On March 28, after “disappearing” from my social circle for nearly 48 hours, I returned to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, coinciding with a new wave of airstrikes by the US and British air forces. Despite the danger at hand, my thoughts were still lingering in the past 48 hours—full of excitement and memories of my journey to and from Saada province and its steep mountains. We were not only among the first group of foreigners invited after the Houthi forces took control of the capital, but also pioneers lucky enough to explore the Houthi headquarters. Although the visit was brief and superficial, everything we saw and heard felt novel and fascinating.

March 26 marked the tenth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab-Islamic coalition’s military intervention in Yemen’s civil war. For the Houthis, it also marked the tenth anniversary of their religious jihad against the Saudi coalition and the United States. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” with the coalition’s air force unleashing bombs and missiles across Yemen under the pretext of saving Yemen’s legitimate government and halting the Houthi advance after their capture of Sana’a.

At 5 a.m. that day, our “international brigade”—comprising former officials, journalists, and scholars from the US, UK, South Africa, Malaysia, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia and China—departed in a convoy arranged by the Houthis to visit their “revolutionary base” and “uprising headquarters” in Saada province.

For security reasons, our trip was kept secret. We departed at dawn when there were few pedestrians or vehicles on the streets. Instead of the armored and bulletproof vehicles we previously used in Sana’a, we traveled in identical white Toyota Land Cruisers, with a lead vehicle flashing lights but sirens off to guide us quietly out of the city.

Less than a week before the end of Ramadan, the city of Sana’a, which had been noisy all night due to evening iftar and pre-dawn suhoor, fell silent at dawn. We drove easily through the dark, sparse streets and left the city smoothly as the sky lightened, heading north on the Chinese-built Sana’a–Saada highway toward Saada city, the provincial capital 230 km away.

Sana’a and Saada, two adjacent inland provinces in Yemen’s northwestern highlands, have no rivers or tall mountains along the route—only continuous brown hills, gravel, and desert. Occasional small green oases provided a glimpse of life on this famously barren ancient land. While the scenery was monotonous and lifeless, it felt fresh and memorable to us.

No matter how far we traveled, on both sides of the road were clusters of short plants—either exposed to the sky or covered with white mesh—densely planted qat trees. Their leaves contain the hallucinogenic substance cathinone and juice that suppresses hunger and boosts alertness. Reportedly, 70% of Yemenis are addicted to qat. Though water is scarce, 60% of it is used to irrigate qat trees. In short, Yemenis can go a day without food, but not without qat.

After traveling nearly 200 km and reaching the border between Sana’a and Saada provinces, our driver told us this area was once occupied by Al-Qaeda and was only fully cleared by the Houthis after 2015. Although the Houthi-controlled area is in a state of war, we didn’t see any signs of conflict—no soldiers, military vehicles, camps, air defense systems, or war scars. Even the few security checkpoints were almost symbolic. In contrast, I experienced far stricter and more numerous checkpoints in southern Iraq last year, making that place seem more dangerous than Yemen.

Our vehicle was playing Yemeni pop songs all the way—rhythmic and powerful, in a typical Arab rap battle style. The melodies were modern and catchy, with tunes that deeply resonated, and the lyrics were passionate and stirring, featuring buzzwords like “Gaza” and “Palestine.” The driver said this was a representative work by a Houthi rap artist named Iras Laith (Iras being the Arabic name for Jesus, and Laith meaning “lion”), whose songs have gone viral globally, especially in the Third World. The U.S. government has reportedly placed a $26 million bounty on him.

Yemeni friends familiar with Irsa said that whenever he performs his rap, his comrades dance the traditional jambiya (curved dagger) dance around him, and his popular songs have seen massive downloads online. A Houthi soldier mentioned that in order to protect Irsa, the Yemeni people have hidden him—just as they’ve hidden their “revolutionary leader,” Hussein’s brother and heir to the cause, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

Three and a half hours later, in a slightly dim and dusty atmosphere, we passed through the “Saada Gate,” damaged by U.S. or Saudi coalition airstrikes, and arrived at this city—considered the “eye of the storm” in Yemen and even the entire Middle East. We checked into the so-called five-star “Yemen Star International Hotel,” a six- or seven-story building. It is located on a side street off Saada’s main road and had clearly just been renovated, possibly even unfinished. We guessed we were among its first guests. Although the hotel lacked internet, it had most basic facilities and satellite TV with various foreign-language channels, including programs from the “Yemen TV” run by the southern government.

During our time in Saada, we experienced a rare extended internet outage, causing an unintentional scare for our families back home. On the morning of the 27th, I happened to see a text alert about a missed call—only then did I realize my daughter and other colleagues and students had tried to reach me multiple times and had been searching for us all night. Since we left the hotel at dawn on the 26th, we had lost connection with our contacts back home via social media and WeChat. In the rush to leave, I hadn’t anticipated a full communication blackout. Before departure, I had only briefly informed a contact at the embassy and a colleague at Xinhua News Agency via WeChat that I was joining the group heading to Saada. Since we didn’t return to Sana’a that day, and I had my phone on silent due to recent daily meetings, it ended up causing needless worry for friends, family, and colleagues. I truly feel sorry—though that’s another story.

Looking out the hotel window, the city of Saada was not large, shielded to the north by hills—about one kilometer wide east to west, and three to four kilometers long north to south. The city consisted mostly of low-rise buildings, many with tin roofs, and only seven or eight mid-rise buildings under ten stories tall. On the sunlit northern hills a few kilometers away, three giant Arabic slogans were spelled out in white stones: “Muhammad,” “Ali,” and “Persistence Means Victory.” The emphasis on the name “Ali” alone reveals the Shia religious identity of the people of Saada.

Yemen’s main population follows the Zaidi sect, the smallest branch of Shia Islam. Zaidis believe in the fifth-generation Imam Zaid, a descendant of Muhammad and Ali, whom they regard as the hidden Mahdi. Because of this, they are also called the “Five-Imam Sect.” Alongside the “Seven-Imam Sect” (Ismaili) and the “Twelve-Imam Sect” (Twelvers), Zaidis form one of the three major Shia branches. Zaidis have primarily survived in Yemen’s Shia-majority population and are theologically closer to Sunnis due to their recognition of the authority of the first four caliphs, making them the most moderate of all Shia sects.

Upon arriving in Saada, after a simple lunch, former Minister of Information Dayfallah al-Shami accompanied us to visit the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombing sites and the Saada Martyrs’ Cemetery. One site bombed by the U.S. was a cancer center under construction. At the scene, at least two top floors had been pierced by missiles, and the floor below had partially collapsed. Some group members found an unexploded heavy bomb in the basement. According to the site manager, this was the site of the March 24 U.S. bombing. No casualty information was mentioned.

After leaving the U.S. bombing site, we were taken to visit bombing sites left behind by the Saudi-led coalition. Along the way were several ruins, but our hosts specifically took us to see two bombed-out buildings at Saada University, one of which was a student dormitory. It’s said the bombings occurred around 2017. Desks and chairs under the rubble suggested that part of the facility had indeed been classrooms or laboratories. The seats scattered outside had been eroded by wind and rain, leaving only rusted metal frames… As for why the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombed civilian facilities, only the historical archives may one day tell us the truth.

On the 24th, while in Sana’a, we had also visited one U.S. and one Saudi coalition bombing site respectively. The U.S. strike was said to be on a residential building, but the remains didn’t look like a home—there were no signs of domestic items. Organizers said 15 people were injured and two died, though we weren’t arranged to visit any of the wounded in the hospital. The Saudi coalition site was from a few years ago and reportedly extremely tragic: over 800 people attending a funeral were “deliberately” bombed, resulting in more than 150 deaths and around 600 injuries.

What struck us the most was the Saada “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” where hundreds of war victims lie. Especially heartbreaking was the “Children’s Martyrs’ Corner,” where dozens of boys and girls who died prematurely are buried. In front of their flower-like portraits, mourners had placed bunches of fake flowers. Four of the deceased children were from the same family—it seemed they perished together in a single car, the twisted wreckage of which now hangs above their resting place. Previously, we had also visited a “Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Sana’a, but the emotional weight there couldn’t compare to the children’s section in Saada.

After our first day in Saada, we returned to the hotel together in a minibus. On the way back, we passed through the main street, where the run-down buildings resembled those in Sana’a. Infrastructure was very poor, and street shops were mostly ordinary stores, repair shops, eateries, or fruit stands. The streets were packed with people, and puddles and mud from recent rain made the roads chaotic. Cars and motorbikes weaved wildly, and there wasn’t a single traffic light on the main street. A few traffic police vaguely attempted to direct traffic. What caught my eye most was that nearly every motorcycle carried three or four children—an indirect sign of Yemen’s high birthrate and youth-heavy population.

That night in Saada wasn’t peaceful. Our thoughtful hosts knocked on the door to ask if we needed toiletries. We politely declined and hinted not to be disturbed again. However, at midnight, they knocked again and brought a large bag of unopened pajamas and toiletries, which was quite touching. In the deep of night, as we were fast asleep, they knocked a third time to deliver a hearty breakfast—flatbread, chickpea paste, eggs, drinks, and mineral water—placing the tray at our door.

Around noon on the 27th, our hosts, having taken a good nap after iftar, appeared leisurely in the hotel lobby and “suddenly” informed us that we would be going to Maran, a town on the northern border of Saada province, 70 kilometers away, to visit the hometown of Hussein, the founder of the Houthi movement. It was another unexpected delight. We divided into Toyota off-road vehicles, crossed Saada city, and headed for the northern mountains of the province bordering Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the week, all our activities had been notified at the last minute. We were never told in advance who we would meet—not even the drivers knew our next stop; they were only told to follow. Due to the wartime situation and open threats from Israel and the U.S. to assassinate Houthi leaders, the secrecy of our movements was for the safety of both our hosts and us foreign guests. We fully understood this and respected the principle: “guests follow the host.”

Heading north from Saada, the 70-kilometer journey involved crossing mountain after mountain—the farther we went, the higher the mountains, and the steeper the roads. Although the quality of the mountain roads rivaled provincial highways back home, they were still winding and twisty, taking two full hours for a one-way trip. Unlike the semi-hilly, semi-desert landscape along the Sana’a–Saada highway, this mountainous route revealed large oases, terraced fields, sparse trees, and even streams and small dams, indicating that northern Saada is a relatively agriculturally developed area, though still mostly at a subsistence level of natural economy.

Approaching the birthplace of the Houthi movement—the town of Maran, where Hussein launched his rebellion—the terrain was dominated by towering ridgeline mountains running east-west, averaging over 200 meters in height. Each mountain had three to five typical Yemeni earth buildings about ten meters tall. The mountains around Maran are densely packed, with earthen buildings scattered across peaks, forming a breathtaking skyline that resembled a miniature “Great Wall.” The scene evoked an ancient system of warning beacons, signaling threats across great distances.

Below this “Great Wall” were clusters of earth buildings that resembled a mix between farmhouses, forest forts, and watchtowers. These provided shelter from the elements for local farmers and served as strongholds against outside threats. This remote area—far from the centers of power in both Yemen and neighboring countries—offered an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare. It’s here that the Houthi movement was born, grew strong, suffered setbacks, and rose again—ultimately expanding from Yemen’s northwest corner to take over much of the country.

Finally, deep in the mountains, just 20 kilometers from the Saudi border and adjacent to the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran, we arrived at Maran—a small, picturesque town nestled in the hills. This was Hussein’s hometown and resting place, located in a naturally defensible spot with steep terrain.

The Houthi forces built a majestic “Martyrs’ Cemetery” on a high point resembling an eagle’s beak, constructed primarily in off-white stone and offering panoramic views of the surrounding mountains. On the town’s broadest hilltop—nearly 1,000 square meters—they also built a grand marble plaza for Hussein’s tomb. At the center lies a beautifully crafted rectangular sarcophagus engraved with Quranic verses. Along a long flight of concrete stairs descending the mountain, another burial site can be found, along with a cave where Hussein once hid from government troops during the early revolutionary days.

Shami, our guide and recently resigned Minister of Information, accompanied us throughout. He vividly narrated the life of Hussein and the legends of the Houthi movement, especially the six-year “First War” from 2004 to 2010, recounting dramatic life-and-death struggles between the Houthis and the government, and the key figures who played roles in that era.

What stood out was Shami’s emphasis that the Houthi movement doesn’t operate on a cycle of revenge and has moved beyond tribal narrow-mindedness. Many former mortal enemies who once exchanged gunfire with them are now colleagues and comrades, holding positions in the Houthi-led administration. In fact, none of the Houthi officials who accompanied us to Saada—including the escorts, bodyguards, and drivers—were from Saada. They hailed from Sana’a, Ibb, Marib, and even more distant provinces. Former Houthi Prime Minister Habtoor, whom I had interacted with several times, is from Aden and once served as its governor—suggesting he is likely a Sunni Muslim.

My Houthi friends told me that they don’t differentiate by sect or region; they believe in “One Yemeni Family.” The Houthi movement’s ability to sweep through northwest Yemen and ultimately control more than half the country would have been impossible without such inclusiveness.

In 1962, a republican revolution broke out in North Yemen, ending more than 1,000 years of Zaidi Imamate theocratic rule. Afterward, Zaidi elites and the population found themselves caught between the internal pressure of Yemen’s secular republicanism and external pressure from Saudi-supported Sunni Salafism, and were gradually marginalized. In 1992, aiming to revive “Zaidism,” religious leader Hussein from Saada established the “Believing Youth” movement. Through religious schooling and preaching, it spread religious and political ideas, resisting the republican regime led by Saleh internally and countering Saudi ideological expansion externally, while also laying out a vision for an Iranian-style Islamic regime.

In 1994, four years after Yemeni unification, civil war broke out. Hussein, who belonged to the same powerful Hashid tribe as Saleh, led Saada tribal militias to help the government suppress the southern rebellion—partly out of tribal interests and other political calculations—thereby growing his own power.

After 2001, as the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Saleh government was forced to align with the U.S., supporting troop deployments to both countries. While the Houthis did not support international terrorism, they consistently adhered to anti-American and anti-Zionist ideology, focused on liberating Islamic lands and reviving Islam. This caused the two sides to become enemies again. In 2004, a six-year civil war broke out between the Houthis and government forces. Hussein was killed early in the conflict. His successors renamed the “Believing Youth” to the “Houthis” in his honor, vowing to carry on his fight until a ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. The country plunged into political chaos. Losing both military and popular support, and abandoned by the Hashid tribe, Saleh was forced to resign. With backing from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the Hadi government—mainly supported by southern factions—was established. In 2014, amid efforts to form a federal system, the Houthis rebelled again, claiming their interests were not being protected. They swiftly entered the capital, seized power, and—teaming up with Saleh for the third time—set up parallel administrative and legislative institutions to replace the Hadi government, forcing it into exile in Saudi Arabia.

On March 25, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a “Ten-Nation Coalition” of Arab and Islamic countries to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, and on March 26 officially began airstrikes against the Houthis—ushering in a new phase of the conflict. The Houthis declared Saudi Arabia, its allies, and their Western backer, the United States, as enemies. The following year, with Jordan and others mediating, the Houthis began peace talks with the coalition. In 2017, Saleh—accused by the Houthis of betrayal and of negotiating for personal gain—broke ranks. Disputes over military control further escalated tensions. Eventually, Saleh was intercepted and executed by the Houthis while fleeing Sana’a.

By 2023, the Houthis had become a powerful force, controlling half the country. They extended Hussein’s anti-American, anti-Israel ideology abroad and, for the first time, intervened in the Israel-Palestine conflict. They became a solid pillar of the “Axis of Resistance,” opened a front in the Red Sea, targeted Israel, and even launched airstrikes deep inside Israeli territory—triggering military retaliation from the U.S., U.K., and others.

On the night of the 27th, after having iftar in Saada, we concluded our rapid tour of the Houthi stronghold and began our overnight journey back to Sana’a. The drive took nearly four hours, with no streetlights along the way—our young driver relied entirely on his familiarity with the roads. He had been driving all day, and we worried about whether he had the strength to stay alert. But Yemenis have their own way—both the driver and the bodyguard riding shotgun kept chewing qat leaves for energy, seasoned by years of battlefield experience. The bodyguard, only 23 years old, was already a veteran with five years of combat experience.

While we were away from Sana’a, media reports indicated that the U.S. and U.K. had launched airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport and other targets. Shortly after midnight, we returned to the noisy city of Sana’a. We had barely settled into our hotel for half an hour, just beginning to notify friends and family via WeChat, when a series of thunderous explosions erupted in the clear night sky. The sound of F-16 fighter jets circling overhead followed, along with sporadic anti-aircraft fire. Drawing on my extensive frontline experience in Gaza and Baghdad, I could almost identify every model of jet, missile, bomb, or bullet just by sound. My immediate reaction: “The U.S. is launching an airstrike.” And this was the first time during my week in Yemen that I directly experienced and heard a U.S. strike.

On the 29th, I left Yemen as planned, bidding farewell to the Houthi movement, with whom I had only just begun to interact and was far from familiar. Yet, the Houthis have now risen to become a key part of the “Axis of Resistance” and an important player on the Middle Eastern stage. This political “celebrity” or “nouveau riche” type of non-state actor, despite Yemen’s extreme poverty and streets full of struggling citizens, has positioned itself as the backbone and vanguard of “Palestinian liberation.” In my view, its enthusiastic promotion of the Palestinian cause is a strategy aimed at shielding itself under the banners of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism, using the turmoil it stirs in the Middle East—especially in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean—to gain broader domestic, regional, and international legitimacy. Ultimately, this is a bid to force the international community to recognize it as Yemen’s sole legitimate representative, or at the very least, to secure dominance and voice in the process of forming a joint government.

This trip may not have yielded every possible gain, but it still brought many insights—some even unexpected. That said, the regrets are obvious. Despite our repeated requests, we never got the chance to visit the front lines to see Houthi soldiers, equipment, or camps. We had no opportunity to speak with their top leader—Hussein’s brother and successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. We didn’t visit the crucial Red Sea port city of Hudaydah under Houthi control, let alone conduct a full investigation in rival-controlled areas like Aden or Taiz.

Fouad, an advisor to the Houthi “Prime Minister” who coordinated my entire visit, tried to reassure me, saying, “It’s okay. Come again next year. We’ll take you to Aden, or anywhere else you want to go.” This wasn’t just his personal wish—it likely reflects the broader ambition of the Houthis to one day unify and rule the entire country.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

The Houthi War: The “Sixth Middle East War” and the Palestinian Narrative

Donald Trump remains one of the world’s most unpredictable leaders, yet India appears confident in its approach to managing relations with him. Indeed, the Indo-US relationship arguably reached new heights during Trump’s first term. Under his administration, the US became India’s largest trading partner, defense deals worth billions of dollars were finalized, and the two nations collaborated closely on shared “challenges,” notably China.

Naturally, the path wasn’t always smooth, particularly concerning trade disputes. However, many observers believe India navigated its relationship with Trump more effectively than many other nations.

What accounts for this perceived success?

Three primary factors contribute to India’s approach: economic engagement, the personal rapport between Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and India’s strategic concessions yielding benefits for the US.

Trump, often described as a transactional leader, doesn’t operate from a “grand theory” of foreign policy. Instead, he tends to evaluate relationships based on tangible benefits for the US. In this context, India’s primary offering is its expanding economy. The country’s recent growth trajectory, particularly the burgeoning middle class, holds significant interest for a leader focused on economic outcomes.

In 2017, Trump said, “Since India opened its economy, it has seen astonishing growth and a new world of opportunities for its expanding middle class.” This economic growth presented opportunities for US firms to sell to Indian companies and attract Indian investment into the US. This dynamic was evident during Trump’s first meeting with Modi in 2017: SpiceJet finalized a $10 billion deal with Boeing for over 100 aircraft, and the US agreed to sell $2 billion worth of Predator drones to the Indian military. Trump publicly commended New Delhi for these agreements.

Subsequent meetings between Modi and Trump consistently emphasized trade deals and investments. New Delhi, similar to strategies employed by other nations, highlighted India’s investments in the US and significant defense purchases, aligning with Trump’s focus on economic wins.

Despite significant differences in personality and background, Trump appeared to hold Modi in high regard. Trump has referred to Modi as “India’s Elvis” and one of the US’s “greatest friends.” Notably, Modi was the first leader Trump hosted for a working dinner at the White House in 2017. Trump also lauded Modi for his “tremendous accomplishments,” praise not typically bestowed on many other world leaders. Critics suggest Trump admires Modi’s “populist strongman” persona. Trump himself alluded to this dynamic in a 2024 podcast interview, describing Modi as a “good guy” who could nevertheless be “a real pain in the ass,” specifically referencing Modi’s firm stance regarding Pakistan.

Modi, in turn, demonstrated adeptness in managing the relationship. Large-scale events like the 2019 “Howdy Modi!” rally in Texas and the 2020 “Namaste Trump” event in India, both drawing massive crowds, clearly impressed Trump. He praised Modi as one of “America’s greatest and most loyal friends” and pledged that, if re-elected, India would “have no better friend” than the US. Trump might also view strong ties with Modi as beneficial for garnering support among Indian-Americans.

The third factor involves strategic concessions from India, resulting in perceived gains for the US. New Delhi strategically yielded on certain issues prioritized by Trump.

Illegal immigration serves as one example.

While the deportation of undocumented Indian immigrants from the US sparked some public discontent in India, the Indian government maintained a low-key response. Officially, it condemned illegal immigration and signaled its willingness to accept deportees without significant obstruction.

India also reduced tariffs on certain US products, including motorcycles and agricultural goods, addressing Trump’s vocal complaints about high Indian import duties.

New Delhi calculated that these concessions would satisfy key Trump demands. These moves were not without reciprocal benefits for India, however. Trump facilitated India’s access to high-end defense technology. He also appeared receptive to Indian priorities, such as combating Khalistani separatist groups operating in the US, and reportedly agreed to the extradition of Tahawwur Rana, sought by India in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Recapping the first Trump term, the US became India’s largest trading partner, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was revitalized, and Washington adopted a more assertive stance towards China. Furthermore, there was minimal US interference in India’s domestic politics. This latter point—minimal interference in India’s internal affairs—is particularly significant for New Delhi.

From New Delhi’s perspective, these outcomes suggest that “India’s game plan for Trump” is largely effective.

The potential extradition of Tahawwur Rana, sought by India as a key figure in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks (2008), represents a major Indian objective in bilateral discussions. Securing US agreement for his extradition has been a long-standing Indian demand. Joint statements often include commitments to take “decisive action” against groups threatening India’s security, which India interprets as progress on the Khalistan issue.

Discussions often include potential US commitments to streamline defense sales to India, possibly involving reviews of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which govern defense exports. Exploratory talks regarding a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement, which could open the US defense market to Indian companies, are also a recurring theme. Such developments, facilitating access to advanced defense technology, are viewed as significant gains by India.

However, these potential gains for India are often counterbalanced by US trade demands.

For years, Donald Trump has complained about high Indian tariffs on US goods. Addressing these complaints, discussions often revolve around negotiating a new bilateral trade agreement (distinct from a comprehensive free trade agreement) aimed at granting US companies enhanced market access, potentially with target dates like late 2025. The stated ambition includes finalizing such an agreement and boosting bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030, more than doubling current levels.

Meanwhile, while the US already sells billions in oil and gas to India, a key objective for a potential second Trump administration would likely be reducing the significant trade deficit (around $50 billion) by increasing these sales further. A renewed energy partnership could position the US as one of India’s top energy suppliers.

Thus, the dynamic involves India potentially gaining access to more US defense technology while facing pressure to purchase more US energy.

However, India’s willingness to significantly increase US energy imports beyond symbolic amounts likely hinges on competitive pricing, especially compared to discounted supplies available from sources like Russia.

Nevertheless, India is already a substantial and growing customer for US goods. Imports from the US have increased significantly in recent years (e.g., by $3 billion in one recent period), with crude oil being the top commodity by value since 2019. Furthermore, New Delhi highlights its $40 billion investment in the US in recent years, supporting approximately 500,000 American jobs. New Delhi can leverage these existing purchases and substantial investments to counter pressure for further increases in imports from the US. These activities may have also helped prevent the trade deficit from widening further. Additionally, India can argue that its defense posture and role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region align with and advance US interests, potentially mitigating pressure to buy more US arms. India’s naval operations in Middle Eastern waters to protect shipping and its efforts to supply missiles to Southeast Asian nations as a counterweight to China further bolster this argument.

Modi has also pledged cooperation in combating illegal immigration to the US, targeting human trafficking networks. Given the political sensitivity of illegal immigration in the US, such cooperation helps assure Washington that India respects US concerns on this front.

Other potential areas of discussion or agreement include the US offer of the F-35 fighter jet, coinciding with India’s search for a 5th generation aircraft, and joint calls for Pakistan to prevent its territory from being used for terrorism.

Early in Trump’s first term, Modi was among the first world leaders hosted, following only the leaders of Israel, Japan, and Jordan—all close US allies. This sequencing signaled the importance the Trump administration placed on the US-India partnership, although immediate, concrete results were not necessarily expected at that early stage. Nevertheless, initiatives like the announced “US-India COMPACT for the 21st Century (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Trade and Technology)” aim to provide a framework for strengthening the partnership.

However, significant uncertainties requiring attention persist, particularly regarding the handling of undocumented migrants and the provision of sanctions waivers. Specifically, the implications of a potential Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, including potential reluctance to grant sanctions waivers, remain unclear for India’s strategic Chabahar port project.

Finally, India’s strategies for navigating potential trade disputes under Trump have faced criticism for being reactive or insufficient. Critics argue that some measures, such as concessions on tariffs, appear aimed at short-term appeasement rather than long-term strategic positioning, seemingly uncharacteristic of New Delhi’s usual approach. The “Make in India” initiative, designed to boost domestic manufacturing, serves as another example. Despite initial enthusiasm and Trump’s apparent support for India as a manufacturing alternative to China, its overall success has been limited, potentially dampening initial US optimism. While progress is evident in sectors like mobile phones and pharmaceuticals, broader success remains elusive. In many other sectors, competitors, especially China, present formidable challenges. More significantly, inadequate infrastructure remains a major impediment to the “Make in India” goals. Consequently, India appears to be falling short of its initial ambitions in this area. In other words, it seems that Delhi still has a long way to go.

Amid fluctuating global trade dynamics, New Delhi, prioritizing the US relationship for strategic reasons, is actively negotiating multiple bilateral trade agreements (reportedly seven). These aim to bolster India’s economic standing and tackle market access and production hurdles. Concessions are expected to vary across agreements based on strategic considerations. The political capital invested and positive rhetoric surrounding these negotiations signal a departure from past skepticism, partly driven by pressures like Trump’s focus on tariffs.

Characteristically pragmatic, New Delhi focuses on mitigating immediate risks and protecting existing market shares in both goods and services. While maintaining market share is crucial, the ultimate objective remains growth. Acknowledging India’s achievements is fair, yet its manufacturing expansion efforts have arguably fallen short of potential.

And yet, despite these challenges, the India-US relationship appears fundamentally robust.

Recent remarks by Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar offer insight:

Jaishankar stated, “Many of Trump’s priorities are working for us.”

He added, “We believe that working with the US to strengthen the international financial and economic system should be a priority.”

Furthermore, Jaishankar observed, “The US is moving towards multipolarity and that suits India.”

At 11:00 p.m. local time on March 20, I boarded Yemen Airways flight IY647, which took off in the rain from Queen Alia International Airport in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Meanwhile, air raid sirens were once again sounding in Israel to the west, as it was reported that the Yemeni Houthi forces had launched missiles at Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city, which were successfully intercepted. More than two hours later, the Boeing aircraft carrying nearly 200 passengers flew at low altitude over the brightly lit Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and landed safely. Our local hosts drove us through long city roads to finally settle at the Shaba Hotel. With Ramadan more than halfway through, this mysterious Arab capital at the frontlines of war was at its liveliest and most bustling time of day. There were no signs of war — perhaps the night had masked the smoke and devastation of the battlefield. On the surface, the infrastructure in Sana’a appeared so outdated that it reminded me of Gaza, Palestine, where I was stationed 25 years ago.

In the early morning of the 21st, the Houthi forces claimed they had launched a “Palestine-2” hypersonic missile at Israel the previous day, successfully striking a military target south of Tel Aviv. It’s truly surprising that the Houthis — often dubbed the “slipper army” — are now capable of producing hypersonic missiles themselves. It’s a testament to the rapid advancement and widespread accessibility of modern technology. What was once exclusive to major world powers no longer holds a monopoly, evoking the sense of “the swallows of yesteryear’s noble halls now nesting among common folk.”

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree emphasized that this was the second missile attack launched from Yemen on Israeli territory within 24 hours. Observers noted that this was also the Houthis’ first strike on Israeli soil following Israel’s renewed airstrikes and partial ground raids in Gaza — actions that have already caused nearly a thousand Palestinian deaths.

Just prior to the attack on Israel, the Houthis had engaged in a direct confrontation with the U.S. Red Sea fleet — again sparked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On March 7, the Houthis warned Israel that if humanitarian aid restrictions on Gaza were not lifted within four days, they would resume attacks on ships entering or exiting Israeli ports through the Red Sea. This coincided with the second round of ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas stalling. On the 10th, before the Houthi deadline expired, Israel preemptively announced a cutoff of electricity to Gaza to pressure Hamas. Consequently, the Houthis resumed their Red Sea ship attacks.

The Houthis’ support for Hamas and advocacy for the Palestinian cause naturally angered the U.S., which unconditionally backs Israel. Between March 15 and 19, under orders from President Trump, the U.S. launched its largest recent air assault on Houthi positions via the USS *Harry S. Truman* carrier group in the Red Sea, targeting their radar, air defense, missile, and drone systems. The strikes extended over Sana’a, the Red Sea city of Hodeidah, and the Houthi stronghold in Saada province near the western border. In response, the Houthis launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against U.S. naval targets.

Amid all this, Israel swiftly resumed large-scale air and ground assaults on Gaza, reclaiming the “Netzarim Corridor,” which cuts off north-south traffic within the Gaza Strip. According to U.S. and Israeli media, Israel had informed the U.S. in advance of its plans to reignite conflict in Gaza and received open support from the Trump administration. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the assault was “just the beginning.” With the renewal of conflict, the far-right factions that had exited Israel’s coalition government announced their return. Analysts believe Netanyahu is deliberately reigniting war to hinder the next phase of ceasefire talks, thereby preserving his fragile coalition, prolonging his political life, and avoiding accountability for the severe consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood attack that had previously rocked Israel.

Before Trump returned to power, with Hamas and Hezbollah suffering heavy blows—especially after the unexpected fall of the Damascus regime—the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean underwent significant changes. The year-long “Sixth Middle East War” seemed to be nearing its end, and the focus of both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States, the Arab world, and even the international community shifted toward the multidimensional reconstruction of Gaza. The Houthi forces even temporarily suspended their attacks on Israeli targets in the Red Sea region. However, the failure of the second round of ceasefire negotiations over Gaza and the outbreak of renewed fighting suggest that the “Sixth Middle East War” has not truly ended but has simply moved past an intermission and entered a new phase—with a change in the main battlefield and primary adversaries.

From Israel’s perspective, after more than a year of intense southern offensives, the Israeli military has essentially crushed Hamas. Following two months of focused campaigns in the north, it not only severely weakened Hezbollah but also unexpectedly caused the collapse of the Assad regime, leading to the complete fall of the northwest wing of the “Shiite Crescent.” The key goal of the third phase is to eliminate Hamas’s presence in Gaza entirely, and with the help of the United States, strike hard at the Houthis and Iran, both of whom strongly support Hamas.

From Hamas’s point of view, although it has lost most of its leadership and main combat forces, and the Palestinian people have paid a tremendous price, it has not lost its political foundation or its legitimacy in the struggle. Hamas remains the irreplaceable governing force in Gaza. After the first phase ceasefire, Hamas quickly mobilized thousands of police and security personnel to maintain public order—demonstrating its remaining strength and unwillingness to exit the political and historical stage. It is eager to remain in Gaza under the banners of “legitimate resistance” and the “Palestinian cause,” and participate in the political, security, and economic reconstruction of Gaza in this new era.

From the U.S. perspective, Trump does not want to be permanently tied to Israel’s war chariot. Yet, based on national interests, personal ties, and religious beliefs, he has no choice but to shield and support Netanyahu’s government and Israel. Therefore, Trump introduced the “Clear Gaza” plan to pressure the Palestinians and the Arab world. He has also launched heavy strikes on the Houthis to ease Israel’s burden, while publicly warning and threatening Iran—the so-called “ultimate backer”—in an attempt to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cool down the Middle East, and ultimately reduce America’s involvement in the region.

From Iran’s perspective, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” has led to two direct confrontations with Israel, nearly dragging the entire country into full-scale war. It has also seen severe setbacks for the twin geopolitical drivers of the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance.” Iran has suffered a historic political and diplomatic defeat, with more than forty years of investment and influence—especially since the Arab Spring—lost almost overnight. This could undermine the legitimacy of its policies and governance. Over the past few months, Iran has maintained a hardline diplomatic stance—emphasizing support for Palestine and issuing warnings to Israel and the U.S.—which in turn has provoked Israel and the U.S. to “press their advantage” and try to defeat both the “Shiite Crescent” and “Axis of Resistance” through the Gaza war.

From the Houthis’ point of view, since their original goal was to establish an Iranian-style regime, they naturally adopted Iran’s political and diplomatic discourse. That means they must raise the Palestinian banner and align themselves with the Palestinian narrative to overcome the inherent disadvantages of being a Shiite militia. However, the Houthis also possess a level of confidence in their discourse that Iran lacks—because both Palestinians and Yemenis (including the Houthi tribes) are ethnically Arab. For a long time after their uprising began, the Houthis were preoccupied with survival and unable to involve themselves in other causes. Since the outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2014 and their rise in power, the Houthis remained focused on fighting the internationally recognized Yemeni government—backed by Saudi Arabia and the “Islamic Ten”—and had no capacity to engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now, with the Houthis gradually controlling one-third of the country’s territory, two-thirds of its population and Red Sea coast, and major cities like Sana’a and Hodeidah—and having developed cruise missiles and drones capable of striking deep into Saudi Arabia and the UAE—their leaders’ vision has clearly expanded. Their ambitions have grown, and their geopolitical appetite is no longer what it used to be. Thus, after Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” offensive in October 2023, the Houthis responded with military actions, officially joining the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” opening a new front in the Red Sea outside the Eastern Mediterranean theater—forming the southern battlefield of the ‘Sixth Middle East War.’

From a certain perspective, the Houthi forces—who firmly believe that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”—see their vast desert homeland of Yemen, full of tribes and known for its simple yet tough customs, as a second Afghanistan. With confidence in their military capabilities, they believe that the United States would never dare to send hundreds of thousands of troops for a ground invasion. Instead, the U.S. can only rely on long-range airstrikes, which not only do not harm the Houthis’ survival foundation, but actually serve as a form of publicity—elevating the Houthis in global public opinion as a new bastion of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism. This strengthens their political legitimacy, the perceived justness of their struggle, and the necessity of unifying governance and the state.

Although the Houthi movement rarely publicly links its support for the Palestinian cause, concern for Palestinian suffering, and promotion of the Palestinian narrative directly to its own ideals and ambitions, it can be inferred that such large-scale actions—at the risk of drawing fire and becoming enemies of Israel and the U.S.-led Western allies—are actually intended to force the international community, especially the Arab League, to recognize its effective governance in Yemen. It seeks acknowledgment of its leadership role in Yemen’s political reconstruction and a withdrawal of support for the exiled government. Even if the world does not accept a new Houthi-led regime acting alone, it should at least support a coalition government led by the Houthis—thus ending over a decade of war in Yemen and bringing stability to the Red Sea region.

From this angle, war and peace in Gaza are not just private matters between Palestine and Israel; they are part of the broader political dynamics of the Middle East—and even global politics. Resolving this complex chain of issues is no easy task. But at the very least, achieving a ceasefire in Gaza could deprive surrounding nations and political factions of their excuses and leverage, giving Middle Eastern leaders space to focus on key issues like development, cooperation, and prosperity.

As for the Houthis’ control over much of ancient Yemen—once known as the “Happy Land”—the country remains one of the poorest and most underdeveloped in the world. The Houthi forces have poured significant funds into developing missiles, drones, and various military technologies to “rescue” Palestinians hundreds of kilometers away, while their own people continue to live below the poverty line. This is not a choice any leader with national responsibility should make in terms of priorities. However, for revolutionaries and revolutionary parties, seizing nationwide power and establishing a unified government is likely their most urgent political desire and mission. The Houthi movement and its leaders can hardly resist the immense temptation of political power.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.