Following the October 7 Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, European and US media outlets began publishing reports that were almost entirely identical to Israeli military statements. Just like in the Ukraine war, not only is taking a different side out of the question, but even expressing neutral opinions has become enough to be labeled as ‘anti-Semite.’ Similar to how displaying Soviet-Russian symbols on the streets is seen as a police matter, Palestinian flags, keffiyehs, pro-Palestinian slogans, graffiti, and banners have become the focus of prosecution or social isolation.

It is clear that Germany and the German media are leading the way in this regard. The “Staatsräson” (“state reason”) formulated during Angela Merkel’s tenure had placed Israel’s existence and security in a position where it was unacceptable to even discuss them within the German state and politics. Indeed, after October 7, both former Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, a member of the coalition partner Greens, frequently brought this issue to the fore. The German media also enthusiastically embraced the German state mind’s stance on Israel.

Journalist Fabian Goldmann publishes articles on his personal blog exposing how the German media acts like a Federal Foreign Office bureau on Israel. The influence of Israel in the media has progressed so far that the spokesperson for the Israeli army in Germany even published a list of journalists under the headline “10 people spreading hatred of Jews.” Goldmann is one of those on the list.

We met with Goldmann in Berlin and discussed the German media, how the Palestinian issue is covered in the media, journalistic standards, and the future of Germany and the German media.

Let’s first talk about German media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian war in Gaza. As you’ve pointed out several times in your articles, the German media strongly supports Israel over the Palestinians and doesn’t allow critical or alternative voices in favor of the Palestinian cause. What do you think about this coverage? How and why does the German media choose to report on the Gaza war in this way?

We could talk about this for hours, but I’ll try to summarize a few key points. You said they don’t allow Palestinian voices—I wouldn’t say they don’t allow them at all. Occasionally, Palestinian perspectives are included, and there are some decent articles on what’s happening in Gaza.

However, the problem is that 99% of the coverage is really, really bad. We’re used to this in Germany. Right-wing media typically handle topics like Israel, Islam, migration, and refugees in a biased way. But what’s new since October 7 is that even the mainstream media—public broadcasters and traditionally left-wing newspapers like taz, or left-liberal ones like Die Zeit—are doing a terrible job. They’ve always leaned in this direction, but now it’s extreme.

The first sign that something had shifted came immediately after October 7, when all newspapers published unverified stories about babies being burned in ovens, women being raped, and dead bodies mutilated—without credible sources. Even left-wing outlets reported this. At the same time, there were no Palestinian voices. Everything was reported from the perspective of the Israeli army. Israeli army spokespersons were featured on major news shows and talk shows like Tagesschau.

I recently conducted a study on the perspectives shown in Tagesschau. Israeli officials appeared 134 times, while Palestinian officials were featured only four times. That’s about the same screen time as officials from Belgium or Luxembourg, which is absurd given the context.

It’s always been bad—coverage of the wars in Iraq, Syria, or Ukraine was also problematic—but it’s never been this one-sided. The Israeli army’s narrative dominates headlines and lead paragraphs. You usually have to read the fifth or seventh paragraph before the Palestinian perspective appears, if at all.

Even when highly credible organizations like the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children, or Oxfam contradict the Israeli narrative—labeling the war as genocide or pointing out that civilians are being targeted instead of just Hamas—the German media still largely adheres to the Israeli army’s version.

After October 7, some British alternative media outlets exposed that Israeli army officials met with UK media executives. Do you have any evidence of similar meetings between Israeli officials and German media groups?

It’s no secret that the Israeli government exerts pressure on German media. Reporters Without Borders recently published a report on press freedom in Germany, based on interviews with about 60 editors and journalists. Many said the Israeli embassy—along with organizations like the Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft (German-Israeli Society)—frequently calls editors-in-chief to complain about coverage.

I’ve also heard of cases where they provided lists of journalists they disapprove of and asked media executives to fire them. Israeli embassy staff often contact German journalists directly. I myself was listed by Arye Sharuz Shalicar, the Israeli army spokesperson in Germany, as one of the “top 10 German anti-Semites or Israel haters.”

If a Russian politician had done something similar, there would’ve been a national uproar, with journalist organizations and editors-in-chief speaking out. But when Israel does it, there’s complete silence. Even the bosses of affected journalists don’t defend them.

A lot of those in charge of German media are affiliated with pro-Israel or pro-transatlantic organizations. Culturally, many German journalists don’t see their role as holding power to account. Instead, they report what politicians do: portraying politics rather than scrutinizing it.

If you watch Al Jazeera, BBC, or even Russia Today, their interviews with politicians are far more critical. German media generally echoes what politicians say, often adopting their agendas; not only on Israel, but also on migration, COVID-19, and Ukraine.

This bias is amplified when it comes to Israel. In Germany, the political spectrum concerning Israel is extremely narrow. Even parties with differing views on sending weapons to Israel don’t challenge the basic pro-Israel stance. There are no parties that support Palestinian resistance.

Another factor is racism. Some studies show that many journalists genuinely believe there’s a cultural war between Israel —representing democracy and liberalism— and Islam —seen as barbaric. Palestinians are often portrayed as terrorists. One Die Zeit headline even claimed there were no Palestinian civilians—an appalling view that suggests Palestinian lives are worth less than European lives.

This issue goes back decades. Studies consistently show that Islam is portrayed negatively in German media and is always linked to terrorism or violence. Migrants are overrepresented in crime stories compared to actual statistics. It all ties into racism, stereotypes, and Islamophobia.

Since October 7, there’s also been a surge in campaigns targeting anyone who speaks out for Palestinian rights—journalists, cultural figures, politicians, Jewish artists, and academics. If you publicly use terms like “apartheid” or “genocide,” you risk losing your job or being labeled antisemitic or Islamist.

There was a journalist named Michael Muhammad who worked for a public broadcaster. He tweeted something like, “What do you expect from Palestinians when they have no other way to fight for freedom?” This triggered a massive campaign against him, and he was fired within two hours without even a proper conversation. That was just the first of many such cases.

Al Jazeera published a solid report a few months ago about Deutsche Welle, exposing its suppression of pro-Palestinian or Israel-critical voices. Many journalists from outlets like Tagesschau or Spiegel write to me privately. They agree with my blog and interviews but don’t dare speak up. They’re considering quitting.

I read about Axel Springer having an unofficial or even written policy requiring employees to be pro-Israel. Is that true?

It’s not unofficial, it’s written in the contract. Axel Springer explicitly requires employees to support Israel and the market economy. Deutsche Welle adopted something similar after a scandal two years ago in which 8–10 Arab-background editors were fired for allegedly promoting antisemitism due to old social media posts. It ended in the company modifying their contracts.

Is there rising antisemitism in Germany post-October 7? How can we measure that?

Official statistics have spiked, including those from the Ministry of the Interior and various NGOs. But these stats have a fundamental flaw: they count anti-Israel positions as antisemitism. For example, pro-Palestinian slogans or clashes with police at demonstrations are recorded as antisemitic incidents.

So, do I think antisemitism has actually increased? Honestly, I don’t know. The statistics are so distorted that they’re no longer reliable. There’s little serious research that separates genuine antisemitism—such as attacks on Jews for being Jewish—from political positions critical of Israel.

You’ve followed the German media for years. How does it compare to media environments in other Western countries?

A big difference is that in Germany, biased reporting on Israel spans the entire political spectrum—from left to right. In the U.S., CNN or NBC are bad, but you also have great outlets like Democracy Now! or The Intercept. In the UK, the BBC is awful, but The Guardian occasionally offers quality reporting. Even in Israel, while the Jerusalem Post is terrible, Haaretz and +972 Magazine provide balanced perspectives.

Germany has no equivalent. There are a few small, independent outlets, but they have tiny readerships. Additionally, while British media still include Palestinian and independent perspectives, German media rely almost exclusively on Israeli sources.

BBC or CNN will at least phrase things like, “Hamas, which is designated a terrorist organization by Western governments.” In contrast, German media simply say, “the terrorist organization Hamas,” fully adopting the government’s viewpoint.

Could you be convicted for saying Hamas isn’t a terrorist organization in Germany?

As a journalist, you have some freedom. For private citizens, I’m not sure of the legal implications—it might be considered a gray area.

Another point—German media do almost no investigative journalism on Gaza. Can you explain this phenomenon?

Yes, this is a huge issue. When Gaza schools are bombed, German media report what Hamas and the Israeli army say, then conclude, “We can’t verify the facts due to the fog of war.” But independent journalists and international NGOs can verify these facts—and often do.

The problem is not just lack of access but lack of effort. In many countries, contradictory reports prompt actual investigation. In Germany, that’s where journalism stops. They simply echo Israeli claims and tell viewers they can’t know what’s true.

What’s your view on the media being called the “fourth estate”? How does it apply in Germany? Is the media powerful in Germany?

Yes, the media are powerful, but the real question is how they use that power. Instead of holding power to account, German media often align with those in power. They are more like PR departments for the government.

Take a Tagesschau segment and compare it with a Foreign Ministry press release, it’s nearly identical. This was true during COVID-19, on Ukraine, on migration policy—and it’s true now with Israel.

Could future clashes between the German government and a possible Trump administration over Israel or Ukraine create space for alternative voices in German media?

I doubt it. Even if Trump tries to expel Palestinians from Gaza and calls it the “Palestinian Riviera Plan,” I think Germany would still support it—just as they’ve supported bombings of hospitals and mass displacement in Gaza.

I can’t recall a time when Germany stood up to the U.S. on any major foreign policy issue. They support Washington at all costs. I don’t see the media or government changing.

From time to time, there are a couple of decent Tagesschau reports. People hoped the International Court of Justice ruling or Amnesty’s report labeling the conflict a genocide would change something. But nothing ever changes. Within weeks, the media went back to talking about “Hamas command centers.”

The only hope I have is that German media are losing relevance. People are turning to TikTok, Instagram, blogs, and independent platforms. They’re organizing protests, forming new coalitions—Palestinians, Jewish activists, intellectuals, and others. That grassroots activism is where change might come from, not the system itself.

Alexander Rahr is one of Germany’s leading foreign policy experts. He worked at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) for twenty years, where he held managerial positions and played significant roles in shaping German foreign policy. Specializing particularly in German-Russian relations, Rahr is known for his work on Eastern European policies. His analyses, which bring intellectual depth to politics, have earned him respect in both academic and decision-making circles. Rahr, a recipient of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, has also drawn the German public’s attention to the Eurasian region with his perspectives on the area. We conducted an exclusive interview with Alexander Rahr at his home in Berlin. We asked him about the new federal government in Germany and the prominent issues.

Q: What will be the biggest challenges and tests for the new government?

A: The biggest challenge, to put it simply, will be to present a different image from the traffic light coalition [traffic light coalition, referring to the previous SPD-Greens-FDP government] and not to be internally divided like them. That in itself is already a difficult task. And I am sure that the first major dispute will erupt over the issue of migration in the summer months. Especially if the CDU, along with Interior Minister Dobrindt, is serious about closing borders and deporting people. In that case, the danger of the coalition collapsing would immediately arise, because the SPD would oppose it. I believe such disagreements will also occur in defense and militarization policies. Individuals within the SPD who come from the peace movement will oppose such extensive armament. In short, it would surprise me if this government lasts 4 years.

The German economy cannot be fixed by ‘militarizing’

Q: Germany has been in a recession for some time. In this context, I’d like to ask: With the new government, is the aim to stimulate the economy by prioritizing military spending, in other words, to achieve economic dynamism through a kind of militarization? Is this possible? Because this seems like a transformation. Germany is no longer the leader in the automotive sector as it once was. Could it now be seeking to fill this gap with the defense industry?

A: Yes, this is the plan of the Merz government [referring to a hypothetical future government led by Friedrich Merz of the CDU] and the elites. This situation quite surprises me, because I don’t recognize such a Germany. But when I read Spiegel and other news sources, I come across things that confirm what you’re saying. German economic circles, especially the government and parties, believe that an arms race—which is the policy Reagan pursued 40 years ago of “exhausting the Russians through an arms race”—will lead to a major economic breakthrough. They think that large-scale European armament will bring new orders, new companies will be established, new financial resources will be created, and most importantly, Europe will thereby strengthen, intimidate others, and gain more influence in the world.

This is a rather traditional perspective. However, it is very dangerous and ignores certain realities. This viewpoint completely underestimates the Russian economy; because it is still believed that Russia can be defeated with sanctions, but this will not happen. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that the response to large-scale militarization by Germany or Europe will be for the rest of the world—China, for example—to start arming itself. China will no longer be so peaceful. Other countries seeing Europe arm itself will initially think it’s against Russia, but then they will realize it could also be against China and other countries, and they will prepare themselves accordingly. This is not a good development for the global economy. On the contrary, it could lead to the formation of new blocs in the world and the end of globalization.

When we look at Germany’s internal dynamics, I think there’s a great deal of living in a fantasy world here too. Because Germany’s biggest problems are neither in Russia nor in the Ukraine crisis; they are not externally sourced. Germany’s real problem—which experts have been pointing out for years—is deindustrialization. This process is quite advanced. For Germany to become a strong industrial country again, it needs to regain its potential, but not through armament. We need to produce things that people genuinely need and rebuild the infrastructure. Bridges are crumbling, roads are deteriorating, railways aren’t working, airports aren’t functioning properly. All of this cannot be fixed with a defense industry. We are no longer living in the 1930s.

The government will make major cuts in social spending

Secondly, the largest item in Germany’s state budget is social spending. 43% of the German budget is allocated to social payments such as pensions for retirees—whose numbers are increasing—the long-term unemployed, students, and special pension rights for mothers. So, social spending in Germany is extremely high. You cannot simultaneously try to rapidly expand the defense industry, make Europe the world’s strongest military power, and maintain these social budgets and the social safety net at the same level. They will have to make cuts. And it is precisely at this point that we will reach the limits of society’s tolerance. Of course, it’s not possible to borrow indefinitely. The money allocated to armament will not generate enough tax revenue to cover the deficits in social spending. This means that there will be cuts in social benefits, or people in Germany—especially retirees—will have to forgo many things they are accustomed to in the coming years.

Borrowing currently seems attractive to the incumbent governments in Europe and America. But they forget that they have to pay substantial interest. This money is not earned; it is borrowed, and high interest must be paid on it. This interest can only be covered by income generated by the economy. And a large part of this income will be spent just to pay this interest. Consequently, this trajectory could lead to a major social crisis in Germany. Germany has not experienced large-scale mass protests in the last 30 years. The German people have always been a satiated, or at least relatively satiated, populace. Here, compared to some European countries, no one is hungry. But let me say this: if care is not taken, this situation can change rapidly within a few years. If Germany does not reorient itself towards the “social” priorities that formed the basis of the social market economy in the past, and instead focuses solely on armament, then the problems we will face will become clearly apparent.

The AfD could be banned by the current establishment parties

Q: I’d like to come to the topic of the AfD… In your opinion, is it still possible for this party to be banned in the future, or will the German elites or the system try to integrate the AfD? Could the party eventually be drawn into the system and perhaps become a governing partner with the CDU? What would need to happen for this? For example, scenarios such as the party splitting by dissociating from figures like Björn Höcke and adopting a more “conformist” line are being discussed. What are your thoughts on this?

A: I can offer you three possible scenarios on this matter. First scenario: Politics continues with a “muddling through” approach. Meaning, problems are patched up with temporary solutions, some things are attempted to be fixed, but they break down again after a while. Managing the situation this way can be sustained for a few more years as long as the money lasts and the public tolerates it. But at some point, this scenario will become unsustainable.

Second scenario: The “Brandmauer” [firewall, meaning a strict refusal to cooperate with the AfD] collapses, and the CDU is forced to enter into a coalition with the AfD. This could happen particularly at the state level. Furthermore, I think a formation like Sahra Wagenknecht’s party could re-emerge, strengthening particularly in East Germany. Even if this doesn’t happen, another similar left-leaning party could emerge. This could also be an answer to your question about whether the AfD will split: the AfD won’t split, but a different party might be born. This new party could, under certain conditions, become a coalition partner with the AfD in states like Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, or Saxony. If this model works, similar developments could occur in other states. This is a very plausible development scenario for Germany within the next 20 years.

The third scenario is this: The AfD could be banned by the current establishment parties or elites. I think such a culture of prohibition is quite possible in Germany; serious fear can be instilled in the public through the fear of Russia or the threat of fascism. German society, due to its historical past, is very sensitive to such fears and could support such a ban. However, other countries will not approach this situation in the same way. If Germany moves towards such a policy of prohibition, it could lose its leadership position in Europe. Because I don’t think other European countries will follow the same path.

German politics awaits a post-Trump US

Q: What will German foreign policy be like in the new era? Relations with the US and Germany’s role within Europe are among the most keenly anticipated and debated topics.

A: German foreign policy is still in an impasse, and the new government doesn’t have much time to decide what to do. With Merz, the world not only gains a new German chancellor, but Europe also gains a new leader. Although this may seem like a somewhat arrogant approach from Germany’s perspective, it is perceived and expressed similarly in other European countries. Hopes are pinned on Germany. To put it simply, steps such as the European Union’s future militarization plans, internal reforms, and gradual disengagement from America can only happen under German leadership.

The UK is no longer in the European Union and does not have the massive budget that Germany will have if it abandons its debt brake [a fiscal rule limiting structural government deficits] in the coming years. France, on the other hand, is in economic decline. Therefore, the burden of European leadership rests on Germany’s shoulders, and Europe must now redefine its own direction. This is now Merz’s responsibility. The real question is: To what extent will he and his new team be able to achieve this? Personally, I have my doubts, but objectively speaking, it is clear that Merz needs to set a direction in three fundamental areas.

The first goal is to completely redefine Germany’s relationship with America. However, this is not as easy as it sounds. For decades, Germany focused more on transatlantic thought—that is, an America-centric approach—than on Europe. Breaking away from America in cultural, civilizational, military, and economic contexts is almost impossible. However, if Europe wants to establish a more autonomous structure and realize the currently targeted vision of becoming a great power, it must do so. Meaning, Europe should become an independent great power alongside America, not subordinate to it. But this will not be easy, as resources may not be sufficient for this goal.

Ideologically, Germany is not ready for this either. When talking about reshaping the transatlantic relationship, it is necessary to emphasize this fact: Germany neither wants to nor can it distance itself from America. Because at the level of civilization, culture, politics, military and security policies—and even historically—it is completely intertwined with America. A large part of the elites in Germany were educated in America; they studied at American universities. Therefore, the prevailing approach in German politics is the expectation that Trump will fail within two years, Democrats will gain a majority in Congress, then two years later Trump will lose power, and a young Biden or a new Obama-like Democratic leader will replace him. This leader will then continue the transatlantic relationship that has existed since 1945. In fact, Germany’s hope and strategy is to invest in this scenario.

That’s why I say Germany’s strategy is contradictory: on the one hand, it aims to be more autonomous, but on the other, it is psychologically unprepared for it. Germany is still waiting, hoping to endure for another two years for Trump to leave the stage, and then hoping everything will return to how it was. Because Germany’s desire is to return to the old “normal,” the old status quo. In reality, Germany is not at all ready to assume a leadership role in Europe. Indeed, the main question is: Will Europe accept this new leadership claim by Germany under Merz? I am quite skeptical about this. The German or European elites have a desire for European leadership under Merz, but this desire may not be realistic.

The second major problem is Russia. Decisive decisions need to be made on this issue now, but the decisions currently being made are heading in completely the wrong direction. Everything is moving towards the possibility of a war with Russia. Here too, Germans and Europeans are largely living in a fantasy world. They believe they have always won for the last 35 years, that Europe is still strong, and that they can defeat Russia. However, I approach this with skepticism. Because Russia is still a great power and is on its way to becoming a great power again. In my opinion, Germany’s policy should not be directed towards such radical militarization, and it should not spend 500 billion euros on defense. Of course, deterrence can be relied upon, that is true. But at the same time—and this is completely lacking—diplomacy must be pursued, one must sit down with Russia at the table, and a compromise must be sought through negotiation. I believe this: A Europe positioned against Russia will never be stable. This should be the fundamental principle. We need a Europe that includes Russia. Constant conflict with Russia further weakens Europe; it divides Europe, just as it did during the Cold War. We need to see this.

The third decisive issue—after the US and Russia—is Germany’s relations with other states, especially with the Global South in general. Germany wants to redefine its foreign policy in this area. However, this will be very difficult as long as Germany only talks about “value-oriented foreign policy” and does not approach the world with a realistic, realpolitik perspective. The Global South, in particular, sides more with Russia than with Europe. At the same time, these countries are striving to form their own power bases and alliances against the West and America. New Eurasian-centered alliances are emerging before our eyes between Russia and China, and Russia and India. Central Asian countries are integrating into Russia’s security pact on the one hand, and China’s “New Silk Road” [Belt and Road Initiative] strategy on the other.

Yes, I believe the German federal government is not in a good position regarding these three main problems, because it has not yet fully grasped these realities. Germans and German politics are still in the euphoria of the victories of the last 35 years, believing that Europe has always won, is morally superior to others, that value-oriented foreign policy must necessarily apply to other countries and continents, and ultimately that America—especially Trump—will be ideologically defeated and everything will return to how it was. But things will not develop this way.

The European Union has launched an ambitious initiative targeting Central Asian countries, which have long fostered close military, economic, and political ties with China and Russia.

The EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on April 3-4, between the EU and five Central Asian countries, was the first of its kind and underscored Brussels’ interest in the region. With its “Global Gateway” project, the EU is attempting to create an alternative trade corridor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while its share of direct foreign investment in the region has risen to 40%.

One of the summit’s most significant outcomes was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s pledge of 10 billion euros in investment for the “Middle Corridor” passing through the region. Another issue that made headlines in Türkiye was the decision by member countries of the “Organization of Turkic States” to accredit ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus, which the UN recognizes as the legitimate government of Cyprus. The joint statement referencing UN resolutions that do not recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus caused controversy in Türkiye.

EU’s Central Asia move due to resource scarcity

Speaking to Harici, Alexander Rahr, head of the Berlin-based Eurasian Society, said that the EU’s recent move toward Central Asia is driven by the EU’s need for raw materials, raw material producers, and external resources. The German author noted that the EU has very few of the raw materials needed to strengthen its industry and industrial base, and therefore the EU is becoming increasingly dependent on external resources and raw materials.

“The EU has lost Russia, its main supplier and producer of raw materials; natural gas, oil and coal, and other minerals,” Rahr said, reminding that the continent is also in conflict with America, and a long-term trade war is expected between America and Europe, according to a number of experts. According to Rahr, it is therefore dangerous for the EU to rely only on the US or countries very closely linked to the US.

Rahr also stated that the EU is moving away from China. According to him, Brussels foresees a major crisis in China, a possible war with Taiwan one day.

Therefore, according to the German expert, the EU has very few options and is now eyeing Central Asia. These states are not too far from Europe and also contain a large amount of raw materials and minerals that the EU needs. Rahr continued:

“So the issue is clear: the EU needs a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries as a supplement to the lost Russian market and as a solution to problems with China.

The EU’s problem is that the Central Asian countries are very well connected to Russia and the Russian market. Russia’s influence in the region is much greater than that of the EU. The view that the EU will break Central Asian countries away from Russian influence is extremely naive. I think this is far too ambitious for the EU. They are also too late and the EU does not have the political instruments to do this.”

‘Brussels’ policy is disturbing because it focuses on values, not cooperation’

Rahr also emphasized that there are other large, active, hegemonic powers in the region. One of these is China: with its Silk Road strategy, it connects Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia partly to Europe and has a great deal of authority, political power, and influence in the region.

Türkiye is also in the region. It is very active in cooperation with Central Asian countries in this field.

Rahr therefore thinks that the EU is “too late” and also points out that the EU has other problems:

“Brussels’ foreign relations and economic policies focus on human rights, liberal values, and feminist foreign policy. All of these play an important role for the EU in building cooperation with countries outside Europe. But this is very disturbing for many countries that are not part of European culture. These countries do not want to be lectured or pressured by the EU. I think this is one of the obstacles to cooperation between the EU and Central Asian countries in the future.”

‘Eurasian countries will not break their ties with Russia just because the EU wants them to’

The German author also said that if Europe tries to encourage Türkiye, Central Asian countries, and even China to get rid of Russia’s influence, to break the ties they have established with Russia for decades, and to force countries such as Türkiye and Kazakhstan to participate in anti-Russia sanctions, he thinks that it is too late in this respect as well.

According to him, these countries, Central Asian countries, especially China, India, that is, “Eurasian countries,” have established a suitable relationship with Russia during these sanction wars. Therefore, he does not expect countries outside the EU to destroy their relations with Russia.

According to him, on the contrary, they benefit from these relations with Russia: “Of course, they also want to establish relations with the EU, why not? The EU is a very attractive market and has money for investment. But these countries also know the limits and political goals of the EU.”

‘Brussels will lose if it tries to break the region’s ties with China and Russia’

Rahr, who admits that trade relations between Germany and Central Asian countries are less important than, for example, these countries’ trade with China, says that China’s Silk Road strategy has developed very rapidly in this region.

Rahr noted that the EU, and especially Germany, can enter the region with European Silk Road strategies and ideas, “They can build special and very important corridors. This is logical and should be supported because a corridor built by Europeans may balance the political power carried by China’s Silk Road strategy,” he said.

Rahr thinks that the EU’s problem is “ideology.” According to him, Brussels will lose if it tries to spoil these countries’ relations with China or Russia:

“In my opinion, the EU will only win if it enters this region with an inclusive approach. Cooperation with all the main actors in the region and the construction of necessary corridors. Asia and Türkiye also benefit from this approach. But this must be a completely inclusive approach and must also combine investment with the globalization of markets, inter-market cooperation, and a common security approach for the region. A new Cold War should not be waged, as is currently the case in Ukraine.”

‘The Cyprus issue has been politically resolved in my opinion’

Finally, touching on the Cyprus issue, Rahr argues that the problem on the island has been politically resolved. “Everyone understands that Cyprus consists of two parts, the north connected to Cyprus and Türkiye,” Rahr claimed.

Rahr, who stated that “morality and international law” are very important for the West and that the issue is not completely resolved according to the Western approach, concludes his words as follows:

“In my opinion, if you look at the issue from a realistic and political point of view, there is a status quo in Cyprus. Many referendums were held on the island and the majority of the Cypriot population accepted the current status quo as it is. It seems impossible to change the real situation in Cyprus.

A realistic view should prevail here as well. You will always find some experts who question the ongoing processes in Cyprus and representatives of a larger international perspective.”