Opinion
The struggle of two positions for peace in Ukraine: The West and the Global South

How will the power struggle, which is called the Russia-Ukraine war in Western public opinion and the war between Russia and the West (US, EU, NATO) in Moscow, end? There are two different lines on this question. The Western world, representing the first line, recently organised the “Peace in Ukraine Summit” in the Swiss town of Bürgenstock on 15-16 June.
The fact that the conflicting party, Russia, was not invited to the summit shows that the West wants to achieve peace in Ukraine not through negotiations and concessions, but through the complete defeat of the rival country. It is therefore no coincidence that just before the peace summit in Ukraine, the proceeds of Russia’s frozen assets were transferred to Ukraine and Russia was allowed to be shot from Ukrainian territory with the West’s intelligence and ammunition support.
In view of the decision on long-term and institutionalised support for Ukraine to be taken at the NATO meeting in the coming days, it would be more accurate to call the event in Switzerland the “Initiative to Surrender Russia” rather than the “Peace Summit in Ukraine”.
Bring Russia to its knees: Theoretically flawed, practically impossible
The attempt to bring peace by bringing Russia to its knees is fraught with both theoretical and practical dilemmas. Former US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, considered a legendary political genius in the Western world, warned that in wars, bringing one side to the table under conditions of total surrender does not lead to real peace, but to a bigger war in the future. It is therefore appropriate to remember that the seeds of the destruction of the Second World War were sown in the First.
This theoretically dangerous approach of the West has no practical equivalent. The Russian economy, expected to be overwhelmed by sanctions, has proved its resilience to the surprise of international organisations, while the Russian army’s advance in Ukraine continues.
The peace summit that prolonged the war
To understand how the peace in Ukraine, or, to use the correct term, Russia’s attempt to surrender, which was organised with dreams between sleep and wakefulness, what Westerners call “daydreams”, ended, it is enough to look at Putin’s statements. In a statement on the sidelines of the G7 and the peace summit, Putin announced Moscow’s new conditions for ending the conflict. According to these, the Russian army will not leave the areas it controls, and as new gains are made, peace negotiations will be updated in the light of new realities.
According to documents published by the US newspaper The New York Times, Russia attracted attention at the negotiations in Istanbul in 2022 by being less demanding on land. The then Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who said that peace had been reached to the brink in Istanbul but that it had been disrupted by external interventions, said: “There are those in the NATO countries who want the war to continue. So that the war continues and Russia becomes weaker.”
At this point, it will come as no surprise that every time the West organises a peace conference, the war drags on a little longer. There is no doubt that such an image serves the US, which wants an Afghanistan-like “endless war” for Russia in Ukraine. In this way, the Washington administration is comfortably keeping European states seeking strategic autonomy on its side, while at the same time creating the political atmosphere necessary to encircle China, which it sees as its main rival.
The objection and the plan of the Global South
The total number of countries that did not attend the summit in Switzerland, or did attend but did not sign, shows that a different alternative for peace in Ukraine is maturing. Russia and Iran were not invited to the summit, while China and Egypt did not send representatives. South Africa, Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates attended the summit but did not sign the final declaration. While the sum of these countries is called BRICS, it is noteworthy that the Global South also shows no interest in the West’s solution/non-solution plan. In fact, with the exception of Turkey and Qatar, most of the countries of the Middle East did not support the declaration, while all of Central Asia, Latin America and the overwhelming majority of Africa preferred to stay out of the game.
The 6-point plan announced by China and Brazil forms the framework of the alternative put forward by the BRIICS countries. The plan differs from the West in that it rejects sanctions and blocs and aims to bring Russia and Ukraine to the table at the same time. Although there is currently no official proposal as to where the negotiations will take place, China and Saudi Arabia are the favoured destinations. Russia is likely to cede the initiative to China, which drew up a 12-point roadmap on the anniversary of the Ukrainian crisis and negotiated it in Ukraine and European capitals. Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced earlier that Russia would participate in a Chinese-organised process, the West will not welcome negotiations under the auspices of Beijing, which it accuses of being a party to the crisis. The NATO secretary general, who blamed China for the failure of the conference in Switzerland, signalled sanctions, while Ukrainian leader Zelenski expressed his disappointment in a more subdued tone, saying: “We are waiting for China’s friendship.
Saudi Arabia may also host negotiations in the settlement process announced under the coordination of China and Brazil and supported by more than 20 countries, despite its recent date. In fact, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit on Ukraine in August 2023 and was represented by the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, at the summit, which Russia did not attend. While Saudi Arabia, which decided not to sign the summit declaration without Russia’s participation, has increased its credibility in Moscow with this latest move, the Riyadh government has a number of tools at its disposal to convince the West. These include its traditional relations with the Western world, its oil card, its Gulf leadership and its special position in the Palestinian crisis. Gabriel Lüchinger, head of the International Security Division at the Swiss Foreign Ministry, has also suggested that Saudi Arabia, which has diversified its foreign policy in recent years with the opening to China and the Iranian peace deal, could be the address for the next round of negotiations.
A ceasefire is possible, but lasting peace is still a long way off
Can the Sino-Brazilian roadmap succeed in freezing the crisis despite the US-NATO policy of perpetuating the war? Although it is possible to find out in the coming months, it seems difficult to establish a lasting peace. Firstly, the West must abandon its belief that “peace means fighting until you are brought to your knees” and focus on the causes of the war. In this regard, China stresses the indivisibility of security, while defining NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the wrong security architecture. Its approach, that the security of one country or alliance should not threaten the legitimate interests of another, is certainly not acceptable to NATO as it seeks to expand into Asia.
The other challenge to lasting peace is how to rebuild Russia-Ukraine relations, which China describes as having a “complex historical background”. Although countries seeking a solution to the crisis, including China, emphasise Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and borders, agreements between Moscow and Kiev, especially in the area of maritime borders, are no longer relevant.
Opinion
Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.
When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.
It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”
The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction
An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.
The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.
Middle East
An assault on the Axis of Resistance: The Israeli escalation against Iran and its impact on Palestine and Gaza

Khaled al-Yamani, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Events in the region are accelerating as if we are on the brink of a new political and security earthquake, led by the direct confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist entity, under blatant American complicity. This confrontation, though it appears to be military and security-based, is in essence a major war targeting the entire project of resistance — from Tehran to Gaza.
Latest escalation: Aggressive maneuvers in the name of ‘Israeli security’
The Zionist entity launched an aerial assault targeting military sites deep within Iranian territory. Under recycled pretexts — related to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — “Israel” continues its strikes, not only against Tehran, but also against its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
But what’s happening isn’t just “preemptive strikes” as Western media claims — it is the continuation of a long war waged by the United States and “Israel” against the Axis of Resistance, aiming to break the balance of deterrence established by Iran and its allies after years of strategic patience and military development.
America and Israel: One goal behind false slogans
This escalation cannot be separated from direct American direction. The Biden administration, though claiming to seek de-escalation, in practice provides full political, military, and intelligence cover for this aggression.
The goal is clear: to dismantle the Axis of Resistance and deprive Iran of any ability to support its allies — first and foremost, the Palestinian resistance factions.
The U.S. administration knows that Iran’s strength does not lie solely in its nuclear program, but in its presence in the regional equation — from Lebanon to Iraq to Palestine. Therefore, striking Iran means breaking the backbone of the Jerusalem Axis.
What does Gaza and Palestine have to do with this?
Any attack on Iran is, by extension, an attack on Gaza. What is plotted in Tehran reflects immediately in the alleys of Khan Younis and the Jabalia refugee camp. The rockets that overwhelmed the Israeli army during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle would not have reached the resistance without decades of accumulated Iranian support.
Now, the Zionist entity — with American backing — seeks to cut off the lifeline to Palestine and destroy the support network Iran has built for the resistance, whether in weapons, knowledge, or training.
Thus, striking Iran is not separate from the ongoing aggression on Gaza; it is a direct extension of it, and part of the suffocating siege aimed at weakening the Palestinian people’s ability to endure and resist.
The Axis of Resistance: Unity of fronts and a shared fate
The new equation imposed by the Axis of Resistance after the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle — and later the “Al-Aqsa Flood” — has become a nightmare for the enemy: the unity of fronts. No longer is Gaza alone, or the southern suburbs alone, or Sanaa alone.
Hence, the Zionist entity is now trying to preempt any emerging united front by striking at the center — Iran — before a full-scale confrontation erupts that could spell the end of “Israel” as we know it.
Conclusion: The battle continues… and Palestine remains the heart
We are facing a pivotal moment in the history of this struggle. The enemy seeks to paralyze the Axis of Resistance at its strategic core and turn the conflict into a fight for survival. Yet the Axis today is stronger than ever.
Despite the wounds, Gaza remains at the heart of this confrontation. The battle is not just being fought in Iranian territory or over the skies of Lebanon and Syria — it is being fought over the future of Palestine, from the river to the sea.
Therefore, it is the duty of all the free people of the world, and all honest journalists, to speak the truth.
If Israel emerges victorious from its ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of that victory will not be limited to Tehran or the Axis of Resistance alone. Rather, they will extend to impact the entire regional balance of power — with Türkiye’s role at the center of that shift.
An Israeli victory would, in effect, cement its dominance as an unchallengeable military force in the Middle East, fully backed by the United States. This would open the door to a new phase of political interference and pressure, especially against regional powers that still maintain a degree of independent decision-making — chief among them, Türkiye.
Türkiye, which seeks to maintain an independent and balanced role between East and West, and whose interests are intertwined with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, would come under increasing pressure to reposition itself according to Israeli-American terms. It may find itself facing two options: either submit to the new regional equation, or enter an unwanted political — and possibly security — confrontation.
From this perspective, what is happening in Tehran today is not isolated from what could happen in Ankara tomorrow. If Iran falls as an independent regional power, Türkiye may be next in line.
The assault on Iran is an assault on Palestine. Defending Tehran is defending Jerusalem.
This battle has strategic implications not only for the Palestinian cause and the Axis of Resistance against Zionist-American hegemony, but its outcomes will extend across the entire region — particularly affecting major regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.
If Iran stands firm and emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will strengthen the role of these countries in resisting Zionist arrogance and domination. One could even say that such a victory may bring an end to Zionist hegemony over the region and, as a result, weaken American influence as well.
It would allow these countries to become more independent and distant from U.S. control, which seeks to turn the peoples of the region into subjects by dividing them into warring sects and identities. Therefore, solidarity among these countries at this moment is one of the key elements of victory — and a potential beginning of liberation from Zionist-American domination.
Opinion
Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.
However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.
The US Can’t Be Bypassed
China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.
However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.
This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.
For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.
Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.
Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.
Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite
Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.
When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.
Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.
Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.
Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.
The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.
Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.
However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.
Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions
Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.
This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.
All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.
Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.
Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.
This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.
But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.
In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.
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