Opinion
Why Did the Assad Regime Collapse in Just 12 Days?

On December 8, the Syrian opposition factions, namely the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)” coalition and the “Syrian National Army,” announced that they had captured and taken control of Damascus. On the same day, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who had been in exile in Russia, announced his resignation and ordered the former government to peacefully transfer power to opposition forces. No one expected that the Assad regime, which had endured the trials of a decade-long civil war, would crumble under the opposition’s offensive in just 12 days, collapsing with unprecedented speed and bringing an end to the Assad family’s half-century-long rule in Syria.
A review of this “Syrian War 2.0,” which broke out at the end of November, reveals that the Assad regime was not only quickly defeated by the opposition forces but also lost to Israel, Türkiye, and was ultimately abandoned by its long-term supporters, Russia and Iran. At the core, however, the regime’s own incompetence was its downfall. In short, a combination of complex and multifaceted factors led to the historic collapse of Assad’s regime.
On November 27, opposition factions based in the Idlib province launched a surprise offensive. In just two days, they breached the government’s defenses, entered Aleppo province, and seized control of the provincial capital, Aleppo city, which Damascus had held for eight years. A week later, the rebels expanded their offensive, moving southward and easily capturing Hama and Homs in central and western Syria before finally taking Damascus.
In just 12 days, the Syrian military failed to mount any large-scale, organized defense of the regime. Neither Russia nor Iran took significant action to assist the Assad regime against the relatively weak rebel coalition. The Lebanese Hezbollah sent only 2,000 fighters to express support when Damascus was about to fall, but they were soon forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces outright refused to intervene. In short, the support Assad received during the “Syrian War 1.0” was entirely absent. The “Axis of Resistance” or the “Shia Crescent” disintegrated completely on the western flank of the Eastern Mediterranean, and both Russia and Iran lost their strategic assets and spheres of influence in the region.
At this critical juncture for the state and the regime, from Aleppo to Hama, Homs, and Damascus, there was no sign of fierce or effective resistance from the Syrian military or armed civilians. Instead, there was a total collapse of military morale and public support, an internal failure unlike the determined defense seen four years ago. Notably, the opposition forces were not overwhelmingly powerful nor internationally legitimized.
The anti-government forces were primarily led by the HTS coalition, with the Türkiye-supported “Syrian National Army,” based in Afrin along Syria’s northwestern border, coordinating the attack. The HTS coalition is formerly known as the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, the “Al-Nusra Front.” Due to its terrorist roots and current activities, the organization has been designated a terrorist group by the United Nations, the United States, and Türkiye.
The “Syrian National Army,” on the other hand, is a Turkish-backed proxy force aimed at countering Kurdish separatist groups in the Afrin region, preventing them from linking up with Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. This supports Türkiye’s control over the so-called “safe zone” in northern Syria, disrupts the vertical connectivity of cross-border Kurdish networks, and suppresses Kurdish insurgency and separatist movements within Türkiye.
The sudden collapse of Syrian government forces under attack from northwestern rebel forces was unexpected. However, a closer examination of the region’s geopolitical dynamics reveals that this outcome was inevitable.
Firstly, various opposition factions had laid low, recuperating and significantly improving their combat capabilities. Since the ceasefire brokered by Russia and Türkiye in March 2020, the opposition factions entrenched in northwestern Syria had bided their time for four years, waiting for a chance to rise again. Once they sensed weaknesses in government forces or a relaxation of defenses, they were bound to break the ceasefire, expand their control, and wage war to sustain their growth and aim for ultimate power.
Secondly, the four-year ceasefire had caused the Syrian government to neglect the strategic threat posed by the northwest, particularly failing to fortify Aleppo, its largest city and a critical stronghold. Russian forces stationed in Syria and Iranian military advisors also became complacent, failing to monitor the rebels’ recovery, assess the threat of a counteroffensive, or prepare for war. Following the outbreak of this conflict, Russia immediately dismissed its military commander in Syria, Sergei Kisel, replacing him with General Alexander Chaiko—a move reflecting accountability for negligence.
Thirdly, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” further complicated the region’s already intricate geopolitical landscape. Israel’s “Second Lebanon War” severely weakened Hezbollah forces and further undermined Iran’s military presence in Syria, creating an ideal opportunity for rebel forces to launch their comeback from the northwest. According to Russia’s Gazeta, Aleppo’s defense had been primarily entrusted to the Syrian Republican Guard’s 32nd Division, local militias, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, many of these forces had recently been redeployed to combat revived ISIS sleeper cells in the Syrian desert, leaving the northwestern defenses hollow. Frequent Israeli bombings in the Aleppo suburbs further weakened the remaining forces, causing the defenses to collapse entirely.
Fourthly, just before Israel reached a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, it carried out targeted bombings of the Syria-Lebanon border crossings, severing Hezbollah’s land routes between Syria and Iran. This not only dismantled the western flank of the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance” but also emboldened Syrian rebel forces to exploit the power vacuum.
Fifthly, on a broader strategic level, the protracted war in Ukraine and the increasingly volatile standoff between Russia and NATO distracted Moscow from Syria, a relatively minor chessboard. Similarly, Iran, entangled in its year-long conflict with Israel and juggling a “seven-front” resistance axis, failed to focus on Syria or anticipate the sudden resurgence of rebel forces.
Sixthly, the “Astana Process” countries—Russia, Iran, and Türkiye—agreed to abandon Assad’s regime in pursuit of a negotiated settlement for a “post-Assad Syria.” Following the outbreak of this conflict, both Russia and Iran refrained from intervening decisively to rescue Assad, opting instead to align with Türkiye and restart the “Astana Process,” effectively sealing Assad’s fate.
After the resumption of hostilities, Syria, Russia, and Iran uniformly accused Israel and the United States of orchestrating the rebels’ counteroffensive. Türkiye, which had been deeply involved in the Syrian civil war, remained silent for several days before officially announcing its support for overthrowing the Assad regime. In reality, the rapid progression of the “Syrian War 2.0” and the roles of the various actors supporting the rebels reflect a complex web of interests and calculations.
Firstly, the United States was not the instigator or driving force behind the rebels. From the beginning of the conflict, the United States emphasized that it had no involvement in the offensive and publicly pressured Türkiye. According to Israel’s Jerusalem Post, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and urged Ankara to restrain the “Syrian National Army” offensive and ensure stability in Syria. Although the U.S. dislikes the Assad regime, which aligns closely with Russia and is part of the “Axis of Resistance” with Iran, it does not wish to see Syria plunge into new chaos, allowing radical and terrorist forces to grow again, which could force the U.S. into another counterterrorism war in the Middle East. On December 2, AFP quoted a U.S. State Department spokesperson as saying that the United States would not, under any circumstances, support the HTS, a terrorist organization. Reuters reported that while calling on all sides to stabilize Syria, the U.S. government was also considering lifting sanctions on Syria to drive a wedge between it and Iran.
Secondly, Türkiye was one of the main drivers of the rebels’ large-scale offensive. Without Türkiye’s support or tacit approval, the “Syrian National Army” would not have been able to coordinate with forces like HTS. Türkiye has long insisted that the Syrian government must engage in dialogue with the opposition and form an inclusive government, while also pushing for the normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara. However, the Syrian government categorizes the armed groups in the northwest as terrorist organizations and refuses dialogue under the premise that Türkiye continues to occupy Syrian territory in the north. Analysts argue that Türkiye viewed this new wave of conflict as an opportunity to pressure Damascus into submission, or even overthrow it, to further dominate the post-Assad era and shape the geopolitical landscape of the new Middle East.
Thirdly, Israel has played a significant role in weakening the “Axis of Resistance” and exacerbating the conflict. During the “Syrian War 1.0,” extremist and terrorist organizations had exploited the hostile relationship between Syria and Israel, as well as the Syrian army’s reluctance to use heavy weapons near the Israeli ceasefire line. Analysts believe that the use of heavy weaponry, drones, and advanced electronic warfare by the rebels in this round of fighting indicates the involvement of Israeli intelligence agencies. Both sides share a common enemy in the Syrian government and its allied “Resistance Front.” Although Israel officially denies involvement in the attacks, the implicit understanding between the two parties is evident. With the resurgence of the Syrian conflict, Israel has succeeded in further diverting the attention and resources of the “Resistance Axis,” reducing pressure on Israel from the northeast and Iran. On December 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu excitedly proclaimed that the collapse of the Assad regime was a “direct result of Israel’s actions against Iran and Hezbollah” and declared, “This has triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East.”
Fourthly, Ukraine has also been accused of involvement in the conflict. On December 3, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations accused Ukrainian intelligence agencies of assisting Syrian rebels, including providing weapons, training, and operational guidance targeting Russian forces in Syria. On December 4, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated these accusations, alleging that Ukrainian authorities were directly involved in the Syrian rebels’ offensive. Ukraine has remained silent on these allegations, and no third-party evidence has confirmed Ukrainian intelligence’s involvement. However, theoretically, forcing Russia to open a second front in the Middle East could alleviate Ukraine’s military pressure in the east of Ukraine.
As a pivotal state in the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” Syria’s evolving conflict has profound implications. Hezbollah, which previously deployed troops to aid Damascus during the regime’s defensive battles, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have both declared their unwillingness to send forces across borders to assist this time. Although Iran has repeatedly stated its readiness to deploy troops upon the Syrian government’s request, no concrete action has been taken. Russia has also declared its continued support for the Syrian government. However, beyond deploying its existing forces and equipment in Syria to fend off rebel advances and conducting missile drills in the Eastern Mediterranean for deterrence, Russia lacks the willingness or capacity to mount a large-scale military intervention as it did during the “Syrian War 1.0.”
The collapse of the Assad regime is not a victory for the Syrian people but rather the result of a combination of the government’s incompetence and external interference. Regime change in Damascus does not signify the beginning of long-term peace and stability in Syria; rather, it may mark the start of a new round of power struggles. Western, central, and southern Syria are now under the control of the HTS and the “Syrian National Army”; northern Syria is dominated by Türkiye’s “safe zone”; eastern and northeastern Syria are controlled by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces; and the southwestern Golan Heights, encompassing over 1,200 square kilometers, have long been under Israeli occupation. Over the past week, Israel has further expanded its defensive perimeter, capturing several key positions on the Syrian side… This “partitioned” Syria faces continued vulnerability to external manipulation and an even more uncertain future.
Opinion
Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.
When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.
It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”
The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction
An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.
The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.
Opinion
Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.
However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.
The US Can’t Be Bypassed
China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.
However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.
This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.
For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.
Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.
Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.
Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite
Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.
When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.
Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.
Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.
Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.
The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.
Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.
However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.
Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions
Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.
This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.
All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.
Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.
Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.
This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.
But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.
In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.
Opinion
Trump’s Iron-Fist Crackdown on Illegal Immigration Further Tears Apart American Society

As of June 13 (Pacific Time), one week had passed since a conflict erupted following a raid on illegal immigration sites in California by federal agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This conflict not only showed no signs of abating but rather spread like wildfire from Los Angeles, the capital of California, to 24 cities across the United States, including San Francisco, Dallas, Austin, New York, and Washington. Although protesters strongly oppose the federal government’s forced deportation of illegal immigrants, President Trump, who has already deployed the National Guard and some Marine units, has threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act, authorizing armed forces to suppress protesters more forcefully.
That same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals suspended a federal judge’s previous night ruling requiring Trump to return control of the National Guard. This undoubtedly gave Trump’s iron-fisted action a legal umbrella. The “alternative civil war” sparked by immigration policy reveals the complex realities and interest struggles of American society and puts Trump and the Republican Party’s governance prospects to the test. Although this unrest is unlikely to lead to a real American civil war as depicted in the 2024 Hollywood political prophecy film Civil War, it will undoubtedly further tear American society apart.
On June 6, federal law enforcement officers carried out a raid in Los Angeles County targeting illegal immigrants, storming at least seven locations and arresting 44 people. That evening, 500 protesters gathered in downtown Los Angeles, where law enforcement used tear gas, flashbangs, and rubber bullets to suppress them. On June 7, violent clashes erupted between federal law enforcement and protesters in the city of Paramount, California. As the crackdown on illegal immigration met resistance, Trump signed a presidential memorandum to “liberate Los Angeles,” bypassing California Governor Newsom and deploying 2,000 state National Guard troops to Los Angeles.
This marked the first time since 1965 that a U.S. president activated a state’s National Guard without a request from the state’s executive authority. On June 8, Trump further threatened to deploy 700 Marines to California to “protect federal property.” Trump’s administrative pressure campaign against California ignited the fuse of this “domestic unrest” and triggered a new constitutional crisis.
On June 9, Governor Newsom and California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the federal government from using the state’s National Guard and Defense Forces for law enforcement, but a federal judge in California rejected the motion and scheduled a hearing three days later. On June 10, due to ongoing arrests, Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass announced a curfew in a one-square-mile area of downtown. Shortly after, Spokane, the second-largest city in Washington State, also declared a curfew in response to protests against ICE…
A review of public statements and public opinion over the past week shows that this national dispute over the handling of illegal immigration reflects deep-rooted contradictions and power struggles, directly illustrating America’s political polarization and social fragmentation.
First, this is a clash of beliefs about the rights and wrongs and merits of immigration. The United States is a multiethnic federal nation built through immigration and sustained by continuous immigration that supports its development, prosperity, innovation, and vitality. Without massive immigration waves, America wouldn’t have come into being. Without long-term immigrant contributions, America wouldn’t be strong. Trump himself is a descendant of German immigrants. On June 5, when new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz made his first visit to the U.S., he gave Trump a symbolic gift: a framed German birth certificate of his grandfather Friedrich Trump from Karlstadt.
Neither Merz’s subtle persuasion nor Trump’s own immigrant heritage can mitigate the serious rift in U.S. society over immigration. Trump and other conservatives, represented by the Republican Party, who adhere to market economy principles and social Darwinism, believe that the U.S. has too low an immigration threshold, allowing large numbers of low-quality or illegal immigrants to enter. They argue this not only takes away Americans’ jobs and dilutes welfare benefits but also erodes loyalty to America and causes the continued decline of the social status and influence of white Americans. Therefore, in his second presidential campaign, Trump promised to expel all illegal immigrants if elected, to reclaim the jobs and benefits lost by Americans—especially white Americans.
However, opponents—especially Democrats who advocate for cultural diversity and universal human rights—argue that immigrants revitalize the U.S. economy. They provide abundant cheap labor that supports the service, transportation, construction, and manufacturing industries. Thus, immigrants should not be discriminated against, let alone expelled. Moreover, even if some immigrants entered illegally, many have since settled down, abide by the law, work hard, and even build families, becoming an inseparable part of American society. Forcibly deporting them harms not only the economy and industries but also causes humanitarian crises like broken families and displaced children.
Secondly, this is a partial game in the overall struggle between federal and local interests. The crisis first broke out in California, reflecting the misalignment and differing calculations between the federal government and this economically powerful state. Previously, trade-dependent California had clearly opposed Trump’s tariff policy; the immigration dispute is merely a continuation of existing conflicts and has intensified past antagonisms. California is the largest economic state in the U.S., contributing 14% of national GDP. Its economic development has long relied on various types of immigration, making it a stronghold long seen as a sanctuary for illegal immigrants. According to unofficial statistics, California has up to 2.3 million illegal immigrants—around 20% of the U.S. total and 5.9% of the state’s population, higher than the national average—with 74% of them being of working age. If large numbers of illegal immigrants are expelled, California businesses will face skyrocketing labor costs or labor shortages, potentially leading to economic stagnation or even decline. Therefore, California’s political and business elites have consistently resisted federal immigration enforcement measures. The trade war has already cost California over $40 billion and intensified conflicts between immigrant laborers and native workers. Expelling immigrants would undoubtedly worsen California’s economy.
California is both a major contributor of federal taxes and a major recipient of central fiscal transfers—mutual dependence is high. Yet, to break this “sanctuary fortress” of illegal immigrants and promote new immigration policies nationwide, the Trump administration plans to sharply cut federal funding to California starting June 13, citing its “anti-energy, criminal-coddling, and illegal immigrant-sheltering” policies. Governor Newsom emphasized that California pays over $80 billion annually to the federal government—much more than it receives—and threatened to stop sending federal taxes. Long-standing tensions between the federal government and California were further inflamed by Trump’s radical immigration policy and ultimately exploded due to federal agents’ forced arrests.
Thirdly, this is a power dispute between federal law enforcement and local autonomy. The United States is a federal state with a clear division of powers between central and local governments. In principle, the federal government is responsible for foreign affairs and national defense, and controls borders and ports, thus holding absolute jurisdiction over immigration. However, as the largest immigration-receiving state, California is known for emphasizing independence and autonomy, particularly opposing federal interference in immigration, environmental, and educational matters. In 2017, California passed the California Values Act, refusing to share immigration data with federal authorities and resisting federal deportation cooperation.
This conflict also represents a clash between sentiment and law, power and legality. Californians emotionally and logically reject the federal government’s inhumane, ahistorical, and rights-violating deportations. They further question the incomplete procedures, rough tactics, and broad targeting during enforcement. Notably, Newsom accused Trump of unconstitutionally deploying the National Guard without his request. The deployment of Marines was also considered a violation of the constitutional principle barring military involvement in civilian affairs. The California Attorney General’s office stated that using military force was “illegal,” stripped the state’s authority over its National Guard, and escalated tensions.
Fourthly, this is a contest of power between strongmen—Trump and Newsom. Both are charismatic leaders in this democratic society, though Trump is Republican and President, while Newsom is a Democratic heavyweight. Newsom comes from a prominent family, was twice mayor of San Francisco, and has served two terms as governor of California since 2018. He is a rising radical within the Democratic Party with vast experience and connections, and a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election. For the ambitious and relatively young Newsom, the White House is his next and only step. His confrontation with Trump is seen as a preview of the next presidential race.
Trump’s hardline style is well-known, and some analysts suggest Newsom is using Trump’s own methods to become “the next Trump.” The rivalry between these strongmen didn’t start today—it began during Trump’s first term. Since Trump returned to the White House, Newsom, representing a powerful autonomous state, has opposed him repeatedly. In January, when wildfires broke out in California, Trump blamed Newsom and threatened to cut federal disaster aid. Newsom retorted that Trump politicized climate issues. In April, Trump launched a tariff war; Newsom strongly condemned it and instructed the state attorney general to sue the federal government—launching the first legal salvo among U.S. states. In response to Trump’s threats of arrests, Newsom loudly challenged him, seemingly daring Trump to act—knowing that if arrested, he and the Democratic Party would gain widespread sympathy.
Fifthly, this is a prelude to the midterm election battle between Democrats and Republicans. Trump’s crackdown on illegal immigrants drew heavy criticism from Democratic lawmakers, as expected. California has long been a Democratic stronghold and key vote base—also the toughest challenge for Republicans. Trump ordered a crackdown on California to fulfill campaign promises, assert authority, suppress Democratic momentum, weaken their vote base, and build on his previous electoral dominance. This aims to secure Republican victories in the 2026 midterms and clear obstacles for the next presidential election.
Border security was one of Trump’s most popular issues in the 2024 election. His overwhelming victory suggests both he and the Republicans enjoy broad public support, and now must take decisive immigration action to keep campaign promises. They also need to give voters a reason to support the GOP again in the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential race.
Whether bypassing the governor to deploy troops is legal will be debated along political lines. Observers will recall the 1957 Little Rock incident: when a segregationist governor used the National Guard to block Black students from entering school, President Eisenhower federalized the Guard and sent in the 101st Airborne Division to protect those students.
That moment became iconic in the U.S. civil rights movement; photos were once hung in American embassies as both reminder and boast. Over half a century later, the role of the National Guard and federal troops has again become central to America’s domestic crisis response—but political and societal divisions are arguably worse now than in the 1950s. America’s inclusiveness and confidence, openness and progress, now appear to have reversed course.
California’s sharp backlash made it the epicenter of this round of conflict, but that doesn’t mean all U.S. states share its immigration stance. Still, it is clearly a microcosm of American society. Trump’s aggressive immigration policy is a systematic project serving his “Make America Great Again” agenda. How it ends—only time will tell.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
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Opinion1 week ago
European defense autonomy and Germany’s military role enter a turning point
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Asia2 weeks ago
OECD forecasts slower Chinese economic growth due to trade war
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Diplomacy4 days ago
Former diplomat warns forcing Iran out of the NPT is the greatest danger
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Asia2 weeks ago
Lee Jae-myung inaugurated as South Korea’s new president, vows unity and economic revival
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Asia1 week ago
Japan, US showcase B-52 bombers in nuclear deterrence dialogue
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Europe2 weeks ago
Vatican under Pope Leo XIV warns against AI ‘playing God,’ urges ethical development
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Middle East6 days ago
Netanyahu’s government survives no-confidence vote as Haredi crisis is delayed
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Europe2 weeks ago
Merz government plans €46 billion corporate tax cut for Germany