OPINION
Haniyeh’s death and its implication to the Middle East
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Yang ChenOn July 31, Haniyeh, the supreme leader of the Palestinian Hamas, was killed in Tehran after attending the inauguration ceremony of the new Iranian president. Unfortunately, as of now, the details of Haniyeh’s death has many versions, highlighting the complexity of this attack. However, Hamas, Iran and other countries have firmly believed that Israel is the power behind the throne. Based on this judgement, Iran and the “axis of resistance” it supports will inevitably retaliate against Israel.
For Israel, it will also take advantage of the “window period” of the Biden administration of the United States to increase its provocations in the Middle East. On the one hand, Israel will continue to take actions aiming to completely eliminate Hamas and thereby weaken the unity among all Palestinian parties. On the other hand, it will continue to provoke Iran in order to win greater support from the United States and help Israel and Netanyahu get out of this round of Gaza crisis. As a result, the situation in the Middle East will further fall into turmoil in the next few months.
The reasons why Hamas’ top leader was killed
It’s commonly admitted that the Decapitation Strike is a method often used by Israel to attack its opponents. There are more examples about this assumption this year. In April, Israel launched an air strike, resulting in the loss of three sons and many grandchildren of Haniyeh. It is reported that more than 60 members of his entire family have been killed by Israel. On July 30, an Israeli drone attack reportedly killed Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander, who was considered as Hezbollah’s “second-in-command”. On August 1, the Israeli military issued a statement confirming the killing of Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif in the Gaza Strip on July 13. But the frequent use of this tool also highlights Israel’s decline and hysteria in the Gaza conflict. It can be seen that when the winner cannot be determined on the battlefield, more murders or “decapitation strike” will occur in the Middle East, resulting in a dangerous situation and more uncertainties in the Middle East.
However, no matter who is behind this attack, this is beneficial to the Israel for several reasons. Haniyeh’s death can be used by Israel to ease the Netanyahu government’s internal and external pressure. There are a lot of criticisms inside Israel, accusing Netanyahu of being too weak and making no progress in 10 months’ military actions. The US Biden administration and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris have both made clear statements that Israel should cease fire as soon as possible and sign a peace agreement. Under such huge pressure, Israel resorts to purge of Hamas leaders. On the one hand, it can appease the extreme right-wing forces and hardliners in Israel, and on the other hand, it can seriously weaken the power of Hamas.
It can be used to disrupt or even to stop the peace talks between Israel and Hamas. At present, the peace talks between the two sides are not going smoothly. Compared with the Hamas hardliners, Haniyeh was one of the people who would like to negotiate with Israel. The death of the relatively moderate Haniyeh will inevitably lead to greater obstacles in the negotiations between the two sides.
Israel can exert great pressure on Iran not showing goodwill to the West. Ismail Haniyeh’s death happened in Iran instead of other countries, which is a huge humiliation to the new Iranian government. It was a continued provocation and pressure on Iran, and also a warning to the new Iranian president not to try to improve relations with the West. Israel would like to see an Iran that returns to confrontation with the West.
The death of Haniyeh will bring bad impacts towards process of reconciliation within Palestine. Israel is very wary of the 14 Palestinian factions reaching a reconciliation and signing the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity. It is urgent for Israel to divide them as much as possible and prevent the Palestinian factions from uniting together.
Besides, Israel intends to show the major powers in the Middle East and the world that it has the ability to eliminate any one of the leaders of all resistance organizations at anytime, anywhere. If someone choose to continue to confront Israel, it will inevitably suffer a heavy blow from Israel. This is actually a further deterrent to the “axis of resistance”.
Last but not least, Israel intends to bring Iran down and even drag Iran into a war with Israel. Israel has not achieved its set goals in the Gaza conflict and is helpless against Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah and other organizations. It can only hope to continue to provoke Iran in an attempt to drag Iran into a protracted war and then attract the United States to join in, thus helping Israel get out of the predicament.
The possible responses of Iran and the “axis of resistance”
It is for sure that Iran and the “axis of resistance” it leads will retaliate against Israel, further weakening the power of Israel and the United States in the Middle East.
Specifically speaking, Iran is bound to strike back, but the intensity of the strike will be within controllable range. Iran does not want to have a direct conflict with Israel, nor does it wishes to trigger a military conflict with the United States. After the killing of General Qasem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Syria, Iran adopted a “turn-based strategy” retaliation method to control the confrontation between Iran and Israel. It is expected that Iran will still retaliate in this way this time. But there is a hard question for Iran that how it can have a balancing act, which is that it can strike Israel substantially without escalating the conflict between the two countries.
Although Iran’s counterattack is controllable, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias supported by Iran will further coordinate and intensify their attacks on Israel. During the past 8 months, it can been seen that this is the most effective way to confront Israel now and for a long time to come. That’s why it is unwise to be brave for a moment. In another word, there is still no need for Iran to have a direct confrontation with Israel and United States, but the anger of the people needs to be appeased.
Another point worth mentioning is that although Haniyeh’s death will not affect the normal operation of Hamas’ institutions, Hamas’s force has been severely hit since October 7 last year, and its ability to launch a larger-scale attack on Israel has significantly declined. There are still two months to go before the first anniversary of the Gaza conflict, and Hamas may face a more severe attack from Israel. If it can hold out for these two months, it will inevitably deal a heavy blow to Israel’s status as a military power.
The implication of Haniyeh’s death to the Middle East
After the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation and the internal reconciliation of Palestine, the contradiction between Israel and Iran has gradually become the main contradiction in the Middle East, and the “anti-Israel” united front in the Middle East is in the process of formation.
The resistance faction, mainly under the leadership of Iran, has become the main force against Israel and the United States. Although the moderate faction, mainly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and other countries, still has hope for Israel and the United States, Saudi Arabia has recently significantly improved its cooperation with China in economic and security affairs, and expressed appreciation and support for China’s mediation of internal reconciliation in Palestine. The hardliners, mainly led by Turkey, have not only stopped reconciliation with Israel recently, but have once again taken up the banner of anti-Israel and pro-Palestine. On July 28, 2024, Turkish President Erdogan threatened that Turkey could intervene militarily in Israel as it did in Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya in the past.
The contradictions between the United States and Israel on the Middle East issue will become more prominent, and the Gaza conflict will further spill over to more areas. With Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential election, the Biden administration has entered a “window period”. It is expected that Israel will become fearless during this period, aiming to increase provocations against Iran and intensify the Gaza conflict to a new level.
From Israel’s perspective, not only can there be no ceasefire in the Middle East, but the war must be bigger and more tragic, pushing the Middle East into greater chaos. First, it is beneficial to Netanyahu, and only by continuing the war can he preserve his political career. Second, it is beneficial to Israel, hoping to achieve the goal of completely eliminating Hamas, interrupting the internal reconciliation process in Palestine, and taking advantage of the “window period” of the Biden administration of the United States to do whatever it wants in the Middle East and weaken the resistance forces led by Iran. Third, it is beneficial to Donald Trump. Israel’s rampage in the Middle East will bring tremendous pressure to the Biden administration and presidential candidate Harris, which will indirectly benefit Trump’s presidential campaign.
Although the situation in the Middle East will become more tense, there is still some room before the critical point of a major war. The United States, Iran and Israel are the three most important forces that will determine the next steps in the Middle East.
For the United States, it has neither the will nor the ability to deal with the three crises of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea at the same time. The biggest political issue in the United States at present is the US presidential election.
For Iran, it can deal a major blow to the United States and Israel with only the Houthi armed forces, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and militias in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, it has no reason to engage directly with Israel until now.
The only uncertainty is Israel’s next move, especially whether it will launch a large-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon or launch more provocative actions against Iran. This assassination is just the beginning of a new round of conflict. For Israel, the death of Haniyeh is a test of Iran’s anti-Israel attitude. It will continue to increase its provocations and constantly test the anti-Israel attitudes of Turkey, Syria and other countries, so that it will be in preparation for whether to expand the scope and scale of the war in the next step.
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“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?
Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.
But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.
In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.
These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.
This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.
The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.
The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.
This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.
The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.
Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.
OPINION
Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East
Published
3 days agoon
18/11/2024By
Ma XiaolinOn November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.
Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.
Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.
Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.
Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.
However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.
Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.
Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.
Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.
In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”
It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.
The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.
Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.
With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.
Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.
Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.
Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.
Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.
Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.
Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.
Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.
These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.
Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.
In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.
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