Opinion
Ways to stay in power
General, man is very useful
He can fly and he can kill
But he has one defect: He can think.
(Brecht)
A people on the brink of extinction
An online database called UALosses purportedly tracks Ukrainian casualties based on official Kiev declarations. According to this site, as of January 29th, the total confirmed deaths for the Kiev regime are 68,437. While the overall figure is likely inflated, the age breakdown of the reported deaths is noteworthy. The data indicates the following distribution: 10.2% in the 17-24 age group, 14% in the 25-29 age group, 15% in the 30-34 age group, 17% in the 35-39 age group, 16% in the 40-44 age group, 15% in the 45-49 age group, and 9% in the 50-54 age group. Although the total casualty numbers are questionable, these proportions likely offer a reasonable reflection of the age distribution of losses.
This age distribution suggests a significant depletion of the nation’s most dynamic human capital.
Recently, The Economist, following a trend of estimating the actual casualty figures in the conflict, compiled data from US leaks and official statements. In August 2022, Pentagon leaks suggested total casualties (dead and wounded) of 125,000-131,000. Shortly after, the White House claimed the death toll was under 10,000. By February 2023, the Pentagon estimated 70,000 deaths, while the White House put total casualties (dead and wounded) at 180,000-190,000. After a period of silence from US sources, by autumn of last year, total casualty estimates (dead and wounded) reached 308,000 and then 480,000. The Economist, citing “intelligence officials,” reported up to 100,000 deaths. (Subsequently, the former comedian president of the regime stated the death toll at 31,000.) A financial publication, in a detached manner, proposed different figures: “The proportion of those too seriously wounded to continue fighting is even higher: if one assumes that for every one Ukrainian soldier killed in action, six to eight Ukrainian soldiers are seriously wounded, then one in 20 men of fighting age must have died or been too seriously wounded to continue fighting.”
Let us examine this last estimate more closely. While concrete data is lacking, reasonable assumptions can lead to certain conclusions.
In a previous analysis discussing a potential armistice, I noted, “the Ukrainian population has fallen from around 40 million at the beginning of 2022 to 29 million by mid-2024 according to the best estimates,” and further, “according to Kiev’s own data, 3.2 million people left the country during the year.”
Alexander Dubinsky, a former parliamentarian from the comedian president’s party, arrested for “treason” in late 2023, posted on his Telegram channel last week (Dubinsky, though technically under arrest, appears to be active online based on his frequent updates):
‘If the coefficient of grain consumption (6 million tonnes in 2024) is used to assess the number of the remaining population, the Ukrainian population can be estimated at 21-24 million.’
However, according to official Kiev data, the population by mid-2024 is 35.8 million.
Instead of focusing on the exact number of deaths, let us assume a remaining population of 22 million for calculation purposes. Besides those killed in combat, it’s likely that men constitute the majority of those who have emigrated. Based on this, let’s make an optimistic assumption that 40% of the remaining population is male. Furthermore, for another optimistic estimate, let’s assume the child population is 25%, which is slightly lower than typically seen in population structures (e.g., Turkey’s population pyramid). While we assume an even gender split among children, it’s plausible that more boys have been evacuated. In short, even with these overly optimistic conditions, the adult male population is estimated to be around 7 million.
If, as US leaks from last autumn indicated, the Kiev regime’s casualties total 480,000, this would represent approximately 7% of the adult male population in our optimistic calculation. The Economist’s estimate seems reasonably based, albeit slightly inflated, assuming actual losses are around 500,000. However, if losses approach 1 million, as Russia claimed late last month (General Staff Chief Gerasimov stated on December 18th that total regime losses were 977,000, with 365,000 irreversible), this percentage would double.
In any case, between 7% and 14% of Ukraine’s remaining adult male population have perished on the battlefield or sustained injuries preventing their return to combat.
This situation constitutes a demographic crisis of unprecedented scale.[1]
Ways to stay in power
Sociology offers several approaches to understanding war fatigue. The central aim is to identify a metric that quantifies public dissatisfaction with prolonged conflict. While employing mathematical constants to explain social dynamics is common in sociology, it is not necessarily unhelpful even from a historical perspective. One such approach can be summarized as follows: if, in a country losing war initiative, the sum of (a) the percentage of the population directly or indirectly involved in the war and (b) the percentage of total casualties within that group exceeds 100%, socio-political upheaval is likely. Ranges below this threshold suggest varying probabilities: 80-100% indicates a high likelihood, 60-80% an average likelihood, and below 60% a low likelihood of such upheaval. In Napoléon’s France in 1814, Russia in July 1917, and Imperial Germany in September 1918, this rate surpassed 100%. In Hitler’s Germany in 1945, it exceeded 400%. If we take Ukraine’s current population at 22 million, casualties (dead, seriously or slightly wounded, deserters) at 1 million, and those directly or indirectly participating in military actions for the Kiev regime at 1.5 million, Ukraine’s war fatigue rate would approximate 75%. In 2022, it was around 30%, and in 2023, around 35%.
The precision of such a mathematical approach in historical analysis is debatable, yet the current situation in Ukraine is demonstrably severe, making precise numerical ratios less critical.
The current situation is as follows:
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Kiev regime’s losses in the third quarter of last year in the Kursk direction alone exceeded 40,000. However, official reports from 8 out of 20 regions (oblasts) and 1 special region (Kiev city) still under regime control, representing approximately one-third of Ukraine’s remaining population, indicate the following death tolls for the same period: Vinnitsa 986, Zhytomyr 727, Cherkasy 633, Kiev Oblast 1185, Poltava 809, Kirovohrad 580, Chernigov 632, Sumy 736.
It is evident that the Kiev regime has exerted considerable effort to conceal its losses. While concealing losses might have been simpler through data manipulation in the past, perhaps until the early 2000s, it is considerably more difficult today. The increasing number of families losing contact with relatives at the front makes the actual scale of losses more apparent. Consequently, more sophisticated concealment methods are necessary. The primary tactic employed by the regime is to reclassify the deceased as “missing in action,” thereby excluding them from official death statistics.
A significant threat to the Kiev regime’s stability is internal power struggles. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of Vietnam in the early 1960s: Ngô Đình Diệm, while still in power, was losing US support, foreshadowing his eventual overthrow in a CIA-backed coup and assassination. History, as Marx famously quipped, does not repeat itself identically. As Marx noted, referencing Hegel’s observation, “Hegel points out in one place that great historical events and persons of world-wide significance occur, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as a great tragedy, the second time as a farce.” While the leader of the Kiev regime may be viewed critically, power provides a survival instinct, enabling them to perceive threats. Moreover, unlike Ngô Đình Diệm who relied solely on the US, this regime benefits from the backing of “The City.”
Regardless of potential corruption within the current Kiev regime, it is unlikely they could maintain power through elections. To survive, they must remain in power, and the only way to achieve this is to prolong the conflict. Without the ongoing war, the regime would lack justification for its authoritarian actions, including the suspension of elections.
However, continuing the conflict necessitates further casualties. In a nation experiencing a rapid population decline from 42 million to 22 million in three years, a shrinking pool of potential recruits, and escalating war fatigue alongside growing social unrest, sustaining the war becomes increasingly challenging, even with continued external support in arms, ammunition, and funding. Ultimately, war depends on people, not just materiel and money.
The outcomes of potential ceasefire and armistice negotiations remain crucial (and as I have argued previously, the Kiev regime’s influence is waning, with an armistice primarily offering the West a temporary respite to prepare for a larger conflict). However, even the prospect of negotiations will likely amplify the desire among mobilized Ukrainian citizens to avoid combat and survive. Similarly, the increased possibility of negotiations will diminish the willingness of military personnel to risk their lives for the regime’s objectives.
The regime’s only path to survival is to continue fighting, yet their capacity to do so is diminishing. While the idea of the “last Ukrainian” may be an exaggeration, war fatigue is intensifying and could soon evolve into widespread anger. The fundamental limitation of money, weapons, and ammunition is that people do not want to die.
Dictatorial regimes often resolve seemingly intractable problems through provocation. When faced with overwhelming opposition, a staged provocation can escalate the conflict, potentially securing the regime’s indefinite hold on power.
I began with Brecht, and I conclude with Nazım Hikmet:
“It is like no fear
The fear of those who sell their people.”
[1] In December, Nikita Vasylenko, a professor at Kiev National University, proposed a controversial solution to the demographic issue. This individual suggested that Western peacekeepers could address the population problem, reasoning that “hungry Ukrainians” would find them appealing: “At least 40,000 men with money in their pockets. … And hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women whose husbands were killed or maimed in the war.” Vasilenko was subsequently dismissed by the university ethics committee but faced no criminal charges. It is plausible that his remarks reflect the underlying sentiments within Ukraine’s ruling elite.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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