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Alaska Summit will not reverse Ukraine’s great defeat

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At midnight on August 15 local time, the much-anticipated U.S.-Russia summit concluded at the Joint Military Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, with both sides reaching no written agreement and agreeing to continue talks later. Although U.S. President Trump had predicted that the “probability of failure” was only 25%, the summit, despite seemingly yielding limited results, itself became a milestone in easing U.S.-Russia relations, especially as a consensus on follow-up negotiations was reached. Therefore, it is expected to lay the foundation for a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict through territorial exchange. Naturally, it cannot reverse the great defeat of Ukraine and even Europe.

It is reported that the U.S.-Russia summit adopted a “3+3” dialogue model led separately by Trump and Russian President Putin, lasting nearly three hours. After the talks, Trump and Putin held a joint press conference as scheduled and gave high evaluations of the summit in a relatively friendly atmosphere.

Putin emphasized that the talks were “productive, the atmosphere was positive, and the content was very profound and clear.” He described the U.S. and Russia as “close neighbors separated by the ocean” with a “shared historical heritage (referring to Alaska),” who had also fought common enemies. However, he noted that in the four years since the last summit, bilateral relations had “fallen to the lowest point since the Cold War,” which was not in the interests of either country or the world. Both sides needed to shift from confrontation to dialogue.

When talking about the Russia-Ukraine war, Putin praised Trump’s efforts to promote peace, stating that the “Ukraine incident” posed a fundamental threat to Russia, and he looked forward to “ensuring the solution for Ukraine is stable and long-term, eliminating all the original crises, and ensuring that all laws regarding the establishment of a fair and balanced Europe are taken into account.” Putin pledged that “Ukraine’s security must also be guaranteed” and that he would work with the U.S. side to achieve the goal of “paving the way for peace in Ukraine,” hoping Ukraine and European countries would “accept all this constructively, set up no obstacles, and not attempt to undermine the process through provocations and behind-the-scenes plots.”

Trump declared that he had a “productive meeting with Putin. We agreed on many points; I would say most (key points) are agreed upon, with a few big issues not yet fully resolved… so before we reach an agreement, nothing counts yet.”

Trump said he would later brief Ukrainian President Zelensky as well as NATO and European leaders on the content and progress of the summit by phone and emphasized that whether an agreement would be reached ultimately depended on their attitude. Trump also optimistically stated that the points of disagreement still had a “good chance of being achieved.”

At the press conference, Putin suggested holding the next U.S.-Russia summit in Moscow. Trump neither confirmed nor denied, casually saying it was “rather troublesome” for the U.S. side. However, Trump thanked Putin for visiting, gave the negotiation results a “10 out of 10,” and withdrew his previous warning that Russia would face “serious consequences.”

The U.S.-Russia Alaska Summit attracted global attention, not primarily because it could necessarily bring peace to both Russia and Ukraine, but because it broke Western political taboos by initiating the first U.S.-Russia presidential meeting since the outbreak of the war three years ago. Putin, who had been collectively boycotted by most Western countries, expelled from the G7 club, and wanted by the International Criminal Court in Rome due to the Russia-Ukraine war, had now become a guest of honor for the Western leader, the United States. He even received Trump’s extraordinary courtesy of being greeted personally at the plane’s stairway and escorted to the meeting site in the same car. This undoubtedly humiliated America’s European and NATO partners and proved that Trump was indeed a transactional leader who disregarded values, morality, and integrity.

From this perspective, the Alaska summit also created history, as it was not only the first time a Russian leader had visited this territory once sold to the United States but also the first time in ten years that the U.S. had welcomed a Russian president again. Moreover, the Alaska summit was not only the first Trump-Putin meeting since 2019 but also the first U.S.-Russia summit since the Biden-Putin talks in Geneva in May 2021. From the perspective of bilateral relations, the Alaska summit witnessed and promoted further repair and warming of U.S.-Russia relations, as well as consolidated the stability and sustainability of the personal relationship between Trump and Putin.

However, Alaska did not bring a substantive breakthrough in resolving the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Even at the final critical moment, both sides greatly lowered expectations for the summit’s outcome, including not signing any agreement. The reasons are simple: first, the summit was prepared in great haste; second, it concerned Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty. Before the summit, both teams had limited time for full consultations and groundwork, so it was clearly too late to reach a written agreement or inappropriate to form a written document. Therefore, the Alaska summit became a journey of restoring U.S.-Russia bilateral relations and an exploration of peace in Russia and Ukraine.

Before embarking on the Alaska journey, Trump had already clarified the interim task of the summit, promising not to finalize any agreement with Putin but to leave agreements for subsequent U.S.-Russia-Ukraine trilateral talks. He told the media, “If this is a good meeting, we will achieve peace in the near future.” “The second (trilateral) meeting will be very, very important because it will be the meeting where they reach an agreement.”

Trump also bluntly said, “I don’t want to use the word ‘partition,’ but in some sense, it’s not a bad word.” Clearly, Trump acknowledged the reality of Ukrainian land being taken by Russia and had continuously, overtly or covertly, been selling this plan to Ukraine and other Western partners. Trump’s active planning and promotion of the Alaska summit was very likely aimed at demanding Russia agree to a ceasefire, thereby creating conditions for subsequent “land for peace” or “land for security.” In other words, as long as Russia agreed to a full or even partial ceasefire — for example, no longer launching ground offensives to seize more Ukrainian land, or halting large-scale airstrikes against Ukraine’s deep targets — Trump would have the grounds and confidence to persuade or force Ukraine and its European war-hawk partners to accept reality.

The fundamental reason the Alaska summit did not achieve full consensus may also lie in the fact that Russia has not yet achieved its intended land-control goals, such as complete control of the Donbas region. It could also be that Russia still hoped the U.S. and NATO would provide more reliable guarantees for its current territorial claims and long-term security demands, especially ensuring Ukraine would not join NATO.

Although the Alaska summit did not sign any written agreement, it still left Ukraine and most of its European partners unhappy, uneasy, and pessimistic. Because the final outcome of sacrificing Ukraine and Europe’s security interests has already become apparent, signing an agreement is merely a matter of sooner or later, not a question of whether such a compromise will be made.

Before attending the meeting at Trump’s invitation, Russia’s bottom line had already been laid on the table and known to the world. Its core terms were that Ukraine must cede part of its territory and abandon joining NATO. The Trump administration’s demands were also open and transparent: requiring Russia to quickly agree to a ceasefire in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions, but not requiring Russia to withdraw from the Ukrainian lands it already occupied. The “partition” prospect Trump mentioned in his warm-up for the Alaska summit was the best policy annotation of this.

The Times of London recently quoted U.S. National Security Council sources as saying that the U.S. and Russia had discussed possible models for Russia’s long-term occupation of Ukrainian territory, one of which was based on Israel’s occupation model of Palestinian land in the West Bank. In such a scenario, Russia would have military and economic control over the occupied Ukrainian territories and establish its own government there. Although the White House denied this report as fake news, it was clearly not groundless and was in fact the very tragic ending of the Russia-Ukraine conflict that the author had predicted years ago: the “Palestinization” of the Ukraine issue.

In the face of the reality that the United States appears to be mediating fairly but is in fact adopting an appeasement policy toward Russia, and that Europe cannot rid itself of its emotional and power dependence on the U.S., Ukraine and its European partners have lost confidence and courage. Although Zelensky emphasized that “Ukrainians will not give their land to the occupiers,” he is now more eager than ever to participate in a U.S.-Russia summit, and even hopes to hold a U.S.-Russia-Ukraine summit unconditionally.

NATO Secretary-General Rutte, in an interview with ABC on August 10, helplessly stated that Ukraine may eventually have to accept Russia’s de facto control over part of the occupied territories. Such control would be based on “factual” recognition, not “legal” recognition. This was by far the most candid and straightforward statement from a NATO leader regarding a peaceful solution to the Russia-Ukraine war.

On the eve of the Alaska summit, German Chancellor Merz met Zelensky in Berlin. The leaders of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Finland, as well as European Council President von der Leyen and NATO Secretary-General Rutte, also participated via video link. After the meeting, Merz, on behalf of the European partners, put forward five demands to Trump to ensure Europe’s and Ukraine’s basic security interests: Ukraine must participate in follow-up talks, a ceasefire must precede any peace agreement, territorial claims must be based on the existing frontlines, Ukraine must receive security guarantees, and negotiations with Russia should be based on a “common transatlantic strategy.”

Although the Alaska summit did not reach a milestone agreement, it itself had milestone significance. It not only meant that U.S.-Russia relations had warmed up further, but also that the Russia-Ukraine war was one step closer to a “strategic match point” of U.S.-Russia compromise and Ukraine-Europe concessions. Since Trump and Putin have agreed to continue holding summits, Putin’s suggestion of Moscow as the next venue cannot be ruled out. The next summit may become a decisive closing negotiation, whether limited to the U.S. and Russia, or expanded to include trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks, or even quadrilateral talks involving the U.S., Russia, Ukraine, and the EU or NATO.

The future of the Russia-Ukraine war as a “tragic victory for Russia and a tragic defeat for Ukraine” is becoming increasingly clear, as the balance of victory in the war is tilting more visibly toward Russia and approaching its ceasefire conditions: Ukrainian troops withdrawing from the remaining controlled areas of Donbas, giving Russia full control over Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and the Crimean Peninsula. On the 11th, Ukrainian frontline military personnel admitted that Ukrainian troops entrenched in the southwest corner of Donetsk faced the risk of encirclement, and on the 13th, the governor of that region pessimistically stated that Russian forces had fully controlled the Donetsk frontline.

What cannot be obtained on the battlefield is difficult to obtain at the negotiating table; what cannot be gained at the negotiating table can only be fought for on the battlefield. Whether at the negotiating table or on the battlefield, since the U.S. is almost entirely leaning toward Russia, Ukraine and its European partners will be the losers. Perhaps before the next U.S.-Russia summit or multilateral summit is held, Russian forces will already have achieved their established battlefield objectives, and by then, Ukraine and its European partners will be forced to swallow the bitter fruit of ceding land in exchange for peace.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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