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From Kabul University to the leadership of terrorist group: Who is Sanaullah Ghaffari?  

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After the deadly attack of IS-K on the Crocus concert hall in Moscow, which killed more than 140 people and injured dozens, the name of the young leader of this group has once again made headlines in different media platforms.

But about the real identity of this man who is behind the deadly attacks of IS-K, contradictory and often misleading information has always been reflected in the media.

Now, through interviews with former acquaintances and some information sources who have followed this case, the Independent Farsi reported it has obtained new details about his private life and her path to the leadership of the dreaded IS terrorist network.

Sanaullah Ghaffari, known as Shahab al-Muhajar, is sometimes mentioned as a member of the Haqqani terrorist network. In some cases, a fake identification card of him as a security guard of the former vice president of Afghanistan has been also published, and recently there are rumors about his membership in the rank of former Afghan army in the international media.

But who is Sanaullah Ghafari, where is he from, and how did he become the leader of the Khorasan branch of IS-K?

The Khorasan branch of IS, the only active operational branch of the group in Central Asia based in Afghanistan, has planned and executed several deadly attacks outside Afghanistan in the past several years.

The leader of this IS-K branch, which is now becoming a serious threat to the security of the region, is a young man named Sanaullah Ghafari, who is from Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan.

Sanaullah Ghaffari is Pashtoon and from Kabul

Sources among the relatively distant members of Sanaullah Ghafari’s family have spoken about his family’s ethnic identity and his residency. According to the source, Sanaullah is the son of Abdul Jabbar, a former member of Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and originally from the Kharuti tribe of the Pashtun ethnicity.

His family, who are strongly Hanafi religious followers, live in Khoruti village between Mirbeche Kot and Shekardera, Kabul.

Ghafari’s family is not religious extremist, and they had no Salafist tendencies. However, Sanaullah Ghafari was attracted to Salafist ideas and joined terrorist groups since he was a student at Kabul University between 2012 and 2014.

In its recent report, the Reuters news agency quoted Taliban sources identified Sanaullah Ghafari as a Tajik origin and also a member of the national army of the former Afghan government, a claim that reliable sources in the National Security Department of the former Afghan government categorically denied.

A senior officer of Afghanistan’s National Security Department, who personally followed Sanaullah Ghaffari’s case during his tenure said that Ghaffari was never part of the security forces of the Afghan government rather he was attracted to Salafist groups when he was a student at Kabul University.

Then, due to the tact he showed in religious preaching among students, Haqqani network facilitated his travel to Waziristan of Pakistan.

Ghaffari took military courses in Waziristan under the supervision of Haqqani network and because he was familiar with computer programs, he worked in the field of designing, photographing and editing photos and videos for the Haqqani Network.

But it wasn’t long before he actually claimed the responsibility of planning the Haqqani network’s terrorist attacks, and while still working anonymously and far from fame, he became a serious force for the Haqqani network.

Playing with anonymous names and becoming leader of IS-K

Contradictory information has been published in the media outlets about how Sanaullah Ghafari joined the IS-K terrorist group.

Some have said that he is the liaison between the Haqqani network and the IS-K group, and some have also claimed that Sirajuddin Haqqani forced him to join IS-K. But these are just claims that have no valid reason to prove them.

But a senior national security officer of the former Afghan government revealed the secret of Sanaullah Ghafari’s joining IS-K as follows: One of the usual tricks of this man (Sanaullah) was to play with different names in different situations. When Sanaullah Ghaffari worked for the Haqqani network, he never introduced himself to two individuals or two groups with the same name during the planning and execution of the attacks, but he communicated with operational networks with a thousand different names.”

According to this officer, around 2014, when IS-K emerged in Afghanistan, with the help of this wide connection with its terrorist networks with different names, he got close to IS-K and finally fell from the Haqqani network to IS-K.

This senior national security officer cited an example during his mission to prove this claim and said: After IS-K attacks intensified in Afghanistan, we in the National Security Department, every time we arrested people related to IS-K who were involved in the attacks, we asked them about the identity of their commander and they mentioned different names. But when we asked them to describe the details of the face of their leader or commander, they all described the details of a specific face, and by comparing the portraits we had drawn based on their narratives, we realized that all these names belong to one person, and that is Sanaullah Ghafari.

Anonymous activity aimed to protect IS-K leader

In February 2022, the United States announced a reward of up to 10 million dollars for information leading to the identification and arrest of the leader of the Khorasan branch of IS.

There are several photos of Sanaullah Ghafari, which the US State Department has published as photos of the leader of IS-K and announced his age as 29 years old. But informed sources in the intelligence apparatus of the former government of Afghanistan said that the published photo of the IS-K leader is about 10 years ago and he was almost 24 years old in 2014 and 2015, which means that he is about 34 to 35 years old now.

Meanwhile, a classmate of Sanaullah Ghafari at Kabul University said that he was a university student at least 10 years ago and was over 22 years old.

He also corrected the information published in the media about Ghaffari’s field of study and said that they were classmates at Kabul University’s Faculty of Economics.

This is while some media have mentioned Sanaullah Ghaffari’s education at Kabul Polytechnic University of Engineering and some others at Kabul University’s Faculty of Theology.

Meanwhile, the security sources revealed some tips about the protection methods of the IS-K leader. The senior officer of the National Security Department of the previous government of Afghanistan said that Sanaullah Ghafari tries to operate in complete anonymity and for this reason “he never has a mobile phone and a special protection team is not seen around him”.

Sanaullah Ghaffari survived several attacks

However, the senior security officer noted that he had survived several attacks by the Afghan National Security Forces.

This source clarified: “In 2018, the National Security Forces of Afghanistan carried out two attacks to arrest or kill Sanaullah Ghafari in the small village of Kochkan in Shakardara, Kabul, but he survived these attacks and was not captured.”

He added: “The leader of IS-K has only one special assistant named Salahuddin, who is apparently one of his university classmates and now works as the operational deputy of IS-K and is always by Sanaullah Ghafari’s side.”

Regarding the residence of the IS-K leader, it is said that he has traveled to Pakistan on several occasions, but security sources confirmed that Sanaullah Ghafari has been in Afghanistan all the time, except for the training course he took in North Waziristan under the supervision of the Haqqani network. And now he lives inside Afghanistan.

The deep influence of IS-K in the Taliban system

In the last two years and seven months after returning to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban has always claimed that they have suppressed IS-K in Afghanistan and that this group is no longer considered a threat in Afghanistan.

In the latest case, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesman of the Taliban said that IS-K has lost its operational capability in Afghanistan.

But the information of the intelligence sources of the former government of Afghanistan is speaking otherwise. These sources say that civilians are often targeted in Taliban operations, which are carried out from time to time under the name of destroying IS-K shelters, while IS-K members are not only present in their hideouts in Afghanistan, but have also widely infiltrated the ranks of the Taliban.

As an example, this source pointed to the murder of Abdul Rahim Haqqani, one of the leader of the Haqqani network, in a suicide attack in Kabul and said: The murder of Abdul Rahim Haqqani was planned by a former member of the Haqqani network named Haji Bashir, who joined the Salafi groups in Kabul prison and was recruited by IS-K.”

He furthered: “Haji Bashir hired Abdul Rahim Haqqani’s driver to take the suicide bomber to the premises of the religious school that Abdur Rahim Haqqani was in charge of.”

According to security sources, a large number of Taliban members who were in Afghan prisons in recent years were attracted to Salafist ideas and after being released from prison, they often joined IS-K.

This example shows that contrary to the claims of the Taliban, IS-K has influence in different layers of the Taliban system. The deadly attacks that IS-K recently carried out in Iran, Pakistan and Russia have been attractive and encouraging to some middle-ranking members of the Taliban.

Some reports, including the report of the United Nations Security Council, show that Daesh has about four to six thousand fighters (along with their families) in Afghanistan, some of whom are former members of the Taliban, while other people who went to Afghanistan from Iran and regional countries also joined IS-K group.

Information from security sources shows that some members of the main branch of IS-K, who fled from Iraq and Syria go to Iran and from there to Afghanistan through illegal means.

Is it possible to contain the growing threat of IS-K

After the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, the US claimed to continue the fight against terrorism in this country through aerial surveillance. But the point is that the US uses the Taliban as an intelligence force on the ground to identify and target threatening situations.

Security sources in the previous government of Afghanistan said that the Taliban currently do not have the capacity and ability to collect the information needed by the US Air Force, and as long as there is no necessary force on the ground, there is no possibility of air operations against terrorist groups.

Therefore, it seems that there is currently no serious air threat to IS-K in Afghanistan, and for this reason, this group is freely planning and executing complex and deadly attacks inside and outside of Afghanistan.

Asia

Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets

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Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.

Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.

The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.

The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.

Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.

The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.

Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.

The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.

Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.

The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.

Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.

Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.

Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.

According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.

This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.

The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:

“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”

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Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions

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Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.

Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.

China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.

Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.

The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.

It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.

However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.

Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.

Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.

On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.

The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.

Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.

Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.

Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.

Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.

According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.

Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.

The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.

A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.

These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.

Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.

Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.

Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.

Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”

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China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers

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China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.

China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.

In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.

The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.

Financial sector stability

China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.

China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.

“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.

Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.

Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan

Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.

The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.

Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.

Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.

Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.

Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.

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