Europe
The “German Problem” returns
Export champion, Europe’s largest economy, the engine of growth on the Old Continent, a classic industrial giant… Germany, once known by these titles, is now entering the public agenda associated with falling behind, deindustrialization, job losses, inflation, political infighting, and, in short, stagnation.
Everyone is talking about Germany’s weakness. The automotive sector, which showed signs of crisis even before the pandemic, is considered one of the most symbolic indicators of the country’s decline. The crisis in automotive is followed by energy costs stemming from the disruption of cheap gas flows due to sanctions following the Ukraine war, and the downturn experienced in sectors such as chemicals and machinery production.
Concerns about the future are growing due to the technical recession across the economy. The new CDU-SPD grand coalition set out with the goal of changing this mood but has not yet succeeded. The coalition narrowly avoided the pension package vote turning into a crisis that threatened the government’s existence. Many believe that the days of the government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz are numbered.
Bearing all this in mind, despite everything, I argue that the German state will re-emerge—and indeed has already emerged—as a problem in Europe. I state this not only in the context of the massive militarization trend in Germany but also within the scope of the international restructuring centered around the US.
Question marks regarding the US military presence in Europe are moving towards a plan where Germany is being pushed from behind by the Trump administration itself. Militarily, Germany is being forced, by the US itself, to take the leadership of the Continent. Merz is already preparing for this. Moreover, unlike Europeans who are panicking due to the new US National Security Strategy (NSS), he is able to display a self-confidence that says, “You may write off Europe, but at least establish your relationship through Germany.”
Handelsblatt writer Moritz Koch also draws attention to this point. According to him, precisely while these discussions of weakness are ongoing, the country is experiencing a “historic increase in power.” Koch writes, “It is not Germany’s decline that will shape the next decade politically. On the contrary, it is the Federal Republic becoming Europe’s dominant power.”
Koch reminds us of the “turning point” (Zeitenwende) announced by Olaf Scholz after the Ukraine war, believing that this has changed the balance of power on the continent and that the US departing from its role as “security guarantor” has accelerated this trend.
His answer to the question “Who will protect Europe in the future?” does not include the British or the French; these countries are “chronically cash-strapped.” The only country that can financially bear this burden is Germany; the resources necessary for significant rearmament are gathering here:
“The world has rarely looked so threatening, and Europe has never looked so lonely. In this extraordinary situation regarding security policy, Germany has been assigned the role of lead nation. In the long run, a well-equipped Bundeswehr [German Armed Forces] could make a significant contribution to deterring Russia and at least fill the conventional void left when America turns its back on Europe.”
In this context, debates on conscription(1), a giant rearmament budget of 108 billion euros (defense spending is expected to reach 153 billion euros annually by 2029), the mobilization of “civilian” sectors within the scope of state and military restructuring (with sounds of “planning” being heard here and there), the reorganization of the labor market in line with the needs of the defense industry, and the adoption of next-generation defense technologies and the venture capital involved in this package(2) are all part of the new government’s policy set.
It appears that Europe has also set its sights on Germany; at the very least, promotional activities for it to undertake this role are intensifying. The Financial Times conducted a poll of 88 economists. The result of the poll indicates that for Europe to enter a stable growth path, the Germans’ debt-fueled $1 trillion defense infrastructure investments must succeed.
Both the European Central Bank and the FT economists foresee growth in the Eurozone slowing down to 1.2 percent in 2026. They expect private consumption and defense spending to provide a surprise. There is no harm in predicting the “Americanization” of the Eurozone economy: A consumption boom driven by the richest 10 percent of the population and a production increase pumped by militarization. While “monetary policy,” one of the creeds of the neoliberal era, is sidelined, “fiscal policies” will come to the fore. And of course, there are the “structural reforms” to strengthen the German economy, the “sick man” of Europe.
It is worth remembering that support for this comes from the Americans, provided that Britain and France are added to the mix. The American Edward Luttwak, known for his books on coups d’état, argued in an article penned last May that “superpower” competition has returned and that Europe needs a new superpower:
“Whatever the differences between the three governments, they can act with much greater agility than NATO can as a whole. The tripartite agreement is clearly easier than dealing with dozens of European NATO members from Estonia to Norway and Spain.”
Luttwak says that in a military context, Germany will focus on armored forces, which is still its “area of expertise,” while the British and French will complement this with light infantry and commando units. This trio can counter Russia in the air and at sea; this is the author’s claim.
Let’s return to Koch. Koch claims that Germany’s European neighbors responded “with satisfaction” to the Chancellor’s announcement that he wanted to build “Europe’s strongest conventional army” and to Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’s call for “war-ready” armed forces. Yet he reminds us, “But will this remain so? The German question has shaped European history. Now this question is being asked again.” From the 19th-century debates on German unity to the Anschluss, from the problem of German-speaking communities on the Continent to the two camps of the Cold War, the “German Question” has always been a source of anxiety for non-Germans; Koch implies this.
The author calls on the current German government, and those to come, to behave humbly and attentively towards “large and small partner countries.” If Berlin does not act in line with “European interests” and displays a “stubborn or even nationalist attitude,” distrust will poison Europe, old conflict lines will re-emerge, and rivalries thought to be long overcome will flare up again.
Europe must learn to protect itself, and Germany’s military power can make a significant contribution to this; Koch sings this familiar tune of the German ruling class. But he adds: “This power must never again fall into the wrong hands.”
The wrong power, as can be guessed, is the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Backed by the support of the Trump administration, the AfD is closing 2025 with great progress. First place in the polls is added to electoral success. But more importantly, in a manner that is not exactly quiet, a fierce war of attrition is being waged against the “Easterner” (read: “pro-Russia”) wing of the party, led by Co-Chair Alice Weidel, who came out of financial giants like Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, and Allianz to enter politics. Weidel and her supporters in the party seem to have taken control and, by throwing the AfD into a new transatlantic alliance system, have articulated it into the “national-conservative” international centered on Trump and the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). Close relations with “sister parties” in Hungary and Austria point to the formation of a new Central European sphere of influence.
This articulation means that holes are being opened in the “firewall” domestically as well. The AfD rightly believes that the CDU/CSU is pursuing policies inspired by its own program, and therefore, the time has come for an AfD-CDU coalition. The junior partner of the previous coalition, the Free Democrats (FDP), has almost melted away. It is worth remembering, though forgotten today, that the founders of the AfD were economists who broke away from the FDP during the Greek crisis, arguing that Germany should not bear the financial burden of the Eurozone.
In the economy, especially in what we call Mittelstand companies (family-owned SMEs), the tendency to cooperate with the AfD is increasing, and it is not surprising that the first shot in this regard was fired by the FDP’s Marie-Christine Ostermann. In the SME sector, for example in Saxony, one in every two entrepreneurs now sympathizes with the AfD; especially because it displays a friendly attitude towards the business world, just as the FDP once did.(3)
Therefore, the German Question in 2026 tends to take on much more frightening dimensions with the de facto division of the AfD. In the AfD, which clings ambitiously to the new transatlantic alliance, the voices of those advocating for their country to obtain the atomic bomb, arguing that one must stay in NATO “as long as it lasts,” and believing that relations with Russia should not be established as warmly as before, are becoming louder.
It is obvious that the AfD will also play a role in this “turning point” (Zeitenwende). But one should expect the process to be full of ups and downs. German militarism will penetrate society and Europe not in a sharp (“revolutionary”) way, but in a more spread-out, evolutionary manner that transforms the mood. The government, under increasing pressure to take on a greater security role in Europe, also has to struggle with the constraints of a strategic culture that has viewed military service as a risk since World War II.
On the other hand, the most important output of the US asking Germany to assume the leadership role in the event of its withdrawal from the Continent should be expected to be the intertwining of German-American defense industry connections rather than the sudden expansion of the German army. While the German arms sector is experiencing a major revival, transatlantic cooperation, especially regarding new technology drones, maritime, and air defense, is growing increasingly. Partnerships intensifying in 2025 between Anduril and Rheinmetall, Lockheed and Diehl, and Northrop Grumman and MBDA provide a significant signal.(4)
More critically, the Mittelstand companies, which were cut off from Russia’s cheap energy after the Ukraine war, are recovering through this cooperation: The German defense industry includes approximately 1,350 medium-sized companies that frequently serve as suppliers to US defense industry manufacturers. Research by INSS on the German defense industry determines that for some of these specialized firms (in 2023), 50 percent of sales consisted of exports to the US military; sales to the Bundeswehr were only around 7 percent. Indeed, Germany’s National Security and Defense Industry Strategy admits that the domestic market is insufficient to protect and expand value chains and to encourage innovation in the long term.(5)
On the other hand, militarization certainly encourages a kind of “domestic consumption”: The 100-billion-euro special fund (Sondervermögen) shifted the focus of many firms to domestic contracts. For example, the electronics firm Rohde & Schwarz, whose products were 90 percent export-based, sees its domestic business rising to 30-35 percent following the Zeitenwende. This capital flow also supports domestic infrastructure, such as the new ammunition factory Rheinmetall opened in Unterlüß at a cost of 300 million euros.
Therefore, the withdrawal of the American shadow from Europe and Germany being pushed from behind to lead are two parallel processes; the greatest proof is that the cooperation between the German defense industry and the US increases German domestic consumption. Consequently, those looking forward to the day American boots leave the Continent need to be alert about whether they will get German panzers in return. Europeans, and we on the edge of Europe, face the risk of waking up to the German Question once again on New Year’s morning.
(1) The new bill aims to close the personnel gap in the German Armed Forces through a “selective service framework”: All 18-year-old men will complete a questionnaire and medical screening to assess their willingness and suitability for service, while women can participate voluntarily. The registration process will begin on January 1, 2026, for men born in 2008 and later. The law also envisages better pay and social rights for volunteers, as well as incentives for long-term service. Initially focusing on voluntary recruitment, the law leaves open the option of reintroducing compulsory service if the number of volunteers remains insufficient.
(2) According to a report published on CNBC this month, the United Kingdom and Germany stand out as key hubs for a new wave of artificial intelligence defense startups. German AI drone manufacturers Helsing and Quantum Systems reached valuations of 12 billion and 3 billion euros respectively this year following investment rounds worth hundreds of millions of euros. Stark, founded in 2024, produces drones for attack and reconnaissance purposes and has secured $100 million in funding from investors including Sequoia Capital, Peter Thiel’s Thiel Capital, and the NATO Innovation Fund. According to recent market research by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, more than 6,600 AI startups employing 149,000 people have been founded in Germany since 1995.
(3) German thinker Wolfgang Streeck argues that most AfD members are “middle-class Poujadists,” adopting an anti-state and pro-neoliberal stance. The movement (UDCA) founded by Pierre Poujade in France in the 1950s mobilized mainly the lower middle classes, shopkeepers, artisans, and peasants in the south.
(4) The Anduril-Rheinmetall partnership will produce military drones for Europe. While Lockheed and Diehl cooperate on maritime air defense systems, Northrop Grumman and MBDA have signed a memorandum of understanding to develop air defense systems connected to Germany’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). To this, the Patriot production cooperation between Raytheon (RTX) and MBDA should be added.
(5) More than 135,000 skilled workers are employed in the German defense sector. These positions usually require high-level technical expertise, such as specialized welding and the production of complex systems like tank gun barrels. In terms of financial impact, German defense companies generate approximately $30 billion in annual revenue. Germany’s arms export licenses have also reached record levels recently: They were worth 12.2 billion euros in 2023 and 13.2 billion euros in 2024.
Europe
Hungary’s new PM Magyar vows absolute ban on illegal migration, challenging Brussels over fines
Hungary’s newly elected Prime Minister Péter Magyar has pledged to block all illegal migration, reject European Union quotas, and challenge Brussels’ punitive fines, signaling a highly restrictive border policy even as he vows to restore ties with European partners.
In his first interview with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung since taking office, Magyar outlined his administration’s strategic roadmap. He addressed the smear campaigns directed against him by the former government of Viktor Orbán, relations with the EU, migration policy, and the economic necessity of maintaining energy ties with Russia.
Reflecting on his transition to power, Magyar noted that the Orbán administration targeted him, his family, and his colleagues during a highly polarized campaign.
“I have known Viktor Orbán for a long time. What happened during the election campaign was no surprise to me, even if it might be difficult to imagine in other countries,” Magyar said. “The mudslinging campaign was not just directed at me personally, but also against my family, my colleagues, and my friends. However, those who faced each other were not Hungarians against Hungarians; it was Viktor Orbán and his vassals standing against the Hungarian nation. One of our most important campaign promises is that we will do everything we can to reunite the Hungarian nation.”
Despite running a pro-European campaign to secure victory, Magyar acknowledged fundamental disagreements with Brussels, particularly on migration. He argued that former Prime Minister Orbán’s hardline stance during the 2015 European migrant crisis was correct.
“My government will pursue an extremely strict and decisive policy regarding illegal migration,” Magyar said. “You can be as angry with Viktor Orbán as you want—and no one has criticized him more than I have—but when the migration crisis began in 2015, he was right. Many member states have now admitted they made wrong decisions at the time. In any case, we will protect our homeland, our country’s borders, and the external borders of Europe.”
“Hungary will not accept any illegal migrants”
Responding to whether Hungary would comply with newly implemented EU asylum rules, which mandate member states to conduct processing procedures at external borders, Magyar delivered a firm refusal regarding quotas and penalties.
“I can only say this: Hungary will not accept any illegal migrants. We will not pay any penalties for this either,” Magyar said. “However, we will help protect Europe’s external borders, whether in Greece, Malta, or Italy. The 2015 migration crisis must be a lesson for Europe. The most important duty of European politicians is to protect the safety of the people. I believe there are many ways to stop illegal migration without violating European Union rules. It is simply a matter of being able to negotiate.”
Magyar also dismissed the current relevance of a European Court of Justice ruling imposing a daily fine of 1 million euros on Hungary for failing to implement EU asylum procedures, arguing the decision is outdated.
“The court’s decision was made at a very different time and under a different legal framework,” Magyar said. “Today, we are in a completely different situation. This decision no longer reflects today’s reality. Today, there are many countries acting just like Hungary, yet this European Court of Justice decision does not apply to them. I find this incredibly unfair. In order to protect our borders and avoid having to pay the daily fine of 1 million euros, we will hold talks with our European partners and find a common solution.”
While acknowledging that the judicial ruling is final and cannot be appealed, Magyar described the financial burden on Hungarian citizens as unjust.
“The decision cannot be appealed. We are looking for new rules and opportunities to avoid paying the fine,” he said. “It is unfair and disproportionate that the people of Hungary must pay a fine of 1 million euros every day. Similarly, it is a great injustice that while other member states receive these funds, Hungary has been provided with no financial resources for the wire fence it constructed to protect the external border of the European Union.”
“Exclusion only makes the far-right stronger”
Magyar strongly opposed pushback from member states—particularly pressure from Germany—to transition EU foreign policy decision-making from unanimity to qualified majority voting, defending the preservation of national sovereignty.
While rejecting the confrontational rhetoric favored by Orbán toward Brussels, Magyar emphasized the importance of compromise among sovereign states.
“I served as a diplomat within the European Union for a long time, and I know very well how difficult it is to reach a consensus among 27 countries. Yet, most of the time, this is achieved,” Magyar said. “Orbán always said, ‘We must defeat Brussels.’ I do not think that is the point. The point is to understand each other, to persuade, and not to try to defeat one another. People do not want a United States of Europe; they want a European Union based on strong member states. For this reason, I do not support transitioning to a majority voting system in many areas instead of the unanimity rule at this stage. We will negotiate and find a middle ground.”
Addressing the political rise of far-right parties across Europe, particularly in France and Germany, Magyar criticized traditional political elites for being disconnected from public anxieties and relying on political moralizing.
He warned that isolating these populist movements is counterproductive.
“I do not like labels like far-right or far-left. I do not like ideological wars,” Magyar said. “People deserve more than politically correct speeches where ideological labels are slapped on one another. I have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of other member states, and I will not do so; on this point, I differ from Orbán. However, I observe that some countries make mistakes in combating extremist parties. In many countries, politicians do not act honestly. They do not understand people’s fears and expectations, and they do not dare to talk openly about problems and face them. They use the language of political correctness and, at the end of the day, fail to grasp reality itself. These are precisely the mistakes that certain groups exploit. Excluding these people and these parties, building a wall of isolation around them, is not a solution on its own. Exclusion only makes these forces stronger. In many countries, these mistakes have been recognized, but not yet everywhere.”
Asked if this critique applied to Germany, Magyar maintained his criticism of governing establishments.
“In many countries, the political, media, and economic elites protect their own positions and do not always address the real fears and problems of the people. But the public does not forget this. That is why what we need is honesty, honesty, and once again, honesty,” he said.
On the debate over whether conservative factions in the European Parliament should cooperate with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, Magyar shared his perspective on the future strategy of the European People’s Party (EPP), which includes his own party, Tisza.
“In the European Parliament, political forces must always seek a majority, and grand coalitions between the center-left and center-right can function. Germany and Austria are good examples of this,” Magyar said. “However, this does not always work, and that is why the CDU/CSU and the European People’s Party, which includes my party Tisza, may have to make a decision one day. In my view, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) are the natural allies of the European People’s Party. Whether they want to cooperate with the AfD is not my decision to make. However, I believe that talking to one another and listening to the other’s arguments never causes harm. What we accept from each other’s proposals is an entirely separate matter.”
“Europe will partially return to Russian energy after the war”
Defending Hungary’s decision to continue importing crude oil and natural gas from Russia despite the war in Ukraine, Magyar emphasized the country’s landlocked geography and economic constraints.
“The Hungarian people elected me as the Prime Minister of Hungary. My government’s duties include ensuring energy security, security of supply, and the lowest possible energy prices,” Magyar said. “In recent years, Hungary has become one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the European Union. Three million people live below the poverty line. Our neighbors in the European Union must understand that Hungary is a landlocked country. We are still dependent on Russian oil, and we cannot change this overnight. We have not seen economic growth for years, and we need cheap energy to grow. Of course, we are doing everything we can to diversify our energy resources, but we cannot afford to see our companies’ competitiveness decrease further and Hungarian families’ energy poverty increase. I think Europe will partially turn back to Russian energy resources and lift sanctions when the war ends, because the competitiveness of all of Europe is at stake here. In a future state of peace, no one has an interest in maintaining a new economic and political Cold War. For this, of course, the war must first end.”
While Orbán maintained close ties with American conservative movements and received explicit support from Donald Trump, Magyar indicated that the change in leadership in Budapest would not damage relations with Washington.
“The US is Hungary’s natural ally in NATO and a highly important economic partner. What happened during the election campaign will not change this. We will maintain good relations with every American administration,” Magyar said.
Magyar criticized Orbán’s personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, arguing instead for a pragmatic, non-ideological approach to Moscow in the post-war era.
“I know the role of Russia in Hungarian history very well. I have not forgotten the years 1849 and 1956. In both periods, Russian troops bloodily suppressed the Hungarian freedom movement,” Magyar said. “But on the other hand, the reality is that geography does not change. We must accept this as it is. Therefore, we must develop pragmatic relations with Russia once the war against Ukraine ends. Nonetheless, it is extremely clear that Russia currently poses a security risk to all of Europe. It is unacceptable that people in Europe must live in fear of Russian sabotage or a Russian attack. That is why this war must end, and we must provide international security guarantees to Ukraine. However, Europe can only develop when normalcy returns, and Russia cannot have an interest in a new Cold War becoming permanent on the continent.”
“We can turn a new page with Ukraine”
Magyar pledged to end the hostile state-sponsored propaganda directed at Ukraine by the previous administration, emphasizing his respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and his personal involvement in humanitarian efforts.
“We want to build good relations with all our neighbors, not least because a Hungarian minority lives in each of them. This also applies to Ukraine,” Magyar said. “We have always stated that Ukraine is the victim in the Russia-Ukraine war and that Ukraine has the right to its territorial integrity. When the Russians bombed the largest children’s hospital in Kyiv in the summer of 2024, I immediately went to Kyiv with our volunteers and personally delivered the humanitarian aid of the Hungarian people. Right after the attack, we set off in a 30-year-old Ford Transit and reached Kyiv within 20 hours under air raids and missile bombardments. I did not see any other European politician at that bombed hospital. We are currently holding talks with Ukraine at a technical level, and we are working to reach an agreement within a few days to restore and guarantee the language, education, and cultural rights of the 100,000 Hungarians living in Ukraine. Today, we need to clarify certain matters with Ukraine regarding our minority in that country, and I hope we will achieve this in the coming days. Ethnic Hungarians there currently do not have the opportunity to use their mother tongue in their relations with official authorities. However, if we resolve these issues on the basis of mutual interest, we can turn a new page.”
Magyar cautioned that future security guarantees for Ukraine must be concrete and enforceable, unlike previous international agreements.
“In 1994, the famous Budapest Memorandum was signed, in which the US and other major powers guaranteed Ukraine’s independence and integrity. However, these promises were not kept, because empty slogans are of little use,” Magyar said. “Right now, everything is at stake in Ukraine. A large number of people are dying, and it is possible that this country will lose part of its territory. Therefore, Ukraine needs real, enforceable international guarantees.”
However, the Prime Minister reiterated that Hungary would remain militarily uninvolved in the conflict, stating that arms shipments do not constitute a genuine security guarantee.
“I do not believe that weapons are a security guarantee. Security guarantees can only be provided by the international community,” the Hungarian leader concluded. “Hungary cannot play a decisive role here; this is the work of the major powers. We can provide diplomatic and humanitarian aid, and Hungary can also provide a suitable ground for negotiations.”
Europe
EU agrees new deportation rules allowing migrant return centers outside the bloc
European Union lawmakers and member states have reached agreement on new legislation overhauling rules governing the deportation of asylum seekers.
According to Politico, the agreed text allows asylum applicants whose claims have been rejected to be sent to dedicated return centers established outside the EU.
As a key condition of the deal, measures to establish the return centers are set to be implemented immediately.
The move is said to be of particular importance to the Netherlands and Germany. Other provisions of the legislation are expected to take effect one year later.
The agreement must still receive final approval from both the EU Council and the European Parliament before it can formally enter into force.
European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner said the agreement would help the EU regain control over both those arriving in the bloc and those required to leave it.
According to data from Eurostat, the proportion of migrants denied asylum in the European Union who ultimately leave the bloc remains at around 27%.
“We must give people the feeling again that we have everything under control,” Brunner said.
The new framework grants member states the authority to transfer individuals ordered to leave EU territory to return centers located outside the bloc.
Several member states are already examining the option, while human rights organizations have warned of risks of rights violations and abuse during the process.
The legislation also introduces stricter measures, including home searches, extended detention periods, entry bans, and penalties for individuals deemed security threats or those who refuse to cooperate.
French Member of the European Parliament François-Xavier Bellamy told the publication: “For years, Europe sent the worst possible message: even if you had no right to stay, there was a high likelihood that nothing would happen. That era is ending. If you do not have the right to remain in Europe, you must leave.”
The initiative, however, has faced opposition from lawmakers affiliated with liberal and left-wing groups.
Melissa Camara, a representative of the Greens group, described the agreement as “a legal arsenal serving a xenophobic ideology” and criticized both offshore centers and the detention of minors.
Marta Welander, head of the International Refugee Committee, said the new measures signaled “a troubling new era.”
Welander argued that the rules would normalize migrant raids and increase the risk of people being deported to countries where they could face persecution or torture.
According to available data, the number of migrants living within the European Union reached 64.2 million in 2025. During the same period, the foreign-born population arriving from outside the bloc increased by 2.1 million people annually.
In 2010, the European Union was home to approximately 40 million migrants.
As a result, the migrant population has increased by more than 60% over the past 15 years, while migrants’ share of the EU population has risen to 14.2%.
In December last year, US President Donald Trump said Europe faced the risk of destruction because of the migration policies pursued by European countries.
Trump had previously argued that the continent was facing a wave of migration and that, as a result, Europe was “no longer the Europe it once was.”
Europe
Anthropic invites EU cybersecurity agency to access Mythos AI hacking model
Anthropic has invited the European Union to access Mythos, its powerful AI-powered hacking tool, by sending an invitation to the bloc’s cybersecurity agency.
A European Commission official said the AI company issued the formal invitation following a meeting with the Commission in San Francisco last Thursday, adding that the EU must now establish a mechanism that would allow access to the model under appropriate security safeguards.
Bloomberg reported on Monday that ENISA, the EU’s cybersecurity agency based in Athens, would be granted access to Mythos.
European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier said the Commission had held “several productive meetings with Anthropic” and “welcomes the latest developments regarding potential future access.”
Anthropic unveiled Mythos in early April and warned that the model outperformed most humans in identifying and exploiting cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
The disclosure raised concerns that the model could be used to carry out large-scale attacks against critical and sensitive systems if it fell into the hands of cyber adversaries.
European officials were unable to access the cutting-edge cybersecurity AI technology for weeks, prompting urgent calls from European lawmakers and government officials to secure access.
Cybersecurity officials also urged Europe to develop its own version of the technology.
“This latest development is extremely important in helping us gain a clear understanding of the potential risks. We should not forget that Mythos is not an isolated case and that a new wave of powerful models is entering the market,” Regnier said.
An ENISA official said the agency does not currently have active access to the model but is working to make it operational.
The Commission is developing a formal action plan to respond to powerful AI hacking tools.
According to an industry official, the Commission has indicated that it wants to publish the plan before the summer break.
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