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The century-old debate on the Magic Mountain continues: Naphta or Settembrini?

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As we celebrate the 150th anniversary of the birth of Thomas Mann, the most significant author in modern German literature, Mann and the countless masterpieces he penned continue to maintain their importance and relevance.

Like every great writer, Mann, with his creative genius, clearly depicted the complex conflicts of his era in his novels, expressing his foresight on how societal contradictions would take shape.

His works, which a century ago explored the social and cultural problems of post-war Germany, have much to say today about the intellectual legacy of German intellectuals who either openly support the war against Russia or are forced to quietly approve of it.

The characters in his novel The Magic Mountain, published a century ago, who express anti-Russian sentiment and prejudices against Islam and Eastern societies, are like shadows from the past of today’s German intellectuals.

On the other hand, Mann’s journey to the East a century ago shows how even writers representing Europe’s progressive and humanist tradition shared many of the prejudices of Western conservatives.

The works of Thomas Mann, who discussed the future of Europe and reckoned with the war during the crisis of a century ago, are filled with lessons that need to be remembered in Europe’s current conditions of war and crisis.

Mann’s Impressions of Istanbul

In 1925, Thomas Mann undertook a brief journey to the East, primarily to Cairo. Apart from his impressions of Egypt, which inspired his Joseph and His Brothers series, this trip has been overlooked in even the most meticulous biographies.

There is some justification for this neglect by Mann’s biographers. Mann’s travel notes are surprisingly superficial and brief. These short notes give the reader the impression that Mann was compelled to travel out of necessity rather than his own desire.

Particularly striking are the political and sociological limitations of his perspective, in addition to the superficiality and brevity of his impressions of his visit to Istanbul. This overshadows the breadth of curiosity of the great writer who, in his literary works, described everything around him in the finest detail.

In Mann’s notes, one finds not the slightest impression of the transformation taking place in the imperial capital, which had just established a new democratic republic after a war of independence and was experiencing freedom after occupation.

Mann’s observations are reminiscent of the impressions of German travelers who visited Istanbul a century earlier: people wearing the fez, the contrast between Europeanized women and traditional women identified with the East… So much so that almost the only praise for Istanbul’s magnificence is reserved for the Hagia Sophia.

Undoubtedly, this situation has direct links to orientalist thought. Despite the full orientalist tone in Flaubert’s impressions in Voyage to the Orient, when compared to the intensity and depth of his observations, Mann’s attitude can be better described as disinterest or indifference.

However, if we consider Mann’s masterpiece The Magic Mountain, which he began writing in 1918 and published at the end of 1924, evaluating his notes on Istanbul becomes much more complex.

One of the novel’s most important characters, the humanist and representative of the Enlightenment tradition, Settembrini, states: “He approved of what was happening because a path beneficial to civilization was being followed. A general atmosphere of peace and disarmament was blowing through Europe. Democratic ideas were developing. He claimed to have learned through back channels that the Young Turks had completed their preparations for a revolutionary uprising. Türkiye was to become a constitutional nation-state—what a great victory for humanity!”

Although he did not share Settembrini’s Mediterranean optimism for the future, Mann, who defended the Weimar Republic and wanted democratic thought to take permanent root in Germany, shared these ideas.

To approach Mann’s notes on Istanbul with a broader perspective, we will critically examine Settembrini’s political position in the novel, as well as Naphta, the opposing pole who balances Settembrini’s intellectual weight, and the debate between them, which to a large extent continues today.

A Reckoning with War in The Magic Mountain

It is striking that the section where Settembrini heralds the victory of the constitutional nation-state in Türkiye is the very part where Naphta enters the novel. Until Naphta’s appearance, the political and aesthetic advice Settembrini gives to Hans and Joachim is about life and the fundamental values of European bourgeois society. In a sense, as Naphta says, “Listen to our Voltaire, our rationalist,” he repeatedly reiterates his unwavering faith in the rationality and progress of the Enlightenment.

With Naphta’s entry into the novel, the political and aesthetic debate expands by another layer and intensifies tragically. The ideological framework of the novel transcends the borders of Europe, shifting to war and, inevitably, the West-East conflict and the crisis in the international political system.

In response to Settembrini’s words about the birth of the democratic nation-state in Türkiye, Naphta cynically retorts, “The emancipation of Islam, oh how wonderful. Enlightened fanaticism—marvelous.”

It is jarring to see, in all its nakedness, the century-old intellectual roots of these words, which shocked us when we heard them from many Western intellectuals, especially after September 11.

In this context, when we read The Magic Mountain, we are captivated by the work’s relevance, like that of many masterpieces. Mann began writing the novel towards the end of World War I. The work was published before World War II.

Those who read the novel after its publication considered it a reckoning with the war, a diagnosis of the social diseases that created the war, and a critique of the intellectual climate in Europe that affirmed war.

Those who read the book after World War II, however, saw The Magic Mountain as a great writer’s profound foresight into the rising authoritarian regimes in Europe, an account told with a deep intuition for the inevitable consequences of the European bourgeois society’s illness. Thus, like every great writer, Mann was seen as a ‘prophet’ after both world wars.

Today’s conflicts in the international political system, especially after the Ukraine crisis; Europe once again coming face to face with war; the political crisis with Russia expanding into a cultural crisis, leading to the revival of historical prejudices about the West-East conflict; as well as the rise of far-right populist parties in Europe, the crisis of Western liberal democracy, the structural problems in parliamentary regimes… and many similar issues compel us to put The Magic Mountain before us again and reconsider our assessments.

The provocative prophecies of The Magic Mountain, particularly who Settembrini and Naphta represent in real life, have always been debated. Perhaps the most striking and closest analogy was made by the German writer Rüdiger Safranski. Safranski identifies Settembrini with the Kantian Ernst Cassirer and Naphta with Martin Heidegger.

In Davos, where the novel is set, just four years after its publication, Cassirer and Heidegger confronted each other at a conference in 1929. Starting from the fundamental question ‘What is man?’, they debated the core points of divergence in Western philosophy, just like Settembrini and Naphta.

It was a profound debate experienced by German intellectuals whose paths would sharply diverge after the dissolving Weimar Republic, tragically dividing them into opposing enemy camps. In this context, Mann demonstrated his foresight by presenting the irreconcilable opposing ideas on freedom, war, and Europe’s intellectual heritage that he raised in his novel.

Perhaps what led Safranski to think of such a similarity was Settembrini accusing Naphta, saying, “So you’re defending Pan-Germanism? Is that it?” This analogy becomes even more striking when one considers Heidegger’s joining the ranks of Nazism.

The anti-Russian sentiment observed in Europe today, especially in Germany, was echoed a century ago in Naphta’s words: “And I think you are a Russia enthusiast.” The ideological and cultural fractures of a century ago are still vividly felt today.

European Humanism’s Trial by War

When we think of Mann, an admirer of Tolstoy, these parts of the novel resemble the relentlessly tense and dramatic political discussions in Dostoevsky’s works. Like Dostoevsky, Mann has his characters, who express opposing views, speak with their most powerful arguments.

When powerful ideas become concentrated, they begin to collapse inward, thus revealing contradictions that even the most bombastic rhetoric cannot hide. Ideas that seem opposed and irreconcilable dramatically converge, and universal ethical principles begin to bend and warp.

The same traces can be observed in the political positioning of the characters in the novel regarding war. The soldier Joachim expresses the inevitability, and even necessity, of war with the words: “War is a necessary thing. As Moltke said, without war, the world would soon fall into decay.”

The intellectual ‘princeps scholasticorum’ [Latin: first among scholars], Naphta, at the most heated point of the discussion, ends the debate by presenting war as the sole and valid solution to all existing social problems: “Meanwhile, we are about to suffocate from the crowds; all professions are so teeming with people that soon previous wars will pale in comparison to the fights that will be fought for a piece of bread. Open spaces and green cities! The strengthening of the race! But why should it be strengthened if civilization and progress say there will be no war? War will take care of these problems and will produce solutions for both strengthening the race and reducing births.”

From the soldier to the university intellectual, war is defended on the same moral grounds. It is starkly observed how imperialist bourgeois society, when faced with a deep economic and political crisis, always brings war to the agenda, pushing humanity to the brink of disaster.

Faced with this pro-war sentiment spreading like a plague across Europe, what position does the humanist Settembrini, who advocates for peace and progress, take? Settembrini states that international peace will be established by transitioning to a system of free and equal states. However, Settembrini takes an anti-war stance based on principles and optimistic ideals rather than on facts of reality.

At this point, Mann allows Settembrini’s weak points to emerge. First and foremost, Settembrini does not see or accept the crisis into which European bourgeois society has been plunged. He considers European bourgeois society’s 18th-century progressive and revolutionary character to be immutable and universal; he cannot see that the bourgeois society he identifies with reason now possesses irrational tendencies.

The signs of why the humanist tradition was not effective in shaping public opinion against this pro-war sentiment in a Europe where war was being loudly proclaimed are hidden in these points.

Despite all his provocative religious ideas, Naphta is more realistic than Settembrini. He puts forward a self-assured conservative alternative to the crisis of capitalism. He even becomes a point of attraction for people restless from the crisis by voicing the strongest opposition to capitalism in Europe. A striking example of this is that at the end of the discussion, Hans and Joachim, although they dislike Naphta, agree with him on some issues.

Settembrini’s other contradiction is much more dramatic. Despite his anti-war, humanist stance, Settembrini also defends war at a certain point in the name of progress and freedom: “Even Voltaire approved of wars that served to spread civilization and suggested to Frederick II that he wage war on the Turks.”

As the discussion continues, Settembrini goes so far as to defend the Crusades: “Even war, my dear sir, has at times been forced to serve progress; if you recall certain events from that period you so admire, that is, the period of the Crusades, those wars, in the name of civilization, strengthened economic and commercial relations between peoples and united Westerners under a single idea.”

Undoubtedly, Settembrini’s contradictions expose the contradictions of the Enlightenment, especially the moderate Enlightenment. Montesquieu’s views, which explained the qualitative differences between civilizations with his theory of geography and climates, initiated the Enlightenment’s treatment of ideas about the East with an orientalist discourse. Many philosophers, like Voltaire, caused this orientalist view to become entrenched.

Settembrini and Naphta, who represent opposite poles and conflicting value judgments throughout the novel, tragically become identical in their views on war and the East.

As in Dostoevsky’s novels, the two opposing characters actually complete each other; the existence of one necessitates the other. Settembrini and Naphta are complementary others.

The traces of the rising pro-war sentiment in Europe extend back to the Enlightenment, and the West’s imperialist, orientalist view of the East originates from many of the Enlightenment’s ideas.

The most striking expression of this is Settembrini’s generalization of the East as a civilization of inertia, motionless, and closed to dynamism and progress, despite his enthusiastic celebration of democratic development in Türkiye: “I am a European, a Westerner. Your scale of values is perfectly suited to the East; the East detests action. Lao-Tzu teaches that between heaven and earth there is nothing so beneficial as doing nothing, and that if humanity had renounced action, complete peace and happiness would reign on earth.”

Precisely because he is a Westerner, a European, Settembrini cannot see the contradictions in his own bourgeois society. This blind spot causes him to falter in the face of rising conservative pro-war sentiment in Europe and the orientalist discourse about the East, preventing him from taking a clear stance.

It is at these points that we must examine the historical and ideological roots of why, before World War I, European intellectuals and artists—from conservatives to humanists to radical avant-gardists, with the exception of a small minority of intellectuals—took their place in the ranks of war.

The Istanbul notes of Thomas Mann, a Westerner and representative of Europe’s humanist tradition, and even Mann’s own contradictory attitude at the beginning of the war, should be discussed from this perspective.

Naphta won the century-old debate in The Magic Mountain; who is to say that Naphta won’t win the debate today as well?

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A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order

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The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.

The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”

One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.

The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.

Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.

Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.

On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.

Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.

When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.

The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.

The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.

The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism

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Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.

As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.

In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.

Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.

Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion

NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.

And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.

The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.

The collapse of the Atlantic system

Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.

In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.

Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.

For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.

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Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing

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Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.

For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.

Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.

It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.

The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.

Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.

This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.

For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.

China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.

All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.

The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.

Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.

Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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