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The prospects for the Russia–U.S. Budapest summit are bleak

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On October 23, White House spokesperson Levitt said that the planned U.S.–Russia meeting in Budapest had not been completely canceled, stating, “The president and this administration look forward to holding such meetings again in the future, but we must ensure that the talks can yield concrete positive results.”

Although Levitt’s clarification rekindled hope after U.S. President Trump announced the cancellation of the summit the day before, the wide gaps in the parties’ positions mean that even if the Russian and U.S. leaders gather in Budapest, the summit’s prospects would still be bleak. The summit was set during a phone call between Trump and Putin on October 16 and received active cooperation from the Hungarian government. However, the situation took a sharp turn within just a week, showing that brokering peace between Russia and Ukraine is by no means easy.

On the 22nd, Trump announced to the media that he was canceling the planned meeting with Russian President Putin because he felt the two sides “could not achieve the necessary objectives.” However, Trump did not shut the door on a new round of U.S.–Russia summits, stressing that he would meet with Putin in the future and reiterating the principled position of “adhering to a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine conflict.”

As efforts for a Russia–U.S. summit were impeded, the United States and Europe further increased pressure on Russia, casting a greater shadow over the possibility that the summit would proceed and make positive progress. On the 22nd, the Trump administration first announced sanctions on Russia related to the Ukraine crisis, citing Putin’s “dishonesty and lack of candor” in the relevant talks, and imposed sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies—Rosneft and Gazprom—to cut off financial sources supporting Russia’s prosecution of the war. It is reported that the crude oil exports of these two companies account for 50% of Russia’s total crude oil exports.

At the same time, to reinforce these sanctions, the Trump administration launched “secondary sanctions” and indirect containment measures, imposing a 25% tariff on Indian goods exported to the United States to retaliate for its purchase of Russian oil at discount prices, thereby undermining Russia’s ability to maintain a military edge. Reuters commented that this was a major shift in Trump’s Russia policy.

As a new measure tightening the screws on Russia in step with the United States, the 27 EU member states also announced on the 22nd a 19th round of sanctions against Russia, focused on the energy and financial sectors. Under this sanctions order, the EU will for the first time ban Russian liquefied natural gas from entering the European market and will lower the price paid for Russian crude oil to 47.6 dollars per barrel; in addition, Russia’s two major oil companies will face a comprehensive trading ban, financial institutions in Russia and certain other countries will be restricted by trading bans, and crypto partners will be included in the scope of sanctions for the first time.

Of course, to some extent, the U.S. and Europe stepping up sanctions on Russia is also a punishment for Russia’s joint exercises of its land, sea, and air strategic nuclear forces on the 22nd, during which it launched intercontinental ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. At this point, the Russia–U.S. Budapest summit that once offered a glimmer of hope to the international community is likely to be aborted completely. The fundamental reason is the huge gap between the positions of Russia and Ukraine and their European partners, as well as the United States, with differences hard to bridge.

Russia’s demands are very clear and not open to doubt. Specifically, a peace agreement must be reached first before a cease-fire can be discussed. Moreover, Russia does not intend to give up the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula it currently occupies; it is only willing to trade parts of the Ukrainian territory it occupies in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions for Ukraine’s withdrawal from the remaining areas it controls in Donbas, allowing Russia to have full possession of the more strategically significant eastern Ukraine.

The U.S. position has wavered but ultimately accommodated Ukraine and its European allies. Trump has repeatedly hoped for a local cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine followed by a peace agreement. In essence, he wants to persuade Ukraine to give up the land occupied by Russia and to avoid futile and unwinnable battles so as not to fall into a passive situation of losing more territory the longer the war lasts. It is reported that during Ukrainian President Zelensky’s recent visit to the White House, Trump, who had missed out on the Nobel Peace Prize and lost patience with mediation, was extremely displeased. He not only tossed aside the battlefield map of Ukraine presented by Zelensky, but also received this deferential leader of a small country coldly, leaving him to hold a press conference only on the street outside the White House fence. The reality that a weak country has no diplomacy is lamentable.

Ukraine and its European partners who firmly back its resolute resistance to Russia take a hard line. Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized that territorial issues are non-negotiable, that talks can only be based on the lines between the two sides before Russia launched the “special military operation,” and he rejects ceding land for peace. Most European countries reject the “land swap” plan Putin recently proposed to Trump and oppose Ukraine obtaining a peace agreement at the price of giving up territory, because in essence it still sacrifices Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty.

Recently, Ukraine and its European partners also jointly formulated a “12-point plan” to comprehensively end the Russia-Ukraine war. Its main contents include that, after both sides agree to a cease-fire and commit to stopping territorial advances, Ukraine will obtain security guarantees, funds needed to repair war damage, and a fast track to join the EU. Europe will gradually lift sanctions on Russia and, after it agrees to help Ukraine with reconstruction, return the 300 billion dollars of Russian assets frozen in European countries. If Russia attacks a neighboring country again, European sanctions will quickly resume. In addition, Russia and Ukraine will open negotiations on the governance of occupied territories; however, neither Ukraine nor Europe will legally recognize any occupied territory as belonging to Russia.

In this sense, Ukraine and Europe have still made concessions to a certain extent, namely acknowledging the reality that it is difficult to defeat Russia militarily and retake the territory Ukraine has lost, being willing to first stop the war based on practical considerations, solidify the zones of control and the battlefield pattern, treat the occupied territories as a “governance issue,” and hold to the final bottom line of not recognizing Russia’s legality over Ukrainian territory.

Power determines the course and outcome of war; circumstances overpower individuals. Because Russia has won an overwhelming victory at the battlefield level and continues to expand its occupied areas, it insists that Ukraine and Europe must accept a package peace treaty before a cease-fire, and it demands that Ukraine not join NATO in the future and that there be no foreign troops stationed in Ukraine.

The vast negotiating gulf between Russia and Ukraine and their European partners buried Trump’s passion and optimism and left the White House master, who believes in “transactional diplomacy” and is eager for quick results, at a loss, increasingly showing dissatisfaction with Putin, and in the end hitting both sides: brandishing sanctions to try to force Russian concessions while refusing to sell Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine so as not to worsen U.S.–Russia relations and bring trouble upon himself.

The Ukraine war has lasted three and a half years, and the stalemate cannot be fundamentally changed in the short term, so various peace proposals are naturally being floated to break the deadlock. However, history shows that wars are easy to start and hard to end, because neither side wants to be the loser or readily accept defeat. The large-scale military contest in the Korean War lasted only one year, but peace talks continued for two years. America’s Vietnam War lasted 14 years, with peace talks continuing for seven. The Soviet Union’s Afghanistan war lasted 10 years, with negotiations taking three. America’s Afghanistan war lasted 13 years, and after Obama announced the end of the war the two sides still fought and negotiated for as long as seven years…

The Russia–Ukraine war will not change the overall pattern of “a miserable victory for Russia and a disastrous defeat for Ukraine.” It will likely end in the “Korean War model,” namely both sides fight to exhaustion, find the optimal stop-loss point, halt fire, sign an armistice, and then wait for a better window to sign a peace treaty. It has been 72 years since the Korean War armistice and a peace treaty is still far away. Therefore, expecting the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war to cease fire soon and reach a peace treaty is wishful thinking.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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