Europe
US secures multi-billion-dollar energy and AI deals at Three Seas summit in Dubrovnik
A struggle for influence is intensifying between the European Union and the United States in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) emerging as a primary arena for this geopolitical contest.
An analysis published by German Foreign Policy reveals that Western European nations and the EU are increasingly positioning renewable energy as a strategic counterweight to US liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries in the region.
At a 3SI summit convened in late April in the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, representatives from the Trump administration met with officials from the 13 EU member states that comprise the initiative. The parties agreed on a series of new projects spanning energy supply, pipelines, artificial intelligence (AI), and digital infrastructure.
The immediate focus of these talks centred on new natural gas interconnectors for South-Eastern Europe and a massive AI project in Croatia carrying an estimated investment volume of €50 billion.
Originally established to modernise and expand infrastructure between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, the initiative has increasingly transformed into a vehicle for American power projection in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
Energy policy remains the critical battleground: whilst the Trump administration seeks to lock in long-term US LNG export markets, the EU is pushing to pivot the region towards renewable energy. Notably, investments targeting renewable energy systems were also approved during the Dubrovnik proceedings.
A brief history of the Three Seas Initiative
The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2015 by Polish President Andrzej Duda and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, holding its inaugural summit in Dubrovnik in August 2016. The platform comprises 13 EU member states stretching from the Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) through the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Austria, down to Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.
Albania, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova have subsequently associated themselves with the platform.
The initiative derives its name from its geographical objective: linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas through the territory of its member countries.
The creation of the 3SI was heavily driven by the United States. US strategists drew direct inspiration from an interwar Polish foreign policy concept formulated by Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Piłsudski’s “Intermarium” plan sought to unite Eastern European nations—spanning from the Baltic states to Yugoslavia and Romania—into a geopolitical bloc designed to act as an anti-Soviet bulwark.
In late 2014, the US think tank the Atlantic Council, collaborating with Central Europe Energy Partners (CEEP)—a lobby group representing energy companies in Poland, Lithuania and Romania—published an influential analysis. The report focused on developing a “North-South Corridor” extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas.
The founding documents of the Three Seas Initiative explicitly reference this American strategic blueprint.
Washington has spent years utilising the 3SI to consolidate and expand its influence over the participant states. The cornerstone of this strategy is energy policy, specifically aimed at substituting imports of Russian pipeline gas with US-sourced LNG.
A North-South corridor to bypass the East-West axis
To achieve this geopolitical shift, the Three Seas Initiative seeks to expand the infrastructure of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe by adding robust north-south transport and energy links. Since 1990, infrastructural development in the region had run predominantly on an east-west axis, prioritising integration with Germany at the heart of the EU.
Constructing a north-south network will not only facilitate the distribution of US LNG imported via Adriatic and Baltic ports, but also foster a more autonomous regional infrastructure. By reducing reliance on road and rail networks terminates in Germany, the project threatens a significant dilution of Berlin’s economic and political leverage in the region.
Following the EU’s commitment to phase out Russian gas imports entirely by 2027, the strategic weight of LNG terminals and their corresponding north-south pipelines has steadily grown.
This structural dependency is visible within Germany itself. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, approximately 96% of the LNG imported via German North Sea and Baltic terminals in 2025 originated from the US. This US supply accounts for 10.3% of Germany’s total gas imports.
German-American friction in South-Eastern Europe
The struggle for influence in Eastern Europe, and the decisive role of energy transit within it, was recently illustrated by a leadership crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina surrounding the German diplomat Christian Schmidt, the international community’s High Representative.
Schmidt’s eventual resignation was precipitated by intense political maneuvering between certain Western European nations—led by Germany—and the Trump administration, which has been actively pursuing gas and raw material agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Having successfully pressured Schmidt to step down, the US proposed Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi as his successor. The nomination served to drive a wedge between EU member states, with Germany opposing Washington’s preferred candidate whilst Italy offered its support. President Trump warned that Washington would halt financial assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina if the US plans were thwarted.
The move aligns with a new US strategy for South-Eastern Europe submitted by the Trump administration to Congress in May. The updated policy pivots away from “democracy promotion,” focusing instead on security and securing market access for American corporations.
Historically, Bosnia and Herzegovina has relied on Russian natural gas delivered via the TurkStream pipeline. Washington aims to replace this supply with US LNG imported through a terminal on the Croatian island of Krk.
The proposed infrastructure plans involve constructing a new pipeline extension into Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be built by US engineering firm Bechtel alongside AAFS Infrastructure and Energy. Schmidt had increasingly been viewed by US officials as an obstacle to these plans.
A victory for the Trump administration at the 3SI summit
In late April, Dubrovnik hosted the 10th anniversary summit of the 3SI alongside an aligned Business Forum. The event drew high-level participation, including seven presidents and prime ministers from 3SI member states, numerous cabinet ministers, and senior representatives from the Trump administration.
At the forum, the US successfully leveraged multi-billion-dollar energy and technology projects to entrench its footprint in South-Eastern Europe.
US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright declared in Dubrovnik: “The United States is ushering in a new era of cooperation for Central and Eastern Europe. This partnership is built on our mutual support for an aggressive energy expansion agenda.”
To formalise this initiative, Wright, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Borjana Krišto, signed a memorandum of understanding to launch the “Trump Peace Pipelines Framework”.
The agreement directly advances the “Southern Interconnection” project, which will link Bosnia and Herzegovina’s gas grid to the Croatian network and the Krk island LNG terminal.
At the summit, Polish Climate and Environment Minister Miłosz Motyka also emphasized the region’s commitment to expanding nuclear energy, calling it the “cornerstone of our new security architecture.”
Parallel to these energy agreements, American investors announced plans to build a massive AI and data centre hub in Croatia. The Pantheon Atlas investment group signed a memorandum of understanding with the Croatian firm Končar Group to construct an AI campus.
The total investment is projected at approximately €50 billion—a sum exceeding half of Croatia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).
The gigawatt-scale power capacity required to run the data centre is comparable to the electricity demand of a major metropolitan area like Zagreb. To meet its current power requirements, Croatia relies heavily on natural gas, much of which is imported through the Krk LNG terminal.
Foreign policy implications of the energy transition
The Dubrovnik summit also marked the establishment of a new regional infrastructure fund. The vehicle is designed to finance joint investments in hydrogen production, cross-border transport infrastructure, renewable energy systems and electrical grid expansion, with at least €2 billion earmarked for initial projects.
By comparison, more than €4 billion was invested in natural gas infrastructure within the region between 2016 and 2025.
This gradual shift toward renewable energy introduces a distinct foreign policy dynamic. While LNG supplies are overwhelmingly dominated by imports from the US, the hardware and technology required to deploy renewable energy infrastructure do not carry the same transatlantic dependency. In the vast majority of cases, this technology is manufactured and supplied from within Europe itself.
Europe
UK faces £258bn infrastructure gap as commission urges private funds
Every adult in Britain would need to pay an extra £590 a year in tax to fund planned public infrastructure investments worth £258 billion.
Sir John Armitt, chair of the private sector-led Public-Private Partnerships Commission, stated that delivering vital projects, such as Thames Water’s long-delayed White Horse reservoir, would require the government to increase infrastructure investment by two-thirds—equivalent to around £25 billion annually until 2030—if financed through public funds.
The crisis surrounding the early release scheme has highlighted the UK’s need for greater prison capacity, while Ofwat has warned that population growth and climate change could leave England facing a shortfall of billions of litres of water per day over the next 25 years.
Armitt, who was the final chair of the National Infrastructure Commission before it was replaced by a new agency, noted that the government’s constrained financial position means its fiscal rules would be “put in jeopardy” if the UK attempted to finance infrastructure spending through additional borrowing.
According to the report, such an approach would add approximately £7 billion to debt interest costs by 2030, £14 billion by 2035, and £23 billion by 2040.
Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves had altered the fiscal rules to treat capital investment differently from day-to-day spending.
However, the required additional borrowing would still increase overall national debt.
Armitt, who recommended the creation of an OBR-style body for infrastructure, said:
“Those who believe that taxpayers and the public sector can close this gap alone have not looked closely enough at the public finances. If debt interest were a government department, it would be the fourth-largest in Whitehall. The UK faces a fundamental choice: do we want to provide the infrastructure that the public expects and the country needs, or do we not?”
A rise in government bond yields over the past two weeks has narrowed the government’s fiscal headroom, intensifying pressure on Reeves’s successor, John Healey, to balance the public books as Prime Minister Andy Burnham targets “growth in every postcode”.
The commission’s report, delivered by consultancy Bradshaw Advisory, also revealed that the UK has the lowest level of investment among G7 nations.
The report argues that reducing the cost and delivery times of infrastructure projects requires a comprehensive overhaul of the UK planning system, along with the elimination of political risk aversion and other regulatory obstacles.
According to the findings, rail projects in the UK take 50% longer than the international average, whilst delivery timelines for nationally significant projects doubled between 2009 and 2019.
To expedite construction and mitigate the threat of bureaucracy, the report proposes the introduction of a “parliamentary approval vote” for critical national infrastructure projects. Armitt characterised the current landscape as an “appalling cycle” of legal challenges.
The commission noted that uncertainty drives up the cost of infrastructure projects by generating “over-engineered designs to withstand any potential legal challenge and repeated consultations”.
Armitt called for greater pragmatism in Whitehall regarding the role of private investors and developers, who are more efficient than the public sector at delivering infrastructure because they must generate a return on their investments.
He also argued that the available capital pool is vastly larger. UK pension funds hold trillions of pounds in assets, yet only a small fraction is allocated to infrastructure projects.
Armitt said infrastructure investors have recently raised concerns that government efforts to increase public control have dampened their appetite for investing in the UK.
Arguing that this shift would deter investors, Armitt pointed to the windfall tax imposed on North Sea oil.
Armitt added that investors, particularly pension funds, “want long-term certainty and confidence”.
A separate Oxford Economics report commissioned last week by transport groups and infrastructure investors revealed that the UK has lagged behind every major economy except Greece on investment over the past 25 years.
Jon Phillips, chief executive of the Global Infrastructure Investor Association, said:
“Private capital is mobile by nature… at a time when the German, French, and Canadian governments are actively seeking to attract international investors, the UK risks losing ground.”
A government spokesperson said they welcomed “ideas to build the infrastructure needed across the UK”:
“Over the course of this Parliament, we have made progress by publishing the 10-year infrastructure strategy, increasing public investment by £120 billion to crowd in private finance, and delivering reforms to planning, major infrastructure, and regulation to give businesses and local leaders the stability they need to make long-term decisions.”
Europe
Wolfgang Streeck links German polycrisis to capitalism and AfD rise
German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck has examined the link between the conditions driving the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the capitalist crisis, calling on the left to “stop playing games and grow up.”
Writing for New Left Review (NLR), Streeck begins by asking what it means to exist within a “polycrisis.” In his view, under an increasingly “less democratic” capitalism, the countries of the rich world face “a bundle of similar crises that have emerged more or less unnoticed.”
According to Streeck, beneath these developments lies a fiscal crisis that has finally moved to the fore. In this context, “the mounting demands placed on society by the evolution of contemporary capitalism” clash with the shrinking capacity of “democratic politics” to secure the resources required to meet them.
Streeck argues that one consequence of this dynamic is the striking rise of “new-model opposition parties that are critical of the existing order and threaten to unseat the now-ageing ruling parties of the post-war era.”
Contending that nearly all of these problems in Germany stem from a policy of “stealth austerity,” Streeck points out that public investment has been deprived of resources as a result: “Stagnant [economic] growth; under these conditions any structural change assumes a zero-sum character; the deterioration of public infrastructure, including railways, bridges, and roads; a growing housing shortage and rising urban rents; the inability of both cities and rural areas to adapt to the consequences of climate change; the lack of an immigration policy to offset an ageing population alongside a sharp decline in birth rates; the decay of the education system, especially primary schools; the indebtedness of local authorities and their diminished capacity to make necessary investments and provide basic services; rising income and wealth inequality; with those most affected being chronically low-income families, particularly families headed by single mothers; and finally, widespread anxiety about the future, driven in part by fears of cuts to basic state-provided services that are becoming increasingly difficult to finance.”
According to the author, since the 1970s an ever-widening gulf has emerged between the overhead costs of capitalism and the amount that capitalist firms are willing (or can be forced) to contribute toward covering them. The progression operates as follows: these costs arise from the necessary preconditions and consequences of capitalist production, ranging from research and development and the creation of human capital to remedying environmental destruction. Yet they also stem from the need to secure legitimacy for a mode of production in which the extracted surplus value accrues to a small class of capital owners. Every form of the social wage; that is, state top-ups to the market wages of workers, such as social security and health insurance, serves to consolidate this legitimacy. As capitalist development advances and new needs arise among workers and their families, these expenditures (such as childcare facilities or eldercare) expand. At the same time, however, the scope for levying taxes on both the working classes and the classes that profit from them reaches its limits.
Streeck writes that during the neoliberal era, in order to sustain this zero-sum game; that is, to enable both capitalists and workers to carry on, states resorted to borrowing on deregulated global financial markets. Yet as sovereign debt levels escalated, the state faced the risk of losing its “creditworthiness” in the assessment of “the markets”; doubts emerged over its ability to meet interest payments from existing revenues, and even the interest itself had to be financed through borrowing.
In Germany, this development manifests through a “reform” debate conducted “under the watchful eye of the markets,” encompassing restrictions on pensions, sick leave, and labour rights.
Alongside this, the debt tap is opened to appease NATO allies and the arms industry, and perhaps as a last resort to slow down deindustrialisation.
According to Streeck, with the fiscal crisis no longer a slow-moving one, and with no hope of bringing it and the accompanying infrastructure and social welfare crises under control in the foreseeable future, traditional centrist parties have abandoned their conventional approach of “spreading cheer and optimism.”
The same holds true for the standard democratic narrative that those dissatisfied with government policy can vote for another party at the next election; the risk that this will benefit the new “anti-systemic” opposition appears too great.
Streeck writes:
“This paves the way for the formation of a party cartel in which the main parties avoid clashing with one another. In Germany this scenario seems particularly plausible: after all, the CDU and SPD were in power almost uninterruptedly throughout the long years of ‘shadow austerity’, and largely in coalition.”
Consequently, the issue ceases to be the debt crisis, rising rents, crushing living costs, shrinking public services, or growing segments of the population turning to food banks; instead, it becomes “populism,” the AfD, and neofascism.
Streeck points out that centrist parties, or “we democrats,” use this to make closing ranks mandatory once again. The logical extension of this policy is a summons to fight “against the right” and make a final stand for “our democracy,” rather than struggling against the growing power of markets over the public: “And for the sake of this, we are asked to set aside our petty squabbles over who will be subjected first, and who spared until later, to the overt austerity demanded by subsidised capital markets.”
Streeck continues:
“At first glance; from the standpoint of the ruling political class; this certainly has its appeal. Demonstrations by all sensible people against the AfD are far preferable to demonstrations against the rising cost of living; ‘firewalls’ cost far less than insulating the walls of old apartments; reports by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are far cheaper than nurseries and schools where all children can be accommodated and educated together. Moreover, floating the idea of having a party supported by at least a third of the electorate banned by the Constitutional Court in the name of ‘militant democracy’ guarantees an exciting item on the evening news about the daily exertions of those who run the state.”
Yet Streeck believes that none of this will work, either now or in the long run. Pointing out that the current governing and political class has taken no steps to address the real problems it “wants to hide behind the AfD problem,” the sociologist says: “Even if the party is banned, trains will still not run on time, heat-related deaths will not decline, cities will not become more liveable, rents will not fall, and pensions and jobs will not become more secure.”
Streeck notes that the situation would not change if the AfD were to enter government rather than being politically or physically locked away; nevertheless, he argues that the prevailing political mentality fears giving the AfD the opportunity to fail in the face of the “polycrisis.”
Streeck believes the AfD will not be diminished by the next demonstration or the next broadcast of partisan television news. In his view, as long as the “forces of the state and democracy” exhaust themselves on a secondary battlefield such as “democracy versus populism” to divert attention from the crises unfolding under their own governance, the AfD will have an easy ride.
Reminding readers that an external enemy (Russia) has been added to the internal enemy, Streeck underlines that the two are conflated as far as possible through “conspiracy theories.”
The author notes that the drive to transform a “welfare” state into a “garrison” state and brand the AfD as the “Kremlin’s fifth column” raises the question of how a debt-laden government intends to fund raising defence spending to at least 5% of GDP: “Will it resort to even more austerity or even more borrowing, risking an ultimate rupture with the domestic population, with global financial markets, or with both?”
Arguing that the left, unlike “PR specialists,” must ask certain questions, the German author points to the following:
“How can we make capital pay the bill for the costs it imposes on society and nature? How can we prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion? How will we protect companies that provide quality jobs to people in our country from a global trading system that shows no respect for workers? How can we halt the decline in our population through immigration and better family policies? In a society in transition like ours, how will we ease the debt burden on our local authorities so that they can deliver the public services essential for everyone to lead a good life? And how must ‘our democracy’ be restructured so that it becomes a democracy for all and gives citizens the opportunity to take control of their own lives; so that they are not forced to beg for handouts from a state whose coffers are empty and will remain so for a long time to come?”
Streeck concludes his article by stating: “Playtime is over; the situation is serious, and we urgently need to grow up.”
Europe
AfD’s Siegmund links German rearmament to remigration plans
Ulrich Siegmund of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), who is expected to become the next state premier of Saxony-Anhalt, has stated that they do not oppose Germany’s rearmament, arguing that arms will be required during the “remigration” process.
The issue specifically concerns a factory in the Saxony-Anhalt town of Sangerhausen. Israeli defence contractor Elbit intends to establish production facilities there, though protests against the plan have been under way for some time.
The company manufactures, among other products, the Hermes combat drone, howitzers, and rocket launchers.
According to Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Mayor Torsten Schweiger, neither drones nor ammunition will be produced in Sangerhausen.
The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) had previously announced its opposition to the state becoming a defence industry hub for Israel.
Following a parliamentary group meeting, Siegmund was asked directly at a press conference about the proposed investment project.
Siegmund replied:
“Our position is very clear. We do not condemn the production of military equipment in general, because during future repatriation and deportation campaigns for migrants, we will naturally require the appropriate tools. This also applies to internal security, our own stability, and national defence. We are aware that such things do not fall from the sky.”
Siegmund also argued that a distinction exists between sending military equipment to foreign wars financed by German taxpayers and the approach they advocate.
AfD has not yet taken a final decision
Siegmund explained that the AfD is monitoring the situation in Sangerhausen and remains in contact with local political representatives.
At the same time, he noted that the economic aspects of a potential factory site should not be ignored. The party also plans to examine closely what is produced in Sangerhausen and under what conditions.
“We want to examine closely: what is produced there, and under what conditions? And do we face the risk of being drawn into foreign conflicts as a result? If so, we view this situation with great scepticism,” Siegmund said.
Siegmund also pointed to conversations he had with citizens during the election campaign. Many people, including local residents in Sangerhausen, welcomed the AfD’s stance.
However, his party has not yet reached a final decision regarding the prospective facility. “A valid decision has not yet been taken because we still do not possess all the information,” the AfD politician said.
Green light for militarisation on grounds of remigration and security
Siegmund’s remarks indicating that weapons are needed for “remigration” drew attention. The term refers to the deportation of people with an immigrant background and was coined by Austrian right-wing activist Martin Sellner. The AfD has adopted the phrase over the past few years.
Years ago, Thuringia AfD leader Björn Höcke spoke of “well-measured cruelty” in the context of deportation procedures.
AfD politicians Kay Gottschalk and Lena Kotré attended an international “Remigration Summit” held in Portugal in late May.
There, Martin Sellner of the Identitarian movement declared their aims to secure “Europe’s ethnocultural continuity”, halt all legal or illegal immigration into Europe, and remove “millions” of non-Western immigrants from the continent.
In a video recorded alongside Sellner, Dutch activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek said: “Nobody comes in, and millions go out.”
In interviews, Kotré and Gottschalk presented the mass deportation of millions of people as a panacea for the housing market, the education system, and society.
Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticised the AfD on Wednesday, stating that the concept of “remigration” amounts to nothing other than “ethnic cleansing based on skin colour and origin”.
Wagenknecht criticises “remigration”
Meanwhile, BSW, which decided unanimously to hold talks with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, has publicly announced its “red lines”.
Party founder Sahra Wagenknecht stated that she maintains clear red lines against the AfD, particularly regarding “remigration”.
In an interview with RTL and ntv, Wagenknecht said: “They will feel our strong opposition on this matter. I find it terrible that people are worried and frightened.”
Stating that it is unacceptable for “well-integrated citizens” to be affected, the BSW leader remarked: “And we will not yield on this.” She continued:
“If the AfD is truly serious about frightening people who came to our country, work here, are well integrated, pay taxes, and whose children grow up here; if they intend to tell them, ‘You do not belong here’ or convey the message, ‘We want to expel you’ [we will prevent it].”
Regarding the AfD’s election manifesto equating homosexuality with “sexual deviance”, Wagenknecht replied: “Naturally, we believe every individual should live and love as they wish, and that equality exists here, including legal equality. Anyone questioning this does not live in modern times.”
BSW does not back Siegmund for premier
Wagenknecht also dismissed claims that BSW would elect AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund as state premier in Saxony-Anhalt, stating: “We have always made what we want very clear.”
Wagenknecht argued that Siegmund had given “completely contradictory statements regarding when he wants to be state premier and when he does not”.
“One gets the impression that he himself might feel it is not such a good idea after all,” Wagenknecht said.
The BSW founder called for a “respected figure across party lines” upon whom everyone could agree and who could “bring this country a little closer together”.
-
Europe2 weeks agoGermany’s CDU drafts tougher citizenship rules to counter AfD
-
America2 weeks agoPentagon launches mass polygraph inquiry over munitions leaks
-
Asia2 weeks agoChina leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers
-
America7 days agoMilanovic declares global neoliberalism dead, warns of plutocracy
-
Russia2 weeks agoMearsheimer says Trump seeks Ukraine peace but lacks diplomacy skills
-
Europe2 weeks agoAfD secures sweeping victory in Saxony-Anhalt state election
-
Middle East2 weeks agoIran weighs 1980 hostage crisis playbook for US midterms
-
Europe2 weeks agoBSW rules out AfD coalition but weighs issue-by-issue cooperation
