Diplomacy
‘Non-Western lingo was used to show that relations with China are considered independent of the West’

The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Turkey, who met with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and then President Erdoğan in Ankara yesterday, can be seen as an opportunity to put relations back on track after they were strained by the domestic political agenda during the election period. In particular, Wang’s emphasis on the need to encourage more Chinese companies to invest and do business in Turkey seems to have pleased Ankara, which is seeking foreign investment in the midst of an economic crunch.
Indeed, the center of gravity of the meeting was the Central Corridor from Beijing to London, with Turkey at its center. While President Erdoğan expressed his desire to accelerate cooperation in the context of harmonizing the Belt and Road Initiative and the Central Corridor, Wang Yi, who is also a Politburo Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Director of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, stated that “they are ready to enhance mutual strategic trust and deepen cooperation with Turkey”.
The Chinese Foreign Minister emphasized that they support Turkey to play an important role in the regional and international arena and that they oppose any foreign interference in Turkey’s internal affairs.
Chinese media also highlighted President Erdoğan’s telling Wang that they “do not support NATO’s increasing activities in the Asia-Pacific” and emphasizing their commitment to the “one-China” principle.
The Uighur issue, seen as one of the most critical problems in the relations between the two countries, was glossed over with a sentence such as “The situation of Uighur Turks was also discussed on the occasion of the visit”, once again showing that the emphasis and statements made on the ‘Uighur issue’ during the election period were handled in the context of domestic politics.
‘Economy and trade dynamics are catalysts in Turkey-China relations’
Commenting on the visit to Harici, Istanbul Gedik University ASEAN Center Director Dr. Sibel Karabel pointed out the importance of timing conjuncturally and said the following:
“First of all, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the state of Turkey-China relations in the current conjuncture and the extent of economic and trade relations. The strategic partnership of the two countries should also be emphasized in this context. In 1971, diplomatic relations were established and as President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated in the meeting, Turkey has been adhering to the ‘one China’ policy since then. In 2010, a strategic partnership was established. In 2015, Turkey officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative with a memorandum of understanding. And mutual commitments have been made to continuously increase the volume of bilateral trade and engagement between the two countries in the regional and global context.”
Stating that economic and commercial dynamics are “the catalyst” in Turkey-China relations, Karabel listed the following data: “When we evaluate the background of the Belt and Road Initiative, a target was set for the mutual trade volume between the two countries to reach 50 billion dollars as of 2015. We are talking about a trade volume of 33 billion dollars. On the other hand, Turkey’s foreign trade deficit against China, which unfortunately increases rapidly every year, especially between 2019 and 2022, is an important issue. In fact, in this context, the Belt and Road initiative is both an initiative that will highlight Turkey’s potential to become a center for transit trade and an initiative that has the caliber that can cure this problem. In other words, the investments made and planned to be made in the Belt and Road initiative have the potential to turn these trade dynamics between Turkey and China a little more in Turkey’s favor.”
Pointing out that Turkey is currently lagging behind this potential, Karabel summarizes the dynamics of the current commercial relationship as follows: “We know that the total investment of Chinese companies in the Belt and Road Initiative between 2013 and 2022 is approximately 1.4 trillion dollars. And in the same period, we see that the investments allocated to Turkey are 5.11 billion dollars. So our share in total investments is around 1.3 percent. And especially when we look at the trade balance between Turkey and China between 2019 and 2022, we see that imports have doubled. In other words, by nature, semi-finished goods are imported from China and processed and re-exported to the European Union countries. This is the dynamic of the trade relationship.”
Central Corridor emphasized
Sibel Karabel noted that the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor were particularly emphasized in the talks, and that Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan drew attention to different energy fields, aviation fields, different sectors, and mentioned “improving the Belt and Road Initiative’s ability to respond to global threats and global challenges”.
Underlining the importance of Wang Yi’s emphasis on “developing strategic mutual trust and deepening cooperation mechanisms”, Karabel said, “Wang Yi even talked about a future-oriented and broad-targeted relationship dynamic in his meeting with President Erdoğan.”
‘A relationship within its own dynamics separate from the West’
On the other hand, drawing attention to President Erdoğan’s emphasis on the ‘One China policy’ and the fact that China’s development is not perceived as a threat by Turkey, Karabel stated that the expression “China’s development is perceived as a threat” is a Western jargon, and that it is a matter of how the West sees China: “The West perceive China’s development as a threat when evaluated from the realist paradigm in the context of the relative balance of power on the global level.”
In this context, Karabel said that Erdoğan’s statement that “they do not see China’s development as a threat” can also be considered as a “tacit reference” to NATO documents and commented as follows “In fact, there is a tacit emphasis here that Turkey’s relations with China are independent from the West and have their own dynamics. This is an important emphasis.”
The importance of the Central Corridor and Turkey increased after the Ukraine crisis
Karabel also touched upon the importance of the Ukraine issue in the bilateral relations and discussed this in the context of Turkey’s growing importance in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor:
“The Belt and Road Initiative is actually a very dynamic initiative and is being pursued under the direction of the National Planning Commission in China. It is not only a matter of combining the plans, projects and infrastructure lines that were declared in 2013 and have been rigidly and rigidly implemented since then, but also the articulation of previous mechanisms and projects into the Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore, the Central Corridor, where Turkey is located, is actually more prominent in the context of Ukraine. As a matter of fact, one of the biggest trademarks of the Central Corridor is that it is more advantageous than the Northern Corridor and the Southern Corridor. On the trade route from China to Europe, it has a cost advantage because it stops at fewer countries. There is also a very serious saving in time. It significantly reduces the number of days of transportation. In fact, before Ukraine, the route that China tended to use more was the Northern route. Now there are more countries on the Southern route. There are countries subject to sanctions etc. So now, after the Ukraine incident, the importance of the Middle Corridor has increased a bit more for China.”
The course of relations with the US, EU and China reflects the new era of Turkish foreign policy
On the other hand, evaluating the visit together with the NATO summit, Karabel points out that events and sectors are intertwined with each other and that this situation reflects the new era of Turkish foreign policy:
“At the NATO summit, the F-16s came to the fore, especially in the Swedish issue, and on the other hand, Turkey’s integration with the European Union and the European Union membership negotiation process were brought back to the agenda. The revival of Turkey’s full membership negotiations with the EU is a step towards revitalizing the almost frozen relationship. Turkey’s relations with the European Union do not only consist of membership negotiations. That is an important part, but there are also acute issues. For example, the Customs Union, modernization of the Customs Union negotiations, visa liberalization. In fact, there are a number of acute mini-sectoral issues. Therefore, on the one hand, there is an effort to revitalize these, and on the other hand, there is an effort to carry out relations with the United States in a way to develop relations on a more common ground, such as the F-16 issue.
On the other hand, as a result of the conjunctural developments in relations with China and Asia, we observe that Turkey’s leverage is actually increasing, especially in issues such as being an epicenter of transportation and turning this structural trade balance in its relations with China more in its favor. These are indeed conjunctural and historical opportunities, important opportunities.”
Diplomacy
Russia–Ukraine failed peace talks: The war must go on

Nikola Mikovic, journalist
The mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse. The long-awaited peace talks between Russia and Ukraine were finally held on May 16 in Istanbul, though they failed to produce a ceasefire or a peace agreement. The question now is: what comes next?
Initially, Russian and Ukrainian representatives were scheduled to meet in the largest Turkish city on May 15. Since the Ukrainian delegation did not appear, the peace talks were postponed to the following day. Such a move could be interpreted as a diplomatic humiliation for Moscow, given that the Russian officials waited the entire day in vain for their Ukrainian counterparts. Kyiv seems to have adopted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy of being notoriously late for important diplomatic meetings. The problem for Ukraine, however, is that this approach did not yield any positive results.
According to reports, the Russian delegation has issued maximalist demands, expecting Kyiv to withdraw its troops from four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) annexed by the Kremlin in exchange for a ceasefire. Russia has also reportedly threatened to seize Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy regions. In reality, however, Moscow lacks the capacity to seize the town of Vovchansk in the Khariv region, located just 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the Russian border, let alone the entire oblast. Its rhetoric, therefore, seems like a bluff. Fully aware of this, Kyiv rejected any territorial concessions to Russia.
Prior to the talks, Ukraine, firmly backed by European powers, insisted on an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, while Moscow wanted any potential truce to be result from the negotiations. In other words, the two sides could not even agree on the first steps, which was a clear indication that reaching a deal will be easier said than done. Still, they managed to agree on exchanging 1,000 prisoners of war each, which is the only positive outcome of the Istanbul peace talks.
Although Russian and Ukrainian delegations are expected to continue negotiations, there is no guarantee that they will reach a peace (or at least a ceasefire) deal anytime soon. Their positions are fundamentally opposed. More importantly, neither side has achieved any of its strategic objectives on the battlefield, which effectively rules out any immediate opportunity for peace. But this is not the first time their peace talks have failed.
Days after Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian and Ukrainian representatives met in Belarus in an attempt to end Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, as Russian troops were on the outskirts of Kyiv. Ukrainian officials agreed to travel to the neighboring nation even though it is a close ally of Russia and had allowed Russian forces to use Belarusian territory for attacks on their country. Talks, however, concluded without any result.
Later rounds of talks took place in March 2022 on the Belarus–Ukraine border and in Antalya, Türkiye. Since then, Istanbul has become the major platform not only for their peace summits, but also for discussions on the grain deal – a document, signed in July 2022, under which the Kremlin effectively allows its opponent to freely exports grain via the Black Sea route. Although Türkiye undoubtedly played an important role in helping Moscow and Kyiv sign The Black Sea Grain Initiative, the 2022 peace talks in Istanbul failed to end the conflict.
The Istanbul talks in 2025 differ significantly from those held in 2022. At the time, Russia demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops only from the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, along with a de facto recognition of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. Now the Kremlin’s demands have grown, as Russia is also calling for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. More importantly, as a result of the 2022 Istanbul talks, Russia made a “goodwill gesture” by withdrawing its troops from Kyiv, as well as Sumy and Chernihiv regions of Ukraine. This time, however, the Kremlin has shown no willingness to make any serious concessions to Kyiv—at least for now.
Moscow has also demonstrated that negotiations can be conducted without Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian leader Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that he does not want to negotiate with the “illegitimate” Zelensky. Therefore, any talks with Ukraine’s president would undermine Putin’s credibility, which is something he wanted to avoid at any cost.
Zelensky, on the other hand, despite signing a decree in 2022 formally declaring negotiations with Putin to be “impossible,” openly said that he wants to meet with the Russian president. He likely aimed to demonstrate a willingness to end the conflict, while simultaneously portraying Putin as someone who “does not want to negotiate.”
The Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul even requested a meeting between the two leaders. Russia has “taken note” of Kyiv’s ambition. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Putin will agree to meet with Zelensky, at least not before his potential meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump.
In the meantime, the Ukraine war will go on. As Medinsky said, quoting Napoleon, “War and negotiations are always conducted at the same time.” Both sides will, therefore, be preparing for a summer military campaign, although they are expected to continue to create the illusion that reaching a lasting peace deal without defeating the opponent is possible.
Finally, until one of the two sides prevails, Türkiye, as a host country, will remain the winner of the peace talks. On May 8, during a telephone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump offered him to become a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. Three days later Putin, without mentioning Trump’s efforts, acknowledged the role of Türkiye and its president in organizing the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.
Türkiye has, therefore, once again solidified its position as an influential player capable of hosting peace negotiations. That is why a new round of Russian-Ukrainian talks will almost certainly take place in Istanbul – sooner rather than later.
Diplomacy
European leaders accuse Putin of undermining peace talks in Istanbul

Leading diplomats from the European Union (EU) have accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of undermining the process by refusing to participate in peace negotiations planned for May 15 in Türkiye, aimed at ending the conflict with Ukraine.
The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Poland, Czechia, and Estonia made strong statements on the matter.
Delegations from the warring countries are already in Türkiye. The Ukrainian delegation is effectively headed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while the Russian delegation is led by Putin’s aide, Vladimir Medinsky.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said that Zelenskyy showed good faith by coming to Türkiye, but where Putin should have been seated, there remained “an empty chair.”
Barrot stated, “Putin is trying to buy time, and it is clear that he does not want to enter into peace negotiations, despite US President Donald Trump expressing his readiness and willingness to mediate.”
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul made a similar statement. The Minister expressed, “Putin is exaggerating his position. The whole world expects him to finally fulfill the demand to sit at the negotiating table with a delegation appropriate to the seriousness of the situation.”
According to Wadephul, Zelenskyy’s willingness to engage in direct dialogue with Putin deserves respect, but the Russian side “is not showing a sign that it is approaching the negotiations seriously.” Wadephul warned that this behavior would not be without consequences and that Europe was discussing further sanctions.
On the other hand, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, speaking at a high-level meeting of NATO diplomats in Antalya, argued that the Kremlin’s decision to send a low-level delegation to the negotiations in Istanbul showed that Putin was “trying to buy time.”
Sikorski added, “We hope that the US President sees this cynicism for what it is and draws the right conclusions.”
Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský stated that Putin’s refusal to meet Zelenskyy directly in Istanbul showed the Russian President’s cowardice.
The Minister remarked, “The real question is whether this can be called a peace negotiation. Putin is clearly afraid. He sent one of the ideological figures, which in itself is a signal of how he is approaching this, meaning not very positively.”
Lipavský also added that his counterparts attending the informal meeting in Antalya expressed a shared view that Putin’s actions showed he did not want to take a step forward.
The Czech Minister said, “European leaders clearly stated that new sanctions could be forthcoming.”
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna also criticized the level of the Russian delegation tasked with conducting the first direct talks with Kyiv in three years.
Tsahkna declared, “Russia’s rejection of a ceasefire and sending an ultra-nationalist with no political status to Istanbul instead of Putin is a slap in the face to Ukraine and its allies. Russia is still not interested in peace, which means we need to increase pressure.”
Lipavský and Barrot also shared a photo taken with US Senator Lindsey Graham. The two ministers reported that the congressman confirmed the US was ready to tighten sanctions on Russia if Putin continued to stand in the way of peace.
Putin had proposed the first direct talks between Russia and Ukraine since spring 2022 take place in Istanbul on May 15. This offer came in response to a demand from the US and EU countries for a 30-day ceasefire.
Zelenskyy had announced he was ready to meet Putin in person in Türkiye. However, the Russian President sent a delegation led by his aide, Medinsky.
The negotiation group also included Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff Igor Kostyukov, and Deputy Defense Minister Aleksandr Fomin.
Zelenskyy described the Russian delegation as “a show.” Ukraine was expected to be represented in the negotiations by Head of the Presidential Administration Andrey Yermak, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Andrey Sibiga, and Presidential Diplomacy Advisor Igor Zhovkva. It was noted that Zelenskyy planned to attend the meeting only if Putin also participated.
Diplomacy
US approves missile sale to Türkiye exceeding $300 million

The US State Department has approved the sale of advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) and Sidewinder missiles to Türkiye, totaling over $300 million.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), part of the Pentagon, submitted two separate notifications regarding this approval to Congress.
According to a written statement from DSCA, the first approved package includes 53 AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), valued at approximately $225 million, along with 6 AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections for these missiles.
The second package approved by the department covers the sale of 60 AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II missiles, related logistics and program support elements, and 11 AIM-9X Block II Tactical guidance sections, totaling $79.1 million.
It was stated that the air-to-air missiles approved by the US administration could be used in various aerial missions, primarily by Türkiye’s F-16 fighter jets.
There is a 15-day objection period for the weapon sale approvals submitted to Congress.
If no objection is raised by members of Congress during this period, the weapon sale will officially take place.
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