Opinion
Central Asia strategy heats up: The EU seeks leadership, China advocates win-win cooperation
Ma Jinting, Research Assistant Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University
The first EU-Central Asia Summit was held on April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The summit was organized under the “5+1” pattern, a dialogue mechanism between the EU and the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).
The summit is a milestone of EU-Central Asia relations, further deepening the cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian countries and marking a deeper strategic partnership. The themes of the summit focused on economic cooperation and investment, geopolitical and security cooperation, climate change and regional energy cooperation, cooperation for sustainable development, as well as humanistic exchanges and medical cooperation. It was also the first time that Central Asian leaders met with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and António Costa, President of the European Council.
Undoubtedly, both the scale and the outcome of the summit show the importance that the EU attaches to Central Asia and the determination of Central Asia to cooperate with the EU. On the one hand, the EU proposed to invest in the “Global Gateway” program, and on the other hand, Central Asia stood by the EU on hot issues. Although the substantive progress after the summit is not yet known, it can be seen that the EU is trying to realize a more sustainable layout of Central Asia through institutionalized cooperation, so as to enhance the influence of the EU in the complex international situation.
The Samarkand Declaration: a new stage in EU-Central Asia relations
Under the profound changes in the landscape of globalization and multipolarity, the deepening of cooperative relations between the EU and Central Asia is an inevitable trend. In Costa official statement to the EU Council before the summit, he said that we are living in a world of disorder and division, a viable solution for the EU is to build a strong partnership, thus promoting the prosperity and development for EU.
At present, Under the background of unilateralism, geopolitical conflicts, the international cooperation mechanism of multilateralism is increasingly important. Multilateralism emphasizes the solution of transnational problems through institutionalized international cooperation, dialogue mechanisms and rule systems, thus enhancing the EU’s influence on international issues. Therefore, the EU has taken the lead in building an institutionalized and open platform through the “5+1” conference pattern. From the perspective of the Central Asian countries, based on the concept of multilateralism,the active participation of Central Asian countries in the dialogue platform can enhance the strategic autonomy of them and maximize their national interests without relying on the big powers.
Before the summit, a relatively stable framework for the EU’s Central Asian policy had already been formed. In the political and diplomatic fields, the EU and Central Asian countries discuss cross-border governance issues such as security and counter-terrorism through the Senior Officials Dialogue mechanism. In the economic and trade field, the EU focuses on energy issues and achieve long-term economic cooperation through reciprocity. For example, the EU is Kazakhstan’s main economic and trade partner, with EU investments accounting for more than 40 percent of the state’s foreign investment by 2024. In return, Kazakhstan imports a wide range of industrial and consumer goods from the EU. In the field of people to people exchanges, the EU provides assistance to Central Asian countries in education, health, law and democracy building through the Global Gateway program. At the same time, the EU opens numbers of opportunities at universities and promotes knowledge sharing between academic institutions.
On the basis of the previous cooperation, both EU and Central Asia countries issued a joint declaration, the joint declaration following the first European Union-Central Asia summit (also called “the Samarkand Declaration”) at the summit. The Samarkand Declaration includes six main elements: first, defining the strategic partnership between the EU and Central Asia; second, advancing “the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” (EPCAs); third, promoting the implementation of the “Global Gateway” program in various areas. Third, promoting the implementation of the “Global Gateway” program in various fields, in which the EU has said it will invest 12 billion euros; fourth, supporting the construction of intermediate corridors; fifth, strengthening security cooperation in counter-terrorism and border security; sixth, jointly addressing international issues such as climate change and water resource governance. In short, the summit upgraded the political and economic aspects of the relationship on the basis of the original cooperation mechanisms, marking an upgrade of the EU’s strategic orientation towards Central Asia. The Samarkand Declaration demonstrates the willingness of the EU and Central Asia to deepen cooperation in the face of increasing global uncertainty, and highlights the EU’s attempts to build an institutionalized system of cooperation in Central Asia.
Central Asia in great power competition: The EU’s logic and challenges of engagement
The consideration of EU on Central Asia has three main points. First, Central Asia is located in the hinterland of the Asian and European continents, and is the land transportation hub of Asia and Europe, so Central Asia is also regarded as a “strategic landmark” by the big powers. Traditionally, Central Asia has been in Russia’s sphere of influence for a long time, and Russia has maintained its influence in Central Asia through alliances. For example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is a military alliance led by Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which focuses on economic development. Since the Ukrainian crisis, the EU has accelerated its strategic layout in Central Asia with the intention of weakening Russia’s influence in Central Asia. The United States, on the other hand, treats Central Asia as a fulcrum for maintaining regional stability, countering terrorism, and containing major powers. Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. has begun to emphasize the role of Central Asia as a “transition region.” Meanwhile, the “Global Gateway” program intends to counterbalance China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” in order to curb China’s influence in Central Asia. The “Global Gateway” program provides alternatives in the areas of infrastructure and digital connectivity to build the EU’s “Asia-Europe Corridor”.
Secondly, abundant energy resources make Central Asia highly dependent in the international community. Central Asia is one of the world’s regions rich in oil, natural gas, and rare metal resources. In particular, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have strong energy export capacity, which makes them extremely attractive to external powers. The EU-Central Asia Summit will further plan the construction of an “intermediate corridor” to enhance the complementarity of the two sides in the fields of energy and transportation.
Finally, Central Asia has a large population and a broad market. Although there is frequent trade between Europe and Central Asia, it is mainly concentrated in the natural resources. China and Russia, as important trading partners of Central Asia, have long dominated the foreign trade structure of Central Asian countries. The EU hopes to expand its share of the Central Asian market with the help of an institutionalized platform. However, the strategic autonomy of Central Asian countries has been strengthened in recent years, and it is still unknown whether the EU’s vision can be realized.
In conclusion, the EU wants to further expand its influence and appeal in Central Asia through this summit, but may have a huge gap when it comes to official policies and the real truth on the ground. In the perspective political-security, Central Asia already has a relatively deep security bundle through the construction of a military defense system with Russia. At the same time, Central Asia have close contacts with Turkey and NATO. In the perspective political and security, the influence of EU is limited. EU can only through the participation of international hotspot issues in the way to draw Central Asian countries. In perspective of the economic and trade , the EU has a certain degree of influence in Central Asia, but in the overall economic exchanges still fall behind China. For example, according to a report released by the Statistics Agency of Kazakhstan, China is Kazakhstan’s top trading partner as of 2024. In perspective the area of international, the EU emphasizes values such as the rule of law and sustainable development, but the acceptance of the values varies due to the different differences among the Central Asian countries. As a result, the EU’s overall influence in Central Asia is limited, and it is not an “external leader” in Central Asian affairs, but rather permeates its influence through specific international issues.
China: Seeking cooperation rather than confrontation
China has consistently maintained a pluralistic and open mind to multilateral relations. China Upholding the principles of multilateralism, adhering to the norms of international relations , abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
China has been actively engaged in maintaining multilateral diplomatic relations by concrete actions in the context of the Global Initiative for Development, Security and Civilization. Respecting the state of development and the diversity of civilizations in each region, China hopes to work with Central Asia, the EU and other actors to promote peace, stability and development in the international community.
From China’s perspective, China has never regarded the EU as a strategic competitor and looks forward to cooperation on international issues. In Central Asia, the foreign policy of some small and medium-sized countries follows the model of balanced diplomacy, which allows them to seek space for development. Central Asia’s active cooperation with the EU can not only ease its overdependence on big powers, but also promote the stable development of the region.
In fact, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an open and inclusive development platform, and China is willing to explore cooperation paths with other actors, to jointly promote the sustainable development for international society. As Liu Jianchao, Minister of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, said in his speech at the Young Experts’ Club of the Upper House of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, “Central Asia is located in the center of Asia and Europe, with a special and important geographic position, and broad prospects for development. China and Central Asian countries have promoted the building of a China-Central Asia community of destiny, shaping a model of regional cooperation on the world map of seeking common development, sharing peace and moving forward together.”
In recent years, based on the special geopolitical environment, the internal cooperation of Central Asian countries has significantly increased. Starting in 2018, the leaders of the five Central Asian countries have been strengthening regional identity and cooperation mechanisms by holding summit. The pattern of organizing the EU-Central Asia Summit is also a multilateral cooperation based on regional consensus. The Central Asian countries are not only in frequent contact with the EU, but also actively participate in international affairs by participating in the “Central Asia-China” and “Central Asia-US” C5+1 dialogues.Those willingness have shown their ability to take action in international affairs.
Energy development and regional stability in Central Asia have become the critical issues. How to deal with the relationship between national development and the major powers, and maintain a balance between taking sides on hotspot issues and strategic autonomy, are issues that the Central Asian countries need to address.
Opinion
Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia
Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.
An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.
The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.
Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.
Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.
The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.
Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.
The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.
Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.
In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.
Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.
Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:
- Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
- Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
- Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
- Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.
The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.
Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).
Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.
Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.
Opinion
Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.
In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored
The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.
Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.
At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.
Why Egypt?
Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.
This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.
According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.
This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.
Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios
At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.
The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.
This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.
A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies
This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”
Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.
A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.
The Messages Behind the Attack
Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.
For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.
For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.
Egypt’s Official Response
The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.
The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.
This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.
Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.
The Impact on Global Energy Markets
The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.
Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.
The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.
What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?
First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.
Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.
Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.
Conclusion
The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.
References:
1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro
4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html
Opinion
Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism
Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.
The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.
Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…
The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.
Why?
Because of this:
Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.
According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.
Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.
In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.
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