Opinion
How did imperialism dismember Yugoslavia?
US imperialism, having enlisted Israel—one of its two strategic allies, the other being the United Kingdom—is endeavoring to reshape the Middle East. The priorities of the US and Israel include the liquidation of nation-states in the region; regime change and even border alterations in Iran, whose turn has come following Iraq and Syria; and the establishment of full US control over energy resources and transit routes. Among these priorities are also the containment of Chinese and Russian influence in the region, the establishment of a Kurdish state as a garrison or puppet state, and the alleviation of Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.
As the US and its European partners advance toward their imperialist objectives, they are exploiting identity politics to the fullest extent. To divide Middle Eastern countries from within and pit them against one another, they incite and exacerbate medieval remnants and feudal residues of belonging, affiliation, and sensibilities. The objective is to first persuade these countries toward federalism via feudalism, and subsequently to divide and dismember them.
In this context, the events that unfolded in Yugoslavia during the final decade of the last century offer critical lessons regarding the consequences of ethnic, religious, and sectarian slaughter. Let us recall Yugoslavia: a nation that interpreted socialism in its own unique way, observed regional and global balances, was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, took significant strides in economy and industry, drew attention with its achievements in sports and arts, and held a prestigious position in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was torn apart in a bloody fashion. Today, seven states stand in Yugoslavia’s place: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Kosovo.
Yugoslavia, which literally means the Land of the South Slavs, was founded after World War II under the leadership of Tito—who was known as Marshal due to his military successes during the war, despite not being a soldier by profession. Tito was a patriot who defended his homeland against Nazi occupiers, a successful commander, a formidable organizer, a staunch socialist, and a successful, charismatic statesman. Born to a Croatian father and a Slovenian mother, Tito believed in independence, self-management, federalism, and a socialist market economy. He did not hesitate to fall out with USSR leader Stalin. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six federated states and two autonomous regions: Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Croatia were the federated states; Vojvodina and Kosovo were the autonomous regions. Tito’s leadership and charisma bore immense significance for his country. With the death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, Yugoslavia entered a period of crisis. With imperialism descending upon it, the process of disintegration began.
Why was Yugoslavia chosen as a target?
Yugoslavia occupied an important and unique position in the Balkans, not only geographically but also politically and diplomatically. It possessed an effective administration. It was socialist, yet not under the tutelage of the USSR. It maintained an independent line. It stood out with its industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce.
Alongside these strengths, it also faced significant problems. Ethnic, religious, and cultural differences were rife. Corruption in the bureaucracy was widespread. Rising nationalist currents were becoming conspicuous. There were deep disparities in economic development among the federated republics constituting Yugoslavia. Serbia, holding the population majority and military power, and the economically advanced Slovenia and Croatia held diverging views regarding the country’s future. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 left Yugoslavia isolated against the West.
The termination of the socialist regime in Yugoslavia, along with economic and political steps taken to prolong the federation’s life—such as the adoption of a market economy and the transition to a multi-party system—did not yield the hoped-for results. On the contrary, they accelerated the country’s dissolution. Both socialism and the federal state collapsed simultaneously. In this respect, its fate resembled that of the USSR. Different political currents in different federated republics failed to cooperate to keep the country standing. Ethnic and religious sensitivities strengthened under the guise of democracy and freedom imposed by the West. In every federated republic, separatist movements, organizations, and actors came to the fore with support arriving from the US and Europe.
Yugoslavia’s unique model of socialism, based on a Yugoslav supra-identity, had been successful while Tito was alive. However, after Tito, it became evident that national issues and identity problems had not been resolved, and the conflicts between them had never truly been eliminated. Another misfortune for the country was that the New World Order, globalization, and imperialism prioritized identity politics and placed Yugoslavia in their crosshairs.
What was Tito’s great anxiety?
According to Yugoslavia’s founding leader Tito, Yugoslavia—harboring numerous ethnic communities within its structure—represented an integrated political identity independent of ethnic differences and transcending them. However, Tito was also aware of the games imperialism was playing on his country; in 1971, he stated: “…They are calculating that if Tito goes, everything will collapse. Some are seriously waiting for this. The internal enemy receives countless support from the outside. Great powers will utilize any devil that serves their purpose.”
In the first 35 years of the Cold War, Yugoslavia stood out as the country with the most liberal economy, the most libertarian political structure, and the highest level of ethnic and religious tolerance in the socialist world. Tito’s three administrative principles were decisive in its prominence with these qualities: 1) Ensuring local freedoms through the concept of self-management. 2) Establishing ethnic harmony within a single-party administration through the concept of brotherhood and unity. 3) Serving world peace through the concept of non-alignment in foreign policy. With Tito’s death in 1980, the country lost its most important unifying glue, and these three principles began to rot. The global economic depression effective in the early 1980s also put the country in a difficult position. The disparities in economic development between the federated republics became blatantly apparent. (1)
It was better understood after his death that Tito was, for Yugoslavia, far more than a founding leader or national hero; he was the actor who enabled living together. It became apparent that there had been a failure to institutionalize the commonalities and similarities among the different peoples, cultures, and religions constituting the federal republic to the hoped-for extent, and that the carefully desired Yugoslav supra-identity could not be formed as wished. The principle of “brotherhood and unity,” which Tito never ceased to mention, was forgotten after his death. Indeed, ten years after his death, civil war began.
In the census conducted in 1981, it was striking that in a country of 22.4 million, only 5 percent of the population defined themselves as “Yugoslav.” This 5 percent segment consisted predominantly of civil and military bureaucrats, party administrators, and intellectuals. For 95 percent of the citizens, ethnic identity, historical memory, and national sentiments were paramount. The deterioration of the economy in the 1980s also fueled reaction against the government and reinforced nationalist sentiments. The multicultural, multi-identity, multi-religious, multi-national, and multi-people structure, combined with the economic development disparities between federal republics, presented an environment for the US and the European Union to use, exploit, and provoke.
Different approaches regarding the fragmentation
Various interpretations have been made regarding the fragmentation of Yugoslavia following years of bloody civil wars.
Some experts state that the support provided by the US and the European Union to fascist actors in Yugoslavia divided the country. They argue that Western imperialism could never stomach a strong and united Yugoslavia in the Balkans.
According to some experts, the fundamental reason for the division is economic. Wealthy and industrially strong Slovenia, and Croatia—which possessed significant tourism revenues and was in a better economic situation—viewed the other parts of the country as a burden. They drew closer to the European Union, particularly Germany, and demanded independence.
Some experts argue that the dissolution of the USSR plunged Yugoslavia, which had very strong trade ties with that country, into an economic bottleneck and brought about the division.
According to some experts, the element uniting the peoples in Yugoslavia was the communist ideology. With the collapse of communism, this bond disappeared, and the country was divided as a result of rising extreme nationalism.
According to other experts, the greatest party responsible for the fragmentation of Yugoslavia is Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism dreamed of a Greater Serbia. It ignored the multi-national, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural structure of the country. It viewed the Serbs as the sovereign and primary element of the country, utilized Serb minorities in the federated republics, supported Serb separatists in those regions, and believed it could prevent the country’s division by resorting to violence. Through these attitudes, it caused nationalist currents in other republics to strengthen and ultimately led to the country’s dissolution.
A study conducted in 1980 revealed the economic disparity between the federated republics. According to the study, accepting the Yugoslav average as 100, the minimum subsistence index was 122 in Slovenia and 130 in Croatia. In contrast, it was 87 in Serbia, 76 in Montenegro, 66 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 64 in Macedonia (2). Regarding economic approaches to Yugoslavia’s fragmentation, the per capita GNP (in US dollars) in the federated republics and autonomous regions using 1990–1991 data also provides an idea: Slovenia (5,500), Croatia (3,400), Serbia (2,200), Montenegro (1,700), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,600), Macedonia (1,400), Vojvodina (3,250), and Kosovo (730) (3).
After Tito, Serbia, which was politically strong and constituted the most populous demographic, attempted to transform the federal state into a unitary state. Economically strong Slovenia and Croatia, on the other hand, endeavored to transform it into a loose confederation. The wealthy republics did not want to “carry” the poor republics and viewed them as a burden. The first signs of breaking away from Yugoslavia with demands for independence came from the two wealthy republics, Slovenia and Croatia. Relying on the fact that Serbs lived in different federated states, Serbia was eager to interfere in the internal affairs of these federated states. This, in turn, increased the backlash.
Yugoslavia’s population structure in terms of religion and sect was as follows: Orthodox Christians constituted one-third of the population, ranking first in this regard. Catholics made up one-fourth of the population. Fifteen percent of the population was Muslim. Although sources vary slightly, the ethnic and religious distribution in Yugoslavia’s federated states and autonomous regions in 1981 was as follows:
- Bosnia-Herzegovina: Muslims 39.1%, Serbs 32%, Croats 18.4%.
- Croatia: Croats 75.1%, Serbs 11.5%.
- Macedonia: Macedonians 67%, Albanians 19.6%.
- Montenegro: Montenegrins 68.5%, Muslims 13.4%.
- Serbia: Serbs 66.4%, Albanians 19.6%.
- Slovenia: Slovenes 90.5%.
In Kosovo, Albanians constituted 77.5% of the population. In Vojvodina, 55.8% of the population was Serb, and 21.7% was Hungarian. The most populous minorities consisted of Albanians, Hungarians, Roma, Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Turks. (4)
In Yugoslavia, where the population reached 23.5 million in 1990, Serbs constituted the largest demographic with a population of 10 million. Of these 10 million, 6 million lived in Serbia, 1.5 million in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 600,000 in Croatia.
The football match in Zagreb and the fractured region
While Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s two wealthy federated republics, complained about the central economic structure and viewed the other republics as a burden, they also claimed that the system constantly favored Serbia. According to them, they were the ones working and producing, but the Serbs, who held the majority in the bureaucracy, trade, and banking, were skimming the cream off the country.
Slovenia was very eager for independence. This was because it was both the wealthiest federated republic and possessed a relatively homogeneous population. It had already turned its face toward the free market economy and integration with Europe. It trusted its developed economy. It received support from Germany, with which it had historical ties and which backed it. It pursued a nationalist policy that excluded and belittled the federated republics in poorer and weaker positions. Croatia, too, trusted its economic power. It was a federated republic where nationalism was influential.
Macedonia, Yugoslavia’s poorest federated republic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, its most ethnically mixed, wanted the federation to continue its existence in the form of a loose confederation. Both feared a federation that did not include Slovenia and Croatia. In October 1990, Croatia and Slovenia proposed transforming the federation into a loose confederation. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina supported the thesis of a federation of sovereign states. Serbia and Montenegro, however, demanded a centralized federal system. (5)
The reason Bosnia-Herzegovina—which desired a loose federation—was the country that least wanted the dissolution of the federation was primarily due to the complexity of its ethnic, religious, and cultural structure; other reasons included the fragility of its economy and its military weakness.
The political and social tension, which was running quite high, became fully exposed with a football match played in the Croatian capital, Zagreb. The events that transpired before the Dinamo Zagreb – Red Star match at Maksimir Stadium on May 13, 1990—Croatian footballer Zvonimir Boban kicking a police officer, injured police, fighting fans—demonstrated that living together was no longer possible. The process of division was ignited by a football match played between Croatian and Serbian teams.
Shortly after this event, on July 2, 1990, the Slovenian national assembly, followed by the Croatian national assembly, made decisions for independence. On June 25, 1991, the two republics, unable to agree with the Serbs in the federation administration, officially declared their independence. On June 27, the federal army, under Serbian control, intervened in Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia was ready for war, having quietly invested in its defense and taken the necessary steps for two years. It was the federal army that was not sufficiently prepared. Slovenia won the war. On the 10th day of the war, the federal army was forced to request a ceasefire. In Croatia, the federal army seized one-fourth of the country, and the war ended in January 1992.
Ultimately, Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1992. Conflicts, and particularly genocides and massacres against Muslim Bosniaks, occurred on the country’s fragmented lands. Even though they separated, deep divergences of opinion and crises of confidence came to the fore among the states that would continue to live as neighbors in the same region. The winner was US and European imperialism.
References
- Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994 [Political History 1918-1994], İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1994, pp. 493-494.
- Tanıl Bora, Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Av Sahası [Hunting Ground of the New World Order], Birikim Yayınları, Istanbul, 1994, p. 55.
- Murat Taşar, Burhan Metin, Altay Ünaltay, Bosna- Hersek ve Postmodern Ortaçağa Giriş [Bosnia-Herzegovina and Introduction to the Postmodern Middle Ages], Birleşik Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 1996, p. 109.
- Mehmet Atay, “Balkan Jeopolitiğini Etkileyen ve Değiştiren Politik- Askeri Gelişmelere Kısa Bakış” [A Brief Look at Political-Military Developments Affecting and Changing Balkan Geopolitics], Avrasya Dosyası, Spring-Summer 1998, Vol: 4, pp. 112 – 113.
- Emin Gürses, Milliyetçi Hareketler ve Uluslararası Sistem [Nationalist Movements and the International System], Bağlam Yayınları, Istanbul, 1998, p. 185.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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