Opinion
After the Busan summit, can China and the US overcome the challenges?
On October 30, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a landmark meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Busan, South Korea, recalibrating and setting the tone again for the development of bilateral relations. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in trade, energy, and other fields and to promote cultural exchanges; they also agreed that the heads of state would maintain regular contact. Trump expressed his hope to visit China early next year and invited President Xi to visit the United States. At the same time, the two sides’ economic and trade teams announced several breakthrough advances from the latest round of negotiations.
Observers believe that the successful breakthrough of the China-U.S. trade negotiations in Kuala Lumpur laid a good foundation and created a harmonious atmosphere for the Busan Summit; the summit itself and the consensus reached undoubtedly established a new direction and tone for stabilizing and advancing China-U.S. relations, bringing encouraging optimism to the international community and injecting stability and vitality into the global geopolitical and economic systems. In short, from the Kuala Lumpur negotiations to the Busan Summit, China-U.S. relations have basically bid farewell to the long-term turbulence, twists, and crises that began after 2018. It seems that “the light boat has passed ten thousand mountains,” and is sailing toward a new world conducive to the development and prosperity of both countries and to global stability and peace. However, considering the complexity of major-power relations, a rational assessment of current China-U.S. relations should be that “the heavy ship is still crossing a thousand ridges.”
The 100-minute Busan Summit marked the first meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in six years, and the first China-U.S. summit in Trump’s new term, coinciding with the completion of the fourth round of China-U.S. trade talks. Thus, not only did both sides attach great importance to it, but the international community also watched closely. The China-U.S. relationship is the most important in the world; its trajectory determines not only the future of both nations but also global security and destiny. It can be said that mainstream international opinion hopes that the two great ships of China and the United States will move toward each other, coexist peacefully, advance harmoniously, and work together in unity.
According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping emphasized during the talks that the heads of state play the role of steering and guiding bilateral relations; as the world’s two largest economies with different national conditions, differences and even frictions are natural and normal; China has adhered to one blueprint for more than 70 years, focusing on doing its own work well and sharing development opportunities with the world, with no intention of challenging or replacing anyone; China’s development and revitalization are not in conflict with Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” and can complement each other for shared prosperity; China and the United States should take a broad view, focusing on the long-term benefits of cooperation rather than falling into a vicious cycle of mutual retaliation; both countries have the will and responsibility to promote peaceful solutions to regional hotspots and can jointly demonstrate major-power responsibility, working together on significant, practical, and beneficial undertakings for both nations and the world.
Trump said, “It is an honor to meet President Xi. China is a great country, and President Xi is a respected great leader and my good friend for many years. We have a very pleasant relationship. U.S.-China relations have always been good and will be better in the future. I hope both China and the United States will have an even better future. China is the United States’ greatest partner, and the two countries working together can accomplish many great things in the world. Future U.S.-China cooperation will achieve even greater results.”
At the Busan Summit, both heads of state stated that China would host the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders’ Informal Meeting and that the United States would host the G20 Summit, expressing satisfaction with each other’s success. They also agreed to exchange visits next year.
During Trump’s first presidency, he paid a state visit to China. After his re-election in 2024, he repeatedly expressed his desire to visit China again as soon as possible. However, for well-known reasons, his second visit to China had long remained uncertain. The Busan Summit confirmed that Trump would visit China early next year and that President Xi would later pay a return visit to the United States, a major positive development eagerly anticipated by both countries and the international community. It indicates that the stability of China-U.S. relations in the coming year, or even several years, is within reach, and further improvement is the shared will of both leaders and the trend of the times and the global situation.
Observers also noted that during the Busan summit talks, neither the Chinese nor U.S. heads of state mentioned the Taiwan issue, indicating that this matter—China’s internal affair that has always obstructed China-U.S. relations—seems no longer on the two sides’ topic list, in stark contrast to their meeting in Osaka, Japan six years ago. On September 19 this year, when Xi Jinping and Donald Trump held a phone consultation, the Taiwan topic did not appear in news reports either. Therefore, the two most recent instances of direct communication between the Chinese and U.S. leaders released an extraordinary signal externally, and are undoubtedly a major step forward in overcoming the “Taiwan obstacle” in China-U.S. relations. Recently, the well-known American think tank Rand Corporation suggested that the U.S. government “support China’s gradual unification,” which can be described as a new line of thinking in U.S. think tanks’ approach to relations with China. Considered together, these signs clearly show that China-U.S. relations differ from the past.
After the China-U.S. leaders’ meeting in Busan, the consensus results of the Kuala Lumpur consultations by the two countries’ economic and trade teams were made public. The good news spread rapidly across the world and was encouraging, mainly including the following aspects:
1.The U.S. side will cancel the additional 10% so-called “fentanyl tariff” on Chinese goods (including goods from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region). The additional 24% reciprocal tariff on Chinese goods (including goods from the HKSAR and the MSAR) will continue to be suspended for one year. The Chinese side will correspondingly adjust countermeasures against the above U.S. tariffs. Both sides agreed to continue extending certain tariff-exclusion measures.
2.The U.S. side will suspend for one year implementation of the “50%” de minimis rule in the export-control measures it announced on September 29. The Chinese side will suspend for one year implementation of relevant export-control and other measures it announced on October 9, and will study and refine specific plans.
3.The U.S. side will suspend for one year its Section 301 investigative measures regarding China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding industries. After the U.S. side suspends the relevant measures, the Chinese side will correspondingly suspend for one year its countermeasures against the U.S. side.
In addition, the two sides also reached consensus on cooperation in fentanyl counter-narcotics, expanding trade in agricultural products, and handling certain individual corporate cases. The two sides further confirmed the outcomes of the Madrid economic and trade consultations; the U.S. side made positive commitments in fields such as investment, and the Chinese side will properly resolve issues related to TikTok with the U.S. side.
Economic and trade cooperation is the ballast stone of China-U.S. relations. Although Donald Trump’s second-term policy toward China “started low and moved low,” the posture is commendable and the momentum is good. However, in April of this year he launched a global tariff war, beginning with attacks on neighboring countries and allies and soon pointing the sword at China. China came prepared, quickly launching a “combination punch of eleven arrows” to counter, and promoted the completion of four rounds of marathon trade negotiations between China and the United States:
— May 10–11 this year, Geneva, Switzerland: China and the United States reached a consensus on tariff reductions;
— July 28–29, Stockholm, Sweden: China and the United States agreed to extend the tariff-suspension period;
— September 14–17, Madrid, Spain: China and the United States focused on tariffs and export controls;
— October 24–27, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: China and the United States reached the above package consensus.
The harvest from the half-year series of China-U.S. trade negotiations, especially the major outcomes recently achieved, paved the way for the smooth holding of the China-U.S. Busan summit; and the new consensus reached by the two heads of state at the Busan summit has in turn provided driving force and top-level guarantees for follow-up negotiations to thoroughly resolve economic and trade disputes, and will provide new expectations and clarify a new direction for expanding China-U.S. economic and trade and energy cooperation, as well as people-to-people exchanges.
From the four rounds of China-U.S. trade negotiations to the China-U.S. summit in Busan, we can draw major insights for handling China-U.S. relations:
First, “Let him be strong, the clear breeze brushes the mountain ridge; let him be overbearing, the bright moon shines on the great river.” As a major country in the world, China must unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, strive around the dream of building a strong country and national rejuvenation, and avoid all external interference; it must always “bite the green mountain and not let go,” using strong economic development, great comprehensive strength, and sustained social stability to respond to a world where change and turmoil intertwine.
Second, “A train runs fast because the locomotive leads.” The healthy and stable development of China-U.S. relations relies on the strategic judgment, strategic mutual trust, personal friendship, and frequent communication of the two countries’ leaders. President Xi Jinping not only has a far-reaching view of the overall, strategic, and key essential characteristics of China-U.S. relations, but has also repeatedly stressed: “We have a thousand reasons to get China-U.S. relations right, and not a single reason to wreck them”; “China never bets on the United States to lose, never interferes in U.S. internal affairs, and has no intention of challenging or replacing the United States; we are pleased to see a confident, open, developing, and prosperous United States.” These assertions set the general policy for China in handling relations with the United States. From his campaign for a second term, Donald Trump no longer listed China as a main topic, nor did he promise armed support for “Taiwan independence.” After taking office he released a large amount of positive and healthy information toward China, restrained his subordinates in managing statements regarding China, and held three phone calls with President Xi Jinping. The positive guidance, steady steering, and command of the overall situation by the Chinese and U.S. heads of state have played an irreplaceable navigational role in stabilizing and recovering the bilateral relationship.
Third, be reasonable, advantageous, and measured; talk business when discussing business; contend without breaking. China and the United States are the two largest economies in the world and important trading partners for each other. In the 53 years since normalization of relations, they have achieved many major and mutually beneficial outcomes, while also accumulating many political differences, economic problems, and trade frictions. However, as long as both sides adhere to the principle of avoiding the politicization of economic and trade issues, avoiding the economization of political issues, and avoiding the instrumentalization of the economic and trade relationship, they will certainly find proper solutions and reach a new consensus and a new realm of mutual benefit, win–win cooperation, and mutual achievement.
Fourth, “When elephants fight, the lawn suffers.” China and the United States are, respectively, a world-class power and a major power; their bilateral relationship is vital, a tug on one hair moves the whole body, and it concerns global stability and peace. The China–U.S. trade war has seriously affected the world’s industrial, supply, and value chains, and has impacted the future and destiny of the world trade system, the economic system, and globalization. If China and the United States fight viciously, both will be hurt and defeated and the world will suffer; if China and the United States reconcile, both countries will profit and the world will benefit. This has become a highly shared understanding and a basic consensus of international public opinion. Therefore, in line with the responsibility and mission of seeking the well-being of the two peoples and safeguarding world peace and development, China and the United States must properly handle their bilateral relations, must assume major-power responsibilities, and abide by major-power obligations.
The China–U.S. summit in Busan is a high point of a “V-shaped” reversal after a cliff-like deterioration of relations lasting seven years, but the bilateral relationship has still not returned to its best historical state, nor has a new normal of stable development yet formed. Although the leaders of the two countries stress “to be partners and to be friends,” this prospect is still far from the ideal state of being “true partners and true friends,” let alone “good partners and good friends.”
Given the huge differences between China and the United States—especially the United States’ political system, social system, and national positioning, which lead to continued uncertainty in its domestic and foreign affairs—even if the great ship of China–U.S. relations sails into safe waters with calm seas and bright sunshine, it will inevitably encounter sudden changes of weather, high winds and rough waves, and even the test of stormy seas. However, for China, it must always maintain strong strategic confidence, strategic composure, strategic direction, strategic will, and strategic wisdom, and, with the posture of a great and powerful country of “let the winds blow from the east, south, west, and north; I remain unmoved,” meet changes in the situation and changes in the world.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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