrants careful consideration.

The first article of the agreement, stating that “the right to merit-based representation and political participation in Syria, regardless of religious or ethnic origin, is guaranteed,” may initially appear positive. However, when considered alongside the subsequent article, which states that “the Kurdish community is recognized as an integral part of Syria and its constitutional rights are guaranteed,” it becomes evident that this contains serious issues. A federal structure is present, even if unnamed (pending the final Syrian constitution).

If a Kurdish community exists within Syria, and its existence is constitutionally recognized with its rights (the specifics of which will be defined in the constitution) guaranteed, other ethnic and sectarian groups will inevitably make similar demands. For instance, the Alawites, predominantly residing in Syria’s coastal region and recently subjected to horrific massacres by HTS, are likely to present similar demands. The same applies to the Druze community living in territories that Israel occupied and gained control over immediately after Assad left the country on December 8, 2024. In fact, Druze community leaders have repeatedly declared that they cannot live under a radical Islamic regime centered on HTS and would prefer to join Israel if forced to do so. Considering that the southern part of the Druze region, the Golan Heights, was occupied and annexed by Israel in the 1967 war (despite being Syrian territory under international law), the seriousness of their threats becomes clearer. It should be emphasized that Syria is being steered towards a federation that could lead to partition. In such ethnic, religious, and sectarian federations, quotas allocated to these groups, rather than merit, will likely be more influential in matters such as personnel recruitment.

The reference to the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian state, with all its constitutional rights, including citizenship, guaranteed, signifies a significant step towards federation. The existence of a “Kurdish people” and the mention of their constitutional rights imply that the constitution should be drafted on the basis of “peoples.” One of the main articles of the Syrian constitution will likely begin with a sentence such as, “The Syrian state is the common state of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites…” or “Syria is the common country of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites…”

In this scenario, it can be assumed that Syria will consist of at least four or five autonomous or federated structures. These structures will likely have their own parliaments, internal administrations (including public order forces like police and gendarmerie), judicial systems, and “self-defense forces,” as the PKK prefers to call them. In essence, we can anticipate four or five autonomous/federated units resembling the fragmented and largely independent Kurdish Federal Government of Northern Iraq. It should also be underscored that it is improbable for such a state, formed with a very weak central government in line with Israel’s interests, to possess a substantial army. It would be overly optimistic to believe that in such a federation, named or unnamed, everyone would coexist harmoniously, with different peoples treating each other with utmost respect and avoiding conflicts over power-sharing. The likelihood of such ethnic, religious, and sectarian federal structures, which are inherently fragile, surviving peacefully in a region like the Middle East, where Israel and the US are constantly involved, is extremely low. The possibility of these structures being drawn into disintegration through civil war or territorial conflicts, triggered by external manipulation of internal disputes, should not be underestimated.

The fifth article of the agreement, stating that “the Syrian state shall ensure the return of all displaced refugees to their former places (villages and towns) and guarantee their security,” might initially seem to address the return of refugees who have fled Syria. However, this may not be the case. If this article concerned refugees outside Syria, its inclusion in this agreement would be unnecessary, as such matters fall entirely under the jurisdiction of the Syrian central government. If it referred to refugees from PKK/PYD-controlled areas who were forced to flee their homes due to ethnic cleansing, many of whom are outside the country, this sentence would need to be worded differently. It appears that the “refugees” in question are PKK/PYD groups who have been forced to flee from Turkish-controlled territory, and their return to this territory is being guaranteed by the Syrian state. This could be a precursor to forcing Türkiye out of the territory under its control in the coming years.

Since 2011, Türkiye’s Syria policy has not consistently prioritized national interests. On one hand, Türkiye rightly used force to prevent the PKK/PYD from attaining the status of a puppet autonomous state. On the other hand, Türkiye did everything possible to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Assad regime. Ultimately, the Assad regime was overthrown, and the PKK/PYD has come very close to achieving significant autonomy. The prospects of Syria’s fragmentation and eventual disintegration are not distant.

During the Assad (Baath) regime, as the PKK/PYD faced pressure from Türkiye, they repeatedly approached the Damascus government, stating, ‘Give us autonomy, let us join you and fight together against Türkiye.’ [Assad’s government] said, “You are traitors who cooperate with America. Syria is a nation-state and has a unitary structure. We will not give you or anybody else anything that will disrupt this constitutional structure, we can only enact some regulations for local administrations in the 2012 constitution, and that will apply to all of Syria, not just you.”‘. Ultimately, there is now a Syria that some claim Türkiye conquered, a government described as “our boys,” and the PKK/PYD has signed a treaty with it that includes extensive autonomy. This raises the question: Was this Türkiye’s ultimate objective?