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On what terms can a fresh start be made with Greece?

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Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis travels to Ankara today to discuss a new chapter and a positive agenda with Greece. Technically, this is the counterpart of President Erdogan’s visit to Athens in recent months, but it does not look like an ordinary return visit. The Greek prime minister was interviewed by a Turkish newspaper (Milliyet, 12 May) and President Erdogan by a Greek newspaper (Kathimerini, 12 May). The tone of both leaders is cautious and attentive. Obviously, they are trying to achieve ‘something new’.

As someone who has been closely following the Turkish-Greek tensions, crises and periods of détente from time to time, I have no intention of adding water to the cooked pot; however, since I do not know exactly what the cooked pot is, for whom, how and by whom it is being cooked, I would like to share some of my concerns and my thoughts/evaluations on how these problems, which I have been pondering for years, can be resolved.

First of all, it is necessary to analyse why and how this period of softening was reached. As you may recall, after a series of crises in the second half of 2020 (the Idlib crisis with Russia in January-February 2020 and the Libya crisis with Egypt in the summer of 2020), we found ourselves in a full diplomatic-military crisis with Greece. As a result of the wrong and ideological foreign policy that we have been insisting on for years, we have turned the whole region against us, made enemies of countries like Egypt and Israel, which have always been neutral in the Greek-Turkish issues, and even made Athens dream of taking us on militarily. Why not?

How and why did Greece go from confrontating Turkey in the Aegean to confront Turkey today?

If Turkey clashes with Egypt over Libya – a very serious scenario in the summer of 2020 – and Israel supports Egypt in the armed conflicts, why should Greece not carry out a fait accompli operation in the Aegean against Turkey, which seems to be feuding with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the same time? Moreover, in such a scenario, even France could ‘sell’ Greece enough Rafale fighters overnight. Even Armenia could have extended its front against Azerbaijan through Tovuz, and Turkey could have been shown the error of its ways. When the 15 July coup attempt took place in the summer of 2016, Athens complained that it was not sufficiently prepared to carry out such a military operation. I should also note here that in those years, when I tried to explain that such isolation was contrary to the spirit of the art of foreign policy and that we needed a serious review, I was subjected to a lot of lamentations by the so-called foreign policy experts (!).

In the end, Ankara had to realise that the flawed policies it insisted on pursuing, as if it were a finalist in a competition to create the best example of the worst foreign policy, were unsustainable. The rapid transformation of normalisation between Turkey and Russia into ‘rapprochement’ led to the historic victory of Azerbaijan, which Turkey had fully supported in the forty-four-day war, while Ankara quickly restored its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and even Israel. What is more, it did so in the space of a year. Although Syria remains the limping leg in this series, its remarkably balanced and cautious policy towards the upcoming Ukrainian war, especially since the second half of 2021, has once again shattered Greece’s crude dreams.

For Mitsotakis and Greece, an adventure in the Aegean against a Turkey that has restored its relations with Egypt and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, opened new and clean pages with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and improved its relations with Russia in every field, while Athens’ relations with Moscow plummeted during the Ukrainian war, would have been literally suicidal. There is no doubt that Athens has studied what happened to Armenia when it attacked Tovuz. President Erdoğan’s statement that “we can come suddenly one night” should not be taken lightly. This is where the 2023 earthquake came to the rescue. Just as in 1999, this time Greece sent rescue teams, and both the Turkish and Greek media seized on the issue, making it the beginning of a positive agenda and a new page in politics.

New risks in a new period

In Turkey, where the Greek issue is not a serious agenda in domestic public opinion, decision-makers are always at ease when they talk about reconciling with Athens and solving the problems, because the problems with this country are not used to make a premium in our domestic politics. Even during the time of this government, which made foreign policy a domestic agenda, this issue was not used very much. But that is not the case with Greece. In what can be called an abuse of democracy, every party and every government has used the issue of Turkey to the hilt, publicising every problem with its content, Greek theses and red lines.

As a result, a negotiation process based on give and take has become almost impossible for Greek governments. That is why Greek governments always cling to this excuse. The worst thing is that Europe and America, which often mediated these negotiations, flattered all the politicians/decision-makers by saying ‘you are a big state, don’t compare yourself with Greece, you can be more generous’. This should not happen this time. If there is to be a positive agenda with Greece – and Athens knows very well that the reality of the multipolar world is in favour of Turkey and against Greece – then we should not allow our problems with Greece to be addressed within the Turkey-EU agenda or based on Turkey’s EU membership perspective, as if it actually exists. In short, the problems should be addressed through bilateral negotiations and outside the framework that has so far been polluted/poisoned by the Turkey-EU acquis.

As Dendias said in Ankara, the issue for Greece is simple: Ankara must recognise Greek Cyprus as the Republic of Cyprus, as enshrined in the EU-Turkey acquis through the efforts of Athens and with the complicity of all EU member states that do not want Turkey to become a member, and accept that the only problem in the Aegean, in line with Greek theses, is to refer the issue to the Hague Court of Justice or arbitration to determine where the continental shelf runs between the easternmost Greek-dominated islands and the Turkish mainland. Other issues, such as Greece’s claim to 12 miles of airspace in violation of international law, the arming of islands with non-military status, islands with undetermined status in the Aegean, the issue of adjacent islands and rocks, etc., are all fabricated by Turkey in order to open Greece’s rights to discussion, and Greece refuses to negotiate on these issues.

Wouldn’t it be nice to create appeasement?

It may be possible, but it also involves serious risks. For example, if we can achieve a détente with Greece in the Aegean, without compromising an inch on our thesis that the Cyprus problem should be solved on the basis of two states, so much the better! But such a détente should not take place if, as we have always done, we show unnecessary courtesy by saying that we should not frighten or offend Athens, and if we accuse each other internally of being those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, And if we start accusing each other internally as those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, because it will lead to compromising the steps to be taken towards the recognition of the TRNC, as well as justifying the thesis of the pro-federationists within the TRNC that ‘we told you so, Turkey will say a few words about two states and then take a step back’.

It should not be forgotten that in the last century of the Empire, Greece always managed to win both when it was at odds with the Ottoman Empire and when it was friendly with it. The reason for this is that Europe often took a pro-Greek stance. Atatürk put an end to this cursed period. After the Second World War, Ankara was always vigilant on the Cyprus issue and the Turkish-Greek problems that spread from there to the Aegean and did not allow the West to take initiatives in favour of Greece. However, it must be admitted that this policy could be maintained until the second half of the 1990s, when the EU issue was sold to Turkey through a massive media campaign, and in the two decades that followed, Turkey’s Cyprus and Greece policies were almost turned upside down within the European Union process. The recent caution and the advantages and benefits of multipolarity should not be wasted on a non-existent EU perspective.

OPINION

The Trump pendulum in American foreign policy — NEOCON or MAGA?

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Perhaps the most attractive aspect of Trump is that everyone has their own Trump. He says he will ‘drain the swamp’ and gets votes from the anti-establishment. He says, ‘I’m going to cut taxes for the rich’ and gets support from the rich. On the one hand he says he will give Israel unlimited support; on the other hand he goes to the Arabs and says, ‘I will end the Gaza war’. The most interesting thing is that all these discourses are reciprocated. Unlike the Democrats, who are afraid of offending everyone and cannot say anything to anybody, he manages to reach every segment of society in this way.

This personalized Trump experience has brought the conservatives back to power. Of course, this is not just an electoral issue. As the new cabinet for the new term becomes clear, a similar equation exists in foreign policy. While some look at the appointment of Marco Rubio and say ‘look, this guy is working for the neocons’, others point to Tulsi Gabbard and rejoice ‘here’s the isolationist Trump we’ve been looking for’. However, Trump’s new term codes are based on two words: balance and obedience. The people chosen for the cabinet were chosen to satisfy both wings of the Republican Party, but more importantly to show unconditional loyalty to Trump.

The main reason for this is Trump’s big victory. Unlike in 2016, the absolute victory in this election makes it exceedingly difficult for Trump’s policies to be debated. Moreover, the MAGA crowd, which did not do well in the 2022 midterms, subsequently suppressed the party to such an extent that names like Nikki Haley or Mike Pence, who were publicly identified as neocons, disappeared during the primary process. In fact, after the elections, we realized that the party’s old-timers, like the Cheneys, did not have much of an impact on conservative public opinion. All this makes the MAGA movement the dominant party in the new cabinet.

However, there are arguments against MAGA’s dominance in this balancing act. For example, the fact that members of the Trump cabinet such as Pete Hegseth have signaled ‘continued support’ on the Ukraine issue has created the impression that the neocon wing of the party could be strong in the new administration. But it is a little more complex than that.

The wind of peace in Ukraine

As the Ukrainian war enters its third year and the tide has turned in Russia’s favor, all eyes have turned to Trump’s biggest promise, the ‘peace on day one’ plan. Of course, cabinet members’ statements on Ukraine are still confusing. So, what will Trump’s Ukraine policy be?

One of the most important aspects of Trump’s policy is his personal aesthetic. The image of himself created by his actions should be very positive. For example, Trump cannot accept Biden’s disgrace in Afghanistan. In this respect, he is more concerned with aesthetics than other politicians. In Ukraine, an environment in which Russia swallows the whole of Ukraine will not make Trump look good. If a peace process is to succeed, Ukraine cannot come to the table with weak and reluctant allies. No matter how much Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr. told Zelenskyy that ‘you have a month’s allowance left’, the Trump administration cannot take such a stance. Why should Russia negotiate peace if support for Ukraine is going to be cut anyway? For a realistic peace deal, the U.S. needs to give the impression that it will continue to provide arms support if the talks fail. Whether Trump likes it or not, the country he leads is a party to the war in Ukraine. So, he will have to balance the desire for peace with the bells of war.

The situation on the ground is working against Ukraine. Despite lowering the recruitment age to twenty-five, the manpower problems have not been solved. The U.S. is urging Ukraine to lower the age to eighteen. But the 18-25 age group is the smallest demographic group in Ukraine. Conscripting them will exacerbate Ukraine’s demographic crisis in the coming years. In addition, there is a desertion crisis in Ukrainian brigades that cannot enter the rotation. Between January 2024 and August 45,543 Ukrainian soldiers deserted. The total number of desertions since 2022 is 81,167. In other words, half of the desertions in the entire war took place in the last 8 months. These are, of course, ‘minimum’ figures. Desertions that Ukraine can keep track of. It is difficult to know the real number.

Besides, Ukraine’s Kursk adventure is not going well. While waiting for the Russian army to move its troops in a panic, they had to move their own troops to protect the Russian territory they had captured. This accelerated the Russian advance in Donbass. At 490 square kilometers, Russia gained the most territory in all but the first month of the war. This is precisely why Trump’s final withdrawal of support for Ukraine would weaken his hand in peace talks. Trump would prefer a Ukraine that has solved its manpower problem at the peace table.

A similar equation in Syria

Over the past three days, the world has been shocked by the offensive launched by Syrian opposition groups in Aleppo. The offensive resulted in the capture of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, which has been the scene of fierce clashes for more than four years during the Syrian civil war. In addition to Aleppo, the Syrian National Army (SNA) captured the Kuweires airbase to the east of the city and surrounded the Tal Rifaat region controlled by YPG-PKK elements.

The emergence of such a chaotic environment in Syria can be seen as ‘the footsteps of the Trump era’. Statements such as ‘reconsidering relations with the YPG’ in Project 2025, the Republican presidential preparation programme, as well as Trump’s desire to withdraw from Syria, raise this possibility. However, I believe that these developments are independent of the foreign policy of the Trump era. Trump has not even taken office yet and he has to prioritize domestic issues. In particular, he will seek to reduce Democratic influence in the Pentagon and the intelligence community.

In my interviews with Atlantic Council member Rich Outzen and George W. Bush-era security adviser Dov Zakheim over the past few years, I have often heard the statement that ‘west of the Euphrates, the U.S. would not be bothered’ about Turkey’s operations in Syria. The equation that has emerged today should be assessed mainly between Iran, Syria and Turkey. We need more time to observe the new U.S .policy in the region.

In conclusion, it is useful to see Trump’s foreign policy as a pendulum that will swing back and forth between MAGA and neoconservative balance in the coming years. The direction in which the pendulum will swing will be determined by Trump rather than the Pentagon. This is why other countries will try to ‘humour’ Trump in their relations with the U.S. As I said, everyone has their own Trump… Let’s see how many different Trumps the next four years will show us!

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OPINION

The Ceasefire Between Lebanon and Israel May Not Trigger the “Domino Effect” for the “Axis of Resistance”

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On November 27, Israel and Lebanon reached a ceasefire agreement, which officially came into effect at 10:00 a.m. local time. This agreement, brokered by the United States and France, is a significant achievement for peace and has been widely welcomed by global public opinion. Members of the “Axis of Resistance”, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iran, have also endorsed it. As of the time of writing, only two members of the “Axis of Resistance”, Syria and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, have not yet expressed their stance.

The Lebanon-Israel ceasefire brings a glimmer of peace to the “Sixth Middle East War,” which has lasted over a year and three months. At least, the northern front of this war—known as the “Third Lebanon War”—has entered a more stable phase of temporary truce. Thousands of civilians who fled southern Lebanon have begun returning to their homes, and civilians in northern Israel, who sought refuge from the conflict, are also gradually returning.

However, it may be overly optimistic to assume that this ceasefire will lead to a series of ceasefires across Israel’s “seven-front war” or that Hezbollah’s withdrawal signals the fall of the first “domino” in the “Axis of Resistance.” On the contrary, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East remains an elusive goal, possibly for decades.

Under the terms of the agreement, Israel is to gradually withdraw from Lebanese territory within 60 days of the ceasefire, and Hezbollah is prohibited from returning south of the Litani River, a region 30 kilometers from the border. Southern Lebanon will be managed by Lebanese government forces, in cooperation with United Nations peacekeeping forces, implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the ceasefire allows Israel to focus on countering Iran, giving its long-deployed soldiers a chance to rest and isolating Hamas by disconnecting the Lebanon and Palestinian fronts. He emphasized that an understanding has been reached with the U.S.: if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire agreement, Israeli forces will immediately resume military operations. Meanwhile, Hezbollah declared that it had inflicted severe damage on Israel and emerged victorious.

The timing of the ceasefire is opportune, influenced by multiple factors and the longstanding cyclical nature of intermittent Lebanon-Israel conflicts. Key factors include the protracted duration and widespread impact of the “Sixth Middle East War,” which has caused unprecedented harm to civilians, particularly Palestinians, and provoked intense global public pressure. All parties in the conflict have suffered losses, with no clear winners. Israel faces unprecedented internal and external challenges, while Lebanon’s infrastructure and Hezbollah’s operational capabilities have been significantly weakened.

For the U.S., the Democratic administration’s staunch support for Israel, coupled with pressure from the incoming Republican government to exact greater costs from the “Axis of Resistance,” also played a role. Iran, the leader of the “Resistance Axis,” has shown little interest in escalating the conflict further, particularly after a year of engagements with Israel, including two direct confrontations.

The Lebanon-Israel ceasefire signifies the end of Israel’s “northern campaign” and a shift of focus back to the occupied Palestinian territories. Israel aims to quell the “guerrilla warfare among ruins” in these areas, secure the release of detained soldiers and civilians, and plan future security measures and governance to prevent Hamas from regaining strength. Simultaneously, Israel must address harassment from the Houthis and the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as its ongoing “shadow war” or proxy conflict with Iran, which occasionally escalates into direct military confrontations. Moreover, Israel faces domestic political instability and unprecedented diplomatic crises, including the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant.

The “Axis of Resistance” initially formed a unified anti-Israel front, with the premise of supporting Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation and conditioning their own ceasefires on a truce in Gaza. However, Hezbollah has been forced to cease hostilities unilaterally, as its leadership has been decimated, its infrastructure in southern Lebanon destroyed, and its military resources depleted. Most critically, Israel has compelled Hezbollah to accept the ceasefire by punishing the entire Lebanese state and population, echoing the script of the “Second Lebanon War” in 2006.

Although the “Second Lebanon War” granted Israel 17 years of relative peace on its northern border, it is doubtful that this ceasefire will yield similar results. The unresolved sovereignty dispute over the 22-square-kilometer Shebaa Farms remains a potential flashpoint for future conflicts.

Israel’s unilateral declaration of permanent sovereignty over the Golan Heights in 2016, endorsed by the Trump administration, exemplifies its disregard for international law and norms. However, history suggests that Israel’s unilateral annexation of the Golan Heights may bring more challenges than benefits, as it continues to face resistance from Hezbollah and other actors.

Similarly, Israel’s ambition for a “Greater Israel” and rejection of the two-state solution guarantees continued unrest in Gaza and the West Bank, with millions of Palestinians resisting occupation. This also invites intensified opposition from nationalist and Shia Islamist movements, as well as widespread international condemnation.

While the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire represents a temporary pause in hostilities, it is far from a guarantee of lasting peace. Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the conflict does not signify the collapse of the “Axis of Resistance.” The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has evolved beyond its traditional scope, becoming entangled with broader geopolitical dynamics. As Israel persists in its mission to eliminate Hamas, it risks being ensnared in a quagmire of occupation and resistance, power and counter-power.

As a small country with limited resources, Israel has relied on U.S. support to dominate the Middle East during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. However, if U.S. influence wanes, Israel’s future remains uncertain.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Russia tests hypersonic missile Oreshnik in a show of strength amid Ukraine conflict

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On the evening of November 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in a televised address that Russian forces had conducted a coordinated strike on Ukrainian military-industrial facilities. As part of the attack, Russia tested a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile, codenamed Oreshnik, which was not equipped with a nuclear warhead. Putin accused Ukraine of using Western-supplied weapons on November 19 and 21 to target Russian military installations, escalating the conflict into what he described as a “global confrontation.” He warned that any form of escalation would prompt Russia to take decisive retaliatory measures to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity.

In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Putin’s remarks indicated Russia’s intent to escalate the war further and broaden the scope of the conflict. Zelensky dismissed the accusations of using Western weapons, asserting that Ukraine had long utilized such systems in accordance with its right to self-defense under international law. Notably, Russia provided a 30-minute advance warning to the United States before the missile test. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed concern over the development, describing the test as a “troubling turn of events.”

The Oreshnik missile, capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 10, currently lacks any known countermeasure in missile defense systems. While Putin’s announcement clarified earlier Ukrainian claims about the use of intercontinental missiles with a range of 6,000 kilometers, it nonetheless sparked widespread alarm within the international community. By testing the Oreshnik missile in a combat scenario, Russia aims to signal its readiness to enforce its newly revised nuclear doctrine. This move is intended as a warning to Ukraine and NATO, underscoring Moscow’s willingness to potentially transition from a nuclear brinkmanship strategy to actual deployment, including the first use of nuclear weapons.

The conflict in Ukraine reached its 1,000th day on November 19, marked by an escalation triggered by Western support. On November 17, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly announced they would no longer restrict Ukraine from using NATO-supplied medium- and long-range missiles to target Russian territory. In response, Ukraine launched six U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) on Russia’s Bryansk Oblast, with five intercepted and one destroyed.

The Biden administration and its allies are well aware of the risks associated with loosening restrictions on Ukrainian missile capabilities. On November 20, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv issued an emergency closure, citing the likelihood of significant airstrikes and urging personnel to shelter in place. This precaution marked the first such measure by the U.S. since the start of the conflict, prompting similar actions by embassies from Italy, Spain, and Greece.

Although the missile strikes by Ukraine caused minimal physical damage, their symbolic challenge, potential threat, and humiliation carry significant strategic implications. Should such actions continue, Russia risks losing its frontline advantages, and the security of its mainland could deteriorate further. The ATACMS missiles, alongside the British Storm Shadow and French Scalp cruise missiles, possess ranges of 300 to 560 kilometers, placing Russia’s western border regions, occupied territories such as Crimea, and even the Black Sea Fleet within reach. If launched from Ukraine’s border areas, these weapons could potentially threaten Moscow’s outskirts.

In response to NATO’s easing of missile restrictions and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory, Putin approved a revised nuclear deterrence policy on November 19, setting unprecedented red lines for the use of nuclear weapons. According to this policy, Russia reserves the right to launch a nuclear strike if it or its ally Belarus faces significant conventional attacks threatening sovereignty or territorial integrity. The document also stipulates that any attack by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear-armed state, will be considered a joint assault, and any attack by one member of a military alliance will be treated as an attack by the entire alliance.

This evolving scenario underscores the intensifying dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and highlights the potential for further escalation into uncharted territories of global security risks.

Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship policy, long a tool of strategic intimidation, now appears to have been unsheathed, explicitly targeting nuclear-armed nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as NATO as a collective entity supporting Ukraine’s escalation of the conflict. Moscow has signaled the possibility of initiating nuclear weapon use, even without suffering a nuclear attack, citing the United States’ precedent for employing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

To ensure the clarity of its nuclear messaging, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly addressed Western leaders in English, describing the conflict as entering a “new qualitative phase of confrontation against Russia.” Lavrov emphasized the role of U.S. personnel and data in enabling Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles against Russian targets, invoking the 1945 U.S. nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as historical context.

In an apparent move to prepare for potential nuclear contingencies, Russia’s Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Research Institute announced on November 18 the mass production of modular, mobile shelters known as Cube-M, capable of protecting 54 people from nuclear explosions, radiation, and other threats. On November 20, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former defense minister, inspected the Sarov Federal Nuclear Center in Novgorod Oblast to review developments related to the “special military operation.”

Tensions escalated further on November 21 when Russia accused Ukraine of deploying British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles in an attack on Russia’s Kursk region. This marked Ukraine’s continued defiance of Russia’s warnings to avoid further lowering the nuclear threshold, prompting Moscow to conduct its first combat test of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile. This missile, which NATO currently lacks the capability to intercept, underscores Russia’s resolve to implement its nuclear brinkmanship strategy as more than mere posturing.

On the battlefield, Russia has made significant gains, including neutralizing Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and launching large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These measures, timed with the onset of winter, are designed to exert maximum pressure on Kyiv to force concessions. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has accelerated military aid to Ukraine, lifting restrictions on long-range missiles just weeks before a potential transition of power in the White House.

The U.S. administration’s push to expand and escalate the conflict appears motivated by a mix of strategic objectives: reinforcing Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its resistance, gaining leverage in future negotiations, and solidifying a political legacy. Additionally, the strategy may serve to undermine the potential policies of a future Trump administration, complicating any attempt to de-escalate the war. Critics, including Donald Trump Jr., have accused the Biden administration of recklessly escalating the conflict, potentially paving the way for a third world war, driven by the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Should Trump reclaim the presidency, his administration is likely to revoke Biden-era missile permissions granted to Ukraine. However, the combined effects of Biden’s policy decisions and Ukraine’s high-risk military maneuvers could provoke Russia into intensifying its attacks, potentially shifting the battlefield dynamics in Russia’s favor before any Trump-led peace negotiations.

While Russia is unlikely to cross the nuclear threshold unless faced with dire battlefield reversals, recent signals indicate that Moscow is prepared to follow through on its threats. These include targeting Ukraine’s key decision-making centers or, in extreme scenarios, employing tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Such measures, even with controlled destructive capacity, would echo the United States’ decision during the final stages of World War II and underline the precariousness of the current conflict.

The trajectory of this war, therefore, depends not only on military developments but also on the political calculus in Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv. Any miscalculation could lead to irreversible consequences, marking a dangerous turning point in global security.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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