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Aleppo’s echo in Europe

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The offensive in Aleppo by the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the rapid retreat of the Syrian army are likely to have many consequences. Among them is the alignment of the “rebellious” countries within the EU.

The “rebellion” emerged last summer. Eight EU countries, led by Austria and Italy, sent a letter to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell calling for a new chapter in relations with Syria.

Calling on the EU to “review and assess” its approach to Syria, they proposed the creation of an EU-Syria envoy tasked with re-establishing contact with the Syrian ambassador in Brussels and liaising with both Syrian and regional actors.

Other proposals included a strategic dialogue with Arab countries, developing the EU’s approach to Syria’s reconstruction, addressing the “unintended negative effects” of EU sanctions and creating conditions for refugees to return to Syria.

“After 13 years of war, we have to admit that our Syria policy has not improved much,” said Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg at the time.

The fact that Damascus had survived with the help of Iran and Russia and that the Syrian opposition had been dismembered or driven into exile, ‘no matter how painful’, could no longer be ignored by the European Union, the Austrian minister argued.

The new eight-nation peace initiative was based on the abandonment of the EU’s famous ‘three no’s’ and the red line of ‘no peace with the regime of Bashar al-Assad’.

Indeed, Italy decided last July to send an ambassador to Damascus, the first G7 country to do so in years.

In October, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni told the Italian Senate that the EU should review its strategy on Syria and work with all stakeholders to create the conditions for the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of Syrian refugees to their homes.

Later in November, the Syrian consulate in Italy, which had suspended its activities in 2012 on the basis of ‘reciprocity’, announced the resumption of its services to Syrian nationals in the country.

In October, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer cited the 200,000 people who had crossed from Lebanon into Syria during the ongoing Israeli occupation and attacks as proof that Syria was safe, saying that ‘Syria is now certified as safe in many areas’.

Things went as expected. The EU announced that it would appoint a special envoy to evaluate its Syria policy. The head of the EU delegation to Syria, Michael Ohnmacht, had recently addressed the public in a video filmed in the capital, Damascus.

A spokesperson for the EU foreign ministry told DW that the appointment of a special envoy was being considered, but that it would not mean a change in the EU’s current policy towards Syria. The envoy would report directly to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

Julien Barnes-Dacey, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told DW: “It has been clear for some time that Europe does not have a meaningful Syria strategy. We have fallen into the trap of saying that any engagement means legitimizing the regime, when in many ways it could be seen as a way to help improve the desperate situation on the ground,” Julien Barnes-Dacey, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the Council on Foreign Relations, told DW.

Barnes-Dacey argued that if the EU continues to stay out of Syria altogether, it ‘cannot do much to help Syrians struggling to survive under the regime’s boot and cannot hope to compete with countries like Russia and Iran’.

By a strange coincidence, on 26 November, the day before the jihadist assault on Aleppo began, EUObserver published an article by Beder Camus. Mr Camus, who is based in Istanbul, is a member of the ‘opposition’ Syrian National Council and chairman of the Syrian Negotiations Commission.

In a direct appeal to EU countries calling for a change in Syria policy, he argued that without progress in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and without a political solution, any step towards normalisation with Damascus would ‘undermine the prospects for peace, stability and prosperity’.

“By all estimates, it is clear that Syria is not a safe place for refugees to return to,” the “opposition” leader wrote, adding that according to his own estimates, the Damascus regime currently controls “only about 50 per cent of Syria’s territory and population”, while a significant part of the country continues to suffer from ongoing violence and dire living conditions.

“There are many significant political risks in engaging with the Assad regime, not least that any investment and reconstruction will directly benefit the Assad regime and its network of corrupt officials, businessmen and military personnel,” Camus said.

The HTS attack certainly worked in Europe. After the fall of Aleppo, the country’s second largest city and commercial heartland, one would have expected a change in attitude towards the Assad regime, which controls most of Syria and has made it a safe country.

Cecilia Piccioni, Italy’s ambassador to Moscow, met with Russian foreign ministry officials over Russia’s alleged attack on an Italian charity in Aleppo.

For his part, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said on Sunday that Italy was “closely following developments in the crisis and that the Italian embassy in Damascus is in constant contact with citizens (mostly dual nationals) to facilitate their safe evacuation from the city”.

Tajani also said in X that the Russian attack had caused severe damage to the Terra Sancta College and called on all warring parties in Syria to “protect civilians”.

In a later statement, the foreign minister warned of a new migration crisis with the resumption of hostilities in Syria.

“Lebanon is already hosting one million Syrian refugees. There is a risk that a protracted civil war could lead to a new migration crisis,” Tajani said.

Speaking to journalists on the sidelines of an international humanitarian conference on Gaza in Cairo on Monday, Antonio Tajani warned that the conflict could drag on.

Tajani also argued that the conflict, which directly affects Lebanon, could also affect Europe.

It seems that the Aleppo offensive by the jihadists and their foreign backers will also succeed – at least for a while – in silencing the fractured voices in Europe.

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Donald Trump Jr. makes surprise visit to Greenland amid U.S. interest

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Donald Trump Jr. traveled to Greenland amid his father’s growing interest in the “ownership” of the island and days after the leader of the Danish autonomous region pushed for independence.

The head of Greenland’s foreign affairs department, Mininnguaq Kleist, told Danish state radio DR that Trump Jr.’s visit was personal and that no request for a meeting with the Greenlandic government had been made.

However, a Greenlandic political source told Euractiv that Trump Jr. would meet with Erik Jensen, the head of the Social Democratic Party. Jensen is the minister of finance and taxation in the Greenlandic government.

The office of Greenland’s prime minister, Múte Egede, did not respond to a request for comment. Egede’s official calendar does not show any meeting with Trump Jr., but the source said a meeting between the two was possible.

“This is not an official visit to the U.S.,” a spokesperson for the Danish Foreign Ministry told Euractiv.

In recent days, Egede has strengthened his rhetoric of independence from Denmark. In his annual New Year’s speech, he said that Greenland should work with other countries to “remove the obstacles to cooperation that we might describe as the shackles of colonialism.”

Aaja Chemnitz, a Greenlandic member of Egede’s party and of the Danish Parliament, commented on the visit on social media, writing that “we need to get better at saying no to Donald Trump” and that “I don’t want to be a pawn in Trump’s dreams of expanding his empire to include our country.”

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed his desire to “own and control” Greenland since his re-election.

The Greenlandic government has twice rejected Trump’s offers to buy the island, in 2019 and last year, with Egede saying, “Greenland is ours. We are not for sale, and we will never be for sale.”

Despite its wealth of mineral, oil, and natural gas resources, Greenland’s economy remains fragile, heavily dependent on fishing and annual grants from Denmark.

There is also an American base in the region.

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The final frontier in Ukraine’s crisis: Trump’s peace plan and the proposal for a sanitary zone

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Since its inception, the war in Ukraine has escalated into a profound crisis with far-reaching implications, not only for Eastern Europe but for the entire world. The diplomatic tensions, military interventions, and economic sanctions that have followed have underscored the precarious balance between war and peace on the European continent.

During his election campaign, former U.S. President Donald Trump made a bold assertion: “If I take office, I will end the war in Ukraine quickly.” This statement hints at a potential shift in U.S. military and material support for Europe. While the specifics of Trump’s plan remain unclear, his public rhetoric and insights from his advisors have sparked a multifaceted debate among European nations.

Trump’s stated goal is to “establish peace,” but it is evident that the U.S. aims to reduce its traditional military burdens. This could leave Europe facing a stark choice: either take on a greater role in resolving the conflict or bear the consequences of inaction. Such a scenario would force Europe, already strained by the crisis in Ukraine, to reevaluate its security framework.

At the same time, the question of sustained financial and military aid to Ukraine is testing Europe’s political resolve and economic capacity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has issued a stark warning: “Without financial support, we will lose.” He is urging Western allies to share the burden of the war. Without U.S. support—ranging from advanced weaponry to intelligence and operational planning—Ukraine’s military efforts against Russia would face even greater challenges. Meanwhile, Germany, a cornerstone of the EU, is grappling with whether it is prepared to assume a larger role if U.S. support diminishes. Within the European Union, the lack of a unified approach is evident, as each member state prioritizes its own interests.

What does Trump’s peace plan offer?

Donald Trump has claimed that, if elected president, he would swiftly end the war in Ukraine. During his previous presidency, Trump’s approach to NATO was marked by ambivalence. He notably pressured European countries to increase their defense spending and contribute more to the U.S.-led security umbrella. Now, as he eyes a potential return to the White House, his proposed actions regarding the Ukraine war are of direct concern to Europe. Given its geographical proximity, Europe is the primary region that would bear the consequences of any escalation or misstep in the conflict.

While the specifics of Trump’s peace plan remain undisclosed, leaks suggest that some politicians close to his advisors have discussed the creation of demilitarized zones between Ukraine and Russia. It is speculated that American troops would not be stationed in these zones; instead, they would be overseen by a European-led force. However, this scenario poses significant risks for Brussels. The establishment of such a buffer zone could inadvertently bring European states and Russia into direct confrontation, even with the slightest miscalculation.

Another proposal under consideration is the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force (often referred to as “blue berets”). However, the UN’s track record in conflicts like the Balkan Wars highlights the challenges of such missions. Issues such as a disorganized chain of command can undermine the effectiveness of peacekeepers on the ground. Additionally, creating a UN peacekeeping force requires approval from permanent Security Council members, including China, Russia, and the U.S., which introduces complex diplomatic hurdles. The prospect of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council—particularly on resolutions condemning Russia—remains a significant obstacle.

Within Europe itself, there are deep divisions and contradictions. Germany has pledged continued financial and military support for Ukraine, but debates persist over how much Europe can shoulder if the U.S. withdraws its backing. Ukraine, meanwhile, is in desperate need of funds, weapons, and personnel to sustain its war effort. The Ukrainian military, already outmatched by Russia in conventional power and logistics, requires far greater support from Europe. This support extends beyond cash and weaponry to include troop training, operational planning, intelligence sharing, and maintaining critical supply lines. For Europe, assuming the U.S.’s role in these areas independently would be an immense challenge. While countries like Spain, France, Poland, and Greece have called for joint military coordination, each nation has its own reservations and priorities.

In summary, while the details of Trump’s peace efforts remain unclear, the potential for their failure places Europe in a position of heightened responsibility. If U.S. support is withdrawn, European nations would need to take on greater economic and military risks to support Ukraine. Moreover, if peace negotiations collapse, the conflict could escalate into a larger-scale war, with Europe bearing the brunt of the fallout.

The Biden administration’s ATACMS decision

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden has approached arms aid to Ukraine with caution. Initially, he refrained from providing long-range ATACMS missiles, citing the risk of escalating the conflict into a potential “World War III.” However, Biden has now shifted his stance, greenlighting the use of these weapons for operations targeting deep inside Russian territory. This decision has been widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine former President Donald Trump’s peace initiative. While Ukraine argues that these strikes are acts of self-defense, the use of long-range missiles against Russian soil could escalate the conflict with a nuclear-armed state to an even more perilous level.

The Ukrainian military relies heavily on Western weapons and intelligence to target Russian strategic bases and air defense systems. While international law recognizes the right of an occupied nation to strike enemy logistics centers and military posts in self-defense, the situation remains delicate. The U.S. maintains that it only supports Ukraine’s “right to legitimate self-defense,” but this stance cannot obscure the fact that, in practice, the U.S. is aiding Ukraine by providing intelligence, target selection assistance, and advanced weaponry. This is precisely why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has resisted supplying Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles, similar to ATACMS. Scholz views it as a strategic imperative for NATO to avoid direct involvement and confrontation with Russia on the front lines.

The Biden administration’s decision also risks contradicting U.S. interests. As tensions with Russia escalate, the administration may be increasing the likelihood of a broader conflict. While the U.S. may aim to weaken Russia through attrition, the limits of this strategy remain unclear. Some commentators argue that the Biden administration is conflicted, seeking to make “final moves” on the Ukrainian front to counter Trump’s claims that he can bring peace. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its aftermath may also be influencing Biden’s reluctance to take another significant step back. By cornering Russia, the U.S. is simultaneously drawing Europe deeper into the crisis.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response to these developments will be critical. Direct strikes on Russian strategic bases or airfields using Western long-range missiles could provoke a more aggressive reaction from Moscow. In an environment where nuclear threats have been repeatedly voiced, even a minor miscalculation could lead to catastrophic consequences. Some experts speculate that if Trump returns to power, Biden’s current policy could be sharply reversed, with a renewed focus on negotiations. From a strategic standpoint, it is often argued that no matter how many weapons Biden provides to Ukraine, he lacks a decisive “trump card” to fundamentally shift the balance of the war in Ukraine’s favor.

The limitations of Europe’s military capacity

One of the most pressing debates throughout the Ukraine crisis has been the extent of the European Union and NATO member states’ commitment to bolstering their own military capabilities. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has long criticized Europe, arguing that “Europeans are not paying enough for their own security.” Indeed, the NATO target of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP faced significant resistance in many European countries. Now, discussions are even turning to higher thresholds, such as 3%. However, what this would mean in practice remains unclear. While some argue that Europe must build a conventional deterrent against Russia, viewing defense spending as a form of essential insurance, others warn that diverting massive budgets to the arms industry would come at the expense of social spending, likely provoking public backlash.

In this context, it is worth recalling the insights of Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of Germany. During the Cold War, Schmidt emphasized the importance of maintaining a “military balance” but also argued that this alone was insufficient to ensure peace. He believed that military balance needed to be complemented by political compromises, arms control agreements, and confidence-building measures. In other words, investing solely in weapons is not enough; diplomacy must also play a central role. Schmidt’s legacy serves as a warning to today’s European leaders: “Strength is important, but flexible diplomacy, openness to dialogue, and active efforts to prevent conflicts from escalating are equally essential.” This principle could be applied to rebuilding de-escalation mechanisms between Russia and NATO. However, in the current climate, such dialogue seems distant, particularly as the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate.

Moreover, the idea that “all European countries should participate in Europe’s security architecture” remains an ideal that is often voiced but rarely realized in practice. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally undermined the notion of “accepting Russia as part of the European security system.” As a result, even if peace initiatives in this new era seek some form of “deal” with Russia, it is unclear how far Europe is willing or able to stretch to accommodate such an agreement.

Zelensky’s stillborn ‘victory plan’

At the onset of the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled what he called the “Victory Plan,” aiming for complete military success. His declaration, “We will push Russia back to its borders; we will not cede a single inch of our territory,” was met with widespread enthusiasm in the West. However, as the conflict dragged on, the Ukrainian army suffered significant losses, Russia’s long-term strategy took hold, and it became evident that Western support was not unlimited. The United States and Germany, in particular, have repeatedly cautioned that Ukraine cannot afford the risk of a major escalation by launching large-scale attacks on Russian territory.

In the 10-point peace plan Zelensky presented, the primary condition is the return of all Ukrainian territory, including regions annexed by Russia. Moscow, however, claims legitimacy over these areas through referendums in Crimea and Donbas. This fundamental disagreement leaves the question, “Is there common ground for compromise?” unanswered. Furthermore, Zelensky has ruled out direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even issuing a decree declaring Putin’s administration illegitimate. This stance effectively blocks the path to a diplomatic solution from the outset. Nevertheless, some European leaders support Zelensky’s proposal to organize a peace conference, arguing that Russia’s participation would be beneficial.

This impasse has created an opening for former U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric: “If I am elected, I will sit down and talk.” In both Europe and the United States, there is growing sentiment that negotiations are the only viable way to end the war. However, a ceasefire—freezing the conflict—is a prerequisite for any talks. The direction of such negotiations, the terms under which Ukraine and Russia might reach an agreement, and the guarantees Europe would provide remain deeply uncertain. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, for instance, would require Russia to refrain from using its veto in the Security Council.

European leaders now face a critical choice: support Trump’s peace initiatives or align with President Joe Biden’s strategy of “pushing Russia back.” Both scenarios carry significant risks for Europe. If Trump succeeds, a demilitarized zone could be established between Ukraine and Russia, but European troops would likely be required to secure it. If Biden’s policy prevails, Europe could become a target for Russia amid escalating tensions, especially with the use of long-range weapons.

Moreover, institutions like the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations are grappling with their roles in this evolving security architecture. Whether Europe will develop an independent military structure or deepen its defense cooperation under the U.S. umbrella remains unclear.

The greatest irony in this situation is that the hope for peace appears to hinge on two uncertain factors: Vladimir Putin’s restraint and Donald Trump’s potential election as president, which could lead to a reversal of Biden’s policies. How sustainable or healthy this is for Europe is a matter of intense debate.

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NATO demands investigation into Azerbaijani plane crash amid Russian missile allegations

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NATO has urged a comprehensive investigation into the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane on Wednesday morning, which resulted in the tragic loss of 38 lives. Suspicion is growing that Russian air defense systems may have been involved in the incident.

The Embraer E190 passenger aircraft was en route from Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, to Grozny, the Chechen capital, when passengers reportedly heard an explosion. The plane was diverted hundreds of kilometers off course before crashing near the Kazakh city of Aktau. Miraculously, 29 people survived the crash.

“Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and victims of Azerbaijan Airlines flight J28243,” NATO spokeswoman Farah Dakhlallah said in a statement on X (formerly Twitter) on Thursday. “We wish a speedy recovery to those injured in the crash and call for a thorough investigation.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov echoed the call for patience, stating on Thursday, “We need to wait for the conclusion of the investigation,” while cautioning against premature assumptions.

Russia’s aviation watchdog attributed the crash to a collision with a flock of birds, which allegedly forced the aircraft to divert to Aktau. However, competing theories have emerged.

Media outlets including Reuters and Azerbaijan’s Caliber have speculated that the passenger plane was struck by a Russian air defense missile. These reports suggest the incident occurred in an area where Moscow has been actively targeting Ukrainian drones in recent weeks.

According to Caliber, citing Azerbaijani officials, the aircraft’s emergency request to land at three nearby Russian airports was denied. Instead, the plane was directed to fly over the Caspian Sea, exacerbating its perilous situation.

Further fueling these suspicions are reports of a simultaneous drone strike on Grozny. In a now-deleted Instagram post, Chechen Security Council Secretary Khamzat Kadyrov claimed that a drone attack on Grozny had been successfully neutralized.

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