The European Union has launched an ambitious initiative targeting Central Asian countries, which have long fostered close military, economic, and political ties with China and Russia.

The EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on April 3-4, between the EU and five Central Asian countries, was the first of its kind and underscored Brussels’ interest in the region. With its “Global Gateway” project, the EU is attempting to create an alternative trade corridor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while its share of direct foreign investment in the region has risen to 40%.

One of the summit’s most significant outcomes was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s pledge of 10 billion euros in investment for the “Middle Corridor” passing through the region. Another issue that made headlines in Türkiye was the decision by member countries of the “Organization of Turkic States” to accredit ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus, which the UN recognizes as the legitimate government of Cyprus. The joint statement referencing UN resolutions that do not recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus caused controversy in Türkiye.

EU’s Central Asia move due to resource scarcity

Speaking to Harici, Alexander Rahr, head of the Berlin-based Eurasian Society, said that the EU’s recent move toward Central Asia is driven by the EU’s need for raw materials, raw material producers, and external resources. The German author noted that the EU has very few of the raw materials needed to strengthen its industry and industrial base, and therefore the EU is becoming increasingly dependent on external resources and raw materials.

“The EU has lost Russia, its main supplier and producer of raw materials; natural gas, oil and coal, and other minerals,” Rahr said, reminding that the continent is also in conflict with America, and a long-term trade war is expected between America and Europe, according to a number of experts. According to Rahr, it is therefore dangerous for the EU to rely only on the US or countries very closely linked to the US.

Rahr also stated that the EU is moving away from China. According to him, Brussels foresees a major crisis in China, a possible war with Taiwan one day.

Therefore, according to the German expert, the EU has very few options and is now eyeing Central Asia. These states are not too far from Europe and also contain a large amount of raw materials and minerals that the EU needs. Rahr continued:

“So the issue is clear: the EU needs a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries as a supplement to the lost Russian market and as a solution to problems with China.

The EU’s problem is that the Central Asian countries are very well connected to Russia and the Russian market. Russia’s influence in the region is much greater than that of the EU. The view that the EU will break Central Asian countries away from Russian influence is extremely naive. I think this is far too ambitious for the EU. They are also too late and the EU does not have the political instruments to do this.”

‘Brussels’ policy is disturbing because it focuses on values, not cooperation’

Rahr also emphasized that there are other large, active, hegemonic powers in the region. One of these is China: with its Silk Road strategy, it connects Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia partly to Europe and has a great deal of authority, political power, and influence in the region.

Türkiye is also in the region. It is very active in cooperation with Central Asian countries in this field.

Rahr therefore thinks that the EU is “too late” and also points out that the EU has other problems:

“Brussels’ foreign relations and economic policies focus on human rights, liberal values, and feminist foreign policy. All of these play an important role for the EU in building cooperation with countries outside Europe. But this is very disturbing for many countries that are not part of European culture. These countries do not want to be lectured or pressured by the EU. I think this is one of the obstacles to cooperation between the EU and Central Asian countries in the future.”

‘Eurasian countries will not break their ties with Russia just because the EU wants them to’

The German author also said that if Europe tries to encourage Türkiye, Central Asian countries, and even China to get rid of Russia’s influence, to break the ties they have established with Russia for decades, and to force countries such as Türkiye and Kazakhstan to participate in anti-Russia sanctions, he thinks that it is too late in this respect as well.

According to him, these countries, Central Asian countries, especially China, India, that is, “Eurasian countries,” have established a suitable relationship with Russia during these sanction wars. Therefore, he does not expect countries outside the EU to destroy their relations with Russia.

According to him, on the contrary, they benefit from these relations with Russia: “Of course, they also want to establish relations with the EU, why not? The EU is a very attractive market and has money for investment. But these countries also know the limits and political goals of the EU.”

‘Brussels will lose if it tries to break the region’s ties with China and Russia’

Rahr, who admits that trade relations between Germany and Central Asian countries are less important than, for example, these countries’ trade with China, says that China’s Silk Road strategy has developed very rapidly in this region.

Rahr noted that the EU, and especially Germany, can enter the region with European Silk Road strategies and ideas, “They can build special and very important corridors. This is logical and should be supported because a corridor built by Europeans may balance the political power carried by China’s Silk Road strategy,” he said.

Rahr thinks that the EU’s problem is “ideology.” According to him, Brussels will lose if it tries to spoil these countries’ relations with China or Russia:

“In my opinion, the EU will only win if it enters this region with an inclusive approach. Cooperation with all the main actors in the region and the construction of necessary corridors. Asia and Türkiye also benefit from this approach. But this must be a completely inclusive approach and must also combine investment with the globalization of markets, inter-market cooperation, and a common security approach for the region. A new Cold War should not be waged, as is currently the case in Ukraine.”

‘The Cyprus issue has been politically resolved in my opinion’

Finally, touching on the Cyprus issue, Rahr argues that the problem on the island has been politically resolved. “Everyone understands that Cyprus consists of two parts, the north connected to Cyprus and Türkiye,” Rahr claimed.

Rahr, who stated that “morality and international law” are very important for the West and that the issue is not completely resolved according to the Western approach, concludes his words as follows:

“In my opinion, if you look at the issue from a realistic and political point of view, there is a status quo in Cyprus. Many referendums were held on the island and the majority of the Cypriot population accepted the current status quo as it is. It seems impossible to change the real situation in Cyprus.

A realistic view should prevail here as well. You will always find some experts who question the ongoing processes in Cyprus and representatives of a larger international perspective.”

In recent days, I had the opportunity to set out from Shanghai—one of China’s most vibrant and intellectually rich cities—and revisit Hangzhou and Beijing. These cities are home to China’s most prestigious universities and provide an ideal setting for gauging the pulse of academic circles. With Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States reigniting trade wars through heightened tariffs, the growing turbulence in the international system, and China’s position in this emerging world order, I engaged in extensive conversations with Chinese academics. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, these scholars offered candid insights into China’s foreign policy and the global balance of power. The questions are mine, while the responses come directly from these academics.

From Shanghai to Beijing: China’s academic community speaks

China’s role in the international system has been a frequent topic of debate in both the West and the East in recent years. The escalating trade wars spurred by Trump’s tariffs and a world order shaken by conflicts like Ukraine-Russia and Palestine-Israel have once again placed China under the global spotlight. During my discussions with leading academics from universities in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing, I sought to understand how China views this chaotic landscape and where it positions itself within it.

‘China keeps its distance from conflicts, but it’s a strategic choice’

The first striking aspect of China’s foreign policy is its cautious stance toward conflicts beyond its borders. According to the academics, China justifies this approach with its principles of “non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs” and “non-involvement in disputes between third parties.” However, I posed a pointed question: “Isn’t the root cause of these wars the power vacuum in the international system? If the U.S. were as strong as it once was, would conflicts like Russia-Ukraine or Palestine-Israel be as widespread? Doesn’t China bear some responsibility for the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order? If so, how logical is it for China, as a partial architect of this turbulence, to stand on the sidelines?”

One academic responded decisively: “Yes, it benefits China. The U.S. is no longer as powerful as it once was and is steadily weakening. Constantly engaged in wars, the U.S. is losing both prestige in the international community and economic ground. This situation works against the U.S. and in China’s favor.” I countered with an objection: “But doesn’t it seem like China is losing ground too? Russia and Iran paid heavy prices in Syria over the years, yet China couldn’t even economically support Syria’s reconstruction. Had it done so, might the Assad regime have survived? With Russia tied up in Ukraine and Iran clashing with Israel, Assad was left unsupported and fell. Moreover, groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party have gained strength in Syria and may soon have the capacity to establish a state. Can anyone guarantee that these groups won’t one day target China’s Xinjiang region?”

The academic acknowledged my concern: “Yes, what you say is partly true. Assad had lost the support of his people, and a leader who loses that support will inevitably fall, one way or another. But for China, the real threat isn’t the jihadist groups themselves—it’s the powers backing them. If China is ever forced to fight—and that would truly be a last resort—it would confront not the terrorist organizations, but the forces behind them. China doesn’t approve of Russia’s approach in Ukraine and is pursuing a different path.”

‘Russia made a mistake, China doesn’t favor proxy wars’

Curious about this “different path,” I pressed further: “What do you mean?” The academic’s response was striking: “Russia, with the largest landmass in the world, claimed its goal in Ukraine was to counter groups attempting ethnic cleansing of Russians—which was a legitimate concern. But it did what it swore it wouldn’t: it annexed the territory of a sovereign state. China, on the other hand, hasn’t launched a military operation even in Taiwan, which is internationally recognized as part of our territory. That’s because the people of Taiwan are our people; we seek peaceful reunification, and it will happen eventually. If an operation over Taiwan occurs, it won’t be between China and the island—it will be between China and the powers that support it behind.  China doesn’t engage in proxy wars.”

This response hinted at a red line in China’s approach to conflicts. “So, does that mean China will ignore global conflicts until they reach its borders?” I asked. The academic clarified: “No, of course we’ll raise our voice. We’ll stand against imperialism and with the oppressed. But we won’t be drawn into direct conflict as the U.S. wants. We do not want to jump into the trap that set by the U.S..We’re not ready for that now, but we’re preparing. Look at history: Britain won both world wars but lost all its strength. The U.S., entering both wars late, emerged fresh and energetic, securing victory and becoming the architect of the new world order. China is gathering its energy and strength today. Meanwhile, the U.S. is repeating Britain’s mistake—constantly fighting and wearing itself out.”

‘Waiting for the right moment is China’s strategy’

But isn’t there a limit to this “energy-gathering” strategy? “What happens if you lose all strategic points to the U.S. in the meantime?” I asked. The academic offered a historical perspective: “As Chinese, we, like the Turks, prefer to move forward with historical references. During international crises, we focus on resolving our internal issues and border disputes—it’s a form of preparation for the larger battle. Take the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. While the world was fixated on the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we settled our issue with India in one month. No one even noticed. Of course, no Chinese can figure out why the India launched a war with China first. Similarly, in 1979, amidst the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Second Oil Crisis, we are forced to start the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, we entered Vietnam, achieved our goals swiftly, and withdrew. Timing is important for China.”

In short, while its adversaries fight, China builds its strength, preparing to defend itself when the moment is right. So when might that moment come? “At what point would China shift from rhetoric to action?” I asked. The answer was clear: “Maybe Iran, or maybe the direct attack from U.S.. Iran is so important for the safety of Central Asia and China. We oppose intervention in a sovereign state. Just as the U.S. supported Ukraine against Russia, we would support Iran anyway.”

‘Until 2030, a period of conflict and cooperation’

The academics also shared a long-term vision for China’s relationship with the U.S. “Until 2030, China will adopt a strategy of engaging the U.S. without entering direct conflict,” they said. They describe this period as one of “conflict and cooperation”, but maybe the most intense and dangerous period compared with the next 10-20 years. The reasoning lies in China’s domestic priorities: “Our western provinces are still underdeveloped. Until China completes its overall development, it won’t risk a direct confrontation. Militarily, we don’t want to be part of a conflict, nor do we think we’re ready for one. But after 2030, the gap between China and the U.S. will be reduced to a large degree and the balance will be in China’s favor. By then, we believe the U.S. won’t dare risk a direct conflict either. If they do venture into such ‘madness,’ China will be ready.”

‘China won’t kneel to Trump’s tariffs’

When the topic turned to Trump’s tariffs, the academic was resolute: “We’ll see it through to the end. In 2018, we didn’t immediately retaliate to the U.S.’s tariffs on China, but things are different now. We didn’t start this trade war, and we won’t bow to the U.S.”

Russia-U.S. agreement and new alliances

I also asked about the possibility of a Russia-U.S. deal: “It was said that China and Russia’s partnership had no limits—does that still hold?” The academic replied: “But there is a bottom line for the relations. China has never seen Russia as an enemy. We understand the security rationale behind its intervention in Ukraine, but we’ve always supported a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. If Russia strikes a deal with the U.S., that’s their choice. According to the official documents, China has no allies. The only ally China has maybe the North Korea because of the Korean War.”

Finally, I touched on recent developments: “Last month, Russia blamed European states for world wars, avoiding mention of the U.S. Trump suggests he could reach an agreement with Russia. Meanwhile, tariffs seem to be bringing China and Europe closer. Just last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited China, emphasizing cooperation. Could we see a China-EU alliance pitted against a U.S.-Russia bloc in the near future?” The academic didn’t rule it out: “There are no eternal friendships or enmities. It’s possible. And with potential land and rail links between China and the EU, the strategic importance of Central Asia and Turkey grows. Turkey’s geopolitical position and ties with Central Asia could make it a key partner for China.”

Conclusion: China’s strategic patience and future plans

This interview with Chinese academics reveals Beijing’s patient, strategic, and long-term approach to the turbulence in the international system. By steering clear of conflicts and building its strength, China aims to avoid direct confrontation until 2030, even 2035, 2049 while completing its development. The academics predict that, post-2030, China’s advantage over the U.S. will grow, preparing it for any potential conflict. A critical key country like Iran or a strategic issue like Taiwan could prompt China to act sooner. In the face of Trump’s trade wars, China stands firm: it won’t back down. Meanwhile, emerging partnerships like Russia-U.S. and China-EU, potentially involving Turkey, hint at a global realignment. Time will tell what role China ultimately plays in this chaotic world.

Lucas Zeise, a German economist and co-founder of Financial Times Deutschland, shared his views on the militarization of industry in a recent interview. Zeise said, “If more and more is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of the road to disaster.”

Born in 1944, Lucas Zeise is a financial journalist with a background in philosophy and economics. His career includes positions with the Japanese Ministry of Economics, the German aluminum industry, the Frankfurt-based Börsen-Zeitung, and the Financial Times Deutschland, which he co-founded. Until 2017, he served as editor-in-chief of UZ, the weekly newspaper of the German Communist Party (DKP). He currently writes a regular column for Junge Welt and contributes articles to various publications.

Lucas Zeise answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions about the debate on German industry and economy and global developments.

Tunç Akkoç: First of all, is deindustrialization a reality?

Lucas Zeise: Yes, I think so, but of course it is a long-lasting reality. Deindustrialization is a process that coincides with capitalist development in general. Industry has been the main surplus-value-producing element of capitalism in all countries, and in some of the more developed countries, notably Britain, deindustrialization has reached a more advanced level. Since Britain was the first fully developed capitalist country, this process started earlier.

Economists often refer to this process as the tertiary sector, i.e. the service sector in general. In capitalist countries, the share of services in the economy is steadily increasing. This is a general trend that can be observed everywhere, and is particularly related to the fact that developed countries are gradually shifting their industries to other regions, especially South-East Asia, by exporting capital. While industrialization is taking place in these regions, the process of deindustrialization in developed countries has accelerated.

In addition, the process of financialization has also accelerated and the financial sector has become stronger. However, the finance sector is a service sector, not an industry. Nevertheless, all these service sectors depend on industry remaining strong. When we analyze the UK, we can see that the country has experienced a relative decline compared to other regions. For example, Germany had overtaken the UK in the industrialization process and even surpassed it before the First World War. Likewise, the US has also overtaken the UK in terms of industrialization.

This is a long-term trend. However, two major industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, have managed to resist this process for a long time. The recent economic shocks, however, have accelerated Germany’s deindustrialization process, which has brought about an inevitable crisis. This is the essence of the whole issue.

Tunç Akkoç: Some influential figures in the European Union, such as Mario Draghi, have argued that Germany should move away from the car industry and invest in new technologies such as artificial intelligence. What do you think about such proposals for structural change?

Lucas Zeise: I think such proposals for structural change will happen spontaneously on the one hand. I mean, this process is already going on naturally. China has already overtaken Germany in the car industry. Therefore, Mario Draghi’s advice on this issue is actually a cheap suggestion. It is easy to suggest something like this and then say ‘Great job!'”

On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to steer the economy in this way. It is not enough to say, ‘OK, now we are investing heavily in artificial intelligence and we will get ahead in this field.’ Moreover, it is debatable whether artificial intelligence is really a great revolution or just a passing fad. Artificial intelligence can actually be considered as a sub-branch of the semiconductor industry, i.e. microelectronics.

Of course, the development of microelectronics is important and all countries are making state-sponsored investments in this field. The European Union and Germany are already encouraging this. However, this is not something that is unique to Germany or something that makes Germany different from others. While it is possible to make great progress in this area, this alone is not the final solution to a problem.

Tunç Akkoç: In general, how do you assess Germany’s future energy supply strategy?

Lucas Zeise: Obviously, I am not an expert in this field, so it is difficult for me to give a really good assessment. But it seems very clear to me that all states have to pay attention to such a central sector of the economy.

Germany was already in a different position in that it did not have its own oil companies. This has become a historical tradition. As for natural gas, there used to be two big centers: one centered around BASF, the other around Ruhrgas. These two structures were interconnected and worked well for a while. Over time, however, this system changed and other areas of the energy sector, especially electricity generation, were restructured.

However, this does not change the fact that the energy sector must be guided by the state. Energy policy should be managed by the state in a holistic manner. Developing a common energy policy in the European Union already seems unlikely. However, such a policy should have been mandatory for such a large common market.

At this point, if we look at the example of Turkey, the energy sector there is handled, managed and coordinated in a relatively centralized manner. In Germany, and at the EU level in general, there is a major deficiency in this respect. The state does not really take enough ownership of the energy issue.

Tunç Akkoç: On the other hand, German industry is increasingly turning to the defense industry. Some see in the militarization of the economy the potential for a kind of ‘re-industrialization’. After the war in Ukraine, more and more German companies are breaking the taboo on supplying the defense industry and entering the military equipment sector. How should we assess this development?

Lucas Zeise: On the one hand, this is clearly a sign of the collapse of the still developing and relatively well-functioning global economy. If more and more of it is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this activity is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of a road to disaster.

It is also clear that there is competition for the best defense tenders in the international arena. That is why everyone feels that it needs to enter this field strongly. Nobody just wants to buy aircraft from the US, but wants to build their own defense industry. Germany was already taking part in this process. Although not always at the forefront, tank production in particular has long been strong. This sector was progressing steadily, albeit at a slow pace.

However, this development seems to herald an impending catastrophe. It shows that everyone is preparing for war. This is very similar to the atmosphere before the First World War.

Tunç Akkoç: Elections are approaching in Germany. Do you think that after these elections, Germany’s economic policies will change with a new political order?

Lucas Zeise: More likely no, I don’t think so. I think that economic issues have become a bit more prominent, but if we look back, I remember that in the German Bundestag elections in 1969, one of the main debates in the election campaign was whether the German Mark (D-Mark) should appreciate against the US Dollar. So, a very specific and economically critical issue for Germany at that time was at the center of the election campaign. This debate was directly related to the position Germany should take vis-à-vis the US and Europe.

Today such a debate is missing. The issues that really need to be addressed —energy policy, deindustrialization— are being dealt with in a strangely distorted way. The only thing that everyone seems to agree on is the Agenda 2010 program that Gerhard Schröder launched in 2002 or 2003. This program meant lowering wages, reducing social benefits and increasing profit-making opportunities for companies.

But this approach was already wrong at the time. Schröder’s move enabled some big companies to make a big leap forward and strengthened German capital, especially in the European domestic market. This had certain advantages, but repeating it now would only worsen the situation.

That’s why I think the debate is being conducted in the wrong way and not particularly along party lines. On the contrary, there seems to be a consensus among most political actors on this issue.

Tunç Akkoç: How do you assess the first actions of the Trump administration and what will be the impact on international relations and the global economy?

Lucas Zeise: In my opinion, there is not a new wave of deregulation (liberalization). The US government’s more aggressive stance towards other great powers, or as Trump calls them, ‘shitholes’, or small states, ruthlessly suppressing and crushing them, is not deregulation. It is, in fact, a further intensification of the rivalry between the capitalist states, which are essentially allies, by any means necessary. We can see this situation clearly.

This is not deregulation; it is more like what happened during the Ronald Reagan era. At that time, the US tried to revitalize its rivalry, not with China, but especially with Japan and Western Europe. Reagan’s ruthless behavior towards his own allies was aimed at strengthening the US global position. Today, I think it has become even harsher, so much so that the President of the US can stand up and say, ‘Oh Denmark, you have to give us Greenland, or else we will buy it.’ They even imply that they can intervene directly if necessary.

This kind of behavior is actually a continuation of the past US policies towards Panama. Panama was detached from Colombia and made independent because the US wanted to build a canal there. In other words, this imperialist behavior towards weak countries is already a tradition. But the behavior towards medium-sized states such as Germany, Britain, France or Japan is becoming more and more brutal. I see this as the result of an intensifying and ever more bitter rivalry.

The US in particular is less and less reluctant to use its military power more recklessly, and this is becoming more and more prominent. This is not a new era; it is a further advance of neoliberalism and laissez-faire. The so-called ‘rules-based economic policy’ rhetoric has been completely discarded.

Tunç Akkoç: We see both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic comments about the Chinese economy. When government bonds lose value, pessimists sound the alarm; when exports break records, optimists raise their voices. Does China have the intention or the power to ‘share’ the world with the US?

Lucas Zeise: I completely agree with you; the overly optimistic comments are as exaggerated as the overly pessimistic ones. If I try to think from the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders, their tradition has been to position China as the largest economic power and to take the first place in the capitalist world.

In the present situation, if I am the second most powerful country, naturally my goal is to equalize with the first. And I have to do this because there is almost no scenario in which the US will accept this and say, ‘OK, we can live in peace with China.’ For a while it seemed as if there was this understanding, that we were working well with China and we were happy with that. But this is clearly no longer possible.

The official US policy is based on not allowing China to become an equal power. They want to continue to set the rules and, if necessary, to violate them according to their own interests. Therefore, China is forced to act like an imperial power.