OPINION
Normalization with Syria is both easy and very difficult
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Hasan ÜnalIt should be noted with concern that the talks between the deputy foreign ministers of Türkiye and Syria scheduled for March 15-16 in Moscow, which were supposed to pave the way for normalization between Ankara and Damascus, have been postponed. Based on the media reports, it is possible to conclude that the postponement was due to statements made by Syrian President Assad to the Russian press.
In this statement, Assad underlined two issues in particular. The first is Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian territory, which it controls, and the other is Ankara’s refusal to support groups seen as terrorists by the Damascus government. If we really want to normalize relations with Syria, we need to consider these demands.
GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY
First, it is very useful to make this analysis by putting ourselves in the position of the Syrian and Damascus governments and then focusing on what we want to achieve with normalization with this country. For example, how long do we want to stay in the territory we control in Syria? If we are not opposed to these territories coming under Syria’s full and effective sovereignty, and if it is only a question of timing or timetable, the problem can be overcome. For example, why is it not possible for the Syrian state to gradually appoint administrators to the lands we control and to integrate these lands into its administrative system within the framework of a certain calendar when an agreement is signed with the Damascus government in line with our expectations from Syria (return of asylum seekers and joint fight against terrorism)? More precisely, why not consider signing another agreement with the government in Damascus to cede these territories to Syria’s direct and effective sovereignty once we have reached a compromise with Syria on issues such as the return of asylum seekers and the updated implementation of the Adana Agreement?
Accordingly, once a common ground on the asylum seekers and the Adana Agreement is found, Türkiye would sign an agreement committing to cede these territories to Syria’s direct sovereignty, and a timetable could be set for how this would happen gradually. While Turkish security forces maintain a presence in those areas, Syria could appoint administrators, teachers, doctors, and other civil servants there, and the Damascus government could also consider sending teams to liaise with Turkish security forces. As a result, the process of integrating the public institutions and administration in these regions under the de facto control of Türkiye into the Syrian system and the registration of border crossings by Turkish and Syrian customs officials could be initiated. Trade between the two countries would be recorded and taxed. During such a transition, Turkish security forces would gradually leave the region, at which time the Adana Agreement, already updated, would come into effect and Türkiye’s most important security concern would be addressed. Syria, on the other hand, could reincorporate its territory into its sovereignty. It may be possible to develop a complete win/win strategy.
IF OUR GOAL IS NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY…
If our goal is not to withdraw from the territories we control, then the scenarios are different, and it is already impossible to return asylum seekers and to fight terrorism jointly with Syria on the basis of the Adana Agreement. If our aim is to impose a political solution on Syria, as some of our senior officials insisted until recently after President Erdoğan announced his intention to normalize relations with Syria and meet with Assad after his meeting with Putin in Sochi on August 6, 2022, all this brainstorming should be discarded. According to these senior officials, who use the highly offensive and toxic word ‘regime’, the way to reconcile/normalize with Syria is to bring a new constitution to this country. In other words, we seem to want a named or unnamed federal constitution that changes the constitution of the country in a national-unitary structure and replaces it with autonomous regions. Until recently, the same senior officials were even talking about reconciling the ‘regime’ and the ‘opposition’.
Apart from the fact that such an expectation is not at all compatible with the realities in both the field and the international arena, it can be observed at first glance that it does not serve Türkiye’s national interests. For example, if instead of transferring the territory we control directly to the effective sovereignty of the Syrian state, we want to keep it under the effective control of the groups that we call the Syrian National Army (SMO) and act together with us, we will transform this country into a federation that includes autonomous regions, even if it is possible, let alone Syria or even Russia will not accept it. Wouldn’t we then be playing into the hands of groups in Idlib that we also consider terrorists and, more importantly, the PKK/PYD terrorists who, together with the U.S. forces, are carrying out large-scale ethnic cleansing in the east of the Euphrates and seizing the region? Because a Syria with autonomous regions is the final solution that both groups ultimately want, at least for now. What national interests does such a result serve in Türkiye? We have to ask this question openly and answer it from the point of view of national interests, because the future of certain groups that have emerged as a result of the mistakes, we made during the war, has come to take precedence over the national interests of Türkiye.
There is no national interest to be gained from the Turkish media’s psychologically motivated treatment of the issue, such as ‘Assad has put forward unacceptable conditions for the summit’, because the idea of ‘let’s actually take Aleppo, let’s be on the safe side’ lies behind that logic. And in fact, it reflects a mindset that does not want to compromise with Syria, which it sees as Assad. A mindset that laments, ‘If Russia had not been so involved, we would have overthrown this Assad regime long ago’… Accordingly, it is a way of thinking that assumes it is possible and right to impose at least some conditions on the Assad regime, which we have failed to overthrow, and that it is possible and right for us to exert constant pressure on the ‘regime’ through the SMO, to which we will de facto hand over the administration of the territories we control…
THE HEAVY PRICE OF NOT WITHDRAWING FROM SYRIA
However, when we analyze them carefully, they all contain seriously dangerous and harmful elements for Türkiye’s national interests. Although not possible under the current conditions, if the SMO will become the security forces of the regions we currently control when we force Syria out of its current national-unitary structure and force it into a federation with autonomous regions, HTS and PKK/PYD will position themselves as security forces in Idlib and PKK/PYD regions that will turn into autonomous regions. In such a scenario, Türkiye will not be able to gain any benefit, and this state structure will pave the way for the disintegration of Syria in the next step, because it can be said that Syria, which the Western world, especially the U.S., does not want to remain within its current borders and favors its division into three if possible, will not survive in the medium term and its division into independent states according to federal borders will be inevitable.
After all, in an international environment where the federal structures of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have disintegrated one after another, and where the disintegration of states such as Spain and even the United Kingdom (UK) seems quite possible, it is inconceivable that a federal Syria, which would be the scene of provocations and power struggles by the U.S. on the one hand and Israel and other states on the other, would survive. Well, even if the SMO-controlled territories of a disintegrating Syria want to join Türkiye, can it be a reasonable and logical policy for Türkiye’s national interests to pave the way for the PKK/PYD to become an independent state in this way? It cannot be because Türkiye needs neither land nor additional population. In such a scenario, it should be noted that it is quite predictable the Arab world, which is increasingly normalizing its relations with Syria, will react and act together against Türkiye, which has seized or is trying to seize the territory of an Arab state. In such a case, it is highly likely that the UN Security Council would unite against Türkiye.
What needs to be done is to pave the way for the Erdogan-Assad summit as soon as possible. We need new thinking for reconciliation and normalization, discarding the ideas that underpin old wrong and destructive policies. Two agreements with Syria on the return of refugees and the joint fight against terrorism should be signed before the quadrilateral leaders’ summit including the participation of Russia and Iran. When updating the Adana Agreement, in addition to the PKK, the PYD, YPG and all their derivatives should be included in the text, and jihadist groups, which Syria considers terrorist organizations – some of which we also consider terrorist – can be added to that text. In addition, a timetable for withdrawal will be agreed upon, with Türkiye guaranteeing that it will hand over the Syrian territory under its control to the effective sovereignty of the Damascus government. It would be much more appropriate to concentrate on the extraordinary investment, reconstruction and trade-economic benefits that such a reconciliation of the two states would bring to both sides, and to try to secure Syria’s recognition of the TRNC based on the normalization of relations. On the contrary, every attempt and every delay will continue to impose a huge financial burden on both the current government and the state/nation.
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“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?
Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.
But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.
In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.
These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.
This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.
The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.
The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.
This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.
The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.
Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.
OPINION
Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East
Published
3 days agoon
18/11/2024By
Ma XiaolinOn November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.
Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.
Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.
Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.
Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.
However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.
Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.
Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.
Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.
In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”
It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.
The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.
Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.
With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.
Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.
Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.
Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.
Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.
Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.
Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.
Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.
These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.
Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.
In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.
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