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EU tales for grown-ups: One day chicken and the next day the feathers

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For decades, EU membership was probably the issue most sold by dream merchants in Turkey. Selling dreams started in the 1980s, gained momentum in the 1990s and peaked approximately in the first decade of the current government. The propaganda that if we make these reforms we will be one step closer to the EU or if we solve the Cyprus problem we will be almost there has been circulating. The EU issue was turned into such a huge garbage bag that anything could fit in it. While the PKK’s demands from Turkey were first presented as what we needed to do in terms of human rights and freedoms within the framework of the EU acquis, later on it was almost openly taken to discussions on federation in the name of democratizing Turkey. While Greece and the Greek Cypriots were cooking on our necks during that period, they never failed to ask us when we would withdraw our troops from Cyprus or when we would officially register our full acceptance of Greece’s theses in the Aegean. The Armenian diaspora and the circles backing Armenian slander were also on full watch with their own agenda. The terror of the pundits on television and in newspapers was so tedious that everyone in their right mind was lamenting that Turkey was being turned into Germany, Japan or Italy, which had been occupied at the end of the Second World War, and was being held responsible for everything to everyone. The only difference was that the other countries had fought a big war, with terrible losses and destruction, and had lost the war. But Turkey, in the name of democratization, was treated like a country that had lost the war.

The EU, unable or unwilling to openly say no to Turkey, a country with a population too large to fit into the European Union, a strategically difficult geography and, more importantly, a culturally unpopular country, played a decades-long game with Ankara. As anyone who carefully followed the documents prepared by the EU during the so-called negotiation process immediately realized, the aim was not to make Turkey a member at the end of a certain preparation and negotiation process, but on the contrary, to take all measures to block its path, and it did just that.

December 17, 2004 decisions and the negotiating framework document

For example, Article 23 of the EU summit conclusions of December 16-17, when Turkey was given the date for negotiations, was far from providing a roadmap on how Turkey would become a member and roughly how soon. For the first time in the EU enlargement process, the negotiations would be open-ended and the outcome would not be guaranteed from the beginning. Moreover, even if Turkey were to become a member by accident one day – which was made virtually impossible – this membership was virtually up for grabs because permanent derogations would be in place. In other words, a member state would not be able to benefit from some of the EU’s rights and facilities in perpetuity. For example, Turkey would be permanently excluded from agricultural and structural policies, meaning that Turkey, with a lower per capita income than most of the other members, would not be able to share in the funds provided by these policies. However, the exclusion of a full member country should normally be limited to temporary periods of five or ten years. In fact, a ten-year transition period was envisaged for the ten countries that became members in 2004, whereas for Turkey these derogations were made permanent. Moreover, a permanent derogation was also mentioned for free movement. The content of these summit decisions, one of the EU’s mandatory documents, was further hardened and imposed on Turkey, which started negotiations in 2005, as the Negotiating Framework Document.

In this document, the recommendations of EU institutions – e.g. resolutions of the European Parliament, etc. – were also made mandatory for Turkey and reinforced with other conditions. In 2004, Turkey was obliged to sign the Harmonization Protocol with the EU, which had to be passed by the Turkish Parliament and put into practice. If it did so, trade with the island of Cyprus would have to be carried out through the customs of the pirate Greek Cypriot state using the name of the Republic of Cyprus, and the TRNC would/would have become a signboard state. Moreover, the ships and planes of this pirate state would be able to use Turkish ports and airports. On the other hand, Turkey was also ordered to recognize this pirate state, which was already a member of the EU according to the Negotiation Framework Document, and to exchange embassies. Everything that was unacceptable, from the recognition of the Armenian genocide slander to the opening of the closed borders with Armenia, was included in these documents. The aim was to keep Turkey in this game for a while, to extract important concrete concessions from it, especially on Cyprus and the Aegean, and after harassing it with such demands, to make Ankara walk away from the table saying ‘take your unity and go to hell’. In order to achieve this goal, a capacity to digest was added to the documents. Accordingly, even if Turkey fulfilled everything that was ordered, the EU would not allow membership due to a lack of absorptive capacity.

The Wikileaks documents that came to light in the following years were full of examples that illustrate this scheme very well. When America was telling its European allies how important it was to keep Turkey busy with this deception, it was pointing out that a Turkey that left or was removed from the EU process would oppose many of the things that America wanted to do in the Middle East, especially the construction of Kurdistan, but that a Turkey that was kept in the EU harmonization process would reduce such risks by keeping it distracted with expectations. In fact, this is exactly what happened in the end. The Greek Cypriot state, which did not understand this big game well enough, blocked Turkey’s negotiation chapters related to the Customs Union on the grounds that Turkey had not put the Harmonization Protocol into effect. When the financial crisis erupted two years later, shaking first Greece, then the southern countries and then most of the EU, the EU’s gilding began to fall off for Turkey and Ankara’s enthusiasm for membership began to wane. Then came the showdowns within the current ruling party and the government, freed from the shackles of the EU, began to object to America’s Kurdistan project in the Middle East. And the Turkey-EU negotiations became increasingly unsustainable and stalled/stopped.

The process full of dangerous articles

What could be the purpose of making statements now as if they want to restart this process? We have to ask this question because even if the EU side is wrong and decides to restart this process, the opening of important chapters blocked by the Greeks may not be possible even if we try to give the TRNC to the Greeks. Such a period was tried many times during and after the Annan Plan years. The current government, with the policies it pursued then, had already given up on the TRNC but could not do so. When the Greek-Greek side sees that Turkey is about to make concessions, they raise their demands and expectations so high that Ankara becomes unable to make concessions. As the late Denktaş succinctly put it, it is thanks to Greek-Greek fanaticism that we have not made any major mistakes so far.

To summarize, EU membership with the current acquis is not possible for the structural reasons mentioned above. Moreover, a membership envisaged/designed by this acquis would be a membership so lopsided that it cannot be compared to the membership of other member states. A Turkey that is permanently excluded from Agricultural and Structural policies, that does not have the right to free movement and even, as stated in the documents in question, a Turkey that does not have the right to vote and authority in the EU institutions in proportion to its population… As I have always said as an academic who was constantly criticizing this course in those years, the EU’s membership of Turkey with that acquis would be nothing more than selling our current relations as EU membership. Therefore, it is in Turkey’s interest to opt out of this process and what should be done is to transform the customs union with the EU into a free trade agreement in an appropriate environment and get rid of our obligation to apply the EU’s customs tariffs.

If some people are suggesting that if we raise the EU issue, this will lead to an influx of capital and direct investment from the West into Turkey, it should be well known that this is not true. Turkey’s international image is negatively affected as the EU responds negatively to every statement of the Turkish side in this direction. On the other hand, we should also be aware that it is not possible for Turkey to pursue an independent and self-interested foreign policy if it re-enters the negotiation process with the EU, that is, within the EU’s punching range. If we think that we can talk about the EU and talk about a two-state solution in Cyprus, or that we can enter the EU process and at the same time fight the PKK and the PYD/YPG in Syria, we are deeply mistaken. On the other hand, if we dream of a quick EU membership by turning multipolarity into an opportunity, it is necessary to put it that way, because this cannot be done without throwing the existing Turkey-EU acquis in the trash. And expecting membership from here is just a dream in the foreseeable future, given the current political and cultural atmosphere within the EU. If we do not intend to enter into such a toxic process anyway and we are not in such a dream world, then we may be having strategic communication problems.

OPINION

G20 Summit could use a few extra pairs of chopsticks

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Li Yunqi, Journalist
CGTN Radio

“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?

Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.

But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.

In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.

These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.

This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.

The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.

The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.

This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.

The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.

Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.

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OPINION

Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East

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On November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.

Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.

Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.

Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.

Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.

However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.

Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.

Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.

Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.

In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.

After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”

It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.

The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.

Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.

With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.

Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.

Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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OPINION

Palestinian messages to the Arab-Islamic Summit

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Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.

Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.

Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.

Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.

Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.

Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.

These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.

Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.

In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.

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