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Developments in the Middle East and opportunities for Türkiye in a multipolar world

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Multipolarity has begun to take hold all over the world at a pace that exceeds predictions. As an analyst who has been arguing for years that the unipolar world order under American hegemony would be balanced rapidly, I am happy to see that my predictions have not proven me wrong. Yet I must accept that I could not have foreseen that the effects of the new world order would emerge so rapidly in almost every part of the world. For example, many analysts, not just me, could not foresee that a considerable number of countries from many parts of the world would be so resistant to the impositions of the Collective West, either because they see the end of the US-centered unipolarity coming or because they want it to end. While I think/express that moving away from the U.S. dollar in foreign trade would be an expected development, I must admit that I did not expect it to be materialized in such concrete steps.

THE IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA DÉTENTE: CHINA’S DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS

One of the most important developments that I did not foresee was the starting of the comprehensive normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, thanks to China’s mediation. For decades, relations between Iran, on the eastern side of the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia, on the West Bank, have been an area of bitter rivalry. These tense and at times hostile relations were not a phenomenon that emerged with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. For instance, even in the 1960s and 70s, when both Iran and Saudi Arabia were very, very close friends/allies of the United States, relations between the two states were extremely tense and competitive. When the Shah of Iran wanted to build a large and powerful army, the U.S. told him, “Take what you want, except nuclear,” while Saudi Arabia, which was in competition with Iran in those years, continued to be America’s very close regional ally. While Iran under Shah established fairly close relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia was an active member of the Egyptian-led anti-Israel Arab Bloc countries until Nasser took a direct part in the Yemen civil war against it.

The Islamic Revolution (1979) further deepened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. During the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), which lasted eight years due to Khomeini’s policy of ‘exporting the revolution’, Arab countries, which had previously had disagreements among themselves due to many issues, came together to form a united front against Tehran. Despite Iran’s gradual abandonment of its regime-export policies after Khomeini’s death, and despite occasional efforts at normalization between Tehran and Riyadh, the crisis of trust between Saudi Arabia and Iran has persisted. The policies pursued by the United States after its invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran’s efforts to gain influence by interfering in the internal affairs of both Iraq and the Gulf Arab countries, made the crisis of trust between Riyadh and Tehran permanent. America and its allies, who want to keep the Iranian leadership under constant pressure, have done their best to keep this crisis of trust perpetuated. On the one hand, they have sold large quantities of arms to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates, while on the other hand, they have tried to bring these countries closer to Israel and create a common front against Iran by claiming that they are protecting them against Iran. Admittedly, these policies have served American and Israeli interests in the Middle East for decades.

The fact that the normalization of the Riyadh-Tehran line with the help of Chinese diplomacy seems to have a positive outcome, despite the fact that it is conditional on Iran’s non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the Gulf, especially those with Shia Arab populations (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) and its willingness to compromise in the Yemeni civil war (this also applies to the Saudis), means that the order that America has established in this region for decades will be disrupted. Saudi Arabia’s move away from the U.S. dollar in oil sales seems to herald a completely different milestone. The first visible consequence of all this is that U.S. influence in the Middle East is beginning to decline. It will be necessary to keep a close eye on how this will affect Israel’s policies in the region, because even though the Arab countries that have normalized their relations with Iran are concerned about Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, they will not act as Israel’s natural allies against Iran in the short and medium term.

AS SYRIA RE-ENTERS THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM…

Another area where the decline of U.S. regional influence and prestige, which is already a result that can be expected as the world evolves into multipolarity, is clearly seen is the Syrian issue. The Arab countries are normalizing their relations with Damascus one after the other; it seems that there are not many states in the region that take seriously America’s oppression and blackmail aimed at isolating Syria. Expecting Syria to join the Arab League in a short period of time is now a very realistic scenario. Almost no country in the region takes seriously the U.S. sanctions that condemn the Syrian people to hunger and poverty, and there is a global consensus that the Damascus administration has won the war, even though the U.S. and Western states do not officially admit it…

Türkiye’s comprehensive recovery moves in its foreign policy over the last two and a half years will enable it to adapt to the extraordinary developments and new balances in the region today. For example, if we thought for a moment that we were in tense/stormy relations with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, Greece and even France to the extent that we could enter an armed conflict at almost any moment, as in the second half of 2020, we would be extremely staggered by what happened today. We have taken relations with all the states except Greece and Syria to the point where they should be again, and we have clearly declared our will to normalize relations with Damascus.

The lack of sufficient progress on Syria, despite President Erdoğan’s repeated calls for normalization since early August 2022, may be related to the fact that some stereotypes in the minds of our institutions and senior officials have become obsessions. For example, the statements of senior officials such as the political settlement process, the new constitution, and the reconciliation of the opposition and the ‘Syrian regime’ reflect a perspective that does not want to accept the fact that Syria has won this war. Aside from the impossibility of imposing a new constitution on Syria, which has a national-unitary structure, it is not possible to understand the insistence on these theses when it is clear that even if such an attempt is successful, it will drag the neighboring country into a federal structure and will be the beginning of the division in a world where ethnic/sectarian federations are collapsing or cracking, and it will be possible for the PKK/PYD to become a state in the east of the Euphrates. As we discussed in detail in our previous article in Harici (https://harici.com.tr/suriye-ile-normallesme-hem-kolay-hem-de-cok-zor/), normalization with Syria is both very easy and very difficult.

It all starts with adopting a policy based on national interest and accepting the existing facts. When we put aside policies that are both wrong/erroneous and do not serve the national interest, such as imposing a constitution on Syria, the right options will emerge. In the normalization process, which has not progressed sufficiently due to the bureaucracy’s foot-dragging for months, at least the fact that top officials no longer insistently use poisonous/repellent words such as reconciliation between the regime, the opposition and the regime, the constitution and the political solution process can be considered an important and positive start. It seems that the problem is now centered on Syria’s demand for guarantees that we should withdraw from territory under Turkish control, as has been widely hyped in the media. This is again a question of whether to accept the existing facts. Since we have not gone to Syria to conquer territory, we should withdraw. The problem can be solved by setting a realistic timetable and integrating these regions into Syrian sovereignty step by step while Turkish security forces are there. If Türkiye adopts a policy of sending the refugees, jointly fighting terrorism on the basis of the Adana agreement (both the PKK/PYD and its derivatives and terrorist organizations against Syria) and ensuring that the TRNC is recognized by Damascus…

In a multipolar world, we will need nuanced foreign policies in the Middle East, as in many other regions. For example, to show that while we have good relations with Israel, on the other hand, we will not be part of the competition/hostility policies of this country against Iran or the ideological based anti-Israelism of the Tehran administration while we are in close relations with Iran… To establish as close economic and political relations as possible with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States while at the same time benefiting from their normalization process with Iran and trying to improve our foreign trade and economic relations with all these states… While expressing the legitimate rights of Palestinians and providing political/diplomatic support to the demands of the Arab states for Palestinians from Israel, to achieve this without breaking the connection with Israel… And to strive mainly for the Middle East to be a region of peace and stability, within which Türkiye will provide the most benefits in terms of trade and investment. A foreign policy based on these nuances will make Türkiye strong in the region, while isolating Greece and forcing Athens to gradually move away from its maximalist demands because of the decline in the power of the United States and the Collective West. There is no doubt that Türkiye has more than enough power and human resources to do so.

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Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

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As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.

Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.

When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.

It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”

The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction

An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.

A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.

The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.

If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.

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An assault on the Axis of Resistance: The Israeli escalation against Iran and its impact on Palestine and Gaza

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Khaled al-Yamani, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Events in the region are accelerating as if we are on the brink of a new political and security earthquake, led by the direct confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist entity, under blatant American complicity. This confrontation, though it appears to be military and security-based, is in essence a major war targeting the entire project of resistance — from Tehran to Gaza.

Latest escalation: Aggressive maneuvers in the name of ‘Israeli security’

The Zionist entity launched an aerial assault targeting military sites deep within Iranian territory. Under recycled pretexts — related to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — “Israel” continues its strikes, not only against Tehran, but also against its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

But what’s happening isn’t just “preemptive strikes” as Western media claims — it is the continuation of a long war waged by the United States and “Israel” against the Axis of Resistance, aiming to break the balance of deterrence established by Iran and its allies after years of strategic patience and military development.

America and Israel: One goal behind false slogans

This escalation cannot be separated from direct American direction. The Biden administration, though claiming to seek de-escalation, in practice provides full political, military, and intelligence cover for this aggression.

The goal is clear: to dismantle the Axis of Resistance and deprive Iran of any ability to support its allies — first and foremost, the Palestinian resistance factions.

The U.S. administration knows that Iran’s strength does not lie solely in its nuclear program, but in its presence in the regional equation — from Lebanon to Iraq to Palestine. Therefore, striking Iran means breaking the backbone of the Jerusalem Axis.

What does Gaza and Palestine have to do with this?

Any attack on Iran is, by extension, an attack on Gaza. What is plotted in Tehran reflects immediately in the alleys of Khan Younis and the Jabalia refugee camp. The rockets that overwhelmed the Israeli army during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle would not have reached the resistance without decades of accumulated Iranian support.

Now, the Zionist entity — with American backing — seeks to cut off the lifeline to Palestine and destroy the support network Iran has built for the resistance, whether in weapons, knowledge, or training.

Thus, striking Iran is not separate from the ongoing aggression on Gaza; it is a direct extension of it, and part of the suffocating siege aimed at weakening the Palestinian people’s ability to endure and resist.

The Axis of Resistance: Unity of fronts and a shared fate

The new equation imposed by the Axis of Resistance after the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle — and later the “Al-Aqsa Flood” — has become a nightmare for the enemy: the unity of fronts. No longer is Gaza alone, or the southern suburbs alone, or Sanaa alone.

Hence, the Zionist entity is now trying to preempt any emerging united front by striking at the center — Iran — before a full-scale confrontation erupts that could spell the end of “Israel” as we know it.

Conclusion: The battle continues… and Palestine remains the heart

We are facing a pivotal moment in the history of this struggle. The enemy seeks to paralyze the Axis of Resistance at its strategic core and turn the conflict into a fight for survival. Yet the Axis today is stronger than ever.

Despite the wounds, Gaza remains at the heart of this confrontation. The battle is not just being fought in Iranian territory or over the skies of Lebanon and Syria — it is being fought over the future of Palestine, from the river to the sea.

Therefore, it is the duty of all the free people of the world, and all honest journalists, to speak the truth.

If Israel emerges victorious from its ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of that victory will not be limited to Tehran or the Axis of Resistance alone. Rather, they will extend to impact the entire regional balance of power — with Türkiye’s role at the center of that shift.

An Israeli victory would, in effect, cement its dominance as an unchallengeable military force in the Middle East, fully backed by the United States. This would open the door to a new phase of political interference and pressure, especially against regional powers that still maintain a degree of independent decision-making — chief among them, Türkiye.

Türkiye, which seeks to maintain an independent and balanced role between East and West, and whose interests are intertwined with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, would come under increasing pressure to reposition itself according to Israeli-American terms. It may find itself facing two options: either submit to the new regional equation, or enter an unwanted political — and possibly security — confrontation.

From this perspective, what is happening in Tehran today is not isolated from what could happen in Ankara tomorrow. If Iran falls as an independent regional power, Türkiye may be next in line.

The assault on Iran is an assault on Palestine. Defending Tehran is defending Jerusalem.

This battle has strategic implications not only for the Palestinian cause and the Axis of Resistance against Zionist-American hegemony, but its outcomes will extend across the entire region — particularly affecting major regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.

If Iran stands firm and emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will strengthen the role of these countries in resisting Zionist arrogance and domination. One could even say that such a victory may bring an end to Zionist hegemony over the region and, as a result, weaken American influence as well.

It would allow these countries to become more independent and distant from U.S. control, which seeks to turn the peoples of the region into subjects by dividing them into warring sects and identities. Therefore, solidarity among these countries at this moment is one of the key elements of victory — and a potential beginning of liberation from Zionist-American domination.


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Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

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Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.

However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.

The US Can’t Be Bypassed

China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.

However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.

This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.

For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.

Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.

Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.

Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite

Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.

When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.

Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.

Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.

Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.

The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.

Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.

However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.

Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions

Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.

This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.

All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.

Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.

Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.

This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.

But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.

In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.

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