In 2024, China’s economic recovery still appeared sluggish, falling short of the expectations of many observers. However, on the other hand, China remains the world’s largest growth engine from a global perspective.

More importantly, China finally made some long-awaited decisions or witnessed certain shifts in circumstances. While these actions may seem belated, they are by no means too late.

1. Timely Adjustments to Economic and Financial Policies

In 2024, China introduced a series of accommodative economic and financial policies, including lowering the reserve requirement ratio, increasing infrastructure investment, and supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.

The stock market quickly rebounded, real estate in major cities stabilized, the manufacturing PMI returned to expansion, and the consumer market gradually recovered.

It remains uncertain whether confidence in the capital markets has been fully restored. However, given that by year-end the government reintroduced the concept of a “moderately loose monetary policy” for the first time in 14 years, 2025 holds promising prospects.

Had these policies been implemented immediately after the pandemic, their effects might have been even greater. Yet the negative consequences of excessive quantitative easing in finance policies in the West have often been described in China using the idiom “drinking poison to quench thirst.”

Considering this, the Communist Party of China’s hesitation is understandable. Fortunately, the shift did not come too late.

2. Prudent and Gradual Implementation of Delayed Retirement Policy

Another issue with far-reaching implications is China’s approach to delayed retirement. Many long-time China observers are aware that transitioning a population of 1.4 billion into an aging society poses a colossal challenge.

With birth rates continuing to decline, the so-called demographic dividend is vanishing, and the pressure on the pension system is mounting.

In recent years, delayed retirement has been widely discussed in Chinese society. Although, like people in other countries, most Chinese are not eager to work longer, the implementation of delayed retirement is inevitable.

Thanks to extensive public discussions and the Communist Party’s consideration of diverse opinions, the gradual reforms have been broadly accepted, avoiding the political deadlocks or street protests seen in some developed countries.

The Communist Party could have implemented this reform earlier and more decisively, but the widespread discussions increased public acceptance. This delay, therefore, has its own value.

3. Strategic Breakthroughs in Regional Diplomacy

China also witnessed long-awaited shifts in regional diplomatic dynamics.

Amid a complex geopolitical environment, China fundamentally sought to ease relations with Japan, India, and Australia, allowing it to focus on domestic affairs and competition with the United States. However, unlike the first two areas, this required “cooperation” from other countries.

On one hand, the changes of this year are the result of China’s consistent efforts through a mix of soft and hard policies; on the other hand, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president also played a role. Finally, these countries have noticeably adjusted their stances toward China.

The Sino-Indian border issue was once again effectively managed, Japan’s foreign minister made positive statements toward China, and Sino-Australian relations, after some turbulence, returned to normalcy, benefiting both economies. These diplomatic breakthroughs have created a more favorable regional environment for China.

It would have been better if these changes had happened earlier, but the current outcomes are still quite satisfying.

It is worth mentioning that, on the anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth in late 2024, China test-flew two new fighter jets, believed to be the world’s first two sixth-generation fighters. This groundbreaking event placed China ahead of the West in advanced fighter technology.

On the same day, AI company DeepSeek officially launched the first version of its new model series, DeepSeek-V3, and simultaneously made it open source. Among open-source models, its test performance ranked first, matching closed-source large models in many aspects, and its computational cost is reportedly “only 1/100 of GPT-4.”

Had these achievements emerged earlier, they might have prompted the United States to more seriously consider how to engage in equal dialogue and “healthy competition” with China.

But even now, it’s not too late—especially before the new U.S. president takes office. Perhaps he will understand.

2024 is about to become history, and the year will certainly stand out as a period marked by turmoil, thrilling events, and unexpected developments—a year of upheaval fitting the natural attributes of the Chinese zodiac’s Year of the Dragon. In Chinese culture, the dragon, one of the 12 zodiac signs, symbolizes the emperor, a harbinger of good fortune, and a super beast full of vitality that can stir the seas and skies. In Western culture, however, the dragon represents ominous forces, possessing great power but also destructive and potentially devastating tendencies. Reflecting the nature of the Year of the Dragon, 2024 has witnessed a series of political maneuvers and conflicts across the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, casting a bloody and shadowy tone over the world, foreshadowing more unrest and uncertainty in the coming year.

Trump’s Triumphant Return Sparks Global Anxiety

The biggest surprise and risk of 2024 was the U.S. presidential election and the unexpected, forceful comeback of former President Donald Trump. The Democratic Party, which had governed for just four years, replaced President Joe Biden with Vice President Kamala Harris in the race, but this did little to hinder Trump and the Republican Party’s overwhelming momentum. After surviving an assassination attempt, Trump stunned the world by reclaiming the White House with a decisive victory. The Republican Party also achieved a rare feat, gaining control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the Supreme Court.

Having already experienced the “fierce” leadership style of Trump, the world now faces an even more assertive and confident “Trump 2.0,” with the U.S. consolidating power under one party, increasingly shaped by Trump’s influence. Trump’s return to office is expected to lead to the U.S. withdrawing from international multilateral organizations and treaties, such as the WHO, the Paris Climate Agreement, and UNESCO, disrupting the global governance system. Trump’s “America First” and “America Above All” policies will likely result in steep tariffs on trade partners and pressure on security allies to significantly increase their military spending. Trump may also undermine U.S. post-WWII transatlantic and transpacific alliances, potentially damaging the so-called “Pax Americana.” Trump’s comments about making Canada the 51st state, the necessity of owning Greenland from Denmark, and regaining control of the Panama Canal have left these nations feeling uneasy and tense.

Russia-Ukraine War Tilts in Favor of Russia 

After nearly three years, the Russia-Ukraine war is now clearly favoring Russia. As the conflict extends into its third year, Russia has transitioned from a strategic defensive position to an all-out offensive, consolidating control in the south and expanding its dominance in the Donbas region, forcing the Ukrainian army into retreat. Russia continues to target Ukraine’s infrastructure, aiming to demoralize both the Ukrainian military and civilian population. Despite ongoing aid from the U.S. and Europe, Ukraine suffers heavy losses, particularly in manpower, making it difficult to sustain prolonged warfare.

With Trump set to return to office and his opposition to prolonging the war, the U.S. policy of supporting Ukraine’s war of attrition is losing ground. Ukraine’s government is now faced with the possibility of losing U.S. support, prompting President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior officials to openly acknowledge their inability to reclaim lost territories. There is increasing openness to peace talks, even if it means ceding land. More Western leaders are beginning to believe that the war could reach a ceasefire by 2025.

Political Crises in Germany and France Challenge European Unity

 One of the year’s surprises was the domestic crises in Germany and France, the two engines of the European Union. In Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s dismissal of Finance Minister Christian Lindner of the Free Democratic Party led to internal conflict, resulting in a successful no-confidence vote in the Bundestag. This forced Germany to call early parliamentary elections in February 2025. The root of Germany’s political crisis lies in economic and social issues, including Scholz’s proactive involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, increased defense spending, and value-driven diplomacy aligned with the U.S. The inability to manage immigration, revive the manufacturing sector, and improve social welfare has led to declining public support. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is gaining momentum and may play a role in forming the next government.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to hold early elections in mid-2024 resulted in a surge in far-right popularity, leading to a fragmented parliament and political instability. By December 4, Prime Minister Michel Bayeni, who had been in office for just three months, was ousted by parliament. Ten days later, François Bayrou took over as prime minister, becoming Macron’s sixth prime minister and the fourth within a year. However, Bayrou’s tenure remains uncertain, with approval ratings plummeting to a historic low of 34%.

After Brexit, the EU’s traditional “trio” slimmed down to the “Franco-German duo,” but with political instability and frequent government changes in both countries, European integration and cohesion are severely impacted. This weakens the influence of these cornerstone nations on international affairs. If far-right forces enter ruling coalitions, it will undoubtedly challenge traditional policies in Germany and France, potentially leading to the “fragmentation” of the EU and even a historic regression in the unification process.

The Middle East war was unprecedentedly brutal, leaving multiple losers and one winner

The “Sixth Middle East War” was triggered by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which rapidly spread vertically across the Eastern Mediterranean and horizontally to the Persian Gulf. This created an “eight-front” war, with Israel leading the U.S. in one camp and Iran and Syria aligning with militia forces from Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq in the opposing camp. The war, marked by brutal sieges in Gaza and intense airstrikes in Lebanon, unexpectedly reignited Syria’s civil war, which had been dormant for four years. Even more unexpectedly, this led to the swift collapse of the Syrian regime without major battles.

This hybrid war, interwoven with conventional warfare, guerrilla tactics, shadow wars, proxy conflicts, and high-tech operations, brought shame to modern civilization. Turkey emerged as the sole winner, exploiting the chaos to help topple Bashar al-Assad’s regime. However, all other parties, including Israel and Palestine, ended up as losers. The biggest strategic failures were suffered by Russia and Iran, both of which had deeply influenced Syria. Russia lost its status as a major global player in the Middle East, while Iran’s painstakingly cultivated “Axis of Resistance” and “Shia Crescent” were severely damaged.

Apart from Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria—whose territorial losses to Israel provided some legitimacy to their military actions—other parties engaged in the conflict under the guise of self-defense or Palestinian liberation, pursuing their own interests. This war, the largest in the Middle East since the Cold War, resembled a “Spring and Autumn Unjust War,” driven by ulterior motives.

Former Colonies Assert Independence, France’s Military Fully Withdraws from Africa 

On December 20, France began withdrawing troops from Chad, a Central African nation. Although the withdrawal involved only 120 personnel, it marked a historic step in reducing France’s political and military influence in Africa, as Chad was France’s last military outpost on the continent. New governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—where coups had occurred—had previously expelled French troops, welcoming new allies such as Russia and the U.S.

France, a former colonial ruler of many African nations, had maintained a military presence even after these countries gained independence. This was often justified by counterterrorism efforts and the protection of French interests. France’s intermittent military interventions in Chad had lasted nearly 64 years, peaking at 1,000 troops. Since 2014, France’s counterterrorism operation “Barkhane” in the Sahel region once deployed 5,100 troops. However, as France’s overall power declined and President Macron sought to scale back overseas deployments, African nations’ growing sense of autonomy forced France to gradually retreat.

Failed Coup in South Korea: “Blue House Curse” Strikes Again

East Asia also saw turmoil in 2024. Initially, North Korea’s relations with the South deteriorated rapidly after drones infiltrated Pyongyang. This led to the renewal of a mutual defense alliance between North Korea and Russia, with reports of North Korean troops being sent to the Russia-Ukraine battlefield, creating dual hotspots in East and West.

As global attention focused on the evolving North Korea-Russia relationship, South Korea experienced political upheaval overnight. Plagued by a political crisis, President Yoon Suk-yeol, swayed by advisers practicing fortune-telling, unconstitutionally declared martial law, triggering South Korea’s most severe constitutional crisis since the “June Struggle” of 1987.

Amid global scrutiny, opposition lawmakers broke through martial law lines and entered parliament, overturning Yoon’s decree with a two-thirds majority. This forced Yoon to retract his declaration and publicly apologize. Despite avoiding bloodshed, Yoon fell victim to the so-called “Blue House Curse,” becoming the second sitting president to face impeachment. Although the failed coup highlighted South Korea’s mature democratic processes, it exposed severe partisan strife, paralyzing the nation’s political system.

BRICS and SCO Expand, Global South Continues to Rise

On December 23, Russia, host of the 2024 BRICS Summit, announced that starting January 1, 2025, Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Cuba, Uganda, Malaysia, and Uzbekistan would officially join BRICS as partner countries. This marks another major expansion following last year’s historic enlargement, incorporating nations from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Additionally, 24 other nations remain on the waiting list for membership.

Coincidentally, at the June 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, Belarus’ membership was approved, bringing the total number of full members to 10, alongside two observer states and 14 dialogue partners.

BRICS and the SCO, both initiated by emerging and developing countries, continue to thrive and expand, underscoring the decline of the Western G7 bloc. This reflects the redistribution of political, economic, and trade power, highlighting the shifting balance from West to East and North to South. The Global South’s increasing cooperation and collective pursuit of peace and development symbolize a new vision, offering a rare bright spot in an otherwise turbulent 2024.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

I concluded the first part of this series with the following words:

“In the current situation, an armistice along the line of contact seems inevitable.”

The coming armistice: preparing for a bigger one — 1

The reasoning behind this is straightforward: Ukraine has largely ceased to be an ‘issue’ because it is losing its potential to be one. It has become increasingly evident that Russia will never permit Kiev to join NATO. Moreover, Ukraine’s existing military potential has been significantly depleted. Even if the imperialist bloc were to fully mobilize its productive capacity, it would fail to offset these losses.

On 17 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov revealed that the Kiev regime had received over $350 billion in ‘aid’ from 30 countries since February 2022, with $170 billion allocated for military purposes. Despite this staggering sum, it is no longer sufficient to sustain the fight—let alone secure a victory against Russia.

This reality is universally acknowledged—which is precisely why time is needed for preparation.

‘Preparation’

But preparation for what?

On 13 December, Rutte stated that “there is now neither war nor peace between Russia and the West,” adding that “Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with Ukraine and the West.” The implication is that the West is preparing for war with Russia.

This preparation is no longer concealed at any level. On 25 November, Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, revealed that NATO was discussing “preemptive strikes against high-precision targets” on Russian territory in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO countries. According to Bauer: “The smart thing is not to wait but to hit launchers in Russia if Russia attacks us. A high-precision combined strike to disable the systems that would be used against us is essential—we must strike first.” Furthermore, Bauer called on the “business community” to prepare for a “wartime scenario” and to adjust production and distribution accordingly: “If we can ensure the supply of all critical services and goods, this will be an important part of our deterrence.”

This signifies a complete capitalist reorganization: not deindustrialization but the militarization of industry in Europe. The fact that this call comes not from neoconservative zealots but from military leaders—who typically adopt a more measured approach, primarily because they understand the realities of war—makes it all the more significant. This is not a new plan, nor is it tied to the events of 24 February 2022. The project was already in place as early as September 2021, as the US’s so-called “Reichsführer” in Europe, the “baroness” at the helm of the European Commission, openly stated at the 2023 Munich Conference. However, due to their mediocrity, incompetence, and unpredictability, they failed to execute it effectively. Now, they need time to accelerate this process once again.

Trump’s recent announcement that NATO members should increase their military spending to well above 2% of GDP (reportedly suggesting 3.7%, while The New York Times mentioned 5% last month), if realized, would benefit not only the U.S. but also the European elite. Such a move would be precisely what is needed to expedite this reorganization.

If your opponent is preparing for war, so are you. For some time, Russia has avoided the idea of a conventional war with the West in Europe. At least in its statements, it seemed more likely that any potential conflict with NATO would occur in or around Ukraine. Earlier this month, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that “the actions of the U.S. and other NATO members aimed at escalating the Ukrainian crisis” have increased the likelihood of a direct conflict with NATO. On 16 December, Defence Minister Belousov, after speaking for the first time about the necessity to “fulfil various tasks and maintain a military presence in Central Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and Transnistria,” added: “In the medium term, we must be fully prepared for any development of the situation, including a possible military confrontation with NATO in Europe within the next decade. The decisions taken at the NATO summit last July are preparation for this. This is also reflected in the doctrinal documents of the U.S. and other NATO countries.”

It seems that nearly everyone in their right mind views the prospect of a war between NATO and Russia as increasingly likely. The West, because it is provoking such a conflict—because it needs it. Russia, because it lacks the power to prevent it.

Both sides must undergo significant reorganization. The West must fully militarize its economy. Last year, when Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief (effectively its war minister, succeeding the fascist-leaning Borrell), was prime minister of Estonia, she advocated issuing war bonds using Russia’s frozen assets as collateral. In mid-December, the same Kallas stated that although Russia has a legal right to the assets “seized” by the West, it would not regain them until the funds were used to restore the Kiev regime. She added: “I’m not sure there is anything left of them.” Foreign assets, after all, are based on reputation. They do not need to remain in an account to be traded; they only need to be perceived as valuable. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kallas is not merely indulging in rhetorical excess but is describing the reality of the situation.

As for Russia, its Soviet-era defense complex is so vast and so deeply intertwined with the civilian economy that it does not require reorganization—only improvement and expansion. However, preparing for war demands more than just military readiness. It requires arguments to convince the population of its necessity, individuals capable of defending these arguments, and cadres skilled in executing current tasks. It necessitates reducing income inequality to foster shared values, raising birth rates to ensure societal reproduction and the adequacy of human resources, increasing the output of civilian industry, achieving technological superiority, and maintaining economic independence. This complex process will take time to complete.

In short, a truce is necessary for all sides—not just because Trump desires it. The question is how this will be achieved and whether it will lead to a lasting peace agreement.

Russia’s position

There have been two programmatic statements from the Russian side in the past week.

On 25 December, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov clearly outlined the situation with the West: “Regarding the meaning of the negotiations currently taking place in the West and in Ukraine, we are only talking about an armistice—about allowing the Kiev regime, with the help of the West, to once again consolidate its power and make new attempts to fulfil the instructions of its masters to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia. … We are not satisfied with an armistice; we need reliable, legally binding agreements.” According to Lavrov, these agreements must also address the root causes of the Ukrainian conflict: “Common security in Europe, the enlargement of NATO, the EU’s recent decision to subordinate itself to NATO, and essentially to eliminate all differences between these organisations—including, of course, the rights of people in certain regions who have expressed their desire to unite with Russia.”

The following day, in response to the comment that “Western experts expect the Ukrainian conflict to end in 2025,” Putin remarked: “Your words are dripping with honey” (a Russian expression meaning to speak sweetly or optimistically). He added, “We aim to end the conflict.” However, when asked about plans to freeze the conflict in exchange for a guarantee delaying the Kiev regime’s entry into NATO for 10–20 years, Putin responded: “I don’t know what is being discussed in the current team of the US president-elect. What I do know is that President Biden proposed this to me in 2021. He suggested postponing Ukraine’s entry into NATO for 10–15 years—because Ukraine is not yet ‘ready.’ And I gave him a reasonable answer: Of course, it’s not ready today, but you’ll prepare it and accept it. … What’s the difference for us? Whether it’s today, tomorrow, or 10 years later. I don’t know about the statements of the future team of the president-elect, but in this sense, if such a proposal is made, what is the difference between the current leadership and the ideas you just mentioned? There is no difference. I don’t know how the situation will develop from now on or what instructions the president-elect will give to his administration. Let’s see.”

Thus, Russia’s position can be summarized as follows: It seeks a permanent political agreement, not a temporary ceasefire or armistice. However, a permanent agreement does not exclude temporary armistices. The basis for peace can only be Putin’s ultimatum from July, and nothing else. Ideally, it should include a new security architecture in Europe (with the EU operating independently of NATO), a resolution to the Transnistrian and perhaps Gagauz issues, and a guarantee that NATO will not expand further. The latter includes not only Ukraine but also Moldova and Georgia.

The Western position

I have labeled this section ‘The West,’ but this should not be misunderstood. In August, I wrote in Harici as follows: “The question of a ceasefire should be discussed day and night from Kiev to Washington, from London to Budapest—but not in other European capitals, as they are insignificant, drifting aimlessly like mosquitoes in the wind.” Thus, there are only two meaningful positions in the West: the United States and Britain. Britain aims to extend the war to all its borders and to use Europeans as live ammunition for this purpose. This also appears to be the stance of global finance capital, represented primarily by The City. While this strategy has no chance of ultimate success, that is not its goal; it merely seeks to prolong the conflict for the foreseeable future.

It has become clear that the U.S. will present a scenario with three alternatives. These have been discussed for some time, but the most precise formulation was published on December 6 in the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano. The alternatives are as follows:

1) The partition of Ukraine according to the ‘German model’ and the incorporation into NATO of the regions under the control of the Kiev regime. 2) The second scenario is ‘Israel in Europe’: Ukraine would no longer be a NATO member but would continue to receive military ‘aid.’ 3) An international mission composed of peacekeepers from non-NATO countries such as China and India would be established.

The first alternative is untenable, not only due to Russia’s position but also because of the U.S. determination under Trump to postpone a major conflict with Russia. The second alternative would amount to a continuation of the Minsk deception, while it is the most favorable formula from the U.S. perspective, Russia cannot accept it.

The third alternative appears to be the most viable, but it would only result in a truce. For now, the issue will likely center on the composition of the peacekeeping force. Russia will not accept the participation of NATO countries (with the possible exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia) in such a force. Instead, a contingent could be assembled from the so-called ‘global south.’

One reason for Russia’s emphasis on the third alternative may be to avoid undermining Trump’s position, given his potential role in disrupting the current system.

The ‘triple alliance’ in Kiev

In any case, the current leadership in Kiev must be under immense pressure. It can only survive with Britain’s support, and London is actively working to ensure this. Poroshenko’s recent call to avoid elections in the near future “in order not to weaken the state” is a clear indication of this effort. It seems they are attempting to form a formal or informal coalition consisting of a bankrupt and defunct commander-in-chief, a bankrupt and defunct president, and a bankrupt comedian-turned-president.

The first is a staunch fascist, reckless enough to display Bandera’s portrait behind him when addressing the international press. The second, the so-called ‘chocolate king,’ has also cultivated ‘trusted’ relations with Poland. The third owes his position solely to being the weakest among them (ultimus inter pares). His remarks on military-political matters suggest he may see himself as a modern-day Napoléon I, though, setting aside Napoléon I’s fate, it would be more accurate to describe him as a farcical Napoléon III.

This ‘triple alliance’ is unlikely to materialize, as it is primarily focused on pursuing the first alternative.

What will happen?

From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia set itself three goals: demilitarization, denazification, and ensuring Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO. All three were agreed upon in the Istanbul pre-agreement, which was subsequently rendered worthless—less than toilet paper—at the behest of the U.S. administration and a single visit by Johnson to Kiev. In July, the ‘situation on the ground’ was added, accompanied by Putin’s ultimatum, which was declared in front of the Foreign Affairs coliseum.

The Trump administration’s third alternative poses a challenge for Russia, primarily due to the goal of ‘denazification’ of the regime. By its very nature, this entails the removal of the current leadership in one way or another, preferably through elections. The determination of the ‘chocolate king,’ the comedian, and the bankrupt ‘commander-in-chief’ to avoid holding elections is precisely aimed at preventing this outcome.

So, what will happen? It seems to me that a truce based on the third alternative will be reached by February-March, with elections in Kiev organized in May at the insistence of the U.S.—provided Britain can be overcome as an obstacle. The organization of these elections will be crucial for maintaining the armistice. I doubt Britain’s pressure on the Kiev trio to block the elections will weaken Trump’s resolve. The comedian president in Kiev, who has already been publicly humiliated by Trump Jr. on social media—first by cutting off the dollar flow and then by kicking him out of the frame—is likely well aware of this.

And all of this is to ‘prepare.’