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INTERVIEW

‘Europe will become completely dependent on the US’

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The financial crisis of 2008-9, hyper-financialisation, the war in Ukraine, the economic sanctions against Russia, the rise of the BRICS and the idea that Western civilisation is in ‘decline’… All these are interconnected, and the neo-mercantilist tendencies rising in the US and Europe are both a reaction to and a consequence of all these processes.

The Norwegian political scientist and commentator Glenn Diesen argues in his books and speeches that the political and economic liberal ideas on which Western civilisation was founded are undermining it. According to him, it is essential to strike a balance between traditional values and social ideas and the requirements of modern society, and today’s Russia is moving in this direction and is emerging as the protector of ‘European civilisation’. Western conservatives, who see Russia as a natural ally in this struggle, also want to assert themselves against declining liberalism by returning to traditional Europe.

In your book The Decay of Western Civilisation and Resurgence of Russia (2019) you claim that the internal contradictions within liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism shake the foundation of Western civilisation. It sounds a bit like Spenglerian ‘decline of the West.’ Do you think there are similarities between Spenglerian analysis of the Western civilization and yours? Do we live again in a interwar-period-like situation?

Well, yes and no. I do side Spengler actually, but he is not unique in this sense. If we address most of the scholars who look on civilizations, they all tend to, more or less, reach the same conclusion, which is, civilizations end up destroying themselves, often in their excesses. They would exhaust fundamental culture at their core. I do actually side Spengler, but the collapse of the West is perhaps too much. But I think that all after the world order which has been built up around the West, a lot of the key ideas I think have begun to exhaust themselves.

If we look at, for example, political liberalism, with origin from the French Revolution. Remember, there were three slogans: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity or Brotherhood. Now, we tend to build a lot around political liberalism in terms of almost radical individualism. But what we forget is that the third part of the slogan, which is Brotherhood. I think that this is a reference to the unity of society. This is a kind of fundamental of sociology which is that we have to find a balance between the individual and the group. Once you have radical individualism, it begins to tear away at the common group identity, and eventually, it will fragment the group.

It is not just political liberalism I do see some weaknesses, but also economic liberalism. Again, this has been a challenge since the industrial revolution when capitalism was introduced. We always recognize that unfettered markets are deeply problematic because society becomes an appendage to the market in which the traditional community weakens severely. There has been a recognition since 1945 this had to be addressed, that some of the uglier sides of capitalism had to be contained. We had a kind of different form of capitalism until the 1970s and the 1980s in which there was a revert back to the unfettered markets in response to the stagnation of the 70s. And I also point out that a lot of these had been reversed after the Cold War. But I think there was an ideological hubris, the assumption that markets could do everything. These were excesses of liberalism in which both the economic and the political which failed to look at social cohesion. And I think this is what creates a lot of civilizational decay.

Another common aspect which is seen by scholars on civilizations is pointing out that civilizations are a bit like stars. They seem to shine the brightest when they are already dying. This is what we learn back from the Roman Empire as well. When it was at its height, there were a lot of excesses, a lot of self-indulgence which covered up decadence already set in. So yes, that’s one of the themes of the book. I do see this being a key problem.

You depict an international system in which a state needs a balancing act between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft to compete with others. The more markets get global and the state gets smaller, there is an urgent need for a broader state intervention. Do you think recent re-industrialisation and neo-mercantilism debate in the USA and using the so-called Chinese and Russian threat to the West are examples of this oscillation?

I think the return to neomercantilism is simply a reflection of the international distribution of economic power. Because, historically, we see that liberal economic systems evolve or develop when there’s a clear hegemony such as Britain in the 19th century or when the US took over in the 20th century. Under such conditions, the hegemon has an interest in creating trust. Because once there is trust in the international system, countries would not seek to control everything themselves, they would expect more integration, more open borders. And there is an interest for economic hegemon to support this when they are the most powerful.

So, again, with Britain and the US, they embraced liberal economics when they controlled the leading technologies. This is important because it is very ideal to have free markets if you are the economically dominant power. Because, you have the mature industries which are defined by low cost and high quality. And if you compete against the infant markets, the rest of the world, which are defined by low quality and high prices, open markets or unfettered markets and free trade would fill up the demands in other countries.

For example, when the British embraced free markets by repealing the Corn Laws, they were very open in the parliament, saying “Listen, this is great. The rest of the world would be like colonies to us, because they cannot compete against us on the free markets, they depend on us for manufactured goods, and they can do the rest.” This was the same with the United States.

So, there is an incentive to embrace free trade once you are the dominant hegemon. They will use your technologies, they will trust your control over the maritime sea corridors, they will use your banks and currency, so there is an interest in trust.

However, what we always see is new centers of power emerging. This is when the hegemon gets into a dilemma. Would you allow if you were the US, new powers to rise which can challenge the authority, like China? No. At this point, you have to weaken the rise of adversaries. You have to undermine its ability to develop its technological autonomy. You want to threaten its reliance on transportation corridors, undermine its access to the international reserve currency, banks, etc. Not just China, but of course, Russia as well for that sake.

But the problem is once the US begins to weaponize its administrative control over the international economy, it only increases incentives for other countries to decouple. And I guess that’s what we see now. Even the friends of America, be it Turkey or India, would also be punished by the US if they do not follow the unilateral sanctions of the US. The more the US weaponizes its control, the more you will see countries have incentive to move away from it. And I think that’s one of the things we have really seen in this, for example, that not just Russia is being sanctioned, but anyone can have their bank accounts taken away.

So I see liberal economics has been in decline, and when the hegemon goes away we tend to return to neomercantilism in which we reduce our dependence on others, we seek our own currencies, our own technological sovereignty. This is not necessarily a positive thing, as many conflicts can emerge. However, this is where the interests of states line.

So you think that the Biden Administration or who comes next would pursue the same policies against China and Russia.

Yes, I don’t think it matters who sits in the White House. Keep in mind when Trump unleashed all of these economic wars against China, Biden, Clinton, they all said “What is he doing? This is a Cold War.” However, after Trump went out, you have Hillary Clinton writing articles in Foreign Affairs, saying “We need powerful industrial policies,” which is neomercantilism. You take the government to fund your technological advancements, you use your economic resources, align it with state power to weaken adversaries. So, they follow the exact same policies. Whoever comes after Biden, they will do the same.

This is not necessarily in America’s interest. Because they currently are in a dilemma: they can either try to hold on to this unipolar order, even though there are now multipolar realities which they have to address, bu if they try to cling onto this, by preventing the rise of other powers, they would become so abusive, they would only incentivize the rest of the world to do it more, to diversify quicker.

In my opinion, the best policy for the US is to help to facilitate a multipolar system where they have a privileged position, instead of trying to fight it. Because once they fight it, they would see a multipolar world emerging which is in opposition to the US. You see that now with BRICS. They are very specific. They want to stop reliance on the US dollar. All see kind of a common threat from America. This is not what you want. You want to have a multipolar system emerging where the other actors may balance each other, and leave you alone, that is, the United States. They are not doing this at the moment. In my opinion, they do not pursue the ideal policy for the US. 

Let me ask about the BRICS summit. Can an enlarging BRICS bloc cope with G7 and NATO?

Yes, I think so. Simply because they tend to follow the same policies which the Americans tried to weaken the British hegemony. Keep in mind that when the British were dominant, especially in the early 1800’s, the Americans developed what they called the American system. They had three main pillars: They said we need a manufacturing industry; we need our own more efficient transportation corridors, roads, and ports; and ofcourse, you have to own your national bank.

We see these same things now coming from China which is obviously leading. First, they seek a very ambitious industrial policy to take the technological leadership in most of the new technologies associated with the fourth industrial revolution. We also see that they are pouring trillions of dollars into the Belt and Road Initiative for physical connectivity, new transportation corridors which are not vulnerable to the US pressure. And, the third is the financial aspect, which is the development of the new national banks, or the new development banks, diversifying away from the US dollar as a currency, but also setting up new payment systems, not being dependent on SWIFT, which can be used as a weapon by the US. So, they are already doing this.

I think that the BRICS becomes an institution to further build on these ideas, that is, brings together the huge amount of the countries which control a lot of the national resources of the world, the populations of the world, lots of the trade. They can set up their own transportation corridors, their own banks, and new technological hubs to cooperate with each other. There is a lot of potential. And I think this is the objective. I would not frame it as an alliance in the same way as the G7, because the G7 works together for a collective hegemony of the West under the US leadership. I think the BRICS is something different. They are facilitating multipolarity which means it does not have to have one dominant power. That is also obvious by the fact that the members they took in. For example, Saudis and Iran are not best of friends. But it is a way of resolving differences, instead of necessarily being dependent on a third party. So I think the BRICS has a lot of potential addressing a real demand which is that we have a unipolar world order developed over the past 30 years which no longer reflects the actual realities that the world has already become multipolar. So we need institutions which reflect this current reality. The Americans will not reform, hence you see parallel institutions appearing to facilitate this transition.

Let me ask you about the Ukrainian War. Why are European governments aligned with the USA on the Ukrainian issue even if European industrial interest contradict with breaking off with Russia? How can this war end? Has the Ukrainian army a chance to win this war?

No, I don’t think so. If we look at the front line, this is a war of attrition which is inaccurately being interpreted too much by territory, but it is a war of attrition which means you seek to exhaust the adversary. If you look at the causality ratios on the front line, the Ukrainian side is suffering greatly. 

What we see now is the Ukrainian army is exhausting itself, and the Russians are building up a powerful force in their rear. But Ukraine is also in preparation of a possible war with NATO if it enters the war directly. There are many considerations. But for this reason, there is a necessity for the Russians to hold back a bit as well.

If you just look at the math of it, the attrition rates, with every Russian soldier wounded or killed you have eight on the Ukrainian side. Most casualties in this war are caused by artillery. The Russians have eight to ten times more artillery, we see now eight to ten attrition ratio. So, I don’t see them winning it. Also I see the West having run out of their weapon storage. And also, war fatigue is setting in. The people become less interest in this.

I think that Europe is betting full on this world order based on unipolarity and the endurance of the American hegemony. I think at the beginning of this, the Americans sold to the Europeans this: “We give weapons to Ukranians, we put sanctions on the Russians, by the end of the week the Russian economy will implode, and we will reassert our authority in the international system.There will be no multipolarity.” I think if the Europeans knew what we were getting into at the beginning, we would have been more cautious. Because, what we see now is huge economic problems in Europe, the deindustrialization of Germany. I guess it is very predictable what was going to happen in Europe because we decided to maintain these dividing lines in Europe after the Cold War, and move them closer to Russia which sparked this war. The problem is Europe will be weakened, exhaust itself more, which is bad for both the Europeans and the Russians. Because now, the Europeans will have to withdraw under a bit more US protection, and we already have seen this, they have become more dependent on US security. This means that the Americans have more leverage over the Europeans. Now, they are converting this security dependence into economic loyalties. They told the Europeans to cut themselves off the Russians. Now they are pressuring the Europeans to cut themselves off the Chinese.

What is going to happen with Europe? They are going to be completely dependent on the US which means all these dreams about sovereign autonomy or European independence are gone.

Meanwhile, Russia has other problems as well. It ideally wants to diversify its partnerships, wants to have as many partners as possible so it would not be excessively dependent on anyone. But now, they would be much more dependent on China than they were initially hoping. Still, China is Russia’s most important partner, so they will try to figure this out.

Overall, divided Europe is weakened, it would be more dependent, either on the USA, or on China.

You think that Russia is now balancing two mutually contradictory necessities, namely, ‘irrational’ traditional community and ‘rational’ complex society which mean that it is positioning itself as the defender of European civilisation, contrary to the revolutionary Soviet experiment. Do you suggest that an alliance between ‘populism’ in Europe and Russia can reverse the decline of the West?

I think that having a militarized dividing line in Europe will definitely weaken it, will make this continent into a new Middle East, where great powers use them, and become effectively a chessboard. That is what we already saw with Ukraine. And that problem in Ukraine will spread across Europe.

Russia has its own social problems. Russia is definitely heading towards more conservative stands for many reasons. The key problem with Russian history is it has been a very divided country. It used to live for hundreds of years of Mongol yoke. And then Muscovy. In the 1700s, they reinvented Russia as a European country. They divorced themselves from their own past, changed the alphabet, and the way we dress, we look, we talk. Everything. This splitted Russia in two. You have two ideas about what Russia is. And the Bolshevik Revolution. Now you have the idea of a communist Russia. Then you have the 1990s, the idea of a liberal Russia.

The problem is, once you have such a divided country, you don’t work with your opponents, you seek to crush them. This is not good for democracy, not good for internal cohesion. And you are very vulnerable to having foreign powers to exploit the internal divisions, obviously in the West we attempt to do so. Russia is pursuing this new conservative path in which it seeks to unify the past 1000 years of Russian history.

So effectively doing what Dostoyevsky argued in the 1800s: all these different parts of Russian history are parts of the same Russia. Russia will be European, it will be Eurasian, it will have a socialist past, it has some liberalism. So Russia will largely reject what they consider to be the excesses of liberalism in the West. Because in the West we have a different problem which is why the Russians somewhat compare it to the Bolshevik Revolution in which we are divorcing ourselves from our own past as well.

The liberal nation-state was a very powerful vessel. It was based on the group. Culture, language, all of this clearly create internal cohesion in the group. But at the same time, on this you build on individualism, individual freedom, something that made a very stable and also progressive. But over the past few years, in the West, many people are worried that individualism or liberalism effectively decoupled itself from the nation-states. “We don’t need national culture, we are multicultural. We don’t need secularism, dividing state and church is not enough, we need to have a radical secularism which we essentially pressure the church out of society altogether. So, a lot of these things cause a lot of division.

What I have said about the possible alignment between Russia and Western conservatives, which I think you can already if you look at especially the American conservatives, be it Trump or Tucker Carlson. Maybe to a lesser extent [Viktor] Orban of Hungary as well. They see this conservative Russia as dealing with the similar challenges as we do. Because after the Cold War, we decided not to unify Europe, but instead redivided it. New dividing line is not communism vs. capitalism, but liberalism vs. authoritarianism. This made Russia our main adversary. Conservatives effectively see Russia as being a conservative state. This changes the divisions altogether. Because if the conflict is between liberalism and conservatism, Russia goes from being our main adversary to a key ally. So, I think that on the ideological basis you see many conservatives now have a common cause with the Russians.

But also beyond this, it is just common sense that the 1990s is over. Any aspirational hegemony has been exhausted. There is a recognition that we have to come to terms with reality. And that reality is, the idea that you can just expand NATO up to the Russian border and this is going to be the recipe for stability is simply not going to happen. So, I think that a lot of things are dividing the West at the moment from this perspective.

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INTERVIEW

German economist: Militarization of industry is a path to disaster

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1 month ago

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17/02/2025

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Lucas Zeise, a German economist and co-founder of Financial Times Deutschland, shared his views on the militarization of industry in a recent interview. Zeise said, “If more and more is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of the road to disaster.”

Born in 1944, Lucas Zeise is a financial journalist with a background in philosophy and economics. His career includes positions with the Japanese Ministry of Economics, the German aluminum industry, the Frankfurt-based Börsen-Zeitung, and the Financial Times Deutschland, which he co-founded. Until 2017, he served as editor-in-chief of UZ, the weekly newspaper of the German Communist Party (DKP). He currently writes a regular column for Junge Welt and contributes articles to various publications.

Lucas Zeise answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions about the debate on German industry and economy and global developments.

Tunç Akkoç: First of all, is deindustrialization a reality?

Lucas Zeise: Yes, I think so, but of course it is a long-lasting reality. Deindustrialization is a process that coincides with capitalist development in general. Industry has been the main surplus-value-producing element of capitalism in all countries, and in some of the more developed countries, notably Britain, deindustrialization has reached a more advanced level. Since Britain was the first fully developed capitalist country, this process started earlier.

Economists often refer to this process as the tertiary sector, i.e. the service sector in general. In capitalist countries, the share of services in the economy is steadily increasing. This is a general trend that can be observed everywhere, and is particularly related to the fact that developed countries are gradually shifting their industries to other regions, especially South-East Asia, by exporting capital. While industrialization is taking place in these regions, the process of deindustrialization in developed countries has accelerated.

In addition, the process of financialization has also accelerated and the financial sector has become stronger. However, the finance sector is a service sector, not an industry. Nevertheless, all these service sectors depend on industry remaining strong. When we analyze the UK, we can see that the country has experienced a relative decline compared to other regions. For example, Germany had overtaken the UK in the industrialization process and even surpassed it before the First World War. Likewise, the US has also overtaken the UK in terms of industrialization.

This is a long-term trend. However, two major industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, have managed to resist this process for a long time. The recent economic shocks, however, have accelerated Germany’s deindustrialization process, which has brought about an inevitable crisis. This is the essence of the whole issue.

Tunç Akkoç: Some influential figures in the European Union, such as Mario Draghi, have argued that Germany should move away from the car industry and invest in new technologies such as artificial intelligence. What do you think about such proposals for structural change?

Lucas Zeise: I think such proposals for structural change will happen spontaneously on the one hand. I mean, this process is already going on naturally. China has already overtaken Germany in the car industry. Therefore, Mario Draghi’s advice on this issue is actually a cheap suggestion. It is easy to suggest something like this and then say ‘Great job!'”

On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to steer the economy in this way. It is not enough to say, ‘OK, now we are investing heavily in artificial intelligence and we will get ahead in this field.’ Moreover, it is debatable whether artificial intelligence is really a great revolution or just a passing fad. Artificial intelligence can actually be considered as a sub-branch of the semiconductor industry, i.e. microelectronics.

Of course, the development of microelectronics is important and all countries are making state-sponsored investments in this field. The European Union and Germany are already encouraging this. However, this is not something that is unique to Germany or something that makes Germany different from others. While it is possible to make great progress in this area, this alone is not the final solution to a problem.

Tunç Akkoç: In general, how do you assess Germany’s future energy supply strategy?

Lucas Zeise: Obviously, I am not an expert in this field, so it is difficult for me to give a really good assessment. But it seems very clear to me that all states have to pay attention to such a central sector of the economy.

Germany was already in a different position in that it did not have its own oil companies. This has become a historical tradition. As for natural gas, there used to be two big centers: one centered around BASF, the other around Ruhrgas. These two structures were interconnected and worked well for a while. Over time, however, this system changed and other areas of the energy sector, especially electricity generation, were restructured.

However, this does not change the fact that the energy sector must be guided by the state. Energy policy should be managed by the state in a holistic manner. Developing a common energy policy in the European Union already seems unlikely. However, such a policy should have been mandatory for such a large common market.

At this point, if we look at the example of Turkey, the energy sector there is handled, managed and coordinated in a relatively centralized manner. In Germany, and at the EU level in general, there is a major deficiency in this respect. The state does not really take enough ownership of the energy issue.

Tunç Akkoç: On the other hand, German industry is increasingly turning to the defense industry. Some see in the militarization of the economy the potential for a kind of ‘re-industrialization’. After the war in Ukraine, more and more German companies are breaking the taboo on supplying the defense industry and entering the military equipment sector. How should we assess this development?

Lucas Zeise: On the one hand, this is clearly a sign of the collapse of the still developing and relatively well-functioning global economy. If more and more of it is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this activity is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of a road to disaster.

It is also clear that there is competition for the best defense tenders in the international arena. That is why everyone feels that it needs to enter this field strongly. Nobody just wants to buy aircraft from the US, but wants to build their own defense industry. Germany was already taking part in this process. Although not always at the forefront, tank production in particular has long been strong. This sector was progressing steadily, albeit at a slow pace.

However, this development seems to herald an impending catastrophe. It shows that everyone is preparing for war. This is very similar to the atmosphere before the First World War.

Tunç Akkoç: Elections are approaching in Germany. Do you think that after these elections, Germany’s economic policies will change with a new political order?

Lucas Zeise: More likely no, I don’t think so. I think that economic issues have become a bit more prominent, but if we look back, I remember that in the German Bundestag elections in 1969, one of the main debates in the election campaign was whether the German Mark (D-Mark) should appreciate against the US Dollar. So, a very specific and economically critical issue for Germany at that time was at the center of the election campaign. This debate was directly related to the position Germany should take vis-à-vis the US and Europe.

Today such a debate is missing. The issues that really need to be addressed —energy policy, deindustrialization— are being dealt with in a strangely distorted way. The only thing that everyone seems to agree on is the Agenda 2010 program that Gerhard Schröder launched in 2002 or 2003. This program meant lowering wages, reducing social benefits and increasing profit-making opportunities for companies.

But this approach was already wrong at the time. Schröder’s move enabled some big companies to make a big leap forward and strengthened German capital, especially in the European domestic market. This had certain advantages, but repeating it now would only worsen the situation.

That’s why I think the debate is being conducted in the wrong way and not particularly along party lines. On the contrary, there seems to be a consensus among most political actors on this issue.

Tunç Akkoç: How do you assess the first actions of the Trump administration and what will be the impact on international relations and the global economy?

Lucas Zeise: In my opinion, there is not a new wave of deregulation (liberalization). The US government’s more aggressive stance towards other great powers, or as Trump calls them, ‘shitholes’, or small states, ruthlessly suppressing and crushing them, is not deregulation. It is, in fact, a further intensification of the rivalry between the capitalist states, which are essentially allies, by any means necessary. We can see this situation clearly.

This is not deregulation; it is more like what happened during the Ronald Reagan era. At that time, the US tried to revitalize its rivalry, not with China, but especially with Japan and Western Europe. Reagan’s ruthless behavior towards his own allies was aimed at strengthening the US global position. Today, I think it has become even harsher, so much so that the President of the US can stand up and say, ‘Oh Denmark, you have to give us Greenland, or else we will buy it.’ They even imply that they can intervene directly if necessary.

This kind of behavior is actually a continuation of the past US policies towards Panama. Panama was detached from Colombia and made independent because the US wanted to build a canal there. In other words, this imperialist behavior towards weak countries is already a tradition. But the behavior towards medium-sized states such as Germany, Britain, France or Japan is becoming more and more brutal. I see this as the result of an intensifying and ever more bitter rivalry.

The US in particular is less and less reluctant to use its military power more recklessly, and this is becoming more and more prominent. This is not a new era; it is a further advance of neoliberalism and laissez-faire. The so-called ‘rules-based economic policy’ rhetoric has been completely discarded.

Tunç Akkoç: We see both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic comments about the Chinese economy. When government bonds lose value, pessimists sound the alarm; when exports break records, optimists raise their voices. Does China have the intention or the power to ‘share’ the world with the US?

Lucas Zeise: I completely agree with you; the overly optimistic comments are as exaggerated as the overly pessimistic ones. If I try to think from the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders, their tradition has been to position China as the largest economic power and to take the first place in the capitalist world.

In the present situation, if I am the second most powerful country, naturally my goal is to equalize with the first. And I have to do this because there is almost no scenario in which the US will accept this and say, ‘OK, we can live in peace with China.’ For a while it seemed as if there was this understanding, that we were working well with China and we were happy with that. But this is clearly no longer possible.

The official US policy is based on not allowing China to become an equal power. They want to continue to set the rules and, if necessary, to violate them according to their own interests. Therefore, China is forced to act like an imperial power.

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INTERVIEW

Head of Roscongress: Local currencies are used to bypass sanctions

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1 month ago

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16/02/2025

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Alexander Stuglev, the Head of  Roscongress Foundation, spoke to Harici: “For easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS can be used.”

With the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow has increasingly turned to business diplomacy and international trade cooperation as strategic tools to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. Central to this effort is Roscongress Foundation, Russia’s premier organization for fostering global economic dialogue and partnerships. Established to enhance Russia’s business ties internationally, Roscongress serves as a bridge connecting Russian enterprises with global markets through high-profile forums such as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). The organization plays a critical role in reshaping Russia’s economic development by emphasizing collaboration with emerging economies, strengthening ties with traditional partners, and exploring new trade opportunities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Roscongress was organized a meeting in Istanbul and Alexander Stuglev, the Head of  Roscongress Foundation, replied the questions of Harici.

As we understand, Roscongress is the main tool for business diplomacy and to eliminate the impacts of Western sanctions. Can you tell us more about the organization?

Yes, you have noticed correctly, Roscongress was established in 2007 as a non-financial development institution that deals with the organization and holding of major international economic and political events in Russia in the interests of attracting investments to the Russian Federation and developing the economy of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, while organizing events we, of course, proceed from the fact that in addition to interaction between Russia and businessmen from a particular country, direct connections can also be established with third countries, that we are also welcoming.

Could you tell us more about the opportunities and risks you see in Turkish-Russian relations in business sector?

Undoubtedly, to some extent, sanctions affect the development of Russian-Turkish relations and, in general, business relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, today, all those who use these turbulences in a pragmatic way to build their business projects in Russia are winning, occupying the vacated niches from Western countries, developing their own business. And from the point of view of easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) can be used.

First of all, there are always risks out there, marketing risks included. Secondly, in addition to the fact that Turkish companies have occupied the niches vacated by Western companies, we see a general change in the structure of the Russian economy with a greater focus on creating products and services within Russia.

Tourism for example; the number of tourist trips that have now emerged in Russia is many times higher than there were before COVID, about 83 million trips are made by Russian citizens annually within Russia.  And this requires the infrastructure development.

Taking into account the large number of support programs from the Russian state for companies that are developing tourism infrastructure, there are great chances, for foreign companies as well, if they organize a Russian legal entity in the format of an LTD and get the opportunity to develop their projects. This is one of the possibilities.

Creative industry, computer IT security, IT products; in all those areas we can cooperate completely freely. These are such cross-border industries, where, I think, it’s very difficult to be a subject for sanctions.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin set a goal of increasing bilateral trade volume to $100 billion. Do you see an expansion or a contraction in the Turkish-Russian trade volume in 2025?

Firstly, this is practically 100% growth to what we have now.As for the forecast for 2025-2026, the main thing is,first: in my opinion, the construction of transport and logistics projects.There is the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea for example.Second; this is cooperation in the field of energy. Thirdly, this is cooperation in the field of chemistry (creation of chemical products) from supplied raw materials, from oil and gas.This is a promising area of pharmaceuticals, supplies of medical equipment, as well as medical services in Türkiye.Undoubtedly, the development of tourism is very promising but also creative industry, IT industry, Cybersecurity.These are the areas that, in my opinion, will develop in the near future. Of course, traditional cooperation in the field of metallurgy.Traditional cooperation in the field of agriculture and food supplies will grow for sure.

What challenges do sanctions pose to bilateral relations?

The first is an axis from the sanctions regime, including through payment in national currencies and using digital currencies. The second is business, thanks to its capabilities, will find a solution to any restrictions. I do not want to go into details now, do not want to disclose the details of the opportunities that companies can use to maintain a normal trade balance.

Anti-colonial movements in Africa seem to have opened up space for Russia in both diplomatic and commercial terms. How do you assess the situation there?

This is an anti-colonialist movement not only in relation to France, but also in relation to other countries. This is also a movement in relation to proposals that are unfair to Africa, for example, on the green transition, because it will destroy African business and will give great advantages to global companies. In my opinion, it is necessary to proceed from the interests of African countries, which, in fact, Russia always does. This is the advantage of our economy and politics.

We work in a ‘win-win’ mode. In the same way, the Turkish side can work in Africa. In the same way, Chinese investors have been actively working in Africa to this day in the form of the prospects of this market. But based on common interests, on the one hand there is a creation of profitable enterprises. On the other hand – the development of the African economy.  Only this will provide an opportunity for further mutual growth. If we simply export material resources from the colonies as a consumer and do not give anything in return, nothing good will come for sure.

After the fall of Assad government, does Russia have any interest in doing business in the reconstruction of Syria?

I am sure that Russian companies will take part in this process, just like other international companies. Now a period of political stabilization will pass and a period of certain growth will begin. The main thing is that extremist movements and non-constructive movements in relation to Syria and the Syrian people do not prevail in politics.  I believe that politics and economics will improve in the near future.

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INTERVIEW

‘Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis’

Published

2 months ago

on

02/02/2025

By

From January 9 to 11, the World Festival of the Antifascist International took place in Caracas, Venezuela. More than 2,000 national and international guests from more than 100 countries, as well as other Venezuelan cities, attended the event. Among them were representatives of social movements, political parties, cultural and popular organizations, intellectuals, indigenous peoples, youth, students, workers, parliamentarians, communicators and other personalities. The mega activity was carried out within the framework of the Inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, who on January 10, was sworn in as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the period 2025-2031, and also served as an example of international support for the continuity of the Bolivarian Revolution under the leadership of Maduro. Another important event that surrounded the Festival was the Inauguration of Donald Trump this January 20.

The Italian-Argentine philosopher Rocco Carbone, who has delved into the discursivities and political and cultural processes of Latin America, was born in Cosenza, Calabria, in southern Italy, but has lived for more than 20 years in the Argentine capital, Buenos Aires. Carbone studied at the Università degli Studi della Calabria. He received his doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Zürich, Switzerland, and currently teaches at the National University of General Sarmiento (UNGS) and is part of the prestigious world of Argentine scientific research center CONICET.

In addition to the aforementioned International Fascist Festival, Carbone participated in other activities carried out in Caracas within the framework of the Inauguration of President Nicolás Maduro, such as the January 9 March; the Swearing-in on January 10; and, the III World Communication Congress of the University of Communications (LAUICOM) held on January 11, among others. In that sense, Harici was able to talk with the Italian-Argentine philosopher about what fascism is, who is Argentine with Javier Milei as its president, and what is coming for Latin America and the world with the arrival of Trump to the White House.

Venezuela has just celebrated the International World Anti-Fascite Festival. Can you give us a definition of what fascism is and how it is expressed today?

The first thing I would tell you is that fascism is never something new, fascism is always old. With this I want to tell you that I am a little reluctant to talk about neofascism, but rather the word fascism convinces me more. I know that, at least in Argentina, where I have lived for more than 20 years, and also in the rest of Latin America this is a difficult word. It is a difficult word from political theory, from political action, for different reasons. But, without a doubt, when we say fascism we are referring to the Italian experience, to the German experience of the 20th century, which were experiences that extended more or less between the 20s, 30s and 40s. But if one theorizes this word a little, in the 20th century we see fascism in different places, that is, fascism in the 20th century was an international force. We find fascism, for example, in Great Britain, where in the 1920s and 1930s there was the British Union of Fascists, led by Oswald Mosley, a guy who had trained with Lord Keynes, the key to economics who was part of a brain of the Blackmore Group.

For example, in old China in the 1930s, within the Kuomintang of the Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Sun Yat-sen, there also existed a dual power apparatus called the Blue Shirt Association, which was an apparatus fascist type military politician. If we think about Our America, for example, in Cuba governed by Gerardo Machado y Morales, the greatest fact against that political experience is that he persecuted a great militant who was part of the student movement and the Cuban labor movement, Julio Antonio Mella. Being an avid writer, in some of his texts, which we can read today because they have been preserved, Mella called Machado Morales “the tropical Mussolini”, that is, Mella identified Machado as a fascist. Then Mella had to exile himself from Cuba and went to live in Mexico and Machado had him murdered.

And if we think about Argentina in the 1930s, the so-called “Infamous Decade”, there was an Argentine fascist party recognized by the Italian fascist party that had a mass experience, especially in the city of Córdoba, where it was led by a relatively important Argentine Thomist philosopher, Nimio Juan Manuel de Anquí.

And why do I say all this? Because everything that is in history, everything that is in the political history of the world and in the political history of Latin America, at some later point, that history can be reactivated again. And it seems to me that this is happening today in Our America with different expressions of politics that if we call it right or extreme right or extreme right, we say absolutely nothing, because that is an insufficient descriptive expression.

So it seems to me that using these categories says nothing, for example, about the Venezuelan opposition, about Milei, about Bolsonaro. And it seems to me that this word, fascism, has indeed been reactivated. Now you ask me to give a definition of fascism, and I believe that we can think of fascism in many ways, we can think of it in relation to statehood, but we can think of it as political power without necessarily linking it to the nation-state.

Regarding Javier Milei, you have just released a book about the type of fascism that the Argentine president characterizes. Tell us a little about that.

Yes, the book is precisely called “Flamethrower: Milei and Psychotizing Fascism.” Fascism is a psychotizing power because it is a power that tends to drive the citizen, the free organizations of the people, the political parties, and politics crazy… Fascism is a power that discursively, but also politically, when it makes policy, always says two things at the same time and these things contradict each other.

In the case of Milei we can see it clearly, for example, when he was in the middle of the presidential campaign, Milei said that the current Minister of Economy, his Minister of Economy, Luis Caputo, was a criminal and a thief, because he had requested a loan from the IMF for 45 billion dollars, which became an enormous Argentine external debt. But then, when Milei won the presidential election, he chose Caputo as economy minister and now praises him.

Well, there we effectively see a power that narratively says two things at the same time that deny each other. That is why I say that it is a psychotizing power, that is, a power that tends to drive the citizens crazy. And, from my point of view, that psychotizing style basically tends to at least inhibit the popular response to fascism. That is the psychotizing element, the permanent contradictory element, that activates fascist power. We also see it in the permanent development of policies.

In the case of Milei, before becoming president he was briefly a deputy, and when he was a parliamentarian he voted in favor of the elimination, for example, of a tax that is the Income tax (also called the tax on great wealth). Milei voted against that entry, because for him, the Argentine State is a kind of evildoer, it is a kind of thief. The State is a kind of criminal because it taxes the citizens. However, now that he is president he is reinstating the income tax. Once again we see a contradictory policy that balances between a denial and an affirmation.

I believe that in this way we can understand fascism: as a kind of latent political force that is present in the life of people, as a kind of small person (a dwarf) that is – to a greater or lesser extent – in each one. of us and that, appropriately stimulated, grows again.

This January 20, the White House has a new tenant. What can we expect from Trump’s international policy towards Venezuela and Latin America?

Klara Zetkin in her 1923 text: “Fight against fascism. And how to defeat it”, argues that fascism is “a tool of capitalism in crisis.” In that sense, Trump is the head of state who represents the maximum expression of capitalism, and when capitalism is in crisis (in fact, Trump feels that the United States is in crisis, is in danger) to surf that crisis and stay afloat, capitalism expands. a much more radical tool than capitalism itself: fascism. It seems to me that this is a great definition to understand what we are talking about when we talk about fascism, because as we said before, that word activates historical comparisons, which can confuse us or divert us a little. And it seems to me that if, on the contrary, we connect it with the rationality of capitalism, especially the capitalism in crisis that we are experiencing in the 21st century, that is, a capitalism that has many dimensions, there is a productive capitalism, analog capitalism, there is another platform capitalism, financial or digital, there is another type of capitalism, specifically in Latin America, the narco capitalism.

And capitalism at this moment is going through a transition phase, because there is a dispute for the hegemony of capitalism between the old US imperialism and new emerging countries, such as the BRICS. I am referring to Russia, I am thinking of China, India, Iran, which are disputing that hegemony, that leadership. 

And so, because capitalism is closely linked to imperialism, the United States feels the pressure of that crisis. Trump has expressed it several times, for him American power is in crisis, in decline. So in different places in the Western world, forms of fascism are activated so that capitalism stays afloat, stays alive and reaffirms itself in this moment of transition from one hegemony to another hegemony, which we still do not know what it will be. Let’s say, this neo-hegemony or hegemonism is still uncertain, but it seems to me that the world is moving towards it, therefore, it seems to me that we must effectively understand it under that paradigm: fascism as a tool of capitalism in crisis.

As to how Trump’s arrival at the White House may affect Venezuela, this is also a bit uncertain. But the obvious thing is that the Trump administration needs an antagonist. If Israel and Gaza reach a prolonged peace agreement, beyond the circumstantial ceasefire, and if Trump manages to end the war in Ukraine. The United States will exert greater pressure and interference against Venezuela. Trump is acting psychotically against the Chinese government, his main enemy in the fight to maintain global hegemony. That is why thinking about a “reasonable capitalism” is nonsense, which is why people must unite and organize.

What do we do?

Imagining and organizing a new world, alternative to the power schemes of powers that do not fight to achieve something but rather covet everything that exists is the task of participation and struggle for the forces of emancipation that vibrate in the ideas of social justice. and egalitarianism. National and popular forces with the Latin American perspective of the great Homeland. Because, what is a town, after all? It is not a fixed or eternal idea but an idea that names and summons the possibility of being constituted in each historical stage. That idea indicates less a large number, a large conglomerate, or a conspicuous number of people mobilized than a fluctuating community experiencing an epiphany. A revelation of power, of knowledge, of beauty, of shared knowledge. A social bond, a hug. An experience: a constitutive part of what one is and without which one cannot be, nor continue to be. From Our America it must still be possible to imagine and organize an emancipatory action – spliced ​​with the dimensions of multipolarity and the BRICS – constituted around a popular slogan: Make Antifascism Great Again, on the 80th anniversary of the subordination of archaeological fascism at the hands of the revolution.

Notes

“Flamethrower. Milei and psychotizing fascism” (2024) by Rocco Carbone. In this essay, the Italian-Argentine philosopher maintains that “fascism is a highly psychotizing or maddening political power. And this characteristic is expressed very well in Milei, because Every time Milei speaks he says two things that clash with each other, for example: First he said: ‘Pope Francis is the representative of the evil one on earth’ and then, when he makes a trip to Rome and visits the Vatican, he says: “The Pope is the most important Argentine in history.” In this text, Rocco invites us to resist and combat this political power because “fascism does not imply an idea different from our own, but the death of all ideas.” And he concludes that “Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis,” a thought previously postulated (1923) by the feminist and German communist deputy Klara Zetkin (1857-1933) in the text “Fight against fascism. And how to beat it.”

In “Mafia capital: The hidden logics of power” (2019) the philosopher maintains that: “Organized crime (now nationalized) has a very broad advantage over Argentine democracy and its laws.” In his text, Rocco reviews Latin American history and the recent radicalization of neoliberal governments. It also describes the development of the Mafia, from its origins and how: “in just two generations it stopped being a regional and rural organization to become another, made up of modern, cosmopolitan and refined businessmen, with doctorates, capable of expressing themselves and doing things.” His work has been published in many languages.

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