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Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam inauguration reignites Nile River tensions

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With Ethiopia’s inauguration of the Renaissance Dam last Tuesday, Addis Ababa has entered a new period of tension in its relations with the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan.

Cairo and Khartoum have long expressed their complete opposition to any “unilateral steps” that would harm water resources in the Eastern Nile basin, emphasizing that their water security is inextricably linked.

The Nile River originates in the tropical region of East Africa and consists of two main tributaries: the White Nile, which rises from Lake Victoria, and the Blue Nile, which rises from Lake Tana in Ethiopia.

These two rivers merge in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and flow northward, eventually emptying into the Mediterranean Sea.

While Ethiopia focuses on the potential benefits of the dam, the calculations in Khartoum and Cairo are becoming more complex.

Sudan’s Roseires Dam concern

For Sudan, the ecosystem of the Blue Nile will be negatively affected if approximately 300 cubic meters of water per second are not released. The size of the Renaissance Dam and its direct impact on the Roseires Dam, located about 100 kilometers away, are sources of serious concern.

The Roseires Dam, a hydroelectric power station, is situated on the Blue Nile in the Sudanese city of Ed-Damazin. Constructed between 1961 and 1966, the dam is used for irrigation and electricity generation, featuring a plant with a capacity of 280 megawatts.

Upgrades were made in 2013 to increase the dam’s storage and power generation capacity. This dam is considered the backbone of Sudan’s electricity grid, providing the country with clean and cheap electricity.

The safe filling and operation of both the Renaissance and Roseires dams depend on full compliance with the daily exchange of data between the two facilities.

Although this was stipulated in the 2015 Framework Agreement, the absence of a signed binding agreement means that commitments are not being fulfilled.

This situation jeopardizes the operation of the Roseires Dam due to a lack of information regarding discharge data, the safety status of the Renaissance Dam, emergency plans, and other technical operational matters.

Sudan argues that the necessary coordination must be based on a written agreement that guarantees the sharing of data on the filling and discharging of the dams.

Such an agreement should include a commitment to full cooperation to ensure the two dams operate in harmony, as the filling rules for the Roseires Dam depend on the amount of water released from the Renaissance Dam and the flood season.

Egypt’s search for alternatives

Egypt, meanwhile, continues to reject Addis Ababa’s policies regarding the dam, its future, and its negative impacts on the country’s water resources.

Egypt’s annual share of water from the Nile River is approximately 55 billion cubic meters, 80% of which is used in agriculture. Since Ethiopia began constructing and impounding water at the dam, the Egyptian government has resorted to various policies to reduce water consumption.

Chief among these measures are reducing the cultivation area for rice and focusing on crops that consume less water, such as corn, potatoes, and clover.

The government has also turned to projects like seawater desalination plants, wastewater treatment facilities, and the rehabilitation of thousands of kilometers of water canals to prevent water waste.

However, these measures and projects have not stopped Cairo from pursuing political and diplomatic efforts to compel Ethiopia to sign a binding legal agreement that secures the historical water shares of the downstream countries.

The historical roots of the dispute

The water dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia is not rooted solely in the Renaissance Dam but in the Nile waters themselves and whether Ethiopia recognizes Egypt’s 55.5 billion cubic meter share, established by the 1929 and 1959 agreements.

Ethiopia does not recognize these historical agreements, particularly the 1902 agreement signed between the then-Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and Great Britain, which colonized Egypt and Sudan.

Addis Ababa argues that these agreements were signed during the colonial era and therefore cannot be inherited, while Egypt strictly adheres to the theory of state succession to international treaties.

This deep disagreement led to Egypt’s refusal to join the Nile Basin Countries Framework Agreement, signed in 2010 and known as the Entebbe Agreement. While Ethiopia and other countries ratified the agreement starting in 2013, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo did not become parties to it.

Egypt’s reservations at the time centered on Article 14b concerning water security and Article 8 regarding prior notification for projects. Egypt demanded that it and Sudan be informed and their approval obtained before the implementation of any project.

At the Kinshasa meeting in May 2009, Egypt insisted that the legal framework of the agreement include text in Article 14b on water security, explicitly stating that Egypt’s historical water share would not be touched.

Furthermore, it demanded that Article 8, concerning the principle of prior notification for downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) to object before any project begins, be included in the main body of the agreement rather than in the annexes; however, these demands were not met regarding the Renaissance Dam.

Complex political conditions and a long negotiation process

In February 2011, the Ethiopian government announced the start of construction on the Renaissance Dam. Some observers viewed this move as taking advantage of the critical political situation in Egypt following the January 25th Revolution and the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak.

In Sudan, the government of President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in April 2019, but the country quickly descended into political tension and has been the scene of a bloody conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces since April 2023. This situation has weakened Khartoum’s negotiating position on the water issue.

While Egypt was preoccupied with its internal affairs, then-Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi laid the foundation stone for the project in April 2011, initially named “Millennium” and later changed to the “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”

Zenawi later proposed the establishment of a tripartite technical committee composed of the water ministers of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to study the dam issue and reach a common vision and agreement that would satisfy all parties.

The committee was formed in September 2011 and began its meetings two months later. This marked the beginning of a long negotiation process that included dozens of technical and ministerial-level meetings but failed to produce any solution.

In December 2023, Egypt announced the end of the negotiation process related to the dam due to, according to a statement from the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation at the time, “Ethiopia’s persistent refusal for years to accept any technical or legal middle-ground solution that would safeguard the interests of all three countries.”

Is there a solution to the conflict?

Last Tuesday, coinciding with the inauguration celebrations for the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, Cairo lodged a formal protest by sending a letter to the Security Council condemning a “unilateral act” contrary to international law.

In the letter from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo stated that the giant dam is a “unilateral act contrary to law and international customs.”

Egypt emphasized that it “will not allow Ethiopia’s attempts to unilaterally dominate the management of its water resources and reserves the right to take all measures guaranteed by international law and the UN Charter to defend the existential interests of its people.”

However, Egypt has not yet specified what these measures will be.

It is evident that the period after the dam’s commissioning will not be like the one before, especially since the dam has now become a fait accompli and given the political and economic challenges facing Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan.

Diplomacy

Ukraine faces demographic collapse as fertility rates slide

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British magazine The Economist reported that mobilization, conflict casualties, and pervasive uncertainty have left Ukraine confronting the threat of demographic collapse.

According to data cited by the magazine, Ukraine’s fertility rate has declined from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to between 0.8 and 0.9.

This rate marks a lower level than that of any major nation except South Korea.

In the first half of 2026, the number of deaths in Ukraine surpassed the number of newborn babies threefold.

The report noted that ever since independence was gained in 1991, the number of births in the country has lagged behind the number of deaths every year.

The Economist emphasized that the demographic collapse driven by the ongoing fighting constitutes an “existential threat.”

The magazine identified mass refugee migration as the principal driver of the population loss.

More than 5 million Ukrainians reside abroad, predominantly in Europe.

The proportion of those wishing to return among those who left the country is also steadily shrinking.

According to data from the Centre for Economic Strategy (CES), the share of those seeking to return dropped from 74% in 2022 to 43%.

The fact that the majority of refugees consist of Ukrainian children and women under the age of 44 further aggravates the demographic picture.

The Kyiv government decided to exempt men under the age of 25 from mobilization to alleviate the demographic decline.

The magazine reported, however, that many young people have fled the country, while those who remain do not plan to start families.

Projections cited in the report indicate that even if hostilities cease in the coming years, Ukraine can, at best, expect merely a deceleration of depopulation.

Olga Duhnich, an expert at the Ukraine-based think tank Frontier Institute, stated that the generation born in the 1990s and 2000s is the least populous in Ukraine’s modern history, meaning the country cannot expect a post-conflict baby boom.

The United Nations (UN) projects that Ukraine’s population will decline by 0.7% to 0.9% each year over the next two decades.

Under this projection, Ukraine’s population will fall to approximately 25 million by 2040.

If hostilities drag on, people are expected to abandon plans to have children, deepening the crisis even further.

Beyond exempting men under 25 from mobilization, the Kyiv government is rolling out various support packages to boost birth rates.

Under legislation enacted in the country, parents who have children receive a direct payment of 50,000 hryvnias (around $1,100).

Parents are also paid 7,000 hryvnias each month during the first year.

Other state programmes subsidize childcare costs, while Ukrainian soldiers are granted free freezing of egg and sperm cells.

Ukrainian Minister of Social Policy Denis Ulyutin said in May to the Livyi Bereh media outlet that roughly 22 to 25 million people lived in government-controlled territories.

Ulyutin characterized the prevailing picture by saying: “This is a catastrophe.”

Ella Libanova, Director of the Institute for Demography and Quality of Life Research, estimated the population at 29 million during the same period.

Libanova attributed the steep fall from a population of 30 million in 2025 to high death rates and the demographic crisis.

In a statement in October, Libanova announced that Ukraine’s population had slipped to 28.5 million.

Institute Director Libanova said: “The population is already at 28.5 million; we lost half a million people. We lost them, but thankfully this was still caused by migration rather than casualties.”

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Diplomacy

Armenian opposition urged to form joint front against constitution

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Narek Karapetyan, a lawmaker and head of the Strong Armenia faction in the Armenian parliament, has urged opposition parties to unite around four core principles set out in a joint declaration.

The key points of the declaration include resisting territorial concessions and blocking the adoption of a new constitution, which the opposition has termed the “Aliyev constitution”.

According to a report by Aysor.am, Narek Karapetyan stated that the opposition meeting was originally planned to be led by his uncle, businessman and Strong Armenia movement leader Samvel Karapetyan.

“We initiated the meeting, but the authorities took preemptive steps to prevent Samvel Karapetyan from launching the national unification process,” Narek Karapetyan said.

Noting that, despite these events, opposition representatives convened and signed a joint declaration based on four agreed articles, Narek Karapetyan invited other opposition forces and members of the public to join the alliance.

“We will not allow them to implement the Aliyev constitution in Armenia. We must unite,” Karapetyan said.

Ahead of these developments, Armenian National Security Service personnel detained Strong Armenia Party leader Samvel Karapetyan following a search of his home.

The party’s press secretary, Agavni Sukiasyan, announced that on the morning of the same day, the Investigative Committee of Armenia searched the homes of both Samvel Karapetyan and Narek Karapetyan.

In a report citing the Investigative Committee, Armenpress stated that Samvel Karapetyan was detained as part of a case involving allegations of causing large-scale financial damage to the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA) company, embezzling entrusted property, and money laundering.

According to committee figures, the total damage inflicted on the company exceeds $179 million.

Narek Karapetyan’s home was also searched at the end of July as part of a criminal case.

On 22 July, Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission approved the Prosecutor General’s request to strip Narek Karapetyan of his parliamentary immunity, and Karapetyan was charged with large-scale money laundering.

According to information reported by Sputnik Armenia, the investigation is linked to charges brought against Strong Armenia supporter Aleksan Aleksanyan.

Investigative authorities allege that Aleksanyan received approximately $4.4 million and €230,000 from the Karapetyan-owned Tashir Foundation under the guise of gifts and loans.

Several criminal cases had previously been opened against Samvel Karapetyan.

In 2025, Karapetyan was charged with publicly calling for the violent seizure of power after backing the Armenian Apostolic Church, which had been criticized by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

In January, legal proceedings were also launched against Karapetyan on charges of large-scale tax evasion and money laundering.

Separately, in early July 2025, the Armenian parliament approved a bill enabling the nationalization of the Electric Networks of Armenia company.

In March, Armenia’s Constitutional Court ruled that the nationalization process in question complied with the law.

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Putin approves standard-gauge rail link on China border

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According to analysts, the use of the same standard track gauge as China on the new railway line demonstrates Moscow’s ‘pragmatic’ approach toward strengthening ties with Beijing.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed into law an agreement providing for the construction of a second standard-gauge railway line at a key border crossing with China. Moscow aims with this move to accelerate its eastward pivot and bolster relations with Beijing ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit.

According to a document published on Monday on Russia’s official legal information portal, Putin signed the law ratifying the railway agreement reached with Beijing during his visit to China in May.

The two sides agreed to jointly construct a new line along the cross-border railway connecting Zabaykalsk in southeastern Russia with the city of Manzhouli in northern China.

The defining feature of the new line is that it will use the 1,435-millimetre standard gauge, the most widely used track gauge globally and the one adopted by China, rather than the 1,520-millimetre broad gauge predominantly employed across Russia’s national rail network.

Speaking to the South China Morning Post, Li Lifan, a specialist in Russian and Central Asian affairs at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, said the second standard-gauge line will help ease freight transit capacity constraints at the border crossing. This will reduce waiting times for cargo trains and enhance the speed and reliability of transport services along the eastern corridor.

Freight trains running from China to Russia currently rely on a single 1,435-millimetre gauge track at the Manzhouli-Zabaykalsk border crossing. This transit point handles more than 60% of rail freight trade between China and Russia, as well as a significant share of Europe-bound cargo traffic.

Because trains travelling in opposite directions must take turns using the same track to cross the border, bottlenecks occur periodically.

Zoey Wang, a director covering corporate, infrastructure, and project finance ratings at international credit rating agency Fitch Ratings, said the project is expected to provide more stable transport conditions for two-way shipments of commodities, machinery and electrical goods, consumer products, and cross-border e-commerce cargo.

According to Wang, the project will make corporate shipping schedules more predictable and help reduce costs arising from delays, cargo detention, and supply chain disruptions.

According to Russian media reports, Moscow expects the second line to increase annual transport capacity at the Zabaykalsk border crossing to 39 million tonnes by 2030, an increase of 11 million tonnes over current levels.

With Western sanctions curtailing its access to European markets, Russia has increasingly redirected its trade toward Asia in recent years.

However, experts caution that putting the new line into operation does not necessarily ensure a substantial increase in trade volume. In the view of analysts, the true significance of the decision lies in the strategic calculations underpinning it.

According to Li, despite Russia’s stated target, inadequacies in the country’s domestic railway infrastructure will constrain actual growth. This is because cargo will still need to be transhipped onto 1,520-millimetre gauge rolling stock to move further into Russia.

“This decision does not indicate a shift in the country’s railway gauge system. Rather, it represents a pragmatic choice made at a time when Russia’s pivot to the East is entering its implementation phase,” Li said.

In Li’s assessment, Moscow concluded that the benefits of easing bottlenecks along the trade corridor with China outweighed the costs of preserving existing procedural barriers at the border.

Li also noted that the timing of Putin’s signing was a deliberate choice. The decision came ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit to be held later this month in Shenzhen.

According to Li, Moscow wants to “demonstrate that it can deliver on its commitments to Beijing and set an example that could be replicated elsewhere.”

Zhao Long, director of the Institute of International Strategic and Security Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, offered the following assessment:

“Although Russia has long adhered to the broad-gauge standard, the depth that strategic trust and coordination between China and Russia have reached today leaves no real reason to resist laying standard-gauge railways on specific connecting sections, particularly across critical border segments.”

Zhao continued:

“This situation also reflects the growing influence and gravitational pull of China’s economic, trade, and transport connectivity networks, not only over Russia, but across the entire Eurasian continent.”

Wang also said the project demonstrates that China’s railway technical standards and associated services are finding increasingly broad application internationally.

However, Wang cautioned that increasing border crossing capacity does not automatically guarantee a corresponding rise in trade volume.

According to Wang, the actual impact of the project will depend on a range of factors, including freight rates, inter-customs coordination, European demand, regulatory policies, and operating conditions along the corridor.

According to Russian media reports, construction on the Russian section of the second line is already under way and is expected to be completed by the end of 2026. The section on the Chinese side is scheduled for completion in early 2027.

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