Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s BRICS Sherpa, told a leading Chinese media Guancha.cn that the expanded BRICS is stronger because its share of global GDP in terms of PPP is much bigger than the G7 (about 35.4% vs 29.6%). “Our share of global manufacturing and global trade is over 25%. That’s highly significant for a small group of countries.”

“Population wise, we account for almost 45% of the global population that’s close to half of the global community.”

Well, it seems that the West has reasons to worry.

The rise of the BRICS nations is often seen as a potential threat to the Western-dominated global order. However, this view is both right and wrong.

BRICS is not a cohesive military or economic bloc, and it is far away from a “Global South” equivalent of NATO or the G7. Instead, without positioning itself as a beacon for the world, BRICS operates as a loose coalition with minor influence on global economic policy compared to the G7 .

Militarily, the cooperation among BRICS is minimal. Put aside Russia’s formidable nuclear arsenal, although Russia, China, and India possess aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, they remain primarily regional powers with limited blue-water capabilities compared to the United States.

Internal divisions of BRICS are also notable. While India and China have recently reduced border tensions, genuine mutual trust remains elusive.

Russia is particularly eager for BRICS to help it circumvent Western sanctions, including through a shared payment system. Yet China and the other BRICS members do not share this level of urgency. And only under the geopolitical pressures of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia raised its willingness to align more closely with China in Central Asia and the Far East.

Countries like Brazil, South Africa, and other new BRICS members are comparatively weaker in terms of national power, particularly in heavy industry, and show no inclination to confront the West.

The West perceives BRICS as a “revisionist force” that seeks to reshape the global order. However, the advocacy for a multipolar world is not an attempt to dismantle the existing system but rather to reform it, aiming for a larger voice in international affairs.

Still, there is some validity to Western concerns.

Today’s international system retains remnants of colonialism, and the West continues to benefit from these “colonial dividends.” Historically, civilizations have risen and fallen in cycles at the regional level, yet Western civilization’s recent ascent coincided with technological advances that enabled global colonization and lasting benefits—“colonial dividends”—that, at one time, appeared to be endless.

Most BRICS countries suffered under colonialism, with Russia as the only exception. Although Russia was a colonial power itself, it ultimately found common ground with developing nations due to longstanding antagonism on racial, cultural, and ideological fronts from the West.

The rise of developing nations has shown that Western people are not inherently superior or more industrious; indeed, all of humanity has the capacity to achieve industrial success.

From a global perspective, the rise of developing nations isn’t a zero-sum game. But for the West, it does mean a loss of relative advantage, eroding the economic structure that has sustained high incomes and potentially leading to an absolute decline in living standards.

For the West, the real issue is that the development of BRICS is a natural outcome—there is little they can do to halt developing nations’ technological progress, aside from causing minor disruptions.

Western criticism of BRICS nations’ political systems, economic models, and human rights practices has achieved little and has only fostered resentment among BRICS elites and citizens. Recognizing BRICS’ unique contributions to global economic recovery and poverty alleviation could offer a more constructive approach.

Because BRICS’ development largely follows a natural course, the West may actually benefit by adopting a more hands-off approach. Distrust and confrontation risk losing cooperative opportunities and breeding greater discontent.

The West should feel fortunate that, despite the scars of colonialism, most patriotic political elites of the developing countries remain rational, seeking to reform the international system rather than demand retribution.

Ultimately, the most wise approach of the West could be accepting its relative decline, as no empire lasts forever. Resisting these historical shifts, they would only find that “the more they do, the more mistakes they make.”

On the morning of 26 October, Israel launched a major three-stage attack against Iran, codenamed ‘Day of Repentance’, in retaliation for the second rocket attack on 1 October. Israel’s Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli air force used hundreds of stealth fighter jets to ‘accurately’ hit Iranian military targets. According to the information gathered, Israeli warplanes targeted Iranian military bases related to air defense, missiles and drones in Tehran, Khuzestan, and Ilam provinces.

Israel later announced the end of the counter-offensive against Iran. The Times of Israel reported that the Israeli government, through a third party, had informed Iran in advance of the targets of the attack and warned it not to respond. This is the first time Israel has carried out an air strike against Iran since its independence, and the fact that it easily defeated Iran’s air defense system shows that Israel has absolute air dominance over Iran, long-range precision strike and large-scale bombing capability. The F-35 stealth fighter is said to have a range of up to 3,500 kilometers at maximum payload.

Iranian official sources said the vast majority of the attacks had been thwarted, causing limited damage, and killing two soldiers. Iran’s First Vice President Ali Reza posted a message on social media saying, ‘Iran’s power has shamed the enemy’. Iranian airspace was immediately opened and civil aviation returned to normal. However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry said it reserved the right to retaliate against the attacks.

Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and Iraq immediately condemned Israel. Jordan also denied allegations that Israeli warplanes had been allowed to fly over it. The United States said it supported Israel’s right to ‘self-defense’ and warned Iran not to retaliate.

In full view of the world, the ‘second stage’ of Israel’s retaliation finally took place, and the severity and scope of the attack was as expected. Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities were not targeted and there were no serious casualties. Almost all Arab countries with diplomatic relations with Israel condemned the attack. Therefore, symbolic reprisals between Iran and Israel are expected to end in the short term.

While the possibility that Israeli stealth warplanes flew through Jordanian and Saudi airspace to carry out the attack cannot be completely ruled out, there is no evidence that the Arab neighbors are aiding Israel in violation of their recent pledges, nor is there evidence that US warplanes in these countries were involved in the attacks.

More importantly, Iran has entered a period of rapprochement with its Arab neighbors, indicating that it wants to avoid further escalation. On the other hand, Iran is leading a united front of Shiite colors, the ‘Axis of Resistance’, continuing its past proxy and shadow wars with Israel. Thus, while the left hand embraces the Arabs, the right hand can create a new normalization process in the conflict with Israel and exhaust Israel with a long-term low-intensity warfare method. Iran, which finds its new and solid relationship with Saudi Arabia particularly valuable, is trying to win back the Arab countries that once distanced themselves from it.

On the 23rd, Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defence, announced that Saudi Arabia had recently conducted joint naval military exercises with Iran and other states in the Gulf of Oman. On the 19th, Iranian media reported that Iran, Oman, and Russia had launched a joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean to which observers from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Thailand had been invited. In addition, the Iranian Student News Agency quoted Iranian Navy Commander Shahram Irani on 21 October as saying: ‘Saudi Arabia has asked to hold joint exercises in the Red Sea’.

The sudden increase in military interaction between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Oman and other Arab neighbours shows that the major powers in the Persian Gulf region are actively seeking cooperation and trying to take control of the situation in an environment where the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continues and there is no hope of a quick resolution. The fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia held joint military exercises for the first time demonstrates the strengthening of strategic trust and interaction following the historic reconciliation brokered by Beijing in March last year. It also underscores the Middle Eastern countries’ quest for independent leadership in regional affairs and their determination to rebuild their geopolitical relationships and security structures. It also increases the likelihood that US efforts to create a ‘Middle Eastern version of NATO’ with Israel and the Gulf Arab states will fail.

Therefore, despite Israel’s large-scale bombing of Iran, Iran is still in an advantageous position and the influence of the superpowers in the region has been revealed. The fact that the two military exercises took place back-to-back and covered a large area of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, as well as the lack of open support for Israel’s air strikes by neighboring countries, indicates that Iran has activated the situation.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s covert efforts to persuade Israel, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s ‘peace efforts’ and ‘diplomatic shuttle’ with Egypt and the Gulf Arab states, appear to have forced Israel to limit its attack targets to Iran’s military installations and to ignore its nuclear and oil facilities. This is fully in line with the expectations of all parties. It should also be noted that this is a period when the interests of the US and Israel are not fully aligned.

The current situation in Iran has improved significantly. In April this year, Iran carried out its first major air strike against Israel, and traditional allies such as the United States and Britain intercepted Iranian missiles and drones with naval and air power. The Arab neighbors between Iran and Israel explicitly or implicitly supported Israel: Jordan was directly involved, deploying its air defense forces and opening its airspace to Israeli warplanes. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates reportedly provided intelligence support to Iran’s rivals.

The military impact of Iran’s initial retaliation against Israel was almost nil. This was due to the fact that Israel was fully prepared, having been warned in advance of the targets to be attacked, and that it chose weak precision-strike weapons systems with long flight times, but it was also clear that American naval and air bases in Arab countries played an important role in the intervention.

By carrying out the first air strike, Iran earned the title of ‘brave’ for a proportionate retaliation in accordance with international law and enhanced the credibility of the ‘axis of resistance’, which included parties such as Syria, the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine (Hamas), Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi militias in Yemen and the ‘Popular Mobilisation Force’ in Iraq. Iran thus consolidated its leading position vis-à-vis Israel but lost the diplomatic battle and found itself at odds with its neighbors. This time, however, Iran has escaped the isolation and distress of the struggle with Israel and has won the sympathy of its Arab neighbors.

The rapprochement between Iran and its Arab neighbors could reduce the shadow cast by Israel’s air strikes. In a recent joint naval exercise, Iran cooperated not only with its traditional post-Cold War ally Russia, but also with Oman, where the US and Britain have military bases, and notably invited its old rival Saudi Arabia as an observer. Most pleasing to Iran was Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement and cooperation, which marked a significant shift. Saudi Arabia announced that it would be a participant in the joint exercise, not an observer, which undoubtedly strengthened Iran’s position and reinforced the two countries’ efforts to implement the ‘Beijing Declaration’ and increase strategic trust and cooperation.

Saudi Arabia has also contributed to the reshaping of the regional security architecture by calling for joint exercises with Iran in the Red Sea, its traditional sphere of influence. This could be a sign of Saudi goodwill towards the pro-Tehran Houthi militias, as well as an opportunity for Tehran to wait for the Houthis to resume ceasefire negotiations that have been stalled for years. If the war in Yemen ends with the withdrawal of coalition forces, it would be a complete victory for the Houthi militias and Iran would emerge as the big winner in the long-running conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea.

In June this year, Iran proposed the establishment of a maritime security cooperation mechanism with Saudi Arabia and other regional countries, with the aim of increasing the security defense independence of countries in the region. The consolidation and expansion of the reconciliation process with Saudi Arabia, followed by joint military exercises with Oman and Saudi Arabia, have taken Iran’s idea of regional maritime collective security a step further and partially expanded the diplomatic initiative.

Iran’s diplomacy has taken a new direction and is linked to Saudi Arabia’s recent rapid diplomatic shift. Israel’s aggressive policy, its refusal to recognize the ceasefire in Gaza and the deep suffering of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples have put enormous internal and external pressure on Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the Arab leader. This is why Saudi Arabia has not only postponed indefinitely negotiations on a military alliance with the United States but has also suspended the normalization of relations with Israel. At the same time, it returned to the principle of ‘peace in exchange for land’ that it had been advocating since 1982 and maintaining for almost half a century, stressing the need to implement the two-state solution and ensure Palestinian independence, and declaring that only in this way would normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations be possible.

In this way, Saudi Arabia is expressing its dissatisfaction with the unilateral US support for Israel and its anger at the ‘Israel kills and the US holds the knife’ model. At the same time, it is trying to show the Palestinians, the Lebanese, and the entire Arab and Islamic world its responsibilities and obligations as a great power. In this respect, Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in a new competition for power peacefully.

Iran, as a non-Arab country of Persian nationality and Shia faith, has raised the banner of Palestinian liberation, leading many non-nation actors to play a new leading role in the Middle East conflicts. This role reversal places Arab countries seeking reconciliation with Israel in a dilemma of “big interests, small morals”, which deeply upsets the political balance of power in the Arab world. This, in turn, has negative consequences for the overall stability and political tradition of the Arab world and has the potential to ultimately undermine the core interests of US allies such as Saudi Arabia.

There are structural conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia, including sectarian, ethnic, political system, national strategy, and foreign policy differences, as well as competition for regional status and Islamic discourse. This has led to strained relations, frequent clashes, and even multiple breaks over the past 40 years. The roots of these conflicts lie not only in internal differences on both sides, but also in the rivalry of external powers during and after the Cold War. More than a decade of violent conflicts, from the ‘Arab Spring’ to the ‘Arab Winter’, further deepened the Iranian-Saudi conflict and brought it to a peak; eventually, both sides, overstretched with their limited forces, sought compromise and peace.

The declining influence of the traditional great powers has made Middle Eastern countries more aware of their own independence and empowerment, enabling Iran and Saudi Arabia to take stock of the situation, completely put aside past hostilities and actively reach out to each other. China’s mediation played an important role in this reconciliation.

By mobilizing the ‘Axis of Resistance’, Iran is launching a ‘sixth Middle East war’, unlike the five previous Middle East wars, confronting Israel on seven fronts. This has significantly shifted Israel’s key rivals, decision-making centers and ‘storm center’ from Cairo and Damascus to Tehran. Strategically, it has elevated Iran’s superpower status in the region and strengthened its geographical influence from the Caspian Sea to the Red Sea. This massive change and transformation have led Saudi Arabia to choose to actively participate in and shape Iran’s reshaping of the geopolitical map rather than passively accept it; in other words, it has decided to sit at the table rather than be the dish on the menu.

In this new Middle East war, which stretches from the eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, although the quite different and even contradictory positions and secret games between Iran and Saudi Arabia on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continue, the two countries have passed the tough tests and wisely managed to avoid confrontation. This has not only preserved reconciliation, cooperation, and stability, but also contributed to deepening strategic trust and increasing positive interaction. This is certainly a welcome sign of optimism for the turbulent Middle East and worthy of support.

However, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the direct cause of Israel’s ‘war on seven fronts’ today. The key to an immediate ceasefire in the ‘sixth Middle East war’, involving large and multinational civil society actors, is to extinguish the flames of conflict in Gaza. Lasting peace and security in the Middle East depend on a fundamental settlement of the territorial disputes between Israel and Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. This requires getting rid of the deep-rooted dreams of a ‘Greater Israel’, the law of the jungle mentality and the belief in the use of force.

Similarly, Iran, a perennial flashpoint, must realize that geopolitics cannot be a source of livelihood, even if decades of complex relations reflect ‘Persian acumen’. Persian acumen’ should seek a win-win situation based on peace that benefits others as well as itself. The pursuit of national interests and the attainment of great power status must be in line with the trend towards peace, development, and prosperity, especially for one’s own people.

Today, while there is a growing tendency among Arab and Islamic countries in the Middle East to live in peace with Israel, Iran clings to the past and refuses to recognize Israel’s existence as a sovereign state, placing it in a tense standoff with the United States and the Western world. This leads to the suffering of its own people due to the prolonged blockade and sanctions, while at the same time increasing the tension of the Middle East conflicts, the fragility of geopolitical relations and the fragmentation of regional governance. As a result, this paves the way for far-right forces in Israel to gain strength and solid popular support. As a result, proposals for ‘peace for land’ and a ‘two-state solution’ have failed to materialize.

Prof. Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specializes in international politics, especially Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Niu Jiarui
Research Assistant, Department of History, Shanghai University

On September 27, 2024, the result of the presidential election of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw Shigeru Ishiba triumph over the frontrunners, including the favored candidate, Sanae Takaichi, securing the majority of votes in the second round to become the 28th President of the LDP. Under Japan’s parliamentary system, the leader of the ruling party is invariably the Prime Minister. Consequently, on October 1, following the resignation of the Kishida Cabinet, Ishiba was elected by the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in a joint session, garnering over 50% of the votes, thus officially assuming the role of the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan.

Who is Shigeru Ishiba? Once labeled by the media as a ‘pro-China’ figure, claiming that ‘China poses zero threat to Japan,’ Ishiba has long been known within the LDP as a ‘lone wolf,’ often at odds with various factions within the party, yet he managed a stunning reversal in the polls. Recently, during his campaign, he proposed the establishment of an Asian version of NATO, demanding equal status with the United States, demonstrating a hawkish stance. The question remains whether Ishiba’s leadership will bring new changes to Japanese politics and how it will affect Japan’s relations with China and the United States.

Will his tenure be groundbreaking or ephemeral? The coordination and protection of forces within and outside the party are key.

Ishiba’s election is seen as a result of the machinations of power brokers and factional politics within the LDP. In 2008, Ishiba’s first attempt at running for the LDP presidency ended in defeat by former Prime Minister Taro Aso. In the 2012, 2018, and 2020 elections, he faced similar failures, largely due to his poor relations within the party, often clashing with sitting prime ministers and causing political divisions, leading to his repeated losses in intra-party elections.

In this year’s election, Ishiba won the presidency with a narrow margin of 215 to Takaichi’s 194. Two factors contributed to this outcome: firstly, Takaichi’s radical policies raised concerns among conservative members within the LDP, and secondly, several key ‘kingmakers,’ such as former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, former LDP President Fumio Kishida, and former Prime Minister Taro Aso, all endorsed candidates in the second round. After the initial round, except for Aso’s faction, most of the previously undecided factional votes flowed towards Ishiba. This shift was not only due to Ishiba’s political promises to regain the trust of his peers but also a calculated move by factional leaders to test the waters with a potentially reformist figure within the party. Despite the claim of a faction-free election, the reality is that the election was still influenced by factional politics, and Ishiba’s victory may be a trial by the factions to see if he can lead the LDP out of its current doldrums and restore public confidence. The factions remain cautiously optimistic.

On October 1st, the list of cabinet members was also announced, reflecting the compromises and concessions made by the politically weak Ishiba to various forces.

Japanese politics is essentially about interpersonal relationships, emphasizing the exchange of power and the balance of factional power. Maintaining harmony within the party requires a delicate balance of power and relationships among factions. The new cabinet lineup, which includes one member from the Kishida faction (Kochikai), two from the Aso faction (Wakate Kyokai), one from the Motegi faction (Heisei Kenkyukai), one from the Ishiba faction (Suigetsu-kai), two from the old Nishimura faction, one from the old Hayashi faction, one member from the Komeito, and 11 unaffiliated members, demonstrates a balance between experience and fresh blood, factional equilibrium, cross-factional cooperation, gender and age diversity. This reflects Ishiba’s effort to seek balance in the new cabinet.

Although Ishiba has been cautious and conservative in his actions to avoid conflicts with various parties, his position as Prime Minister remains precarious.

Recently, Ishiba has been accused of potential financial misconduct within his faction, the Suigetsu-kai, involving unaccounted-for political funds. Based on public opinion, such revelations at this time are likely to be recognized as the result of threats or hints from within the party or external forces, signaling to Ishiba to stay within his bounds.

Regardless, the new Prime Minister is immediately facing the risk of a political scandal, which could adversely affect the LDP’s upcoming House of Representatives election. Initially, the Ishiba Cabinet’s approval rating was only 51%, the lowest since 2001. It remains to be seen whether this support rate can be maintained above 50%. Whether the unstable governance can be put on the right track depends on various factors. Given the fragile position of the Ishiba administration, his policies and political direction may be determined by the party’s leadership. How Ishiba balances various forces and successfully fulfills his role as Prime Minister remains to be seen.

A Quest for Equivalence with the United States? Ishiba’s Grand Strategy May Be Difficult to Realize

Japan has long sought military self-defense and strategic protection.

Since the 1951 signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan has maintained a high degree of unity with the United States in military strategy. Alongside the external cooperation formed by the U.S. military presence and Japan’s strategic use of land, Japan has established an internal strategy to expand the scope and responsibilities of its Self-Defense Forces, while also seeking to amend the Constitution’s Article 9, which renounces war. These have long been consistent political goals of the LDP and other conservative parties.

Since the 21st century, leaders such as Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Fukuda Yasuo, and Shinzo Abe have prioritized military strength as part of their policy platforms, actively promoting the revision of defense guidelines and constitutional reform. Ishiba has also taken a hawkish stance in the field of military security, advocating for the establishment of an ‘Asian version of NATO’ during his campaign and emphasizing the importance of a basic national security law and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.

What is Asian version of NATO? As the name suggests, it aims to establish a military organization or alliance in Asia, similar to NATO in Europe, involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and other Asia-Pacific countries, with rights and obligations of mutual military cooperation . Ishiba argued, ‘Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Asia… Asia lacks a collective self-defense system like NATO, and thus has no mutual defense obligations, making it prone to war… the establishment of Asian version of NATO is indispensable.’ He emphasized that geopolitical tensions are the principal rationale behind this proposal. Concurrently, Shigeru Ishiba underscores the notion that ‘Japan is a sovereign and independent nation,’ perceiving the current Japan-U.S. relationship as inherently ‘asymmetrical.’ The advocacy for an Asian version of NATO, rooted in the discourse of regional threats, aims to augment Japan’s military standing in East Asia. It seeks to establish a dialogue mechanism of equal standing between Japan and the U.S. and extend Japan’s military strategic reach into North America, thereby augmenting Japan’s strategic influence on the global stage.

However, the reality is that there are many obstacles to the establishment of the Asian version of NATO. Due to the different relationships with China and the cultural and institutional differences between Asian countries and Europe, the NATO model is difficult to replicate in Asia.

Firstly, ASEAN countries oppose it. The Jakarta Post, as the official newspaper of Indonesia, stated that ASEAN is not interested in Japan’s ‘Asian NATO’ proposal, as this alliance is seen as an affront, as participating in such a military alliance would only escalate regional tensions. ASEAN emphasizes the establishment of a multilateral framework centered on economic benefits, which is inconsistent with Japan’s focus on military competition in East Asia, revealing Japan’s intentions for military strength in the Asian NATO proposal.

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also clearly expressed India’s negative response. He emphasized that India has a unique historical background and diplomatic strategy and does not intend to become part of any military alliance, nor will it follow the practices of other countries. This statement sends a direct and clear message to the new Japanese Prime Minister that India seeks autonomy and independence in security and strategic cooperation and is unwilling to participate in the construction of a regional military group similar to NATO.

At the same time, the pursuit of an equal position with the United States in Asian  NATO will inevitably face opposition from the United States. The concept of an Asian NATO with Japan advocating for ‘leadership under the United States and Japan’ and ‘parity with the U.S. in military terms’ is fraught with challenges, and Ishiba also stated that ‘elevating the Japan-U.S. alliance to the level of the U.S.-U.K. alliance is my mission.’ U.S. officials responsible for East Asian and Pacific affairs stated that Ishiba’s proposal to ‘establish a more formal institution’ is not yet ripe, and the United States prefers to optimize the existing cooperation framework rather than seek the creation of a new closed military alliance.

Therefore, they all have issued a warning to Ishiba, greatly extinguishing the flames of Ishiba’s Asian NATO ambitions, and the United States and ASEAN’s refusal to Japan’s proposed regional military alliance makes the strategic blueprint of Asian NATO difficult to implement.

Is Ishiba a ‘pro-China faction’ within the LDP? Ishiba’s stance on China after taking office still requires cautious observation.

Before becoming Prime Minister, Ishiba showed a ‘pro-China’ signal during his time in governance. As a Christian who empathizes with the weak, Ishiba demonstrated a rare stance on China-Japanese historical issues, acknowledging that ‘Japan should reflect on and apologize for the war,’ stating that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of that war. Compared to the Japanese right-wing politicians who always beautify historical facts and refuse to admit the aggression of war, Ishiba’s stance within the LDP is quite pro-China, and he has long been considered by the Japanese media as a member of the ‘pro-China faction’ within the party. On the issue of China, Ishiba has emphasized that China is not a threat to Japan and has recently stressed the importance of dialogue and exchange to continuously advance strategic reciprocal relations with China.

However, as the leader of Japan, will Ishiba adhere to the political stance of his youth after taking office? On the one hand, Ishiba’s repeated appearances in the election have focused on achieving ‘Asian NATO’ as his governing goal. The establishment of a military alliance inevitably requires creating an imaginary enemy—is it China or North Korea? In this case, will China-Japanese relations deteriorate due to Japan’s military extremism? On the other hand, his demand to station U.S. troops in Guam and establish a security dialogue with the United States on an equal footing has been clearly rejected by the United States. ‘The strategy of competing with the United States’ must be implemented, does this mean that Japan’s strategy will shift, and through strengthening cooperation with China, will it achieve its cunning goals?

Japan’s security has always relied on external support. And Japan, which has long maintained a unified front with the United States, if seeking external parity with the United States, must rely on the interests and strategic support of opposing forces to maintain a close but independent alliance distance. However, in reality, Japan cannot achieve such ambitions at present. As mentioned above, the domestic situation in Japan is unstable, and the external strategy is blocked. Ishiba’s goal of Asian NATO is difficult to achieve breakthrough progress in his three-year term. Looking at the domestic situation, such as the LDP’s financial reform, the upcoming House of Representatives election, the disaster relief in Noto, and the adjustment of the economic market deflation… Japan’s domestic political ruins are in urgent need of repair, leaving Ishiba’s cabinet with little room to develop overseas forces. Therefore, on the external stance, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not loudly proclaimed the strategic shift of Japan after the prime minister’s change, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwao Tsukuda also stated that Asian NATO should be ‘carefully considered.’

Ishiba’s softened diplomatic stance after taking office shows such a conservative handling logic: Japan’s comprehensive alliance relationship with the United States will not change, and Japan’s consistent strategy towards China will not change because of the promotion of security system expansion. Domestic affairs are prioritized over foreign affairs, and the opportunity-based security competition under the threat of the region will be temporarily shelved, with continuous planning and covert operations in the future. Faced with the situation in the East, Japan’s current statements are more conservative, avoiding focal disputes with China and the United States, while focusing on the adjustment of domestic affairs and easing diplomatic pressure. Especially for China-Japanese relations, it is also stated that ‘although there are various unresolved issues,’ there is a desire to build a constructive and stable relationship through strengthened dialogue. Therefore, whether the Japan-U.S. relationship will enter an ‘adrift’ era, or whether the hawkish stance will be implemented to the end, maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance’s security network against China and North Korea, we cannot generalize.

Ishiba’s policy declaration behind shows Japan’s sensitivity to changes in the East Asian geopolitical landscape and the country’s anxiety about Japan’s progress, which is a struggle against the current. Under the competition of China and the United States, the Ishiba cabinet chooses diplomatic compromise, prioritizing domestic affairs, which is the consideration of Ishiba’s timing and also the inevitable result of Japan’s political environment. In such diplomatic deployment, Japan-U.S. relations and Japan-China relations will not change significantly in the future, and the direction of Japan will have to wait and see Ishiba’s future governance performance.