Europe
Europe’s distant territories expose gaps in NATO and EU collective defence frameworks
Many NATO member European countries govern territories far beyond their own borders, a legacy of the colonial era.
From the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean, parts of Europe lie thousands of kilometres from the continent, raising a fundamental yet unresolved question: does a collective mechanism exist for the defence of these regions?
According to an analysis published by Euractiv, in theory a NATO member can invoke Article 5 of the alliance’s treaty and request assistance if it comes under attack.
But the collective defence clause does not apply everywhere, and its geographic scope is actually defined in the far less well-known Article 6.
That article stipulates that for Article 5 to be triggered, an armed attack must occur “on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America (…), on the territory of Türkiye or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”
NATO’s ultimate security guarantee therefore does not cover a large proportion of Europe’s overseas territories.
At this point, the question arises as to whether the EU’s mutual assistance clause can fill that gap.
Unlike NATO’s Article 5, Article 42(7) of the EU Treaties is not a mutual defence clause but a mutual assistance clause.
It does, however, contain no geographic limitation.
European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson Anitta Hipper confirmed to Euractiv that, if invoked, the clause provides a guarantee that “all EU member states are obliged to assist the member state that has suffered an armed attack on its territory ‘by all the means in their power’.”
EU mutual assistance is increasingly becoming a subject of political debate in Brussels.
Some member states remain cautious about its potential implications.
In particular, there is a risk that more explicit reliance on EU mutual defence mechanisms could accelerate a partial US withdrawal from the Continent.
EU diplomats are expected to conduct a simulation this week on the application of Article 42(7), which is politically defined but has never been clearly tested.
Colonial legacy: EU overseas territories
France is the EU member state with the largest number of overseas territories.
Paris controls French Guiana in South America, home to the ESA’s European Spaceport, as well as Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélemy in the Caribbean.
These territories lie below the Tropic of Cancer and are therefore outside the scope of NATO’s Article 5.
In the Indian Ocean, Réunion and Mayotte also remain part of the French state.
The security of these regions is the sole responsibility of the French armed forces, but as part of the European Union, any armed attack could prompt Paris to invoke the EU mutual assistance mechanism.
The Netherlands also possesses Caribbean territories, including Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba.
A spokesperson for the Dutch foreign ministry confirmed to Euractiv that because these territories are located south of the Tropic of Cancer, they fall “outside the geographic scope” of NATO’s Article 5.
“That said, a provision such as Article 5 is not necessary for allies to request or provide (military) assistance in the event of an armed attack on any of these territories,” the spokesperson added.
Unlike the situation with France, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten are autonomous countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Asked about Article 42(7), the ministry said the provision “speaks for itself” and “should be understood as an expression of solidarity among EU member states.”
According to Euractiv, the example of Greenland offers a useful comparison for better understanding the Dutch Caribbean.
Asked about the scope of EU assistance, the spokesperson confirmed that “Greenland is part of the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark and therefore falls within the scope of the mutual assistance clause.”
Moreover, because Greenland is located well north of the Tropic of Cancer, it is also eligible for NATO protection under the treaty’s geographic framework.
Spain presents another interesting case with regard to Article 6. Its North African exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla appear to occupy a grey zone, as they lie outside Europe and North America.
In 2022, ahead of the NATO summit in Madrid, the issue briefly surfaced in domestic political debate.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez appeared to dismiss the discussion.
Noting that Spain had been a NATO member for more than 40 years and that such doubts had never arisen, he said: “Ceuta and Melilla are Spain.”
While the applicability of NATO’s Article 5 may be debatable, no such ambiguity exists with respect to the EU’s mutual assistance clause.
Non-EU NATO overseas territories: Britain
As a NATO member outside the EU, the United Kingdom possesses 14 overseas territories under its sovereignty.
These territories are spread across the Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and most lie outside the core geographic scope of NATO’s Article 5.
Recent geopolitical debates, however, have put these regions back on the agenda, including heightened attention to the Falkland Islands dispute.
A recent internal email first reported by Reuters indicated that the US Department of Defense had considered revisiting Washington’s position on the sovereignty of the islands, partly because it viewed UK support as insufficient on the issue of a US-Israel war with Iran.
British overseas territories that fall outside the scope of NATO’s Article 5 rely entirely on London for their protection.
The US also faces a geographic issue. Hawaii lies south of the Tropic of Cancer.
Territories such as Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands and American Samoa also fall outside the treaty’s traditional North Atlantic framework.
They are therefore outside the strict geographic scope of Article 5, but can nonetheless rely on NATO’s largest military for their security.
This gap in the security architecture for overseas territories reflects the legacy of European states with global territorial footprints, even as collective defence systems rest on frameworks designed for a narrower Europe.
The result is that, in the event of a crisis, responsibility for overseas territories remains at times unclear.
Europe
China’s critical mineral restrictions challenge EU defence expansion plans
The European Union’s plans to expand its defence capabilities are being hindered by China’s export controls and sales restrictions on critical raw materials.
In response, EU leaders are urging member states to accelerate efforts to diversify supply chains.
According to Nikkei Asia, the European Commission announced last week that it would propose new legislation requiring companies across the bloc to broaden their supplier base in an effort to address economic imbalances, although it did not explicitly name China.
The war in Ukraine and growing uncertainty over Washington’s security guarantees have pushed European governments to increase military spending and defence production.
At the same time, according to a report published in May by Joris Teer, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), China accounts for at least 70% of global mining or refining activity in 17 of the 34 materials classified as critical by the EU. Eight of those 34 materials are currently subject to Chinese export controls.
“China is undermining Europe’s rearmament efforts,” Teer wrote. “Simply by activating this tool, China has already increased its leverage and demonstrated both the capability and willingness to restrict supply whenever it chooses.”
The Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe also warned that geopolitical developments and intensifying global competition for critical raw materials are further underscoring the need to strengthen European supply chains.
The organisation represents more than 4,000 companies, including Britain’s BAE Systems, France’s Thales and Germany’s Rheinmetall.
European defence manufacturers are pursuing a range of strategies, including vertical integration, recycling, diversification and stockpiling.
Rheinmetall told Nikkei Asia that it has “no dependencies” and is “well prepared” regarding critical minerals.
A company spokesperson said: “Rheinmetall has stockpiled key raw materials sufficient for several years. We have also implemented IT systems that allow us to centrally monitor and precisely manage raw material consumption across the entire group.”
Analysts, however, caution that stockpiling alone will not be sufficient. Maria Shagina, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said: “Stockpiling serves as an important buffer against sudden disruptions, but on its own it is unlikely to mitigate structural damage over the long term.”
Shagina added that replacing the volume and diversity of critical minerals controlled by Beijing with alternative sources would take years.
In 2024, the EU enacted the European Critical Raw Materials Act, aimed at rebuilding domestic supply chains for such minerals.
The legislation sets 2030 targets for domestic extraction, processing and recycling while limiting dependence on any single third-country supplier to 65%.
A €3 billion ($3.5 billion) fund was established last year to accelerate strategic projects.
Nevertheless, the European Court of Auditors has noted that the 2030 targets are not legally binding and that the EU remains far from achieving them.
Industry groups argue that policy inconsistencies could further slow progress.
The Cobalt Institute, which represents a sector vital to jet engines, advanced batteries and defence alloys, warned that proposed EU chemicals regulations risk undermining the industry.
“Europe has one foot in and one foot out,” said Michael Blakeney, head of government and public affairs at the London-based institute. “It says the right things, but its actions are inconsistent.”
Europe’s efforts are unfolding alongside a more aggressive US strategy to secure critical mineral supply chains.
Shagina said:
“The US is investing more capital to secure and expand capacity, taking greater financial risks and, in some cases, acquiring equity stakes. Europe, by contrast, is generally more cautious, which places it at a relative disadvantage in the competition for critical minerals.”
In April, the EU signed an agreement with the United States to coordinate supplies of critical minerals. Although some member states initially resisted over concerns that the deal could weaken the bloc’s strategic autonomy, they authorised the Commission in early June to join the US-led “Pax Silica” initiative, which coordinates investment and export-control policies.
Teer urged Europe to use ongoing US-EU-Japan negotiations as the nucleus of a broader coalition aimed at making critical mineral production outside China financially viable through state support, minimum-price mechanisms and supply rules.
“Particularly important are countries that either produce raw materials or possess significant mineral deposits, such as Malaysia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Brazil and Indonesia, as well as countries like India with large pools of skilled labour,” he said.
Teer also argued that the EU should activate its Anti-Coercion Instrument, which allows the bloc to impose tariffs and restrictions in response to economic pressure on countries outside the union, in order to deter China from introducing further restrictions.
A European Commission spokesperson said the bloc had “long been aware of the risks associated with the EU’s dependence on critical raw materials.”
“The objective is clear: to anticipate disruptions early and reduce the EU’s vulnerabilities while strengthening our industrial and defence capacities,” the spokesperson said.
Europe
Four European countries move to make citizenship harder to obtain
European countries are increasingly tightening their citizenship rules. Most recently, the Norwegian government has drafted legislation that would raise the minimum residency requirement for citizenship from three years to seven.
The proposed amendments to the citizenship law were presented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion.
Under the draft legislation, stateless individuals born in Norway, as well as those who arrived in the country as children, would be required to reside in Norway for at least five years before becoming eligible for citizenship.
The government also plans to increase residency requirements for foreign nationals who are married to or cohabiting with Norwegian citizens.
Language requirements are set to become more demanding as well. The proposal would raise the required level of spoken Norwegian proficiency from A2 to B1. The new rules would apply to applicants aged between 18 and 67.
Commenting on the changes, Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion Kjersti Stenseng said: “Obtaining and holding Norwegian citizenship should be a privilege.”
The government argues that simplifying administrative procedures while simultaneously tightening eligibility criteria will help reduce the country’s large backlog of pending applications and shorten processing times.
Norway is the latest European country to announce revisions to its citizenship rules.
In Finland, the minimum residency requirement for citizenship was increased from five years to eight years on October 1, 2024.
The country also plans to introduce a mandatory citizenship test for applicants aged between 18 and 64 from the beginning of 2027.
Finnish Interior Minister Mari Rantanen said: “The introduction of a citizenship test is the final component of a comprehensive reform aimed at making citizenship requirements more stringent.”
Sweden has also approved a similar reform. Beginning in June 2026, the standard residency requirement for citizenship will increase from five years to eight years. Authorities are also introducing a financial self-sufficiency requirement for applicants and expanding the scope of security screenings.
Explaining the rationale behind the changes, Migration Minister Johan Forssell said: “It was possible to become a citizen after living in the country for five years without knowing a single word of Swedish, learning anything about Swedish society, or even having one’s own source of income.”
The most far-reaching changes have been implemented in Portugal. Portuguese President Antonio Jose Seguro has signed legislation raising the minimum residency requirement for citizenship from five years to 10 years.
For citizens of the European Union and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the requirement has been set at seven years.
The residency period will now be calculated from the date a residence permit is granted rather than from the date a citizenship application is submitted. The new rules will also affect the children of immigrants.
Previously, children could obtain citizenship one year after birth if their parents held residence permits. Under the new rules, at least one parent must have legally resided in the country for a minimum of five years.
The law also introduces a mandatory examination covering Portuguese history, culture, values and social structures.
Migration policies are tightening across the European Union as well. On June 17, the European Parliament approved legislation allowing irregular migrants whose asylum applications have been rejected but who cannot be returned to their countries of origin to be deported to third countries.
The new EU rules permit the establishment of migrant detention centres outside the bloc’s borders. African countries are reportedly among the options being discussed for such facilities.
Europe
SpaceX warns EU satellite spectrum plan could disrupt connectivity in Ukraine
SpaceX has sharply criticised a European Union plan to restrict access to satellite spectrum, arguing that the proposal risks degrading connectivity in Ukraine and disrupting emergency communications services.
In a document shared with European officials and reviewed by the Financial Times, SpaceX warned:
“This proposal significantly increases the likelihood that Europeans will be deprived of direct-to-device satellite services, or that new European operations will create global interference issues, including for emergency services such as those operating in Ukraine.”
In a proposal unveiled in May, the EU recommended reserving part of the spectrum band used for direct satellite-to-smartphone connectivity for European operators, thereby limiting the frequencies available to US and Chinese providers.
The 2 GHz frequency band in question is currently used by two US companies, Viasat and EchoStar.
SpaceX argued that the EU plan prioritises “an operator’s country of establishment over economic, technical and regulatory realities.”
When the proposal was announced, EU technology chief Henna Virkkunen defended the move, saying the bloc wanted to “increase European capacity in this sector.” She added that other parts of the frequency band would remain open to international operators, arguing that prioritising European providers was justified.
Other participants involved in discussions over the proposal said some EU officials were specifically seeking to limit Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network.
Europe’s initiative follows a warning from Washington. In March, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) cautioned that it could take retaliatory measures if the EU chose to favour European satellite operators over alternatives such as Starlink.
At the time, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr told the Financial Times: “Some of the discussions in Europe regarding satellite sovereignty concern us. If Europe decides to move down that path, then, as you know, we will have to consider reciprocal measures.”
The European Commission’s proposal has not yet entered formal negotiations with EU member states or the European Parliament.
A source close to SpaceX said the company remained hopeful of influencing the outcome of the process, given concerns raised by both businesses and several European governments.
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