Opinion
Ways to stay in power
General, man is very useful
He can fly and he can kill
But he has one defect: He can think.
(Brecht)
A people on the brink of extinction
An online database called UALosses purportedly tracks Ukrainian casualties based on official Kiev declarations. According to this site, as of January 29th, the total confirmed deaths for the Kiev regime are 68,437. While the overall figure is likely inflated, the age breakdown of the reported deaths is noteworthy. The data indicates the following distribution: 10.2% in the 17-24 age group, 14% in the 25-29 age group, 15% in the 30-34 age group, 17% in the 35-39 age group, 16% in the 40-44 age group, 15% in the 45-49 age group, and 9% in the 50-54 age group. Although the total casualty numbers are questionable, these proportions likely offer a reasonable reflection of the age distribution of losses.
This age distribution suggests a significant depletion of the nation’s most dynamic human capital.
Recently, The Economist, following a trend of estimating the actual casualty figures in the conflict, compiled data from US leaks and official statements. In August 2022, Pentagon leaks suggested total casualties (dead and wounded) of 125,000-131,000. Shortly after, the White House claimed the death toll was under 10,000. By February 2023, the Pentagon estimated 70,000 deaths, while the White House put total casualties (dead and wounded) at 180,000-190,000. After a period of silence from US sources, by autumn of last year, total casualty estimates (dead and wounded) reached 308,000 and then 480,000. The Economist, citing “intelligence officials,” reported up to 100,000 deaths. (Subsequently, the former comedian president of the regime stated the death toll at 31,000.) A financial publication, in a detached manner, proposed different figures: “The proportion of those too seriously wounded to continue fighting is even higher: if one assumes that for every one Ukrainian soldier killed in action, six to eight Ukrainian soldiers are seriously wounded, then one in 20 men of fighting age must have died or been too seriously wounded to continue fighting.”
Let us examine this last estimate more closely. While concrete data is lacking, reasonable assumptions can lead to certain conclusions.
In a previous analysis discussing a potential armistice, I noted, “the Ukrainian population has fallen from around 40 million at the beginning of 2022 to 29 million by mid-2024 according to the best estimates,” and further, “according to Kiev’s own data, 3.2 million people left the country during the year.”
Alexander Dubinsky, a former parliamentarian from the comedian president’s party, arrested for “treason” in late 2023, posted on his Telegram channel last week (Dubinsky, though technically under arrest, appears to be active online based on his frequent updates):
‘If the coefficient of grain consumption (6 million tonnes in 2024) is used to assess the number of the remaining population, the Ukrainian population can be estimated at 21-24 million.’
However, according to official Kiev data, the population by mid-2024 is 35.8 million.
Instead of focusing on the exact number of deaths, let us assume a remaining population of 22 million for calculation purposes. Besides those killed in combat, it’s likely that men constitute the majority of those who have emigrated. Based on this, let’s make an optimistic assumption that 40% of the remaining population is male. Furthermore, for another optimistic estimate, let’s assume the child population is 25%, which is slightly lower than typically seen in population structures (e.g., Turkey’s population pyramid). While we assume an even gender split among children, it’s plausible that more boys have been evacuated. In short, even with these overly optimistic conditions, the adult male population is estimated to be around 7 million.
If, as US leaks from last autumn indicated, the Kiev regime’s casualties total 480,000, this would represent approximately 7% of the adult male population in our optimistic calculation. The Economist’s estimate seems reasonably based, albeit slightly inflated, assuming actual losses are around 500,000. However, if losses approach 1 million, as Russia claimed late last month (General Staff Chief Gerasimov stated on December 18th that total regime losses were 977,000, with 365,000 irreversible), this percentage would double.
In any case, between 7% and 14% of Ukraine’s remaining adult male population have perished on the battlefield or sustained injuries preventing their return to combat.
This situation constitutes a demographic crisis of unprecedented scale.[1]
Ways to stay in power
Sociology offers several approaches to understanding war fatigue. The central aim is to identify a metric that quantifies public dissatisfaction with prolonged conflict. While employing mathematical constants to explain social dynamics is common in sociology, it is not necessarily unhelpful even from a historical perspective. One such approach can be summarized as follows: if, in a country losing war initiative, the sum of (a) the percentage of the population directly or indirectly involved in the war and (b) the percentage of total casualties within that group exceeds 100%, socio-political upheaval is likely. Ranges below this threshold suggest varying probabilities: 80-100% indicates a high likelihood, 60-80% an average likelihood, and below 60% a low likelihood of such upheaval. In Napoléon’s France in 1814, Russia in July 1917, and Imperial Germany in September 1918, this rate surpassed 100%. In Hitler’s Germany in 1945, it exceeded 400%. If we take Ukraine’s current population at 22 million, casualties (dead, seriously or slightly wounded, deserters) at 1 million, and those directly or indirectly participating in military actions for the Kiev regime at 1.5 million, Ukraine’s war fatigue rate would approximate 75%. In 2022, it was around 30%, and in 2023, around 35%.
The precision of such a mathematical approach in historical analysis is debatable, yet the current situation in Ukraine is demonstrably severe, making precise numerical ratios less critical.
The current situation is as follows:
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Kiev regime’s losses in the third quarter of last year in the Kursk direction alone exceeded 40,000. However, official reports from 8 out of 20 regions (oblasts) and 1 special region (Kiev city) still under regime control, representing approximately one-third of Ukraine’s remaining population, indicate the following death tolls for the same period: Vinnitsa 986, Zhytomyr 727, Cherkasy 633, Kiev Oblast 1185, Poltava 809, Kirovohrad 580, Chernigov 632, Sumy 736.
It is evident that the Kiev regime has exerted considerable effort to conceal its losses. While concealing losses might have been simpler through data manipulation in the past, perhaps until the early 2000s, it is considerably more difficult today. The increasing number of families losing contact with relatives at the front makes the actual scale of losses more apparent. Consequently, more sophisticated concealment methods are necessary. The primary tactic employed by the regime is to reclassify the deceased as “missing in action,” thereby excluding them from official death statistics.
A significant threat to the Kiev regime’s stability is internal power struggles. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of Vietnam in the early 1960s: Ngô Đình Diệm, while still in power, was losing US support, foreshadowing his eventual overthrow in a CIA-backed coup and assassination. History, as Marx famously quipped, does not repeat itself identically. As Marx noted, referencing Hegel’s observation, “Hegel points out in one place that great historical events and persons of world-wide significance occur, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as a great tragedy, the second time as a farce.” While the leader of the Kiev regime may be viewed critically, power provides a survival instinct, enabling them to perceive threats. Moreover, unlike Ngô Đình Diệm who relied solely on the US, this regime benefits from the backing of “The City.”
Regardless of potential corruption within the current Kiev regime, it is unlikely they could maintain power through elections. To survive, they must remain in power, and the only way to achieve this is to prolong the conflict. Without the ongoing war, the regime would lack justification for its authoritarian actions, including the suspension of elections.
However, continuing the conflict necessitates further casualties. In a nation experiencing a rapid population decline from 42 million to 22 million in three years, a shrinking pool of potential recruits, and escalating war fatigue alongside growing social unrest, sustaining the war becomes increasingly challenging, even with continued external support in arms, ammunition, and funding. Ultimately, war depends on people, not just materiel and money.
The outcomes of potential ceasefire and armistice negotiations remain crucial (and as I have argued previously, the Kiev regime’s influence is waning, with an armistice primarily offering the West a temporary respite to prepare for a larger conflict). However, even the prospect of negotiations will likely amplify the desire among mobilized Ukrainian citizens to avoid combat and survive. Similarly, the increased possibility of negotiations will diminish the willingness of military personnel to risk their lives for the regime’s objectives.
The regime’s only path to survival is to continue fighting, yet their capacity to do so is diminishing. While the idea of the “last Ukrainian” may be an exaggeration, war fatigue is intensifying and could soon evolve into widespread anger. The fundamental limitation of money, weapons, and ammunition is that people do not want to die.
Dictatorial regimes often resolve seemingly intractable problems through provocation. When faced with overwhelming opposition, a staged provocation can escalate the conflict, potentially securing the regime’s indefinite hold on power.
I began with Brecht, and I conclude with Nazım Hikmet:
“It is like no fear
The fear of those who sell their people.”
[1] In December, Nikita Vasylenko, a professor at Kiev National University, proposed a controversial solution to the demographic issue. This individual suggested that Western peacekeepers could address the population problem, reasoning that “hungry Ukrainians” would find them appealing: “At least 40,000 men with money in their pockets. … And hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women whose husbands were killed or maimed in the war.” Vasilenko was subsequently dismissed by the university ethics committee but faced no criminal charges. It is plausible that his remarks reflect the underlying sentiments within Ukraine’s ruling elite.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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